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Abstract  
 
 
This thesis examines the role of space in the work of the German legal and 
political theorist Carl Schmitt (1888-1983). It has two fundamental aims. 
Firstly, to identify what role spatial concepts play in Schmitt's work. Second, 
to examine what relevance Schmitt’s spatial thought might have for thinking 
about the relation between space and politics today. In response to the first 
question the thesis argues that spatial concepts occupy a structural position 
throughout Schmitt’s work that has thus far been overlooked. The central 
claim is that Schmitt understands political order, in the absence of necessary 
foundations, to be fundamentally grounded upon the division of space. The 
division of space allows political relations to be managed within a formal 
framework. However, Schmitt understood this relationship between spatial 
division and political relations to be in crisis in the twentieth century. The 
thesis traces Schmitt's various attempts to address this crisis first within the 
horizon of the state and then on the basis of new global spatial divisions 
beyond the state form. In answering the second question the thesis argues 
that in order to assess the contemporary relevance of Schmitt's spatial 
thought it must be contextualized in relation to both the central concerns of 
his work as a whole and the political contexts within which it emerged. This 
is of particular importance in judging how Schmitt's involvement with 
National Socialism bears on the contemporary value of his thought. In 
conclusion the thesis argues that whilst a critical awareness of his troubling 
past is necessary in approaching Schmitt's work it none-the-less raises 
fundamental questions of enduring relevance. 
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Introduction 
 
 
My interest in Carl Schmitt was born of war.  
 
Like many others, I first encountered Carl Schmitt’s work in the middle years of the last 
decade, at the height of the ‘war on terror’. It seemed during this period that international 
order as I understood it was crumbling. What was most disturbing was that liberal states 
were themselves emerging as the enemies of a peaceful world and the rule of law. The 
language of democracy and the instruments of international law were precisely the means 
by which imperial power was unfurling order from within. Blunt contradictions within 
the situation seemed to exhaust established avenues of protest and warp the old 
coordinates of critique. Schmitt’s thought appeared to cut through this fog. His work 
seemed to speak directly to the tensions of the moment and hit precisely on the raw 
mechanisms of power that had suddenly been revealed. He drew stark conceptual 
distinctions yet remained sensitive to the ultimate contingency of all norms and 
institutions. His stringent realism seemed to dissolve liberal pieties exposing the perverse 
logic of state sovereignty and the duplicity of humanitarianism. The promise of enigmatic 
new paths out of a politically deadlocked present seemed to be held within. Crucially, 
Schmitt’s analysis of political space appeared to offer a key to unlocking the strange 
fusion of brute material force, ideological spin and technological virtuality that had to 
come to characterize the reigning global disorder. But Schmitt was an uncertain friend. 
His sharp insights grew muddy in the light of his past, and slipped through the fingers the 
harder one tried to grasp them. Concepts that first seemed like incisive critical tools 
became double-edged swords that conceded too much ground to opponents. But whilst he 
shifted shape and frequently disappointed, Schmitt raised questions that were neither easy 
to answer nor dismiss.  
 
I have certainly not been alone in looking to this controversial figure for critical 
orientation. The last decade has been witness to an explosion of interest in Schmitt’s 
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thought in a variety of Anglophone debates. In Chapter 1, I examine how scholars from a 
number of disciplines, including Political Theory, International Law, International 
Relations and, more recently, Geography, have turned to Schmitt in search of insights to 
help grasp the nature of the contemporary global politics. During the ‘war on terror’ 
Schmitt’s theorization of the relationship between sovereign power and exceptional 
governance became a frequent source of reference for those attempting to understand the 
mechanisms of state power operating in extra-territorial prisons such as Guantanamo 
Bay. Further, his work was discovered to be the source of startlingly prescient critiques of 
the interventionist foreign policies of the United States, humanitarian warfare and the 
changing relationship between space, law and violence since the First World War. These 
elements of his thought were often read together as part of a broader Schmittian critique 
of the apparent geopolitical disarray at the start of the new century, of which U.S. foreign 
policy during the ‘war on terror’ was the most obvious symptom.  
 
However, despite the numerous attempts to employ Schmitt’s work as critical tool for 
geopolitical critique, a thorough examination of the role of space in his thought has thus 
far been missing. Indeed, Schmitt’s spatial thought has been identified almost exclusively 
with his 1950 book The Nomos of the Earth that appeared in English translation for the 
first time in 2003. The Nomos of the Earth is undoubtedly the key work in Schmitt’s post-
war output and contains the most mature expression of his spatial thought. However, the 
fact that critical attention focused largely on this text in isolation from the concerns of 
Schmitt’s work more broadly led many to identify spatial concepts solely with Schmitt’s 
late work. This has resulted in a degree of disjuncture between the application of 
Schmitt’s insights to the critique of contemporary geopolitical conditions and an 
understanding of the role of space within his work. My thesis aims to address this gap in 
the existing literature by investigating what role spatial concepts play within Schmitt’s 
work as whole. In answering this question I hope to not only contribute a fuller 
understanding of Schmitt’s work but further to provide a firmer foundation for assessing 
its uses and limitations in understanding the relationship between politics and space 
today.   
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Schmitt is a divisive figure who remains controversial due to his official involvement 
with the National Socialist regime and the anti-Semitic content of his work during this 
period. Given the importance of these issues, I believe it is necessary to contextualize 
Schmitt’s work in relation to his life and political choices. In Chapter 2 I will provide a 
brief account of Schmitt’s biography and career and situate his work within the 
intellectual context from which it emerged. In light of the bearing Schmitt’s Nazism and 
anti-Semitism had on the development of his work, and specifically his spatial thought, I 
will devote considerable attention in Chapter 3 to the question of how to approach their 
relation to his work. This contextual element will be traced through the subsequent 
chapters as I provide an account of the development of Schmitt’s spatial thought.  
 
One of the key contributions of my project is to show that spatial concepts play a key 
structural role throughout Schmitt’s work even before they appear as the explicit focus of 
his late work. In Chapter 4, I highlight the overlooked structural foundation provided by 
spatial concepts in Schmitt’s early work from the Weimar period. I argue that Schmitt 
understood spatial division as the means by which the key demands of pluralism and 
political order could be reconciled. Hence, I claim that in his early work Schmitt 
developed a concept of political order fundamentally grounded in the spatialisation of the 
political, the core category of Schmitt’s thought, which he understood to indicate the 
necessary antagonistic nature of political relations. Chapter 5 contextualizes these early 
attempts by Schmitt to theorize the spatial foundations of order within the crisis of the 
state in the twentieth century. I examine the way in which Schmitt understood the thought 
and practice of liberalism to be undermining the spatial foundations of state order by 
dissolving the foundational relationship between space and the political on which it 
rested.  
 
The attempt to locate the roots of this state crisis and formulate a new concept of political 
order led Schmitt to explicitly theorize a concept of spatial order in his later work. 
Chapter 6 examines The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt’s most developed work of spatial 
theory. This was an ambitious book that contained both an explicit theory of the spatial 
foundations of legal order and a historical account of the rise and fall of the first global 
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nomos centred upon the European appropriation of the colonial lands in the New World 
and the world’s oceans. The twentieth century crisis of the state emerged against the 
background of a crisis of this Eurocentric spatial order of the earth and Schmitt examines 
the causes and symptoms of spatial disorder before suggesting models for reordering the 
world. In chapter 7, I examine Schmitt’s two attempts to identify new subjects capable of 
founding order on a new spatialisation of the political after the eclipse of the state: a 
Großraum order of international law, and the figure of the partisan. Schmitt’s Großraum 
theory was an attempt to conceive of a new pluralist spatial order of the earth, but it was 
developed to directly legitimize Nazi expansionist policy in Eastern Europe. The figure 
of the partisan fighter represented his last desperate attempt to conjure up a solution to 
the spatial crisis of the twentieth century. I conclude by noting that both attempts 
ultimately failed to produce a new foundation for spatial order and, as the twentieth 
century wore to a close Schmitt’s concepts were increasingly at odds with the emerging 
realities of a fast globalizing world. Schmitt’s hope of a new nomos of the earth had been 
washed away in a tide of historical change.  
 
By tracking the development of Schmitt’s spatial thought from its early explicit to its 
later explicit formulations, I hope to show that spatial concepts play a central structural 
role in every period of his thought, and that a full understanding of his work must come 
to terms with Schmitt as a spatial thinker. It is only by understanding the role of spatial 
concepts in Schmitt’s work that its uses and limits for contemporary spatial thinking can 
be fairly assessed. I hope the following thesis will make a contribution to clarifying these 
questions.  
 
  
 
 
 
 10 
 
Chapter 1: The Return of Carl Schmitt 
 
 
(1) A Reactionary’s Renaissance: Schmitt’s Anglophone ‘Revival’  
 
Carl Schmitt has been referred to as “the most controversial German legal and political 
thinker of the twentieth century” and his name continues to provoke strong reactions 
wherever it appears.1 As the Schmitt scholar William Hooker recently noted, “it is hard to 
think of another intellectual figure who provokes quite such polarized views.”2 It is not 
surprising that Schmitt continues to elicit such deeply divided responses, given that he 
was not only one of twentieth century Germany’s foremost legal and political thinkers, 
but was deeply complicit with the Nazi state after 1933. Yet, despite this controversial 
political association, the already sprawling body of secondary literature continues to grow 
at an alarming rate. The last two years alone have witnessed the publication of six 
volumes of writings by or dedicated to Schmitt in English.3 Further, as one of Schmitt’s 
biographers Jan-Werner Müller argues, “it might not be an overstatement to say that no 
twentieth-century thinker has had a more diverse range of readers.”4 His work has 
attracted comment from a startling range of readers drawn from a number of different 
national contexts, theoretical perspectives and opposing political positions.  Although the 
startling growth of interest in Schmitt in English language debates in recent years has 
often been referred to as a ‘revival’ this is something of a misnomer given that by and 
large Schmitt’s thought was little known to Anglophone audiences before the mid 1980s. 
                                                
1 George Schwab, Introduction to Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), xxxvii. 
2 William, Hooker. Carl Schmitt’s International Thought: Order and Orientation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 2. 
3 See Michael Marder, Groundless Existence: The Political Ontology of Carl Schmitt (London: Continuum, 
2010); Kam Shapiro, Carl Schmitt and the Intensification of Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2010); Johan Tralua, Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt: The Politics of Order and Myth 
(London: Routledge, 2010); Carlo Galli, Political Spaces and Global War (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2010); Stephen Legg, ed., Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the 
Nomos (London: Routledge, 2011); Carl Schmitt, Writings on War, ed. Timothy Nunan (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2011). 
4 Jan-Werner Müller, A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003), 1.  
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In the context of Schmitt’s Anglophone scholarship, the distinction between an initial 
reception, occurring mostly in the 1980s, and a subsequent ‘revival’ from the mid 1990s, 
rest on rather slender ground. Terms such as ‘revival’ and ‘renaissance’ are frequently 
used by more hostile critics to indicate an intellectual and moral distaste for what they 
consider the resurrection of a corpus better left buried in Nazi disgrace.5 However, given 
the fact that Schmitt has made the transformation from a marginal figure in Anglophone 
debate to the position of a ‘classic’ in the last twenty years, coupled with the sheer 
volume of the work accrued on his thought in the same period, it is not unreasonable to 
consider his Anglophone reception in the last two decades as a ‘revival’. 
 
The first of Schmitt’s books to appear in English translation was The Necessity of 
Politics: An Essay on the Representative Idea of the Church in Modern Europe (a 
translation of his 1923 book on political form in the Roman Catholic Church, later 
published in a new translation as Roman Catholicism and Political Form in 1996), 
published in 1931 as part of a series of books on Catholic thought, Essays in Order. 
There was a long gap before the first critical work on Schmitt’s thought, George 
Schwab’s The Challenge of the Exception, appeared in 1970. Schwab had a profound 
impact on the early reception of Schmitt’s thought, translating and writing the 
introductions for The Concept of the Political (1976) and Political Theology (1985), texts 
that remain the principal focus of Anglophone debate on Schmitt. The Concept of the 
Political initially received little critical attention but by the time Political Theology was 
published in 1985, interest was clearly growing. The first biography of Schmitt in 
English, Joseph Bendersky’s Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich, was published in 1983 
and was followed by the translation of two more important Schmitt books, Political 
Romanticism (1986) and The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1988).6 The growth of 
interest was definitively signalled by the release of two special issues devoted to Schmitt 
in the New York based journal Telos in 1987, a publication that has consistently 
championed Schmitt’s work since. By the early 1990s the American critics Richard 
                                                
5 See for example: Peter Caldwell, “Controversies over Carl Schmitt: A Review of Recent Literature,” The 
Journal of Modern History 77 (2005): 357-87. 
6 The English titles of Schmitt’s works available in translation will be used throughout. When a work 
unavailable in English the original German title will be used.  
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Wolin and William E. Scheuerman offered sharply aimed ripostes to the largely 
apologetic welcome that Schmitt had received from Schwab, Bendersky and the editors 
of Telos. At the start of the new decade interpretive battle lines were clearly staked, 
particularly over the relationship between Schmitt’s thought and his Nazi involvement. I 
will discuss these debates in Chapter 3.  
 
It is important to note, however, that some identify Schmitt as shadowy presence in 
Anglophone scholarship before his 1980s ‘arrival’. William Scheuerman has argued that 
Schmitt exercised a “subterranean influence” on postwar American political thought long 
before his work was first addressed openly.7 This influence was carried, it is argued, 
threw a series of ‘hidden dialogues’ with émigré intellectuals such as Fredric Hayek, 
Hans Morgenthau and Joseph Schumpeter. Scheuerman argues that through these 
thinkers Schmitt’s work “helped determine the contours of political thinking” in the 
United States after the war, albeit indirectly.8 Similarly the German critic Heinrich Meier 
has argued that Leo Strauss, another German émigré intellectual who became an 
influential professor of politics at the University of Chicago in the post-war years, 
conducted his work in a ‘hidden dialogue’ with Schmitt.9 Meier contends that beyond the 
points where Schmitt and Strauss openly acknowledged the influence of the other’s work 
or critique, their thought was characterized by a ‘subterranean’ dance of influence and 
antagonism. Whilst Meier clearly makes the case for the relationship between these two 
giants of twentieth century political thought, the concept of the ‘hidden dialogue’ has 
provided a template for what occasionally amounts to an academic witch-hunt that 
exaggerates Schmitt’s influence. For example, some have claimed that Schmitt is the dark 
magus from which American neo-conservatism emerged by way of Leo Strauss and his 
American student Alan Bloom.10 Schmitt’s open and transparent influence is already 
broad and deep enough to be reckoned with, without giving credence to the myth of his 
arcane hidden influence, a story Schmitt peddled himself long enough. 
                                                
7 William Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End of Law (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
1999), 1. 
8 Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt,12. 
9 Heinrich Meier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue (Chicago, IL: university of Chicago 
Press, 1995). 
10 See for example: Shadia B. Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
1999). 
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Schmitt is, after all, the thinker in whom “National Socialism attained historical 
consciousness of itself”11; the ‘Crown Jurist of the Third Reich’ who produced a legal 
defence for the Night of the Long Knives and sought to legitimate the Nazi expansion 
across Eastern Europe; the Catholic philosopher who argued for the continued relevance 
of theological categories for politics and defined the latter as the struggle between 
enemies; the polemical anti-liberal who wanted to replace the ‘endless conversation’ of 
parliamentary pluralism with a democratic dictatorship yoked to a myth of national 
homogeneity; the anti-Semitic opportunist whose private diaries are riddled with paranoid 
diatribes and who pursued his career at the expense of Jewish colleagues. In light of this 
series of glaring red flags it seems the perennial question that has dogged studies of 
Schmitt must be asked once again: Why Schmitt? Why is it that Schmitt’s work, despite 
the clearly reactionary intent of his thought and his complicity with the horrors of 
German fascism, retains such allure today? What is it that makes his thought relevant to 
contemporary geographic thought? What does a thinker that formulated justifications for 
a world order based around a series of hermetically sealed continental empires and 
imagined the history of modern Europe as a mythic battle between geo-elemental forces 
have to offer an analysis of contemporary problems in the politics of space?  
 
As Jan-Werner Müller, one of Schmitt’s biographer’s, has noted, “the sheer volume of 
[Schmitt’s] writings and writings about him” can create a “cauchemar de richesses” 
leaving the reader overwhelmed.  Providing a comprehensive overview of such a huge 
body of secondary literature is beyond the scope of this thesis. My analysis will therefore 
focus on Schmitt’s ‘revival’ or ‘renaissance’ only in the Anglophone scholarship since 
the 1990s. Delimiting the field of research in this way will provide an identifiable entry 
point into such an abundant literature and a manageable framework in which to develop 
discussion. Approaching the literature in this way in part reflects the linguistic limitations 
of the author but given the abundance and variety of secondary literature I believe that 
                                                
11 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, (London: Verso, 2005), 132. 
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this will not significantly hamper my ability to take firm control of the available 
materials.12 
 
It should be noted that the project is undertaken with a critical awareness of how the 
Anglophone debates have been shaped by waves of translations, of both Schmitt’s work 
and the critical secondary literature, from a variety of European contexts.13 Thus, my 
study is developed keeping in mind the different national and historical contexts from 
which many of the texts in question originate and the timing of their subsequent 
translation. Secondly, I focus on debate since the 1990s as it reflects the period of 
Schmitt’s Anglophone ‘renaissance’ and highlights the extent to which global political 
developments during this period have influenced the manner of his reception. The 
growing reputation Schmitt has enjoyed in the Anglophone academy over the last two 
decades has been powerfully influenced by the apparent topicality of his concerns to 
historical developments during this period.14 His work has frequently been heralded as 
offering prescient insights into the present condition of global politics and indeed this 
                                                
12 Not being able to read German nonetheless places constraints in my engagement with Schmitt’s writings 
not only because a large body of work remains inaccessible but further because I cannot enjoy Schmitt’s 
prose in its original form. This may clearly hamper a deep linguistic analysis of certain of Schmitt’s 
concepts, however, in this project I seek to provide a structural analysis of Schmitt’s work more broadly. I 
believe such a frame can now be reasonably to be developed on the basis of the materials available in 
English translation although doubtless the understanding may not be as rich as if it were to immersed in 
Schmitt’s original texts. Further, I position myself principally in relation to the Anglophone debate on the 
nature, uses and limits of Schmitt’s thought and hence hope to make a contribution primarily within this 
context. I believe it is possible to make a deep engagement with these debates despite the the linguistic 
constraints I work within.  
13 Schmitt’s work has been central to crucial debates in German, Italian and French political thought for 
decades and the Anglophone literature has benefited from a translation of some of these debates although 
substantial gaps remain, many of which are unlikely ever to be filled. Further, I highlight France, Germany, 
and Italy because these are the contexts from which critical works have been translated into English hence 
influencing English language debate. His work has had considerable impact in a wider European context 
although the subsequent influence of this reception on Anglophone debate has been lesser. Jan-Werner 
Müller has provided a useful overview of the deep influence Schmitt exerted on Spain and Portugal after 
the Second World War. See: Müller, A Dangerous Mind, 133-144. During the years of the Iberian 
dictatorships Schmitt’s work did not fall into disgrace as it did in Germany and France and hence was the 
subject of open debate. The British Geographer Alan Ingram has shown how Russian geopolitical thinkers 
such as Alexander Dugin developing arguments for a Russian-centred Eurasian power block have 
appropriated geopolitical ideas from Schmitt’s work. See: Alan Ingram “Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and 
Neo-Fascism in Post-Soviet Russia,” Political Geography 20 (2001): 1029-1051. A study comparable to 
Müller’s tracing Schmitt’s influence beyond Europe and North America would be extremely valuable. 
14See for example: Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); 
Frederic Jameson, “Notes on the Nomos,” South Atlantic Quarterly 104 (2005), 199-204; Chantal Mouffe, 
On the Political (London: Routledge, 2005). 
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supposed relevance has driven the increasing number of translations of his work over the 
last decade.15 
 
This thesis will approach Schmitt’s Anglophone reception over the last twenty years by 
splitting it into two broad phases, each defined by a set of conceptual concerns loosely 
corresponding to the political context of the two decades. During the 1990s, work on 
Schmitt largely focused on the critique of liberalism in his Weimar-era writings, 
reflecting issues that arose in the initial post-Cold War period: the fate of democracy in 
an increasingly consensual political world and the unresolved tensions in liberal 
constitutional thought. In the decade that followed, Schmitt’s later work on global order 
from the 1930s–1960s increasingly became the focus of critical analyses. This shift of 
emphasis reflected the issues surrounding world ordering, humanitarian warfare and 
terrorist violence that came to prominence in the wake of the September 11th, 2001 
attacks and the US-led ‘war on terror’. 
 
To some degree the concerns of each of these phases overlap. Analyses of Schmitt’s 
work on international order appeared in the 1990s just as substantial studies on his 
constitutional theory emerged in the 2000s and of course studies of the latter decade built 
on those of the former. None-the-less, the arc of Schmitt’s Anglophone revival more or 
less conforms to this change in focus. This framework has the benefit of highlighting how 
the reception of Schmitt’s work has changed according to the political context in which it 
was received. In identifying the major strands of his work with the periods following the 
end of the Cold War and the attacks of September 11, 2001, I am not assuming a 
conception of historical development defined by clean breaks as opposed to conflict and 
multiple processes. Hence, I do not suppose that the 1990s were entirely determined by 
the end of the Cold War nor the last decade by the September 11, 2001 attacks. Rather, I 
highlight these events because they decisively shaped the political and intellectual 
concerns of the subsequent periods and the dominant discursive frameworks into which 
Schmitt’s thought has been received. By approaching each of these phases in turn we will 
                                                
15 See particularly: Gary Ulmen. Introduction to The Nomos of the Earth by Carl Schmitt, 9-36. New York: 
Telos, 2003; Gary Ulmen, Introduction to The Theory of the Partisan by Carl Schmitt, Ix-xxi. New York, 
Telos, 2007. 
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be provided with a good indication of why Schmitt is considered relevant to 
contemporary political debates.  
 
(2) A Spectre is Haunting Liberalism 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 provided 
a dramatic opening for the new decade. For many these momentous events marked not 
only the end of the Cold War but signalled the historic triumph of liberal capitalism and a 
new dawn for world order. The American political scientist Francis Fukuyama famously 
trumpeted the ‘end of history’, arguing that liberal capitalist democracy had shown itself 
as the answer to the fundamental questions of human society.16 The disintegration of the 
Soviet system was commonly regarded to have shown capitalism to be the superior path 
to economic prosperity and liberal democracy to be the political system able to satisfy the 
human desire for individual self-determination. Fukuyama’s claims may have been 
blatantly hyperbolic but the early post-Cold War years seemed to be vindicating Margaret 
Thatcher’s dictum: ‘there is no alternative’. By the early 1990s, liberal democratic 
systems were replicated across Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states, and the so-
called ‘Washington Consensus’ embedded market-oriented economic policy in the heart 
of a newly ‘globalized’ world. Consensus in the economic sphere was to be coupled with 
a new vision of international order based upon a muscular, global humanitarianism.17 
With the eclipse of the Cold War, the defining political conflicts of the twentieth century 
could be dispensed with and a ‘new world order’ founded. Peaceful co-existence would 
be guided by the rational principles and humanitarian ethics enshrined in international 
institutions and guaranteed by the globe-spanning military might of the United States. 
Any remaining conflict in the world would now be merely the result of atavistic 
irrationality or moral failures that could be policed by international forces.  
 
                                                
16 Francis, Fukuyama. The End of History and the Last Man (London; Hamish Hamilton, 1992) 
17 For a more detailed analysis of how the coordinates of the post-Cold War era shaped Schmitt’s reception 
in Anglophone debate see Jan-Werner Müller, A Dangerous Mind; William Rasch, “Introduction: Carl 
Schmitt and the New World Order,” South Atlantic Quarterly 104 (2005), 177-183. For a broader critical 
account of the liberal consensus of the 1990s see Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington’s 
Faustian Bid for World Dominance (London: Verso, 1999). 
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It might appear counter-intuitive that at the moment of liberalism’s apparent triumph, one 
of its fiercest opponents would gain such prominence. However, it was precisely during 
the 1990s that Carl Schmitt’s reception blossomed, if that word can be used. He arguably 
gained influence in Anglophone debates in the 1990s precisely because of liberalism’s 
assuredness rather than despite it, as a diagnostician of the dangers that accompanied a 
complacent hegemonic liberalism.18  Thus, two major strands of engagement emerged in 
the 1990s, both of which drew on Schmitt primarily as a critic of liberalism. On the one 
hand, those who feared that liberalism would bask in apparent victory, assuming its 
fundamental questions had been answered, drew on Schmitt as a ferocious anti-liberal 
opponent, to strengthen liberal thought. On the other hand, those who sensed danger in an 
increasingly narrow consensus based on liberal hegemony in domestic and international 
politics drew on Schmitt as a battering ram to escape its restrictions and reaffirm the 
possibility of an alternative politics beyond its banks.19 In both instances Schmitt was 
approached as a perceptive analyst of liberalism’s ailments, one whose solutions were, at 
best, inadequate and, at worst, catastrophic. Hence, he was to be read against the grain, or 
as Chantal Mouffe put it, “with and against Schmitt.”20 But to what degree these 
engagements were conducted ‘with’ and ‘against’ Schmitt differed considerably between 
his readers.  
 
(i) Illiberal Insights: Legal Positivism in the United States 
 
During the course of the 1990s the trenchant critique of liberal constitutionalism found in 
Schmitt’s Weimar-era work became a key reference point for a number of thinkers in the 
                                                
18 This was a point forcefully made by Reinhard Mehring in relation to the German context in the 1990s but 
arguably stands true more broadly as I will argue below. See Reinhard Mehring, “Liberalism as a 
‘Metaphysical System’: The Methodological Structure of Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Political Rationalism” 
in Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, edited by David Dyzenhaus, 131-158. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1998. 
19 For a brisk example of the former view see: David Dyzenhaus. Introduction to Law as Politics: Carl 
Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, edited by David Dyzenhaus, 1-20, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1998; Chantal Mouffe. Introduction to The Challenge of Carl Schmitt, edited by Chantal Mouffe,1-6. 
London: Verso, 1999. 
20 Mouffe, Introduction, 6. Thinking ‘with and against Schmitt” or pitting ‘Schmitt against Schmitt’ has 
been a common rhetorical strategy used by liberals and Leftist thinkers working with Schmitt in order to 
mark a distance from Schmitt even as they draw on his insights.  
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United States attempting to strengthen liberal political theory.21 Schmitt had developed 
his critique of the Weimar Republic’s liberal constitution with the view to replacing it. 
He believed an authoritarian Presidential regime could provide a decisive source of 
political stability adequate to cope with the volatile political context of early twentieth 
century Germany. This authoritarian anti-liberalism eventually led Schmitt to disastrously 
identify the National Socialist regime as a potential source of legitimate order.22 Despite 
Schmitt’s political orientation, liberal critics such as David Dyzenhaus, John P. 
McCormick and William Scheuerman argued that, if selectively engaged, Schmitt’s 
bracing critique of liberalism could be used to strengthen it. Schmitt, it was argued, had 
posed a series of challenging questions to persistent problems in the liberal rule of law 
that it would be foolish to disregard on the basis of his complicity with Nazism. Indeed, it 
was argued that rather than pose a threat to liberalism, as its most intellectually agile 
opponent, he could provide insights needed to protect its values and institutions. 
Regarded by some as “an adversary of remarkable intellectual quality,” Schmitt was 
granted the status of a respected devil’s advocate against which liberalism could test 
itself..23 In a rather perverse twist, the renowned anti-liberal was presented as an almost 
indispensable foil for honing liberal thought. As William Scheuerman argued, "if we are 
to preserve and strengthen the rule of law, we are intellectually and politically obliged to 
provide an answer to Schmitt's attack on it.”24 Thus, even from beyond the grave, Schmitt 
displayed his remarkable talent for making intellectual champions of his political 
enemies. 
 
                                                
21 See: David Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Herman Heller in 
Weimar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Dyzenhaus, ed., Law as Politics; John P. McCormick, 
Carl Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997); William Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt. See also: Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political 
(London: Verso, 1993); Mouffe, ed., The Challenge of Carl Schmitt (1999). For a much more critical 
reading see: Peter Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law: The theory 
and Practice of Weimar Constitutionalism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997).  
22 See: Gopal Balakrishnan The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt (London: Verso, 2002); 
Joseph Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
Bendersky’s account is largely apologetic. 
23 Mouffe, Introduction, 1. Mouffe warned that, “ignoring his views would deprive us of many insights that 
can be used to rethink liberal democracy with a view to strengthening its institutions” (Ibid). 
24 Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt, 2. 
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Although Schmitt had developed his critique of liberalism in a very different political and 
historical context, his work has been considered capable of speaking “directly to some of 
the great dilemmas of our times.”25 The problems Schmitt identified in liberal 
constitutionalism in the Weimar era found an echo in the 1990s. This was in part because 
Schmitt raised fundamental structural questions concerning liberalism’s ‘first principles.’ 
Furthermore, a triumphant liberalism reluctant to recognize its own antinomies 
intensified such historical reverberations. As the American critic Ronald Beiner argued 
(although no one could say the crises facing liberalism in the United States in the 1990s 
were as great as those of the Weimar Republic), “neither does it seem that the 
foundations of liberal politics are so secure, theoretically or politically, that reflection at 
the level of first principles has been rendered pointless."26 Thus, Beiner argued liberal 
thinkers such as Dyzenhaus turned to Schmitt because they knew that "philosophically, 
liberal principles have not (yet) established an unchallenged claim to normative 
authority.”27 
 
Two of the most vexing questions that had occupied Schmitt during the Weimar years 
returned to the heart of debates within liberal legal and political thought in the 1990s. 
William Scheuerman argued that many of the initial analyses of Schmitt’s work in 
English had missed the vital question of the role that legal indeterminacy played in his 
thought.28 This was an issue that was central, Scheuerman argued, to debates in liberal 
legal thought between legal positivists and their critics in the 1980s and 1990s, and gave 
Schmitt a sense of prescience. On the one hand, Scheuerman argued, Schmitt provided 
the most consistently challenging voice against the belief that a formal system of norms 
could provide an adequate basis for legal determination. If the problem of legal 
indeterminacy, or rather the role that personal decision-making played in a liberal 
constitution, remained, then Schmitt continued to pose problems. His arguments about 
the personal nature of sovereign power continued to profoundly trouble the rigid 
                                                
25 Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt, 254. 
26 Ronald Beiner, Foreword to Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, edited by David 
Dyzenhaus (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), vii. 
27 Ibid, ix. 
28 Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt, 254. 
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formalism of the legal positivism, dominant in constitutional law in the United States.29 
On the other hand, Schmitt’s example clearly indicated that anti-formalist critiques of the 
liberal rule of law from within liberal thought and ‘critical legal studies’ needed to 
remember that a greater degree of indeterminacy could also play into more authoritarian, 
and not only more progressive, solutions to persistent legal problems. 
 
The second question, which David Dyzenhaus’s work seized upon, was the problem of 
neutrality within the liberal rule of law. Schmitt had argued in the 1920s and early 1930s 
that the Weimar constitution and the parliamentary system failed to address the 
fundamental question of political legitimacy and instead retreated to the security of a 
‘neutral’ legality. Schmitt, as Dyzenhaus notes, had wanted to highlight “the tension … 
between a neutrality so neutral that anything goes and a neutrality which is a sham 
because in effect it privileges a partial liberal understanding of the good.”30 Such 
neutrality, on the one hand, left liberalism unable to defend itself against internal or 
external threats, as it could not define the substantial basis of its own legitimacy, and, on 
the other, it provided a legal disguise for the pursuit of particular interests. Hence, for 
Dyzenhaus, Schmitt’s critique of legalistic neutrality provided a critical tool for 
unpacking the political deficit at the heart of legal positivism and the ‘political liberalism’ 
of John Rawls. 
  
Both questions concern the political outside of law, the analysis of which Schmitt had 
placed at the centre of his work. By failing to address the political foundations of the 
system of legal norms, liberalism left itself unable to address external and internal threats 
that called the system into question. By taking the political outside of law as the starting 
point for his analysis, Schmitt, as Dyzenhaus noted, “accurately identified some 
difficulties liberalism encounters in dealing with important aspects of contemporary 
society.”31 But if some liberals believed that “seeing what our liberal world looks like 
from an illiberal point of view” might “do liberal politics some good” this was not 
                                                
29 Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt, 4-11. The Introduction of Scheuerman’s book provides an overview of the 
debates between the dominant strands of legal positivism and its critics from within the normative tradition, 
including Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls, and those from the ‘critical legal studies’ school.  
30 Dyzenhaus, Introduction, 15. 
31 Dyzenhaus, Introduction, 17.  
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because Schmitt offered answers to the unresolved problems he identified.32 Dyzenhaus 
argued that Schmitt’s “inability to provide alternatives, testifies to the paucity of his own 
positive thought, even... to its inherent dangers."33 Scheuerman likewise agreed that 
whilst “Schmitt diagnosed serious problems within existing liberal democracy … at each 
juncture his own theoretical responses exacerbated the problems at hand.”34 Thus, whilst 
these liberal thinkers sought to “honestly [acknowledge] the diagnostic merits of 
[Schmitt’s] political and legal theory” he remained an intellectual opponent liberalism 
had to prove able to think ‘against’ rather than ‘with.’35 
 
(ii) Driving Out the Devil with Beelzebub: Left Schmittians in the Post-Political Age36 
 
The first post-Cold War decade was a difficult time for the Left in Europe and North 
America. It had lost its political bearings in the wake of ‘really existing socialism’, the 
steady rise of neo-liberal hegemony since the late 1970s and the gradual erosion of class 
identities.37 To some on this intellectually disorientated and politically defeated Left, 
Schmitt’s thought appeared as a potential source of conceptual reinvigoration. It was 
perhaps a case of desperate times calling for desperate measures but his popularity on the 
Left is one of the most unusual aspects of his Anglophone reception.38 This surge of 
interest was arguably a product of both an internal intellectual crisis of the ‘New Left’ 
and the broader crisis of Left politics in a context where the horizons of political 
possibility had been so thoroughly occupied by liberalism.  
 
                                                
32 Beiner, Foreword ix. 
33 Ibid. 17. In his Legality and Legitimacy (1999) Dyzenhaus argues that other Weimar jurisprudence 
theorists such as Herman Heller and Hans Kelsen may provide better solutions to Schmittian problems at 
the core of contemporary legal debates when read alongside him. 
34 Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt, 25. 
35 Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt, 254. 
36 During the 1980s when Schmitt’s critique of liberalism was being revived by German conservative 
thinkers with a new confidence Jürgen Habermas argued that appealing to Schmitt to strengthen liberalism 
was like like trying to “drive out the devil with Beelzebub” (quoted in Sitze, Introduction, xxi). Much could 
be said of the Left’s appeal to Schmitt to address its aporias today. 
37 For example see: Perry Anderson The New Old World (London: Verso, 2009); David Harvey A Brief 
History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2007). 
38 As William Hooker notes the Left’s appropriation of Schmitt’s work is “both the highest profile and the 
most counter-intuitive use” of his thought today. See: Hooker, Carl Schmitt’s International Thought, 209. 
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The British political philosopher Mark Neocleous argued in 1996 that, “underlying the 
rehabilitation of Schmitt are … the tensions within Marxist political thought.”39 Marxism, 
Neocleous noted, was allegedly failing to take the political seriously and had hence fallen 
into crisis. In the context of this supposed political deficit in Marxist theory, Schmitt was 
offered “as one way of thinking ourselves out of the theoretical crisis.”40 “The crisis” 
Neocelous bitterly remarked, had “reached a point where fascists are being used as the 
basis for a revitalized and rejuvenated socialist political theory.”41 Thus, the appeal to 
Schmitt as a source of intellectual renewal always carried with it a hint of desperation 
given the declining political fortunes of the Left.42 Reflecting on Schmitt’s influence on 
the Left during the 1990s, Jan-Werner Müller argued that the appeal to Schmitt “showed 
to what extent the Left had run out of conceptual resources to rally against an apparently 
triumphant liberalism.”43 The Left, Müller argued, “simply lacked the theoretical 
language for an alternative model of social reality” and retreated to a position of anti-
liberal critique.44  
 
Despite the criticism of those who argued that the Left should pick its friends more 
wisely, Schmitt’s popularity rose rapidly over the course of the decade. He became a 
                                                
39 Mark Neocleous, “Friend or Enemy?: Reading Schmitt Politically,” Radical Philosophy 176, (1996) 13. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid, Neocleous’ understandable complaint was that those on the Left turning to Schmitt were forgetting 
his fascism, and indeed often actively repressing it. He argues that those such as Mouffe “who suggest that 
Schmitt's approach is useful but his solutions unacceptable fail to realize that Schmitt's solutions follow -
logically, theoretically, politically from his premises” (Ibid). Whilst Neocleous’s wariness is certainly 
justified I think his claim here is debatable. I will return to the question of the relationship between 
Schmitt’s Nazism and his thought in Chapter 3.  
42 This is especially true when other thinkers more readily associated with the Left who explicitly 
formulated theories of political action such as Hannah Arendt and Antonio Gramsci did not become such 
frequent reference points. Although a certain reading of Gramsci lay at the centre of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
collaborative work in the 1980s his influence was eclipsed almost entirely by Schmitt’s in Mouffe’s 
writings since the early 1990s. One suspects that the specific appeal of Schmitt’s concept of the political 
lay partly in the affective charge of his friend-enemy distinction and the transgressive thrill of association 
with the ‘Crown Jurist’. The powerful ‘aesthetics of anti-liberalism’ that Müller attributes some of 
Schmitt’s wide appeal to is jut as much a feature of the Left as it is of the Right. See: Müller, A Dangerous 
Mind, 249. 
43 Müller, A Dangerous Mind, 223. 
44 Ibid. In the 1980s the German social theorist Jürgen Habermas memorably argued that the Left’s 
appropriation of Schmitt critique of liberalism aimed to “drive out the devil with Beelzebub.” Quoted in 
Adam Sitze, Introduction to Political Spaces and Global War by Carlo Galli (Minneapolis: University of 
Minneasota Press), xxi. Although this comment was made in the context of Habermas’ conflict with the 
conservative revisionist historian Ernst Nolte in the 1980s ‘historians debate,’ it still offers a biting critique 
of Left Schmittians.  
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“strange substitute for a discredited Marxism of old,” a thinker who could provide a point 
of specifically political orientation in the wake of economic defeat and provide a 
framework for imagining new forms of Leftist political identity in lieu of class 
antagonisms.45 Hence, during the 1990s Schmitt’s thought became strongly identified 
with so-called ‘post-Marxist’ thinkers, such as Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe and 
Slavoj Žižek, who sought to rethink radical Left politics in a world that no longer 
corresponded to the binaries of Marxist class antagonisms but was defined by a plurality 
of identities and social forces.46 Schmitt was thus cast as a thinker who could help the 
Left maintain political struggle after its foundation in class identities had dissolved. In a 
sense Schmitt’s concept of the political, understood as an antagonistic dynamic, quasi-
autonomous of other social spheres, provided the ‘post-Marxist’ Left with a useful tool to 
rethink the possibilities for political struggle beyond the economic sphere.47  
 
Perhaps more than anything else however, Schmitt’s work seemed to establish that there 
was the possibility of an alternative. As the American critic William Rasch argued, in 
Schmitt the Left found a way of “establishing the logical possibility of legitimate political 
opposition.”48 By absorbing a theory of inherently conflictual social relations from 
Schmitt’s work, the Left confirmed that politics could neither be stably hegemonized nor 
overcome altogether. He provided a firm rebuttal to liberalism’s most utopian advocates 
and a sense of comfort to a Left on the back foot in the wake of the Cold War. The 
American Leftist Gopal Balakrishnan closed his 2000 biography of Schmitt’s with the 
claim that “lurking behind the contemporary interest in Carl Schmitt is the sense that this 
present cannot last forever.”49 But in the world of “diminished expectations, cancelled 
                                                
45 Hooker, Carl Schmitt’s International Thought, 211. 
46 See: Ernesto Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London, Verso, 1985): and Slavoj 
Žižek, “Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post-Politics,” in The Challenge of Carl Schmitt, ed. Chantal Mouffe 
(London: Verso, 1999), 18-37. 
47 Unmoored from the strictures of class identification, the political could be conceived of as a more 
dynamic force that could draw on any area of social conflict. This was precisely the appeal to Chantal 
Mouffe as she tried to reconfigure a theory of hegemonic politics for the new conditions of pluralist liberal 
democracies. See for example: Mouffe, On the Political (2005). 
48 William Rasch, Sovereignty and Its Discontents: On the Conflict and the Structure of the Political 
(London: Birkbeck Law Press, 2004), 13. 
49 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 268. 
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alternatives, and closed political horizons” that Balakrishnan depicted, this ‘sense’ 
seemed as much the product of wishful thinking as political analysis.50  
 
For liberal thinkers such as Fukuyama, the melting of the Cold War ice caps had revealed 
a promised land of liberal utopianism. It was to be a peaceful land of economic plenty run 
on the basis of rational consensus where the aspirations of every individual could be 
recognized and old conflicts assigned to history. To thinkers on the Left such as Chantal 
Mouffe and Slavoj Žižek, the belief in this liberal idyll was laying the foundations for 
what they referred to as an ‘age of post-politics.’51 According to these thinkers, a 
hegemonic liberalism had radically repressed the antagonistic dimension of social 
relations in order to establish a universal consensus on an increasingly narrow set of 
terms. The concept of the political was understood, by Mouffe, Rasch, Žižek and other 
Left thinkers, as an ontological category.52 As such, political antagonism was taken to be 
a constitutive element of social relations and could neither be eliminated nor overcome. 
By claiming to represent the final, most rational and ethical form of social organization 
Schmitt’s ‘post-Marxist’ readers claimed liberalism sought to deny this constitutive 
antagonism. In this reading, the specificity of liberal hegemony lay in its denial of politics 
as such, or rather, following Schmitt’s critique, the displacement of politics into the 
spheres of economics and ethics. Thus, any genuinely political difference was excluded 
and opponents of the universal liberal consensus could thus be branded as irrational or 
immoral and excluded from the sphere of politics. By examining the post-Cold War 
world through the lens of the political, it was possible, Mouffe argued, to see “how much 
the process of neutralization and depoliticization, already noted by Schmitt, has 
progressed.”53 
                                                
50 Ibid.  
51 See: Mouffe, On the Political (2005); and Slavoj Žižek, “Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post-Politics” 
(2009). The concept of post-politics is deeply indebted to the work of French philosopher Jacques 
Ranciere’s book Disagreement that originally appeared in French in 1995. In his article on Schmitt and in 
many other instances since Žižek has acknowledged the influence of Jacques Rancière but he receives only 
fleeting mention in Mouffe’s work.  
52 See for example; Mouffe, On the Political; Rasch, Sovereignty and Its Discontents; and Slavoj Žižek, 
The Ticklish Subject (London: Verso, 2000). This ontological reading of the political is typical of the 
influence of post-foundational thought on the reception of Schmitt in recent Anglophone debates. The 
significance of this influence will be discussed below. 
53 Mouffe, Introduction, 2.  
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Hence, for Schmitt’s Left readers such as Mouffe and Žižek, the liberal hegemony of the 
1990s enforced a repressive ‘post-political’ consensus that denied political difference and 
dispensed altogether with the debate over alternative visions of society. In this context, 
Žižek argued, “reference to Schmitt is crucial in detecting the deadlocks of post-political 
liberal tolerance.”54 The critics of ‘post-politics’ thus followed Schmitt’s lead in locating 
the source of liberalism’s problems in the repression of the political. First of all, as a 
constitutive feature of social relations, political difference would not simply vanish 
because it was denied. “To deny antagonisms in theory … does not make them 
disappear” as Mouffe warned.55 The political would therefore return to haunt liberalism 
in the form of, potentially very illiberal, antagonisms. It was argued that by denying 
legitimate channels for the expression of political differences inside the political system, 
antagonisms were allowed to grow more extreme outside. By excluding “the political 
proper”, ‘post-politics’ in fact prompted the return of a violent “ultra-politics” based 
precisely upon absolute categories of Us and Them.56 For Mouffe and Žižek, this 
dialectic of exclusion and intensification explained a number of political phenomena that 
disturbed the supposed liberal utopia of the 1990s. Mouffe argued that the rise of Right 
wing populist movements in Europe and the United States and the emergence of the 
global terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda were, at least in part, the product of the 
depoliticizing liberal consensus that denied legitimate political difference.57 Directly 
echoing Schmitt’s critiques of international law from the 1930s, Mouffe argued that 
political difference would “continue to manifest themselves but with the proviso that now 
they can be perceived only as eruptions of the ‘irrational’ by those liberals who have 
denied their existence.”58 Likewise, Žižek argues that ‘excessive’ ethnic or religious 
fundamentalist violence was the necessary flipside of “depoliticized ‘humanitarian’ 
operations,” each resulting from the denial of political difference.59 Both subscribed to 
                                                
54 Žižek, Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post-Politics, 3. 
55 Mouffe, Introduction, 3. 
56 Žižek, Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post-Politics, 29-31. 
57 See Chapter 4 or Mouffe, On the Political (2005). See also: William Rasch, “Human Rights as 
Geopolitics: Carl Schmitt and the Legal Form of American Supremacy,” Cultural Critique 54 (2003), 120-
147: and Slavoj Žižek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real (London: Verso, 2002) 
58 Mouffe, Introduction,, 3. 
59 Žižek, Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post-Politics, 31. 
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the Schmittian line that the dangerous other side of liberal depoliticization was the 
escalation of conflict.  
 
Thus, Schmitt’s ‘post-Marxist’ readers located the contradictions of the ‘post-political’ 
age in liberalism’s denial of the constitutive role that political antagonism plays in social 
relations. But the question remained as to how ‘the political’ itself was to be dealt with. 
Žižek and Mouffe both agreed that ‘the political proper’, and hence political difference, 
had to be re-asserted but they parted ways on precisely how. Mouffe, always the more 
Schmittian of the two, used Schmitt’s distinction between liberalism and democracy as a 
way to develop a more plural understanding of democracy.60 She argued that, by denying 
any real substantive difference of opinion on the nature of social order, ‘post-political’ 
liberal democracy denied the essential role that difference and antagonism play within a 
pluralist democratic politics. Hence, for Mouffe, the remedy was to introduce a greater 
degree of political difference, and hence antagonism, back into democratic politics. 
However, this would not be a violent clash between those who shared no common 
ground. Rather, Mouffe argued that the ‘shared symbolic space’ of democracy would 
allow ‘antagonistic’ differences to be transformed into ‘agonistic’ differences between 
respected adversaries.61 “By creating the conditions for possible conflicts to take the form 
of confrontations among adversaries (agonism)”, she argued that ‘agonistic democracy’ 
“attempts to avoid a frontal struggle between enemies (antagonism).”62 Hence, Mouffe’s 
‘agonistic’ democracy provided a democratic answer to the limits of ‘post-political’ 
liberalism and yet domesticated the Schmittian political. However, the problem remained 
of precisely how to constitute a ‘shared symbolic space’ where ‘antagonism’ could find 
‘agonistic’ expression. Was the nature of this ‘shared symbolic space’ itself a matter of 
democratic dispute or was it rather beyond question? In other words, what were the limits 
of the political? The lack of an answer to this left Mouffe’s work suspended between an 
                                                
60 Mouffe’s attempt to use Schmitt to develop a more plural understanding of democracy in contrast to a 
consensual liberalism stands at odds with Schmitt’s own analysis that contrasted democratic homogeneity 
with liberal pluralism. Mouffe in other words, carries out a switch of Schmitt’s categories.  
61 The task for democratic theory in Mouffe’s view must be to devise “ways that antagonism can be 
transformed into agonism.” See: Mouffe, Introduction, 5. 
62 Ibid, 4. 
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attempt to push a radicalized understanding of democracy and a slightly widened 
understanding of the liberal system she critiques for being depoliticized. 
 
If Mouffe was committed to introducing a greater degree of difference into the political 
sphere, she remained deeply wedded to a Schmittian conception of difference as the 
horizon of politics. Žižek, by contrast, had a more ambivalent relationship to political 
difference and hence to Schmitt’s concept of the political. From his perspective, Schmitt 
was the high priest of ‘ultra-politics’; “the attempt to depoliticize [social] conflict by 
bringing it to its extreme, via the direct militarization of politics.”63 In the eyes of the 
Slovenian philosopher this was the “most cunning and radical version” of an anti-politics 
as it sought to disavow the conflicts internal to the social body by externalizing them in 
the form of war with enemies.64 Thus, rather than seek a return of this Schmittian ultra-
politics, which is “the form in which the foreclosed political returns in the post-political 
universe,” or somehow attempt to domesticate it à la Mouffe, Žižek argues that it should 
be opposed with a different understanding of the political. The dimension of antagonism 
returns to the social body in the form of a conflict between the “structured social body, 
where each part has its place, and the ‘part of no-part’ which unsettles this order” in the 
name of All.65 “Politics proper”, he writes, “always involves a kind of short circuit 
between the Universal and the Particular: it involves the paradox of a singular which 
appears as the stand-in for the Universal, destabilizing the ‘natural’ functional order of 
relations in the social body.”66 Thus, although Žižek had found Schmitt a useful tool for 
critiquing the ‘deadlocks of the post-political’ he develops an understanding of the 
political in direct opposition to his ‘Us against Them’ conception. Rather than stay within 
the horizon of political difference and affirm the difference between particular identities, 
                                                
63 Žižek, Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post-Politics, 29. 
64 In a comment which showed his excellent understanding of Schmitt’s work and a path to an adequate 
Leftist response to it Žižek argued as follows: “The clearest indication of [the] Schmittian disavowal of the 
political is the primacy of external politics (relations between sovereign states) over internal politics (inner 
social antagonisms) on which he insists: is not the relationship to an external Other as the enemy a way of 
disavowing the internal struggle which traverses the social body? In contrast to Schmitt, a leftist position 
should insist on the unconditional primacy of the inherent antagonism as constitutive of the political.” (Ibid,  
29) 
65 Ibid, 27-28. This is a conception of politics much indebted to the work of the French philosophers 
Jacques Ranciere and Alain Badiou, two thinkers associated with post-foundational political thought.  
66 Ibid, 28. 
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Žižek argues that the reintroduction of political difference is paradoxically a way to 
affirm political universality. This universalization set Žižek’s account at odds with 
Mouffe’s who, having “taken Schmitt to head and to heart”, often seems content to read 
‘with’ Schmitt rather than ‘against’ him. 
 
(iii) Different Differences: the Post-Foundational Left & the New Right  
 
Despite their distinct approaches to Schmitt’s concept of the political, Mouffe and Žižek 
both locate its importance in the relationship between politics and difference. It is this 
concern that allows their work to be identified with the broader trajectory of Schmitt’s 
reception in ‘post-foundational’ political thought in Europe.67 The manner in which 
Schmitt’s work has been taken up by post-foundational political thinkers has had a 
profound impact on Schmitt’s recent Anglophone reception. This influence has been 
exercised not only through the direct engagements with Schmitt’s thought made by a 
number of post-foundational thinkers (including Mouffe and Žižek), but also indirectly 
through the role Schmitt’s concept of the political has played in shaping post-
foundational political thought more widely. This is not the place to provide a genealogy 
of post-foundational thought or of Schmitt’s influence within it, although this would 
certainly make a welcome study. It is nonetheless important to note the basic contours of 
this relationship given the influence post-foundational thought has had on the 
Anglophone reception of Schmitt’s thought.68  
 
Post-foundational political thought as it has developed in France since the 1960s has been 
shaped by the convergence of two factors. On the one hand the attempt to rethink the 
possibilities for emancipatory politics in the wake of the radical Left’s defeat in 1968 and 
                                                
67 I take the term ‘post-foundational’ from Oliver Marchart’s Post-Foundational Political Thought: 
Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007). I 
follow Marchart in using the term ‘post-foundational’ as opposed to the more common post-structuralist as 
the latter term remains tethered too closely to an opposition to structuralist tradition. As Marchart argues 
the common basis shared by post-foundational thinkers is a critical focus on the ‘conditions of possibility’ 
for the foundations of a system of identity rather than the foundations themselves.  
68 Both ventures would make useful additions to the assessment of Schmitt’s impact on post-war French 
political thought and specifically the New Left after 1968 but this work is still awaited. Oliver Marchart 
provides some framing remarks concerning the relationship between Schmitt’s work and post-
foundationalism but these are not developed extensively. 
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French philosophy’s ongoing struggle with the legacy of Heideggerian phenomenology. 
A post-foundational thought can be understood to have extended Heidegger’s critique of 
metaphysics to the field of political thought in order to rethink the ontological 
presuppositions of traditional political concepts.69 The result has been an approach that 
examines political questions as ontological and a thoroughgoing critique of all concepts 
of political foundations. The reception of Schmitt’s thought within the French ‘Left 
Heideggerians’ should be understood against the backdrop of this intellectual and 
political context.70  
 
The key concept that post-foundational thought has drawn from Schmitt’s thought is the 
distinction between politics and the political. This distinction was introduced to French 
Left as early as 1957 by Paul Ricoeur in his article The Political Paradox but was later 
developed by Claude Lefort in his influential 1988 book Democracy and Political 
Theory.71 The key innovation made by post-foundational thought was to render this 
distinction between politics and the political in ontological terms. Mapped against 
Heidegger’s so-called ‘ontological difference’, the difference between beings and Being, 
the political was understood to refer to the ontological level of the conditions of 
possibility for politics, while politics refers to the specific contingent instantiations of the 
political. This distinction has been crucial to Schmitt’s recent Anglophone reception on 
the Left, in particular, in the work of Mouffe, Rasch and Žižek.72 The appeal of the 
political has been to reveal the contingency of any particular political order and thus the 
possibility for the rearticulation of new, albeit contingent, political foundations. Hence, 
the post-‘68 liberal order was not only historically, but also ontologically contingent and 
a Left alternative thought possible. Perversely then, Schmitt is something of a founding 
father of post-foundational thought.  
 
                                                
69 See: Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought. Particularly Chapter 1. 
70 Ibid, 11. 
71 Paul Ricoeur, “The Political Paradox” in History and Truth (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1992), 247-270. 
72 See Mouffe (2005) and Žižek (2000). Numerous prominent thinkers working in the tradition of post-
foundational thought have engaged seriously with Schmitt’s thought, including Etienne Balibar (2004), 
Judith Butler (2004) and Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy (1997) amongst others.  
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It is also important here to acknowledge the influence of the engagement with Schmitt in 
a number of works by the late French philosopher Jacques Derrida. Derrida was the 
towering figure of late twentieth century philosophy and his thought has had a deep 
impact on Anglophone social sciences and humanities since the 1980s. His engagement 
with Schmitt was thus a significant step in the reappraisal of the latter’s work in the 
Anglophone academy, particularly in the United States. Derrida’s late work from the 
1990s until his death in 2004 was characterized by a much remarked-upon ‘turn’ to 
ethical and political themes.73 Direct and indirect engagement with Schmitt’s concepts of 
the political and sovereignty became central to this last phase of his work.74 The most 
explicit engagement came in The Force of Law (1990) and The Politics of Friendship 
(1995) two texts that have served to significantly shape the reception of Schmitt’s work 
in the Anglophone academy over the last two decades.75 Derrida’s rather respectfully 
depicted Schmitt as a “besieged watchman … more attuned than many others to the 
fragility and ‘deconstructible’ precariousness of structures, borders, axioms that he 
wished to protect, restore and ‘conserve’ at all costs.”76 This fearful sensitivity to the 
tenuous nature of political order made Schmitt, in Derrida’s eyes, a uniquely lucid critic 
of political foundations. This identification of Schmitt as something like a post-
foundational thinker avant la lettre is not unique to Derrida but the intellectual high 
regard and the relatively wide readership Derrida enjoyed in many European languages 
arguably helped win Schmitt a new audience if not quite a newfound respectability.77  
 
If rendering Schmitt’s distinction between politics and the political in ontological terms 
has made him a key reference point for post-foundational thinkers of the French Left, a 
very different reading of the relationship between difference and politics in his thought 
                                                
73 See: W.T.J. Mitchell and Arnold. Davidson, ed., Late Derrida (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
2007) 
74 This influence is apparent from his seminal 1990 essay “The Force of Law” up until his last major work. 
See: Jacques Derrida, “The Force of Law: the Mystical Foundations of Authority” in Acts of Religion 
(London: Routledge, 2001), 228-298; Jacques Derrida, Rogues (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2004). 
75 Derrida’s deepest engagement with Schmitt was found in The Politics of Friendship (London: Verso, 
2005), where he probed Schmitt’s famous definition of the political as the relations between friend and 
enemy in relation to the possibility of a politics whose horizon would be friendship rather than enmity. 
76 Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, 107 n4. 
77 Mouffe also claims that Schmitt’s thought displays a character that will later be associated with ‘post-
structuralism’. See: Mouffe, On the Political, 14.  
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has made him an intellectual hero of the European New Right. This chain of influence 
has been less remarked upon within English language debates likely because the thinkers 
of the European New Right tend to have less impact on the Anglophone academy than 
those of the European New Left. Whilst thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Giorgio 
Agamben and Slavoj Žižek have enjoyed public prominence in Anglophone intellectual 
circles, the names of Schmitt-inspired scholars of the European New Right such as the 
late Italian political philosopher Gianfranco Miglio and Alain de Benoist remain 
relatively obscure. This should not however be taken as a sign of their relative 
importance within the public discourses of their different national contexts. For example, 
Miglio was not only instrumental in re-introducing Schmitt’s thought to Italian audiences 
in the 1970s but he was also elected to the Italian Senate as an independent for Umberto 
Bossi’s Northern League, a party whose anti-immigrant and federalist ideology he helped 
to shape.78 Schmitt’s thought has mostly been of interest to the New Right as an 
intellectual resource for asserting the importance of particular cultural identities in 
underpinning political order in contrast to a supposedly ‘weak’ liberal multicultural 
pluralism. This has taken different forms in the different national and historical contexts, 
from the Italian federalism of Miglio to the assertion of European cultural superiority by 
the don of the French Nouvelle Droit, Alain de Benoist.79  
 
This appropriation of Schmitt’s work seems to be markedly at odds with his recent 
reception on the Left, but there have none-the-less been some strange convergences. The 
New York-based journal Telos, instrumental in crafting Schmitt’s Anglophone reception 
since the 1980s, has steadily moved to the Right since its inception as a vehicle for New 
Left thought in the United States. The journal has made a virtue of introducing taboo 
figures from the European Right to its pages, not only Schmitt and Ernst Jünger but also 
those associated with the contemporary European New Right such as Miglio and de 
Benoist.80 This has been reflected by the change of orientation of the editorial board. The 
                                                
78 For more on Miglio’s relationship to Schmitt see Müller, A Dangerous Mind, 207-219. 
79 For more on de Benoist’s relationship to Schmitt see Müller, A Dangerous Mind, 207-219. 
80 Telos have been constant champions of de Benoist’s work, frequently including articles on his thought, 
reviews of his work and original contributions as recently as 2011. See for example: Alain de Benoist, “The 
Current Crisis of Democracy.” Telos 156 (2011), 7-23. Its pages have also played host to Miglio’s work. 
See: Gianfranco Miglio, “The Cultural Roots of the Federalist Revolution”. Telos 97 (1997). 33–40. 
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late Paul Piccone, Paul Gottfried and Gary Ulmen, all major proponents of Schmitt’s 
thought, have all moved towards a strange ideological position characterized by a mix of 
populism, communitarianism and federalism that seeks to assert ‘organic’ communities 
against a ‘technocratic’ and ‘managerial’ liberal state.81 More recently de Benoist has 
appeared in the edited volume of articles dedicated to Schmitt’s The Nomos of the Earth 
alongside thinkers associated with Left-leaning International Relations and political 
theory scholars, including Chantal Mouffe.82 Indeed, the similarity of the positions held 
by figures from opposite ends of the political spectrum, such as de Benoist and Mouffe, 
should be a cause of some concern for those seeking to make use of Schmitt’s work in a 
radical Left politics. Both fundamentally appeal to the powerful constitutive conception 
of political difference in Schmitt’s work. There is a very little separating the Right and 
Left appropriation of Schmitt’s understanding of the relationship between difference and 
politics even if Mouffe’s understanding is relatively ‘anti-essentialist’ in contrast to that 
of de Benoist. Jan-Werner Müller has argued that the peculiar intellectual bedfellows that 
have been made through a shared interest in Carl Schmitt’s work is one of the striking 
aspects of his reception in post-war Europe, and this has been no less the case in his 
Anglophone reception since the early1990s.    
 
(3) The Exception as Norm: Carl Schmitt in the Post-911 World  
 
If the initial phase of Schmitt’s Anglophone reception in the 1990s focused on the 
critique of liberal constitutionalism found in his Weimar writings, a whole new crop of 
concerns drawn from a different set of texts emerged during the next decade. During the 
2000s a set of debates emerged around Schmitt that drew on his later work on 
international law, geopolitical order and the changing nature of warfare and imperialism 
in the twentieth century. This shift of focus breathed new life into Schmitt’s Anglophone 
reception and signalled a second phase of his ‘renaissance’. A new image of Schmitt as a 
powerful critic of the hypocrisies of liberal international law and humanitarian warfare 
                                                
81 See for example: Paul Gottfried, After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
82 See: Alain de Benoist, “Global Terrorism and the State of Permanent Exception: The Significance of 
Carl Schmitt’s Thought Today” The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt edited by Odysseos 
and Petiti, 73-96. Oxford: Routledge Press, 2007.  
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appeared; one that appealed to critics of US foreign policy and the ‘liberal way of war’ 
from across the political spectrum. There had been very little engagement with his work 
on international law and geopolitical order in Anglophone debates during the 1990s, 
although isolated examples had appeared.83 This is perhaps surprising given the 
widespread Anglophone debate on military interventionism during the 1990s. Schmitt’s 
work did not appear to be a reference point in the English language debates around the 
US intervention in Somali in 1993 or the NATO campaigns in Bosnia and Herzogovina 
in the mid-1990s nor Kosovo in 1998-1999.84 However, by the late-2000s it had become 
de rigeur to approach Schmitt as a thinker who could offer insights into the nature of 
warfare and international law at the start of the new century. A second factor to note 
about the second phase of Schmitt’s Anglophone ‘revival’ during the last ten years was 
the massive, exponential growth of interest in his work. If the 1990s witnessed a ‘revival’ 
of interest in Schmitt, the following decade experienced a veritable boom in Schmitt 
studies. Indeed, as the American legal theorist Adam Sitze recently remarked, it appeared 
in the middle years of the last decade that Schmitt was “well on the way to being the 
theorist du jour.”85 Thus, in the 2000s Schmitt’s work was not only considered to have a 
new relevance previously obscured, but also won a considerable new audience and 
gained wider influence.  
 
This rapid growth of interest in Schmitt’s work and the shift in focus in his reception can 
be accounted for by the interaction of three principal factors. The first is the political 
context of his Anglophone reception: If the first phase of Schmitt’s ‘revival’ had been 
shaped by the concerns of the first post-Cold War decade, the second was forged in the 
wake of the attacks of September 11 2001 and the US led ‘war on terror’ that followed. 
The post-911 moment raised a series of issues around sovereignty, warfare and 
                                                
83 See for example: Wolfgang Palaver, “Carl Schmitt on Nomos and Space,” Telos 106 (1996), 105-127; 
Jean-François Kervégan, “Carl Schmitt on World Unity’ in The Challenge of Carl Schmitt, ed. Chantal 
Mouffe. (London: Verso, 1999), 54-74; Anthony Carty, “Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberal International 
Legal Order Between 1933 and 1945,” Leiden Journal of International Law 14 (2001), 25-76. 
84 There were some exceptions although most came after the fact. See for example: Grigoris Ananiadis, 
“Carl Schmitt on Kosovo, or, Taking War Seriously,” in Balkan as Metaphor: Between Globalization and 
Fragmentation, edited by Dusan I. Bjelic´ and Obrad Savic´. 117-160. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002; 
Danilo Zolo, Invoking Humanity: war, law and global order (London: Verso, 2002).  
85 Adam Sitze, introduction, lxii. 
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geopolitical ordering to which Schmitt’s work on international order was considered 
germane. However, the manner in which his work was read in relation to the context was 
shaped by two further textual factors: the influence of the Italian philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben and the translation of previously unavailable texts of Schmitt’s into English. 
Agamben’s work exercised an enormous influence on the Anglophone reception of 
Schmitt during the last decade. Not only did the Italian thinker introduce Schmitt’s 
concepts of sovereignty and the state of exception to new, and perhaps wider, audiences, 
but he set them in productive dialogue with the concept of biopolitics drawn from the 
work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault. Reading Schmitt in relation to 
biopolitics has become one of the dominant approaches to his work, and has done much 
to influence the sense of topicality his work has been considered to have in the ‘post-911’ 
world. Thirdly, the translation of key Schmitt texts dealing with international law and 
geopolitical order has made work available for the first time for Anglophone audiences. 
The most significant book to appear has been Schmitt’s 1950 masterwork, The Nomos of 
the Earth, published in English by Telos Press in 2003. This was followed in 2007 by 
Schmitt’s short 1962 text The Theory of the Partisan, also published by Telos Press. 
These texts have stirred debate in a number of disciplines including Political Theory and, 
most recently, Geography, but their deepest impact thus far has been felt in International 
Relations. In what follows I will examine how the interaction of these factors contributed 
to the massive surge of interest in Schmitt as an ‘international’ thinker that has defined 
the second phase of his ‘revival’ during the 2000s.  
 
(i) New World (Dis)Order 
 
The attacks of September 11 2001 in New York and Washington seemed to puncture the 
utopian dreams of liberalism in the 1990s. If the end of the Cold War had for some 
signalled the imminent ‘end of history’, then these horrific attacks saw history return 
dramatically. The attacks were squarely aimed at the political and financial hearts of U.S. 
power and since they were carried out by al-Qaeda, a non-state group who few had ever 
heard of, they appeared to scramble the co-ordinates of world order and question the self-
evidence of America’s global supremacy. The sense of collective shock was felt far 
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beyond the United States and there was a worldwide outpouring of sympathy. If this 
initial sense of shared resolve in the face of global terrorism smoothed the way for the 
U.S. led NATO war in Afghanistan in October 2001, it had dissolved by the time that 
U.S. and U.K. forces invaded Iraq in March 2003. The response of President George W. 
Bush’s administration to the September 11 attacks led to a highly partisan politicized 
context both within the United States and globally. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
were to be just the first strikes in a so-called global ‘war on terror’ characterized by an 
ongoing campaign to eradicate any ‘terrorist’ threat to U.S. interests anywhere in the 
world; a war unlimited in spatial or temporal scope that encompassed the entire 
population of the earth.86 President Bush highlighted the significance of these operations 
in an address to a joint session of Congress on September 20 2001 when he famously 
warned that, "either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”87 This highly 
provocative and divisive response to the attacks of September 11 was replicated on the 
domestic front. The exceptional threat of future terror attacks was used to justify the 
introduction of controversial legislation curbing civil liberties and permitting widespread 
surveillance, such as the USA PATRIOT Act first passed by Congress a month after the 
attacks.  
 
While exceptional legal measures were rolled out to respond to domestic terror threats, 
military operations aimed at policing global terror networks were launched in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the line between domestic and international was blurred by the 
emergence of new subjects and new spaces with a liminal relationship to both the 
domestic laws of the United States and International Law. As part of the global ‘war on 
terror’, a program of extraordinary rendition was introduced whereby the United States 
Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) abducted those suspected of links to terrorist 
organizations and transported them to secret prisons for internment and interrogation. 
Likewise, those detained during combat operations in Afghanistan, including U.S. 
                                                
86 See for example President Bush Releases National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 14, 2003: 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html 
‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, the official name for the Afghanistan mission also provided an umbrella for 
military operations in the Philippines, the Horn of Africa and the Sahara/Sahel regions of Africa.  
87 See President George W. Bush ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People’, 
September 20, 2001: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html 
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citizens, were deemed ‘illegal enemy combatants’ or ‘unlawful combatants’ and 
transported to detention camps at the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. 
Neither group were formally charged with any crime and faced indefinite detention 
without trial in detention centres, deemed to be outside the jurisdiction of United States 
courts and denied the protection of International Law. Many were subject to the 
‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ introduced to C.I.A and Department of Defence 
(DoD) operations as part of the effort to combat ‘terror’, which, many critics claimed, 
amounted to torture. These measures were widely criticized for ignoring the legal 
protections afforded to suspects in legal cases, the rights granted to prisoners both under 
U.S. and International Law and disrespecting the sovereignty of states from whose 
jurisdiction suspects were abducted.  
 
Whilst some of the neoconservatives occupying powerful positions in the Bush 
administration saw the post-911 moment as a chance to shape a ‘New World Order’ 
around American interests, it appeared that the ‘war on terror’ was contributing rather to 
the rapid spread of a dangerous global disorder.88 Whatever degree of stability and 
accountability existing institutions of international law had been providing seemed to be 
crumbling under the force of an American administration committed to a seemingly 
limitless conflict against an amorphous and ill-defined global enemy—a process that had 
already led to the invasion and occupation of two states and the dismantling of the 
domestic and international statute books. It was precisely within this context that Carl 
Schmitt’s work on international law and geopolitical order emerged as a source of 
seemingly apt insights into the changing nature of international law, global ordering and 
modern warfare.  
 
                                                
88 There has been an abundance of commentary on the neoconservative influence on the Presidency of 
George W. Bush and do I not wish to add to this here. Several commentators have linked the 
neoconservatives in the Bush administration to Carl Schmitt’s work, usually through rather spurious and 
unsubstantiated links to Leo Strauss’s students but often through mere innuendo. For a recent example, 
typically lacking any supporting evidence, see for example, Benno Teschke’s claim that the foreign policy 
of the Bush Presidency “actualized” Schmitt’s thought. See: Benno Teschke, “Decisions and Indecisions,” 
New Left Review 68 (2011), 61-95. Chantal Mouffe has rightly corrected this view by pointing out that the 
Bush Presidency’s foreign policy was typical of the universalistic dissolution of international order that 
Schmitt critiqued in U.S. foreign policy since Woodrow Wilson. See: Chantal Mouffe, “Schmitt’s Vision of 
a Multipolar World Order,” South Atlantic Quarterly 104 (2005), 245.  
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Schmitt had largely crafted this work on international law between the early 1930s and 
the early 1950s as a series of polemics against the crisis of state sovereignty he located in 
the creeping moralization of warfare following the Versailles Treaty and the expanding 
global reach of U.S. interventionism. His aim had been to hail the great success of the 
European state system in limiting war and assert the sovereign power of Germany at a 
time when the reigns of global power were shifting across the Atlantic. Despite these 
differences in historical and political context, many found in Schmitt’s work a conceptual 
framework within which to understand post-911 global politics. Part of the reason lay in 
the fact that the collapse of international order in the early decades of the last century 
continued to cast a shadow at the dawn of the new century. Jan-Werner Müller has 
argued that Schmitt was “a thinker during a time of transition – and a thinker of the 
transition,”89 a transition the International Relations scholars Louiza Odysseos and Fabio 
Petito note, “in which we are still, arguably, living.”90 But the burgeoning literature that 
employed insights from Schmitt work to understand the extension of U.S. power under 
the rubric of the ‘war on terror’ related principally to two specific elements of his 
critique: the operation of U.S. imperialism via interventionism and the duplicities and 
dangers of humanitarian warfare. 
 
At the centre of Schmitt’s work on international law and geopolitical order lay a powerful 
critique of U.S. interventionism. In his 1950 book The Nomos of the Earth, he argued that 
the specific means of U.S imperialism was intervention rather than direct occupation.91 
The United States intervened in other states to protect its interests when it felt it 
necessary but did not take these other states under direct administration nor disturb their 
territorial integrity. Rather than establish direct control over another state’s territory, the 
U.S. maintained an ambiguous ‘absent-presence,’ legitimizing its intervention in some 
                                                
89 Müller, A Dangerous Mind, 245. 
90 Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito, “Vagaries of Interpretation: A Rejoinder to David Chandler’s 
Reductionist Reading of Carl Schmitt,” Millennium 37 (2008), 475. This paper was a response to David 
Chandler’s polemical attack on the Schmitt ‘revival’ in International Relations. See: David, Chandler. “The 
Revival of Carl Schmitt in. International Relations: The Last. Refuge of Critical Theorists?” Millennium 37 
(2008): 27-48. 
91 This built on arguments Schmitt had already advanced in 1933 in “Forms of Modern Imperialism in 
International Law.” See: Carl Schmitt, “Forms of Modern Imperialism in International Law” in Spatiality, 
Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos, edited by Stephen Legg, 29-45, London: 
Routledge, 2010. 
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states but banning other states from intervening where its interests might be threatened. 
Whilst this interventionism was at first limited to the ‘Western Hemisphere’ in the 
Monroe Doctrine of 1823, Schmitt traced how it was expanded into a global ‘pan-
interventionism’ over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth Centuries. In Schmitt’s 
view this ‘pan-interventionism’ effectually established a hierarchy of sovereign power 
between states.92 The United States reserved for itself a greater degree of sovereignty, 
unilaterally legitimizing its own interventions and banning that of other states. For many 
authors, this interventionist model of imperialism outlined by Schmitt perfectly described 
the exercise of U.S. power in the ‘war on terror.’93 Not only had the United States 
unilaterally invaded Iraq without the sanction of the United Nations, hence showing that 
the U.S. followed its own prerogative, but it had maintained the territorial integrity of 
both Iraq and Afghanistan whilst propping up new governments with engaged military 
presence specifically not defined as ‘occupation’. Further, the program of ‘extraordinary 
rendition’ saw this ‘pan-interventionism’ extended to the abduction of individual terror 
suspects from different jurisdictions.  
 
An analysis of the antinomies of ‘humanitarian war’ was the second major aspect of 
Schmitt’s work on international law seized upon in the critique of the ‘war on terror.’ 
Schmitt closed The Concept of the Political, his best-known book in English, with a 
scathing attack on the hypocrisies and dangers of framing war in a humanitarian 
discourse.94 For Schmitt the introduction of universal categories such as ‘humanity’ into 
the discourse of war allowed one side to occupy the position of ‘humanity’ and hence 
define their opponent as the ‘enemy of humanity’. This displaced war into a moral 
framework that, on the one hand, depoliticized the enemy, rendering him a mere criminal 
                                                
92 The manner in which the concept of an ‘unequal sovereignty’ has been employed in order to legitimate 
military intervention in so called ‘failed’ states but to ensure that their territorial integrity is maintained has 
been discussed by the British geographer Stuart Elden in his recent Terror and Territory. See: Stuart Elden, 
Terror and Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
2009).  
93 See for example: Roland Axtmann, “Humanity or Enmity? Carl Schmitt on International Politics,” 
International Politics 44 (2007), 531-551; Julien Freund, “Schmitt’s Political Thought,” Telos 105 (1995), 
11-42; William Rasch, “Human Rights as Geopolitics” (2003). 
94 This vitriolic attack on humanitarian warfare was replicated in a 1930 essay. See: Carl Schmitt, “Ethic of 
State and Pluralistic State” in The Challenge of Carl Schmitt, edited by Chantal Mouffe, 195-208. London: 
Verso, 1999. 
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to be policed whilst, on the other, intensifying the degree of enmity precisely by making 
the enemy an inhuman outcast of humanity. This had two profound effects. In the first 
instance, war was rhetorically intensified, since an ‘inhuman’ enemy did not deserve 
respect and could thus be exposed to the most extreme forms of violence.  Secondly, the 
distinction between war and peace was dissolved as war became indistinguishable from 
policing criminals and peace could never be established with an ‘inhuman’ criminal 
outcast. Thus humanitarian war was especially barbaric and knew no limits in its intensity 
or its duration: a permanent, total war. By conducting war in the name of a moral 
universality, the boundaries between war and peace, enemy and criminal, combatant and 
civilian and inside and outside on which international order had rested were eroded, and a 
horrific indeterminacy entered all political categories. 
 
For many authors, Schmitt’s critique perfectly described the ‘war on terror’. The United 
States had declared itself to be engaged in an endless global war against the enemies of 
humanity. The enemy, ‘terror’, was, on the one hand, so ill-defined and flexible that it 
could never be definitively beaten whilst, on the other, it had no place in the legal norms 
governing the rules of warfare and could thus be legitimately exposed to the most terrible 
violence beyond the protection of the law. Through a Schmittian lens the inhumane 
conditions faced by the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay was the perverse underside of a war 
fought in the name of ‘humanity.’95  
 
In so far as the ‘war on terror’ saw the extension of U.S. power beyond the norms of 
international law in a series of military interventions, it had provided a fertile ground for 
a second phase of Schmitt’s Anglophone ‘renaissance’ that drew on his critiques of U.S. 
imperialism and humanitarian war. However, to fully grasp the nature of Schmitt’s 
reception during the ‘post-911’ years, it is necessary to understand the impact that 
Giorgio Agamben’s work and the emergence of new Schmitt translations had on his 
‘revival’ during the 2000s. In a sense two new Schmitts emerged for Anglophone 
audiences in the last decade significantly influencing how his work has been received 
                                                
95 See for example: William Rasch, “Human Rights as Geopolitics” (2003). 
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since: the ‘late’ Schmitt whose work focused on international law and global order and 
the ‘biopolitical’ Schmitt that emerged from Agamben’s work.  
  
(ii) The Post-Agamben Schmitt 
 
It is hard to overstate the influence that Giorgio Agamben’s works, particularly Homo 
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998) and State of Exception (2005), have had on 
the reception of Schmitt’s thought in the 2000s.96 These books introduced Schmitt’s work 
to new audiences, specifically in the context of the ‘war on terror’. Indeed, it is not an 
exaggeration to say that the ‘post-Agamben’ Schmitt is the one most frequently 
encountered in Anglophone discussions in recent years.  
 
The key innovation of Agamben’s Homo Sacer was to read Schmitt’s account of 
sovereignty in relation to the critique of biopolitics found in the work of Michel Foucault. 
Foucault conceived biopolitics as the exertion of political power over the biological life 
of the population through modern technologies of discipline and control that he described 
as ‘governmentality’.97 This understanding of biopolitics has been frequently contrasted 
to a model of political power focused on state sovereignty. As Foucault famously stated 
“we need to cut off the king's head: in political theory that has still to be done".98 
Agamben sought to examine sovereignty and biopolitics as complementary, not 
contrasting, models of power. In Agamben’s reading, modern state sovereignty produces 
the population as an object of its rule. In Homo Sacer he argued that the key to 
understanding the nature of contemporary politics was to align the theory of sovereignty 
                                                
96 See: Stephen Legg and Alexander Vasudevan, “Introduction: Geographies of the Nomos,” in Spatiality, 
Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos, ed. Stephen Legg (London: Routledge, 2011), 
10. 
97 For more on Foucault and biopolitics see: Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol.1: The Will to 
Knowledge (London: Penguin, 1976); Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the 
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found in Schmitt’s work with the critique of governmental control drawn from the 
Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics.99  
 
Agamben’s reading of Schmitt was a novel addition to Anglophone debates but drew on a 
broader tradition of engagement that the German thinker’s work had with the Italian Left. 
From the early 1970s, thinkers associated with the Italian radical Left have been drawn to 
Schmitt’s work earning the label ‘Marxisti Schmittiani’.100 In the early 1970s, thinkers 
associated with the Autonomia movement drew on Schmitt’s work as a way to rethink 
class struggle by asserting the radical autonomy of the factory workers from the 
institutional structures of the traditional Left at a time when the Italian Communist Party 
(PCI) had accepted the consensus of parliamentary politics.101 As early as 1972 Mario 
Tronti, the editor of the journal Quaderni rossa, appealed to Schmitt’s concept of the 
‘autonomy of the political’ in formulating a theoretical basis for the workers’ movement 
beyond the strictures of the PCI and the parliamentary.102 The legacy of this engagement 
with Schmitt’s thought runs through the Italian radical Left and his work remains a major 
point of reference in the work of thinkers such as Massimo Cacciari, Roberto Esposito, 
Antonio Negri and Paolo Virno, amongst others.103 A major feature of this trajectory of 
Italian political thought has been the use of Schmittian categories within a broader 
conceptual framework defined by the critique of biopolitics. Although substantial 
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differences exist in a manner in which Agamben, Esposito, Negri and Virno conceive of 
biopolitics and the role that Schmittian concepts play in their philosophical edifice, all 
share in an approach that fuses critiques of sovereign power and biopolitical 
governmentality. Whilst the reception of Schmitt’s thought on the Italian Left can 
therefore not be reduced to Agamben’s reading of the relationship between Schmittian 
sovereignty and Foucauldian biopolitics, Homo Sacer and State of Exception introduced 
an important element of the Italian debate around Schmitt’s work into the second phase 
of his Anglophone ‘revival.’ 
 
Two conceptual components of Agamben’s Homo Sacer shaped the second phase of 
Schmitt’s Anglophone reception, each of which was taken to have particular bearing in 
the context of post-911 global politics. The first element was the claim, advanced in 
Homo Sacer, that sovereign power was necessarily bound up with the biopolitical 
production of what Agamben called ‘bare life’. ‘Bare life’ in Agamben’s view is "human 
life...included in the juridical order solely in the form of its exclusion (that is, of its 
capacity to be killed)".104 Agamben argued that the law gained its power over the 
population by enacting a separation between qualified political life (bios) and biological 
life (zoe). Thus, even those consigned to mere biological life remained under the power 
of the law even as they were excluded from the political life of the citizen. Those who 
were only granted ‘bare life’ were excluded from the law’s protections but still exposed 
to its force. This paradoxical position of ‘bare life’ both inside and outside the law was, 
Agamben argued, the exact mirror image of Schmitt’s Sovereign. The Sovereign, for 
Schmitt, was defined by the ability to decide on the state of exception and suspend the 
law in order to protect it in moments of extreme crisis. It was precisely in this suspension 
of the law that ‘bare life’ was produced. Sovereign power fundamentally relied therefore, 
in Agamben’s view, on the state of exception whereby ‘bare life’ could be encompassed 
in the law through its very suspension.  
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For many readers, the production of ‘bare life,’ paradoxically included in the law through 
its exclusion, described precisely the new categories of extra-legal subjects generated by 
the ‘war on terror’ such as the inmates of Guantanamo Bay. Agamben himself pointed to 
this reading in his 2005 book State of Exception. There he argued that “the immediately 
biopolitical significance of the state of exception as the original structure in which law 
encompasses living beings by means of its own suspension emerges clearly” in the 
‘military order’ issued by President Bush in November 2001 which allowed non-citizens 
to be held ‘indefinitely’ and tried in ‘military commissions’.105 Legislation such as the 
USA PATRIOT Act seemed to indicate the growing normalization of the state of 
exception that Agamben had warned against in Homo Sacer, a point he directly made in 
State of Exception.106 Many of the key features of the ‘war on terror’ seemed to be 
illustrating Agamben’s thesis that sovereign power operated precisely through the state of 
exception and that the U.S. seemed to be placing itself in the position of a global 
sovereign police producing a new form of biopolitical order. It was in this highly charged 
political context that Agamben’s biopolitical reading of Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty 
became widespread.107 As the rule of exception appeared to take an ever greater role in 
the operations of global power, so too did Schmitt become an increasingly frequent 
reference point, even if the extent of that reference was often limited to the relationship 
between sovereignty and exception in his thought. 
 
The second element of Agamben’s analysis in Homo Sacer that had a profound impact on 
the reception of Schmitt’s work in the 2000s was his introduction of the concept of 
nomos. For Schmitt nomos indicated the spatial nature of every political and legal order; 
the foundational relationship between ‘ordering’ and ‘localization’. Although this was a 
key concept in Schmitt’s thought, it appeared in later works that were not available in 
English until 2003, and had therefore not received significant attention before Agamben 
made use of it. The appearance of Homo Sacer thus marked the first time in Anglophone 
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debate that Schmitt had been approached as an eminently spatial thinker, and for this 
reason Agamben’s work is particularly significant for me. Agamben’s key move was to 
relate the concept of the ‘nomos of the earth’, or a global spatial order found in Schmitt’s 
late work, to his concept of the state of exception. Schmitt’s work showed, Agamben 
argued, “how the link between localization and ordering constitutive of the nomos of the 
earth always implies a zone that is excluded from law and that takes the shapes of a ‘free 
and juridically empty space’.”108 In Agamben’s reading, the state of exception always 
operated within and through a certain space of exception. Importantly, however, the 
‘juridically empty space’ of the state of exception “is not external to the nomos but rather, 
even in its clear delimitation, included in the nomos as a moment that is in every sense 
fundamental.”109 Thus, Agamben argued, for Schmitt the space of exception was 
structurally foundational to the nomos of the earth. But the fact that the state of exception 
relied on the sovereign and ‘bare life’ being paradoxically both inside and outside the law 
meant that it was ‘essentially unlocalizable’ and always required an ordering of space to 
establish the ‘juridically empty space’ around which the nomos of the earth was 
structured. However, Agamben noted that when “our age tried to grant the unlocalizable 
a permanent and visible localization, the result was the concentration camp.”110 The camp 
was, Agamben declared, the “nomos of the modern”.111 Although Homo Sacer’s 
publication pre-dated the ‘war on terror’ by several years, a number of thinkers drew on 
this concept of the camp as the definitive localization of the exception to describe the 
detention camps at Guantanamo Bay.112 Those detained were declared to be in a space 
literally ‘beyond the law’, excluded from its protections but exposed to its force: homo 
sacri.  
 
Although the U.S. detention centres at Guantanamo Bay seemed to illustrate Agamben’s 
thesis that the space of the camp was the ‘nomos of the modern’, Homo Sacer had in fact 
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presented an argument for the emergence of a new nomos of the earth. Agamben argued 
that the state of exception was becoming “more and more to the foreground as the 
fundamental political structure [of the age] and ultimately becomes the rule.”113 This 
marked the beginnings of a new nomos that was not characterized by clear lines of 
distinction between order and disorder, inside and outside, as Schmitt’s old nomos of the 
earth had been, but rather by ‘zones of indistinction’. The “constitutive link between 
localization and ordering of the old nomos was broken”, he argued, and “the ‘juridically 
empty’ space of the state of exception … has transgressed its boundaries and now, 
overflowing outside them, is starting to coincide with the normal order.”114 This new 
nomos, Agamben argued, “no longer orders forms of life and juridical rules in a 
determinate place, but instead, contains at its very centre … a ‘dislocating localization’” 
into which any forms of life can be virtually absorbed.115 Agamben’s work suggested that 
the new nomos of the earth was a “nomos of exception,” as Francois Debrix argued; a 
“virtual nomos” where everyone becomes a potential homo sacri.116 In such a ‘virtual 
nomos’, everyone is potentially exposed to the state of exception at any moment. Rather 
than rely upon clearly delineated spaces of order and disorder, norm and exception, this 
new nomos could at once suspend everyone in a virtual state of exception and, in an 
instant, localize it in the bodies of those declared outside the law. This global state of 
exception seemed to represent a dangerous fusion of geopolitics and biopolitics, a 
“biopolitical nomos”, as the Italian geographer Claudio Minca argues.117 This new 
(dis)order did not seek to establish a new stable order, Minca argues, but rather sought to 
keep “open the possibility of playing at the threshold of indistinction between a norm and 
its (dis)application.”118 The global state of exception seemed to represent a dangerous 
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fusion of geopolitics and biopolitics that left everyone virtually exposed. It was a 
situation, as Agamben warned, “in which everything again becomes possible.” 
 
Once again, Agamben’s theoretical innovations seemed to find brutal reflection in the 
emerging geopolitical realities of the ‘post-911’ era. From the US’s ‘extraordinary 
rendition’ program to the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes in the London 
Underground by anti-terror officers in 2005 and the increasing use of biometric controls 
in border controls, the concept of a virtual biopolitical nomos of exception seemed to be 
taking concrete shape in the ‘war on terror’.119 In the terms of Agamben’s analysis it 
could be argued that the ‘war on terror’ indicated that an old nomos was collapsing and a 
new nomos was emerging but has not yet fully developed. On the one hand, the United 
States was attempting to produce a localization of the exception in sites such as the 
detention camps in Guantanamo Bay where enemies could be removed from the law. On 
the other hand, it was dissolving the very possibility of marking a distinction between 
inside and outside, order and disorder, norm and exception, by rendering the entire globe 
the potential site for the ‘dislocating localization’ of a virtual biopolitical state of 
exception. It was into this intellectual and political context where Agamben’s ideas on the 
state of exception were being applied to the analysis of the ‘war on terror’ that The 
Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt’s masterwork of international thought, emerged in English 
translation for the first time in 2003.  
 
(iii) The ‘Missing Classic’ of IR 
 
The publication of Schmitt’s The Nomos of the Earth in English in 2003 opened an 
entirely new area of Schmitt’s corpus to the Anglophone debate. Frederic Jameson 
quickly declared Nomos to be a work of “astonishing contemporaneity” and it soon 
received a wave of critical attention in a series of special issues and essay collections in 
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the first years after its publication.120 The surge of interest in Schmitt’s late work sparked 
by the publication of The Nomos of the Earth was fuelled further by the publication of his 
short 1962 book The Theory of the Partisan in 2007.121 These new translations made it 
possible for Anglophone readers to engage with Schmitt’s work on international law and 
geopolitical order for the first time, signalling a major shift in his reception.122  
 
It is perhaps no surprise that the reception of Schmitt’s work grew rapidly in International 
Relations, [henceforth IR] where The Nomos of the Earth was heralded by Louiza 
Odysseos and Fabio Petito as a “missing classic” of the discipline.123 Schmitt’s whole 
oeuvre, Odysseos and Petito argued, deserved reconsideration “not as marginal to 
International Relations, but as central to its key concerns.”124 Likewise William Hooker, 
the author of the most extensive work on Schmitt within IR thus far, noted in 2009 that 
Schmitt’s “arrival as a serious object of debate in international political theory is 
overdue.”125 Indeed, a number of authors have read The Nomos of the Earth as offering 
an alternative history of the rise and fall of the modern European state system opposed to 
the standard accounts of ‘Westphalia’ within the discipline.126 Further, some argued that 
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it was precisely by following Schmitt’s account of the collapsing ‘Westphalian’ state 
system that the nature of the contemporary international crisis signalled by the ‘war on 
terror’ could better be grasped. Gary Ulmen, the translator of The Nomos of the Earth and 
The Theory of the Partisan, argued that the ‘war on terror’ was a symptom of the 
breakdown of normative order in international relations and that global terrorism marked 
the emergence of the ‘global civil war’ Schmitt had feared.127 Several thinkers such as 
Alain de Benoist, Linda S. Bishai, Andreas Behnke and Louiza Odysseos followed 
Schmitt in locating the emergence of this global (dis)order in the failure of liberal 
cosmopolitanism to address the antagonistic dimensions of political relations and the 
need for a restraining power capable of limiting war on the one side and the unchecked 
hegemony of the United States on the other.128 Hence, it was argued that from within the 
longue durée perspective afforded by The Nomos of the Earth, the ‘war on terror’ could 
be seen not so much as an anomaly of ‘current affairs’ but the culmination of several 
longer term tendencies in modern European and world history.  
 
Perhaps the most important and certainly the most curious, if not disturbing, aspect of 
Schmitt’s recent ‘renaissance’ has been the way in which a number of thinkers have 
turned to his thought in the search for a model for alternative world order. Schmitt’s 
notion of a global order based around a number of Continental Großräume (large spaces) 
has found enthusiastic support from some quarters. Schmitt’s proposal for a new nomos 
based upon a division of the earth into a number of Großräume is found in the third of the 
three ‘corollaries’ that accompany The Nomos of the Earth. However, the version that 
appears there is ideologically ‘cleansed’ of the work Schmitt carried out in the late 1930s 
and early 1940s during the expansion of the Nazi Reich. The context in which Schmitt 
developed his theory of Großraum is often ignored by those calling for a new, multipolar 
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world order based on Schmitt’s concept of Großraum.129 In their appeal to a Schmittian 
model of multipolarity, thinkers on the Left, such as Chantal Mouffe, Fabio Petito, 
William Rasch and Danilo Zolo, have made strange bedfellows of European New Right 
intellectuals such as Alain de Benoist and Russian ‘neo-fascist’ proponents of a 
‘Eurasian’ great space such as Alexander Dugin.130 The argument these authors make is 
that a multipolar world order would protect political pluralism and fend against the 
dangers of unipolar U.S. domination. For these multipolar Schmittians, the emergence of 
global terror networks is symptomatic of the exclusion of genuine political pluralism 
under the conditions of unipolar U.S. domination.131 Likewise the US-led ‘war on terror’ 
illustrates that a single hegemonic world power can neither bring stability nor limit 
conflict.132 The only solution, it is argued, is a multipolar world order organized around 
distinct geographic power blocks. 133  
 
(iv) Schmitt’s Geographers 
 
It was also during the second phase of Schmitt’s Anglophone ‘revival’ that his reception 
grew within the discipline of Geography. Although engagement with Schmitt’s work 
within geography remains limited, it is growing. The 2011 volume of essays, short 
thematic responses and fresh translations edited by Stephen Legg, Spatiality, Sovereignty 
and Carl Schmitt, marked something of a milestone. Before the publication of this 
collection however, the response to his work within Anglophone geography was slim and 
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scattered.134 It had been well known in Anglophone geographic debates since the 1940s 
that Schmitt had developed a controversial theory of geopolitical order based on the idea 
of Großraum at a time when the Nazi Reich was pursuing an aggressive policy of 
expansion. The complicated relationship between the German geopolitical tradition and 
Nazism had left a difficult legacy within the discipline of geography and there was 
understandable reluctance to making a fresh engagement with a thinker marred by an 
associated with Nazi spatial theory.135 
 
It cannot be predicted so soon after its publication whether or not Stephen Legg’s edited 
collection will spark a wider re-evaluation with Schmitt’s work in Anglophone 
Geography, but it marks a significant contribution to the debate in its own right. Although 
largely focused on a response to The Nomos of the Earth it is a wide-ranging collection 
that addressed Schmitt’s work from a variety of perspectives within the discipline. In 
longer articles, Gerry Kearns and Timothy W. Luke examine the relevance of Schmitt’s 
text to understanding contemporary political geographies of American power.136 Stephen 
Legg, by contrast, draws out the relationship between Schmitt’s work and the analysis of 
the imperial geographies of the interwar period.137 My own contribution alongside that of 
Claudio Minca examines Schmitt’s thought in relation to the question of spatial ontology 
and how it has been approached in recent multipolar readings of Schmitt and those in 
Italian political thought respectively.138 Matthew Coleman and Peter Rogers both find in 
The Nomos of the Earth analytical tools through which to examine colonial war and 
everyday life respectively, Coleman sketching the relationship between Schmitt and Hans 
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Morgenthau and Rogers the relationship between Schmitt and Foucault.139 These 
engagements show a depth and breadth to the potential engagements with Schmitt’s 
spatial thought within geography, and the relationship between his compromised political 
choices and his spatial thought. 
 
The most significant contribution the collection makes to the debates around Schmitt’s 
work, however, is in including two short texts by Schmitt, newly translated by the 
American geographer Matthew Hannah. The appearance of ‘Forms of modern 
imperialism in international law’ (1933) and ‘Großraum versus Universalism: the 
International Legal Struggle over the Monroe Doctrine’ (1939) in English for the first 
time mark a significant development in the reception of Schmitt’s later work and his 
spatial thought in particular. These texts represent an important point of conceptual 
development between the critique of humanitarian warfare and the Post-Versailles 
settlement found in The Concept of The Political, and the more fully developed account 
of global spatial order in The Nomos of the Earth. Further, the latter article allows 
Schmitt’s theory of Großraum to be located within the context of its original publication 
for the first time in English. Alongside the three important articles from the 1930s and 
1940s included in the 2011 collection Writings on War, the appearance of these works in 
translation allows a more thorough and critical assessment of Schmitt’s spatial thought 
and its relationship to Nazism than was previously possible in Anglophone debate.140 
 
There are two further recent works within Anglophone Geography that deserve mention 
here. The first is that of Claudio Minca. Although Minca’s work focuses on the complex 
spatialities of Giorgio Agamben’s conception of the state of exception, it represents one 
of the principal engagements with Schmitt’s spatial thought in Anglophone debate.141 
Minca’s work perhaps offers the deepest articulation of the how the relationship 
Agamben charts between biopolitics and geopolitics is indebted to the spatial foundations 
                                                
139 Matthew Coleman, “Colonial War: Carl Schmitt’s Deterritorialization of Enmity,” in Spatiality, 
Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt, edited by Stephen Legg, 127-142. London: Routledge, 2011; Peter Rogers, 
“Between Nomos and Everyday Life: Securing the Spatial Order of Foucault and Schmitt,” in Spatiality, 
Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt, edited by Stephen Legg, 182-197. London: Routledge, 2011. 
140 Schmitt, Writings on War, (2011) 
141 See: Claudio Minca “Agamben’s Geographies of Modernity’ (2007). 
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of Schmitt’s thought.142 Further, Minca traces this relationship from Agamben, via 
Schmitt, to the contested legacy of Friedrich Ratzel within the German geographic 
tradition. Minca’s work makes a considerable contribution to understanding Schmitt as a 
spatial thinker within the debates that emerged around Agamben’s theory of exception 
and the ‘war on terror’. The second, a different approach to understanding the relevance 
of Schmitt’s thought to geography, comes in a recent article by the German geographers 
Robert Meyer, Conrad Schetter and Janosch Prinz.143 This trio of authors argued that 
existing accounts of Schmitt’s thought had failed to account for the “complex 
theological-political-spatial triangle” that lay at the centre of his thought.144 In a deeply 
engaging analysis they argue that Schmitt’s spatial thought must be understood in relation 
to his Catholic faith and particularly the figure of the Katechon. In a second move, 
Meyer, Prinz and Schetter examine the potential relevance of Schmitt’s thought for 
debates on spatial contestation in contemporary Geography. On the one hand they argue 
that Schmitt’s thought offers powerful insights into the nature of the relationship between 
space and politics typical of a clearly defined nation-state. On the other, they argue that 
the disjuncture between Schmitt’s theoretical framework and that of recent Geographic 
theory leaves his thought of little use to thinking the nature of spatial contestation in the 
field of contemporary spatio-political relations. 
 
Outside geography, one of the most important Schmitt scholars, Carlo Galli, is relatively 
unknown in the Anglophone academy. As Professor in the Department of Historical 
Disciplines at the University of Bologna and co-editor, alongside Roberto Esposito, of the 
Encyclopedia of Political Thought: Authors, Concepts, Doctrines (first published in 
                                                
142 See: Claudio Minca, “Giorgio Agamben and the New Biopolitical Nomos” (2006). Minca effectively 
taps in to a rich seam of Italian thought that has read Schmitt as a spatial thinker for a much longer period 
than in English drawing on the Italian geographer Franco Farinelli and the urban theorists Andrea 
Cavalletti.  
143 Meyer, Robert, Schetter, Conrad, & Prinz, Janosch. “Spatial Contestation?: The theological foundations 
of Carl Schmitt’s spatial thought,” Geoforum, 43 (2012), 687-696. 
144 Ibid, 687. 
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2000), he is one of the most renowned political thinkers in Italy today.145 Galli’s career 
has been devoted to the rigorous examination and explication of Schmitt’s work.146 
 
In Galli’s reading Schmitt’s thought provides a geneaological account of the development 
and dissolution of modern politics as a specifically spatial form of ordering. Hence, for 
Galli, Schmitt is the paradigmatic thinker of modern ‘political space’, whose work 
contains the clearest distillation of the relationship between politics and space that has 
defined modernity. However, by accepting the terms of Schmitt’s conceptual framework 
Galli argues it is possible to understand the incapacity of Schmittian categories to deal 
with the transformations in spatio-political relations that took place in the late twentieth 
century. The ‘modern age’ has definitively passed, in Galli’s view, along with the  
‘political space’ Schmitt had defined, both of which have been replaced with a paradigm 
he refers to as the ‘global age’. The ‘global age’ requires, Galli argues, altogether new 
spatial and political categories that go beyond the terms of Schmitt’s thought, although he 
offers little indication of what these terms might be. While Galli’s account of the ‘global 
age’ is unconvincing and unsophisticated by the standards of contemporary Anglophone 
Geography, his account of modern ‘political space’ remains a tour de force of spatio-
political thought. By locating the production of modern ‘political space’ at the heart of 
Schmitt’s thought, Galli produces perhaps the strongest case for considering Schmitt as a 
‘spatial thinker’, whose concerns map against those of geographic thought. Indeed, 
Galli’s unconvincing account of the transition from the ‘modern age’ to the ‘global age’ 
means that Schmittian categories arguably remain more useful than Galli himself 
contends.  
 
                                                
145 For a brief account of Galli’s career and an extensive examination of his thought, particularly his 
relationship to Carl Schmitt, see:  Sitze, Introduction (2010).  
146 In 1996 Galli published his magnum opus - a monumental 936-page tome devoted to Schmitt, 
Genealogia della politica. See: Carlo Galli, Genealogia della Politica. (Bologna: il Mulino. 2010). Galli’s 
first book to be published in English is a double volume whose original elements were published in Italian 
in 2001 and 2002 respectively. See: Carlo Galli, Political Spaces and Global War (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010). Anglophone debate thus comes late to Galli’s work and much of it 
still remains untranslated. See also: Carlo Galli, “The Critic of Liberalism: Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism 
Its Theoretical and Historical Sources and its Philosophical and Political Meaning.” Cardozo Law Review, 
21 (2000), 1597-1619. 
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No consensus on the value or limitation of Schmitt’s thought, nor even on its nature, 
emerges from his recent reception in Geography. However, it seems clear from the 
variety of Geographic texts engaging with Schmitt, slim as it may be, that his thought 
bears on some of the key concerns of the discipline and opens up various avenues of 
investigation for geographic thought. The engagements made by a range of authors such 
as Kearns, Legg, Luke, and Vaughan-Williams indicate the potential application of 
Schmittian thought in the analysis of historical and contemporary political geographies. 
Further, the possibilities for productive dialogue between Schmitt’s work and that of 
other thinkers, such as Giorgio Agamben and Michel Foucault, in relation to geographic 
concerns, is visible in the work of Hannah, Minca and Rogers. Conversely, the need for 
contemporary Anglophone debate on Schmitt’s work, and particularly on his spatial 
thought, to engage with his difficult relationship to Nazi spatial theory and the German 
geopolitical tradition more broadly is underlined by Atkinson and Elden. Indeed, Galli, 
Mendieta, Meyer et al., Minca, and Zarmanian all emphasize the fact that any critical and 
productive engagement with Schmitt’s thought depends upon developing a better 
understanding of the spatial aspects of his work.147 Despite the divergence of their 
methods and perspectives, the latter group of authors approach Schmitt’s work as a 
source of insights into the potentially ontological relationship between space and politics 
on the one hand and the historical specificity of modern spatio-political relations on the 
other. Of course, before the use and limitation of Schmitt’s work for geographic thought 
can be fully assessed, it is important to examine more closely the role that spatial 
concepts play in his thought. This is the task to which the current thesis seeks to 
contribute.  
 
(4) An Open Space: Methodology and Contribution  
 
Despite the extent of the work on Carl Schmitt sketched above, gaps nonetheless remain 
in the secondary literature and many areas for further investigation suggest themselves. 
One such gap is a sustained analysis of the role of space in Schmitt’s thought. This may 
                                                
147 See: Eduardo Mendieta, Land and Sea. In Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt, edited by Stephen 
Legg, 260-267 (London: Routledge, 2011). 
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seem counter-intuitive given that much of the second phase of Schmitt’s Anglophone 
reception has focused on his work on international order helping Schmitt to emerge as a 
‘spatial thinker’. However, despite this surge of interest in Schmitt’s spatial thought, 
there has as yet been no significant attempt in the Anglophone literature to systematically 
analyse the role of spatial concepts in his work. This thesis aims to address this empty 
space in the existing literature. 
 
What has been lacking thus far is not an analysis of Schmitt’s spatial thought but, rather, 
a single study dedicated to examining the role of space in his thought as a whole. Existing 
engagements with Schmitt’s spatial thought have advanced through partial readings 
rather than attempting to trace the relationship of spatial concepts to his overall oeuvre. 
These readings have fallen broadly into one of two frameworks. 
 
Firstly, during the second phase of Schmitt’s recent ‘revival’, a relatively slender set of 
insights and concepts were appropriated from his thought in order to illuminate certain 
aspects of the contemporary political and historical context. For example, many recent 
readers plucked concepts such as ‘the political’, ‘state of exception’ and ‘nomos’ from 
Schmitt whilst paying relatively little attention to their structural importance within his 
work as a whole or their position within the trajectory of his thought. By reading 
Schmitt’s spatial thought through the concepts of the ‘state of exception’ or ‘nomos’ in 
isolation, often exclusively through the lens of Agamben’s work, or by confining his 
work to the critique of the ‘war on terror’, there has been a persistent danger that a partial 
reading of Schmitt’s work will become popularized, obscuring the wider relevance of his 
work and his spatial thought in particular. Although these concepts were often employed 
productively in the diagnosis and critique of the ‘post-911’ era, there was a risk that the 
structural integrity of spatial concepts in his thought as a whole will be overlooked or 
under-examined.  
 
Secondly, the recent reception has tended to periodise his work into early and late phases, 
with spatial concerns located solely in the latter. Thus, a picture emerges of a late, 
‘spatial’ Schmitt clearly distinct from an early, ‘pre-spatial’ Schmitt. There is certainly 
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some justification for marking this division in Schmitt’s oeuvre: in On the Three Types of 
Juristic Thought (1934) Schmitt himself located a shift in the conceptual framework of 
his work in the early 1930s from ‘decisionism’ to ‘concrete order thinking’, where the 
former emphasised the foundations of order in a groundless sovereign decision and the 
latter, the deeper socio-historical and spatial foundations of ordering institutions. Further, 
from the late 1930s, Schmitt increasingly turned his attention from the critique of 
constitutional law to the analysis of international law and geopolitical order. Taking into 
account this shift in the conceptual framework and the focus of Schmitt’s thought around 
the mid-1930s, it is understandable that his work is divided into ‘early’ and ‘late’ phases. 
However, this development in Schmitt’s theoretical trajectory is too easily identified with 
a supposed ‘spatial turn’ in his work. Such an interpretation has been particularly marked 
within Schmitt’s Anglophone reception where his early work has largely been received 
through The Concept of the Political (1927) and Political Theology (1922), in which 
spatial themes seem marginal, and through his late work, in particular, The Nomos of the 
Earth (1950) where they clearly predominate. However, the almost exclusive 
identification of Schmitt’s spatial thought with his late work has served to distract from 
the structural importance spatial concepts have in his earlier work and the conceptual 
continuities between the different periods of his work.  
 
The current investigation seeks to avoid such partial readings by focusing squarely and 
comprehensively on Schmitt’s work, in contrast to those readings which approach 
Schmitt by way of another thinker’s work or as a source of ideas for application in 
historical or political critique. I will seek, therefore, to engage with his thought on its own 
terms in order to reconstruct its central conceptual frameworks and track its development. 
Likewise, in probing the role of spatial concepts in Schmitt’s thought, I will not focus 
solely on his later works on international law and geopolitical order but examine the 
broad sweep of his corpus.  
 
In this way I hope to show that spatial concepts are not simply an object of concern 
during a particular period of Schmitt’s work, but rather play a conceptually structural role 
in his thought as a whole. These aims are nonetheless limited. I do not claim that spatial 
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concepts represent the hermeneutical key that unlocks the Arcanum of Schmitt’s thought, 
somehow revealing it’s otherwise hidden conceptual core. Neither do I claim to offer a 
definitive account of spatiality in Schmitt’s work. Rather, I seek to highlight the fact that 
spatial concepts play a structural role in Schmitt’s thought that has been under-examined 
in the existing Anglophone literature. Schmitt’s engagement with spatial concepts is rich 
and heterodox and I argue that the shift in his work is better understood as one between 
implicit and explicit engagements with spatial concepts. 
 
In doing so I hope to contribute to the existing literature in three ways. Firstly, I seek to 
show the importance of grasping the role of space in Schmitt’s work in order to 
understand the broader contours of his thought and, in particular, the conceptual 
continuities between the early and late phases of his work. By demonstrating the 
structural importance of spatial concepts within Schmitt’s work I hope to contribute to 
the debate on the fundamental nature of his thought that should interest Schmitt scholars 
across disciplinary boundaries. Secondly, by outlining Schmitt’s understanding of the 
necessarily spatial nature of politics, I hope to show that Schmitt’s work bears on some of 
the central concerns of political geography. Thirdly, I hope that by understanding the role 
of spatiality in Schmitt’s thought more clearly, the uses and limitations of his thought for 
geographic thought can be assessed more fully. More specifically, I hope that my analysis 
will provide a framework for critically evaluating the recent Anglophone reception of 
Schmitt’s spatial thought, particularly within the debates in International Relations and 
Geography.  
 
The methodology adopted is that of an intellectual biography that seeks to weave together 
a textual analysis of Schmitt’s work and a biographical and historical contextualisation of 
its development. Such an approach is more typical of work carried out within Political 
Theory or the history of ideas than Geography but I believe it is the correct path for a 
project that seeks principally to provide a comprehensive account of the role of spatial 
concepts in Schmitt’s work. There are several reasons why I choose to approach 
Schmitt’s work using this method. Firstly, given Schmitt’s broad and persistent influence 
on political thought on both the Right and the Left in Europe and the United States in the 
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post war era, as detailed above, it is important to clearly identify the nature of his thought 
and chart its relation to his political choices. In other words, before his concepts can be 
appropriated and applied to contemporary concerns it is crucial that the content of his 
work and the context from which it emerged have been correctly understood. This is as 
true of his spatial concepts as any other aspect of his work and the rather superficial and 
uncritical manner in which they have been engaged in recent years suggests the need for 
a deeper appreciation of the relationship between the content and context of Schmitt’s 
ideas. In order to address these concerns it was necessary to provide a detailed 
description and analysis of Schmitt’s spatial thought and further, to relate his work to the 
context in which it was forged. An intellectual biography that focused on the spatial 
aspects of Schmitt’s thought presented itself as the most suitable method available for 
such a task. 
 
The scant knowledge of Schmitt’s work within Anglophone Geography and the relative 
lack of engagement with his spatial thought within other disciplines meant that a project, 
such as this one, that hopes to provide a detailed account of Schmitt’s spatial thought 
necessarily requires an intensive focus on his body of work. However, due to Schmitt’s 
complicated and controversial political involvement with National Socialism I believe 
that such a sustained examination of his work calls for a diachronic approach that 
examines his thought in relation the biographical and historical context from which it 
emerged. When studying any political thinker deeply complicit with institutional power, 
it is important to probe the relationship between their thought and their political 
involvements. When that complicity involved, as in Schmitt’s case, having held 
institutional positions in, and actively tried to legitimate the policies of, a regime as 
odious as the Nazi state, then the imperative to examine the relationship between text and 
context becomes even more pressing. This is especially true for a study focusing on 
Schmitt’s spatial thought given his controversial attempts to formulate a grand spatial 
theory in support of Nazi imperial expansion. A project trying to account for Schmitt’s 
spatial thought without examining its relationship to his political entanglements would 
thus not only be methodologically suspect but also fail to grasp the profoundly polemical, 
and at times activist, nature of his work.  
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However, such a methodological approach that reads Schmitt’s thought in relation to the 
his biographical and historical context is not simply required in order to understand the 
development of his work or to answer the demands of controversy. It also offers an 
opportunity to use Schmitt’s life and work as a lens through which to examine the spatial 
underpinnings of modern European political thought more broadly and specifically its 
relationship to Nazi spatial thought. Thus, whilst the methods of intellectual biography 
are relatively unusual in Geography, especially when applied to a thinker outside the 
canon of the discipline, Schmitt’s position as a key figure in both twentieth century 
political thought and Nazi spatial theory make him, perhaps uniquely, suited to highlight 
the relationships between the often unarticulated spatial imaginaries underpinning 
modern political thought and some of the darkest periods of the last century in which he 
was deeply implicated. More broadly however, I believe that this project offers an 
example of the fruitful engagements that can be made with individual thinkers and their 
work within Geography: work that on the one hand, enriches the discipline, its relation to 
its own history and that of other fields, and on the other, makes a valuable addition to 
debates in other disciplines by bringing a geographic perspective to bear on their 
concerns.  
 
A variety of other methodological approaches that could be taken to Schmitt’s spatial 
thought of course presented themselves. For example, I did not employ a genealogical 
approach to examine Schmitt’s work in relation to certain German traditions of 
understanding the relationship between space and politics, whether in the work of 
geopolitical thinkers such as Ratzel and Haushofer (both of whom Schmitt references), or 
prominent philosophers such as Emmanuel Kant and G.F.W. Hegel. Nor did I focus on 
tracing Schmitt’s influence on contemporary spatial thinking in Europe or the United 
States, or more broadly upon the discipline of International Relations in the post war era, 
for example. Although Schmitt’s relation to both lines of thought is touched upon in this 
thesis these areas of investigation are nonetheless not the focus of the project and remain 
undeveloped. This is by no means to say that interesting work could not be done 
following these paths of inquiry. On the contrary, both would offer extremely valuable 
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additions to the understanding not only of Schmitt’s work but the development and 
intersection of modern lineages of modern political thought. Indeed, teasing out the 
conflicted relationship between Schmitt’s work and the tradition of German geopolitics 
and tracking his influence on post war conceptions of world order, particularly in 
International Relations, are two projects I hope to pursue in the future but both lie beyond 
the scope of this project.  
 
Neither did I approach Schmitt as a thinker from whose work I could draw insights in 
order to critically engage with a particular area or aspect of contemporary, or even 
historical, spatio-political relations. I did not, for example, use Schmitt’s conception of 
the sovereign exception and his critique of liberal humanitarianism to critique recent 
United States foreign policy nor his conception of a multipolar global order to frame an 
analysis of emerging patterns of regionalism in global affairs. There is much fruitful work 
to be done using such an approach, especially when selective insights are employed from 
Schmitt’s work alongside those from other thinkers such as Giorgio Agamben and Michel 
Foucault. Indeed, as noted above, many productive engagements have already been made 
with Schmitt’s work using such an approach. However, in my view it also important to 
understand the content and context of Schmitt’s spatial thought more fully in order to 
gain a deeper insight into the uses and limits of his concepts’ application today. This 
project is thus focused towards these ends and questions of applicability remained limited 
to the conclusions. I hope that by providing a fuller sense of the nature and trajectory of 
Schmitt’s spatial thinking than has hitherto been available in Anglophone scholarship this 
thesis will aid future studies that seek to engage with his work from a variety of 
approaches, such as those indicated above, both within Geography and beyond. 
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Chapter 2: Locating Schmitt 
 
 
If the last chapter made clear the context for the recent reception of Schmitt’s work it is 
likewise important to understand the context of its emergence before moving on to a 
deeper textual engagement. Such a contextualization is especially important given the 
controversial nature of Schmitt’s political affiliations and the deep differences of opinion 
that characterize the secondary literature. In this chapter I therefore provide a brief 
account of Schmitt’s life and career and an analysis of the intellectual currents from 
which his thought emerged. It is hoped that by situating Schmitt within his biographical, 
historical and intellectual context, the analysis of the nature and trajectory of his thought 
provided in later chapters can be better grasped.148 
 
(1) The Intellectual Adventurer: Biography and Career 
 
(i) An Obscure Young Man of Modest Origins: Early Life 
 
“[A]n obscure young man of modest origins” was how Schmitt neatly described himself 
in later life.149 He was born in 1888 in the provincial town of Plettenberg, the same year 
the young Wilhelm II ascended the throne, to a family on the lowest levels of the petty 
                                                
148 This chapter is deeply indebted to the work of other scholars. I make no great claim to originality here 
beyond synthesizing insights from the work of others. Rather than provide an exhaustive or original 
account of Schmitt’s life and intellectual lineage the chapter aims to offer sufficient biographical and 
intellectual background within which to frame the analysis provided in subsequent chapters. I owe 
particular debt to the work of Balakrishnan’s The Enemy (2000) and Jan-Werner Müller’s A Dangerous 
Mind (2003), two works of enormous scholarly rigor. Balakrishnan’s ‘intellectual portrait’ weaves a 
seamless account of the development of Schmitt’s thought in relation to his personal history from his early 
years until 1950. Balakrishnan considers “much of late came after” as “footnotes to earlier works” and of 
less intellectual interest (Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 260). Müller’s study by contrast seeks to dredge 
Schmitt’s influence on post-war European thought and hence focuses on the area that Balakrishnan’s study 
leaves out. Although his book lacks something of the biographical detail of Balakrishnan’s, Müller excels 
at providing an extraordinarily rich inventory of Schmitt’s shadowy presence in the recesses of the debates 
shaping post-war European thought. The two books thus provide good companion pieces, one passing the 
baton of analysis to the other around the pivot of the 1940s. I have also relied heavily on Raphael Gross’s 
immensely rich study of Schmitt’s thought. See: Raphael Gross, Carl Schmitt and the Jews: The ‘Jewish 
Question,’ The Holocaust ad German Legal Theory (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007). 
149 Müller, A Dangerous Mind, 19. 
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bourgeoisie. Plettenberg is located in the Sauerland region, at that time an evangelical 
Protestant area marginalized within the largely Roman Catholic Rhineland, a region itself 
on the margins of a German Empire dominated by the Protestant state of Prussia. 
Schmitt’s family background was professional but modest - his father worked at a local 
railway station - and intensely Catholic. The family’s Catholic identity may have been 
strengthened by their double alienation from the largely Protestant Sauerland and the 
official Prussian Protestantism of the German Empire, and many of Schmitt’s relatives 
were prominent local members of the Catholic Centre Party. Schmitt was born some 
years after the Kulturkampf, the battle between Bismarck and the Catholic Church that 
dominated the 1870s, but it cast a long shadow across relations between the Rhineland 
and Prussia and the Empire and its Catholic population. The legacy of the Kulturkampf 
was a deeply politicized Catholicism and a sense of provincial distance from the imperial 
metropole of Berlin that had a profound effect on the young Carl Schmitt. Schmitt later 
recounted that during his early years of university education in Berlin he felt a deep sense 
of alienation within the Prussian and imperial capital and remembered himself as if 
“standing wholly in the dark … [looking] from the darkness into a brightly lit room.”150  
 
This early sense of alienation from the German capital and its elites was never to wholly 
leave Schmitt, and appears to have filled him with a desire to be close to the political elite 
he felt shut out from by faith and family, and a thirsty ambition for ‘power over 
history’.151 It also allowed him a cold detachment from the pieties of Wilhelmine Kultur 
and the orthodoxies of Prussian liberalism. This latter point is significant in so far as 
Schmitt regarded those who wished to turn the clock back to the ancient regime of late 
nineteenth century Germany as hopelessly romantic reactionaries, unable to think clearly 
within the new categories of twentieth century politics. As Gopal Balakrishnan notes, 
“Carl Schmitt was an outsider in the Wilhelmine social world, and readily turned his back 
on the ‘good old days’ of prewar Germany.”152 This affective distance from the ‘good old 
                                                
150 Müller A Dangerous Mind, 18. 
151 Ibid, 12. Müller notes that Schmitt makes frequent use of the term Geschichtsmächtigkeit, which can be 
roughly rendered as ‘power to shape history’. Schmitt’s much remarked upon ambition and political 
opportunism certainly seems to betray a deep desire to be at the epicentre of historical developments and 
political events. See: Müller A Dangerous Mind, 253 n37. 
152 Balakrishan, The Enemy, 5. 
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days’ of imperial Germany that grew from Schmitt’s Catholic, provincial and petty 
bourgeois background allowed him to propose radical solutions to the crisis of the state in 
the Weimar era that looked beyond the crumbling edifice of the old order.  
 
The conservative American commentator Paul Gottfried has suggested that Schmitt’s 
experience of growing up in a marginalized Catholic Rhineland may have instilled in 
Schmitt the conviction that the state should stand firmly above civil society in order to 
neutralize conflicts.153 The need for the state to stand above society was one of the 
guiding assumptions of Schmitt’s work and he squarely identified religion as a concern of 
the latter. Whilst Müller argues that this separation has “since Hegel, in one way or 
another … been a kind of theoretical axis on which much German political thought has 
turned,” Schmitt’s theoretical commitment to an understanding of the state as 
transcendent to civil society was perhaps shaped by his early experience within a region 
and a community on the fringes of an empire itself cut of partisan cloth.154 This may 
seem at odds with Schmitt’s frequent recourse to Roman Catholic and Christian 
categories in his theoretical work, but he always stood at a remove from the tradition of 
‘political Catholicism’ in Germany and the Catholic Centre Party. This gap widened after 
Schmitt’s failed attempts to get his first marriage to a woman who had pretended to be a 
Serbian aristocrat annulled. After divorcing her, he was excommunicated in 1924. 
Schmitt had argued in his 1923 book Roman Catholicism and Political Form that the 
Medieval Catholic Church could serve an ailing Weimar state with a model of a higher 
power standing above a complex of social oppositions. However, he was not in favour of 
faith-based political parties such as the Catholic Centre Party asserting religious authority 
as political force in Germany or beyond. The state was to stand above the conflicts 
generated by a pluralist society, rather than to take sides within those conflicts. The 
politics of modern European statehood had been shaped by an irreversible secularization, 
in his eyes, and any attempt to politicize religion would only serve to undermine the 
                                                
153 See: Paul Gottfried, Carl Schmitt: Politics and Theory, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990). 
154 Müller, A Dangerous Mind, p 5. Balakrishnan makes similar speculations and it certainly seems that 
they are confirmed by Schmitt’s own later autobiographical reflections, although these need to be held at a 
critical distance given Schmitt’s self-mythologizing and his post-war desire to ‘cleanse’ his record. 
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ability of the state to stand above the increasingly conflict-ridden civil society and risk 
dragging state institutions into a partisan fray, as had been the case in the Kulturkampf.155  
 
Schmitt was not especially concerned with political affairs during the swansong of the 
Wilhelmine Empire, and even the First World War was not initially enough to politicize 
the young legal scholar. Rather, he spent the war in Munich living the life of a semi-
bohemian romantic adventurer in the city’s coffee houses, moving amongst the 
intellectual literati, penning “Dada avante-la-lettre’ under a pseudonym and writing 
appraisals of the minor expressionist poet Theodor Däubler, whilst serving in the 
Bavarian Ministry of War as a propaganda censor (reading Ernst Bloch’s Spirit of Utopia 
in his official capacity). During this period he seemed largely politically indifferent and 
was more concerned with exercising his profound distaste for the official Kultur of the 
Wilhelmine Reich, openly satirizing the heroes of the bourgeoisie such as Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Thomas Mann and Walter Rathenau and flirting with the anti-war sentiments 
circulating the cafes he frequented, apparently immune to the ultra-patriotism sweeping 
the country. As Gopal Balakrishnan has argued in his excellent biography of Schmitt’s 
early life and work, Schmitt remained curiously aloof from any sweeping sense of 
German nationalism during the war, and unaffected by the collapse of the German 
Empire into a state of civil war in the wake of his country’s defeat.  
 
But if his politicization was unusually slow in developing, it was all the more sharp in its 
appearance. In 1919 Schmitt published his first major book, Political Romanticism, a 
work of intellectual history indebted to Max Weber, whose lectures Schmitt was 
attending in Munich at the time. Political Romanticism was a cultural critique of 
bourgeois civilization and particularly of the failure of German conservatives to grapple 
with the wreckage wrought on the political landscape by the First World War. In it 
Schmitt mercilessly attacked the romanticism that he understood to dominate both liberal 
and conservative political thought in Germany at the start of an unpredictable new era. 
                                                
155 This is a point Schmitt made forcefully in his 1930 article Ethics of State and Pluralist Ethic when he 
pointed to the structural similarities in the arguments made for autonomy by German Catholic’s during the 
Kulturkampf and theorists of pluralism at the start of the twentieth century such as G.D.H. Cole and Harold 
Laski. See: Schmitt, “Ethic of State and Pluralistic State”, 197. 
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He argued that the prevailing tendency of the day was to view politics through the prism 
of a ‘cult of self,’ leaving political thought to the shifting whimsy of subjective bourgeois 
occasionalism. This left the political romantic in the position of a voyeur, seeing the 
conflicts shaping German history but lacking the intellectual discipline to act within 
them. It was in a sense a public disavowal of his now former semi-bohemian existence, 
but it was also a polemical rejection of much of what typified German, and especially 
Catholic, conservatism in the early years of the twentieth century: a romantic sense of 
German nationalism typically emphasized through the idea of a high German Kultur 
standing above and apart from Europe; the celebration of the restless, impressionable and 
often irrational will of the individual; the deferral of decisive action in an ‘endless 
conversation.’156 It marked Schmitt’s apparently sudden politicization but indicated his 
lurch to the Right.   
 
This abrupt political awakening emerged from his shock at the civil war that had broken 
out in Munich the same year. Anarchists had declared a council republic in April of 1919 
and communist revolutionaries had broken into Schmitt’s office at the Bavarian Ministry 
of War, shooting an officer at the table next to him. This sudden immersion in the 
disintegration of the old Wilhelmine order brought home to Schmitt not only how 
radically destabilized the political grounds had become, but how unfit the conceptual 
framework of romantic nationalism was to deal with the advent of mass politics that had 
exploded in Europe after 1848, finally surfacing in Germany in the wake of the First 
World War. Schmitt’s diaries of the time indicate the great anxiety with which he viewed 
the wreckage of the old world and the apprehension with which he looked towards what 
might arise from it.157 As he sought to exorcize the remnants of his semi-bohemian life in 
Political Romanticism and reckon with the challenges the changed realities of the post-
war world posed to political thought, he tacked towards the state, against the 
revolutionary masses.  
 
                                                
156 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 22 
157 See: Bendersky’s review of Schmitt’s wartime diaries recently published in Germany. Joseph 
Bendersky, “Love, Law, and War: Carl Schmitt's Angst,” Telos 147 (2009), 171-191. 
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In the early years of the Weimar Republic, Schmitt seemed to opt for a path of caution 
that at once accepted the revolutionary upheaval through which the new Republic was 
born and attempted to steer the state down a conservative path, by strengthening its 
executive arm. He tried to recognize that an age of mass politics in which the 
revolutionary masses were agents was an inescapable new reality and that the 
mechanisms of state had to be reconciled with this in order to guarantee stability. The 
result was that Schmitt both defended the new Republic, and tried to formulate a variety 
of ways in which the state might contain the plurality of social and political forces that 
threatened to undermine it. He would spend the Weimar years embroiled in various 
attempts, both within the lecture hall and the courtroom, to assert state power over a 
volcanic political climate and to maintain the separation between a civil society riven by 
factures and a state struggling to maintain its grip on order.  
 
(ii) Outside the Brightly Lit Room: Academic Career 
 
Schmitt had written his first and second academic theses on the question of 
indeterminacy in jurisprudence, a concern that was soon to lie not only at the heart of his 
intellectual pursuit but the political fate of the Weimar Republic. He held ambitions early 
on for both his thought and for his career but it was not until the ferment of the Weimar 
years provided the opportunity that he moved into the halls of power. Initially Schmitt’s 
career was slow to build momentum and in 1921, the same year he published his study on 
dictatorship in European political and legal thought, The Dictator, he received his first 
academic post in the provincial backwater of the University of Greifswald, an institution 
lacking prestige and access to political influence in a small Protestant town on the Baltic 
Sea. Although Schmitt found the isolation of Greifswald difficult he produced two 
important books there, Roman Catholicism and Political Form and Political Theology, 
that would have a significant impact on both his reputation and the development of his 
thought (although they were published in 1923 and 1922 respectively). As soon as the 
opportunity arose, he escaped this intellectual quarantine and took a teaching post in the 
sleepy but more congenial environs of the largely Catholic Bonn where he was to stay 
until 1928. During the years in Bonn, from 1921 to 1928, he was remarkably prolific, 
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writing important works of legal and political thought (most notably The Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy,158 The Concept of the Political and Constitutional Theory 
published first in 1927 and 1928 respectively) and issuing a steady stream of 
interventionist articles commenting on topical affairs. These appeared in a variety of 
publications and ranged across a broad set of themes from intellectual histories of modern 
political thought and treaties on the antinomies of liberalism, to fiery critiques of the new 
international order emerging from the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations. These 
works were shaped both by the political instability and the sense of historical flux of the 
early Weimar period and Schmitt’s own attempt to feel his way around the issues it 
raised, through an array of engagements with European political thought, both ancient 
and modern, Latin and German. 
 
Schmitt was at once trying ideas out, testing some against the call of the moment and 
saving others in a growing armoury of concepts for later use, as much defining his own 
method of conceptual development as trying to negotiate the Weimar state’s passage 
through the trials ranged against it. He deployed a magpie technique of conceptual 
appropriation from across a wide and often contradictory cluster of inspirations including 
nineteenth century Catholic counter-revolutionaries, Max Weber’s sociology and thinkers 
of the Left such as György Lukács and Georges Sorel. Casting around for models of 
political order he looked not only to the medieval Catholic Church and the absolutist 
princes of the seventeenth century, but also to Mussolini’s fascism, which he always held 
in the highest regard, and even begrudgingly to the Soviet Union. The shadow of the 
revolutionary state to the east was always preferable to Schmitt than the invisible 
influence the United States exercised through the League of Nations and the world 
markets. His reading in a number of major European languages, (German, French, 
Spanish, Italian and English) as well as the classical languages, opened him to debates 
both historical and ongoing to which his contemporaries in Germany were shut out. This 
often positioned him at the cutting edge of theoretical developments and he was the first 
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to offer classes in the newly founded discipline of Political Science at the University of 
Bonn.  
 
Schmitt’s position as a scholar at the forefront of political thought was soon consolidated, 
and he emerged as a leading figure in the intensely political and very public debates 
around the Weimar constitution. Although by the early 1920s the Weimar Republic had 
solidified into a more stable form of order, the new Germany was still fraught with 
tensions. Debate concentrated on the constitution and its many areas of ambiguity that 
now became the focus of serious political contestation. This thrust Schmitt into public 
attention as both a potent advocate of a strong state executive and a virulent critic of the 
division of powers inherited from the nineteenth century’s liberal Reichstaat. Schmitt’s 
argument, that this division of powers threatened to allow the state’s dissolution, found 
fond support amongst the conservative elite and beyond. The newly formed state was 
caught in the midst of increasingly partisan constituencies vying for power, an already 
fragile corporatist compromise between labour and industry was being tested by the 
economic fallout of Germany’s reparations under the terms of the Versailles Treaty, and 
the masses remained politically restive. Schmitt’s call to strengthen the hand of the state 
executive so that it might ensure order was, therefore, by no means a fringe view. 
Although Schmitt was staking a position firmly on the Right and making enemies on the 
Left, it should be remembered that he was still defending the Weimar Republic, albeit 
trying to fashion it into a more authoritarian form to neutralize the influence of what he 
considered an outmoded and destructive liberalism. Not only was the liberal state unable 
to ensure order in an age of mass politics and deep social fractures but was, in Schmitt’s 
eyes, actively pulling the rug from under it.  
 
By the spring of 1928, when he arrived in Berlin to take up a professorship at Berlin’s 
Handelshochschule (School of Business Administration), the battle lines between Schmitt 
and the constitution’s liberal defenders were clearly drawn. The Handelshochschule was 
a newly established and less prestigious institution than the University of Bonn and it is 
likely that Schmitt’s move was part of a concerted effort to position himself closer to 
political influence. Despite his earlier reticence regarding the capital, Schmitt was glad to 
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return to Berlin’s political and intellectual melee and settled easily into the more 
metropolitan milieu it offered to an ambitious young professor. Although he envied the 
prestige and proximity to power of his counterparts in the University of Berlin, Schmitt 
began to develop a wide set of contacts within Berlin’s elite society. Even if he remained 
something of an outsider, he began to cultivate relationships with business leaders, the 
city’s cultural salons and the governing elite. He positioned himself amidst a network of 
social and professional contacts that latticed academia, the business community he 
encountered in the Handelshochschule, the intellectual clubhouses of the capital, the 
governing elite and the world of the salons. His fashionable Serbian second wife, Duška 
Todorović, ensured that their home played host to a mix of the political and cultural elite, 
where Schmitt was given ample opportunity to bind himself closer to power and exercise 
his intelligence, impressing those he encountered with his learning.  
 
Even before the move to Berlin, Schmitt had been involved with the pro-Republic 
Hochschule für Politik, an academic institution outside the established university system, 
where he first delivered the lectures in 1927 that would become The Concept of the 
Political. Here Schmitt mixed with thinkers of liberal and even Marxist persuasion and 
built contacts that allowed him to gain membership in 1928 of the German Sociological 
Association. Balakrishnan speculates that Schmitt may have encountered the early work 
of the Frankfurt School here, such as that by his former pupil at Bonn, Otto 
Kirchheimer.159 Indeed it is here that he had made contacts with Waldemir Gurion, a 
former friend on the left, who popularized the term “Crown Jurist of the Third Reich” in 
a series of polemical articles written while in Swiss exile in the 1930s.160 On his move to 
Berlin, Schmitt’s acquaintance with Johannes Popitz, the permanent state secretary of the 
Reich Finance Ministry, perpetuated a shift to more right-leaning circles. He first 
encountered Popitz through the Handelshochschule and they soon became close friends. 
Popitz was a powerful figure in the Prussian government close to the conservative circles, 
and he acted as a gateway for Schmitt to enter into association with Berlin’s elite society 
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and the governing classes. Schmitt, an outsider by social class and confession, entered 
into the “brightly lit room” of the conservative elite, attending meetings of the exclusive 
conservative Gentleman’s Club and publishing in its house journal Ring. The association 
with Popitz brought Schmitt simultaneously closer to the intellectual circuitry of the 
German far Right and the halls of government power. This furnished him with the 
opportunity to shape the political hermeneutics of the constitution not only amongst legal 
scholars but also amongst those holding and angling for state power. 
 
(iii) State Oracle: Weimar Politics 
 
Schmitt’s political involvement in Weimar had two high, or rather, low points that 
accompanied the renewed state of crisis the young Republic found itself in, as the Great 
Depression wreaked havoc on the country. Schmitt was well known for his call to 
strengthen Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, which granted the President wide 
executive power to intervene in a state of emergency. Against legal positivists such as 
Hans Kelsen, he argued that the exertion of presidential power was required to act as a 
guardian of the constitution in an unstable political situation that threatened to sink into 
civil war. The weakness Schmitt perceived in the constitution created the opportunity for 
partisan forces to test the coherence of the state, but this structural tendency was 
beginning to bear fruit as the nascent Republic was torn between the Nazis and 
Communists, two revolutionary parties set against the constitution and backed by 
substantial paramilitary forces and opposed ideologies. The Weimar state was already 
losing its monopoly on violence and if the President could not stabilise the situation, he 
risked losing even his capacity to decide on the state of exception. It was around the role 
of presidential power within the Constitution, and particularly by the use of Article 48, 
that Schmitt directly entered politics as the Weimar Republic staggered through its final 
death throes. 
 
The circle of arch-conservatives around President Hindenburg were well aware of 
Schmitt and Hindenburg’s Chief of Staff, Otto Meissner, had already drawn on his work 
on Article 48 to quash a Reichstag bill attempting to limit the emergency powers of the 
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newly elected General in the early days of his presidency in 1926. Schmitt was brought 
into the inner sanctum of Reich power in order to help provide legal defence of 
presidential power in a conflict between the governments of the left-leaning federal state 
of Prussia and the Reich government, which had placed Prussia under martial law in July 
1932. The Prussian government was deadlocked and had provided an opportunity for the 
Reich government to exert its power over fiscal readjustment but Prussia sought an 
injunction against commissarial rule. Schmitt was chosen to defend the Reich 
government in the October trial providing him with the chance to establish himself as 
Germany’s premier scholar of constitutional law. Schmitt considered the trial a failure as 
the Leipzig Reich Court had not unambiguously recognized the power of the Reich 
government over that of Prussia (ruling that the Prussian government was unlawfully 
suspended but the Reich had the right to appoint a commissar). Those around the 
President, notably the arch-fixer General Kurt von Schleicher, the Reichswehr minister, 
were none-the-less impressed and continued to hold Schmitt in close council. 
Schleicher’s plan, inspired in part by Schmitt and following his advice, was to have the 
existing Chancellor, Franz von Papen, expelled and Hindenburg appoint him. In office 
Schleicher sought to radically reshape the Weimar Republic along lines that solidified a 
broad-based populism under the Presidency. His plan, the so-called Querverbindung, was 
strongly influenced by the national revolutionary circle to stabilize the nation around 
Presidential rule, social reform and public works. The aim, which Schmitt whole-
heartedly supported during the final years of the Weimar Republic, was to hold the Nazis 
at bay. The party had been strengthened by the Papen government’s shift to the Right, 
and Schleicher’s reformist state was unable to resist the tide of events. It lasted only a 
matter of months and by January 30, 1933 Hitler had been appointed Chancellor, 
signaling the end of Weimar. The proximity to power Schmitt had briefly acquired under 
Papen and Schleicher quickly evaporated and he warily looked on, from the safe distance 
of a new professorship in Cologne, as the National Socialist Party concentrated state 
power in its hands. 
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(iv) Howling with the Wolves: National Socialism 
 
In Legality and Legitimacy, a book Schmitt published in 1932 to support the shoring up 
of the Weimar Republic around presidential power in order to resist the squeeze exerted 
on the political situation by the poles of far Right and Left, he indicated his desire not to 
“howl with the wolves”161 of National Socialism and his continued commitment to the 
constitution. But on learning of Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor, his diaries record that 
although irritated, he was relieved in a way: “at least a decision.”162 This decision for 
decision’s sake seemed to dictate Schmitt’s own response to Nazi power. After a period 
of initial wariness he was soon ‘howling with the wolves,’ throwing his intellectual 
support and public reputation behind the Enabling laws, allowing the government, as well 
as the Reichstag, to pass laws (effectively dissolving the division of powers and the 
distinction between laws and measures). He joined the party on the first of May 1933, the 
same day as Martin Heidegger.163 Schmitt no doubt felt that a National Socialist 
government would provide decisive solutions to the problem of founding order in mass 
politics and might offer some semblance of Mussolini’s Italy, which he admired greatly. 
He was doubtless also driven by opportunism and a desire to be at the centre of world-
historical ruptures, as many have contended. Popitz had asked Schmitt to participate in a 
committee overturning the Reich Court’s ruling of the previous October and he was 
happy to see his position vindicated and the pass opened for the Reich to control federal 
states and appoint commissars from the Interior Ministry. Schmitt was appointed a 
position, by Popitz again, on an advisory council for the state of Prussia, the Staatsrat. 
This was a largely powerless upper house for which Hitler clearly indicated his disregard, 
but which Schmitt even in his later life considered his greatest honour. As these advisory 
roles wound Schmitt into the apparatus of the Nazi state his appointment to a position in 
the law faculty of the University of Berlin, a position made available by the forced 
retirement of his rival Herman Heller, ensconced him in a powerful position at 
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Germany’s most prestigious academic institution. Schmitt returned the favour to his new 
masters by penning a set of screeds laced with virulent anti-Semitism, even going so low 
as to refer to Albert Einstein as a “poison-filled German hote ater” in which he sought to 
provide theoretical legitimation for what was in effect now a case of almost complete 
legal indeterminacy.164  
 
At a conference of legal scholars in Weimar of March of 1933, Schmitt had declared that 
the Enabling Act had killed off the Weimar constitution and laid the basis for a new 
German state. In October the man now dubbed the ‘Crown Jurist of the Third Reich,’ by 
detractors produced State, Movement, People, a text widely read as the “official” legal 
theory of the new Nazi Reich. Schmitt heralded the realisation of a ‘qualitative total state’ 
that yoked the administration apparatus of the State to the Volk who lived in the shadow 
of the movement leading them and acting in their name. Now on the governing board of 
the BNSDJ, the foremost association of Nazi lawyers, Schmitt helped to provide a 
scaffold of jurisprudence legitimacy for the rule of law to become interpretable through 
the lens of political expediency, as the party saw fit. “Today,” Schmitt wrote, “there are 
only indeterminate legal concepts.”165 In this context, where decisionism had reached its 
logical conclusion in its opposite, Schmitt attempted to formulate a widened conception 
of meta-legal legitimacy that would go beyond his dreaded positivism and the 
‘decisionism’ he had long espoused during the crisis years of the Weimar constitution. In 
The Three Types of Juristic Thought (1934) he proposed the idea of a ‘concrete order’ 
that went beyond the state and relied on a historic ‘common law’ grounding the ‘way of 
life’ of a ‘people. Schmitt was bending his long held conceptual frameworks out of shape 
to fit the demands of a legal (dis)order, based on the ad hoc suspension and 
supplementation of a legal system rendered increasingly redundant by ideological 
overdetermination.166 
 
Despite his slavish attempt to follow in the footsteps of National Socialism, legitimating 
its path towards barbarity, Schmitt’s questionable allegiance to the party’s ideology left 
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him exposed to rivals, and he soon fell from grace. The consolidation of Nazi power 
made Schmitt’s learned legitimation less necessary, and those envious of his positions, 
who harbored doubts about his ideological commitment, such as Otto Koelreuter, a rival 
professor; Reinhard Höhn, a colleague, and the Party ideologue Alfred Rosenberg seized 
this as an opportunity to topple the Crown Jurist. The SS newspaper Das Schwarzes 
Korps attacked Schmitt in a series of articles in which he was accused of being a 
Hegelian Catholic, insufficiently committed to the party, who put the state first and 
feigned anti-Semitism opportunistically. These allegations severely damaged Schmitt, 
who was forced to resign his official positions by the end of 1936. The favour of Herman 
Goering, an admirer of Schmitt since his appointment to the Staatsrat, protected 
Schmitt’s university position and his title. It seems unlikely, as some of Schmitt’s more 
apologist readers suggest, that he was in danger because of this SS denunciation but the 
memory of the ‘Night of the Long Knives’ (June 30, 1934) in which Schmitt’s former 
advisee General Schleicher was brutally murdered lay fresh in memory (although he 
shamelessly celebrated this extra-legal purge in a text bearing the title The Leader 
Protects the Law). Schmitt initially tried to prove his allegiance by escalating the anti-
Semitism now coursing through his work. He set up a conference aimed at eliminating 
the influence of Jews on German jurisprudence. He opened the conference quoting 
Hitler’s Mein Kampf: “I defend myself against the Jews, I struggle to do the work of the 
Lord.”167 The conference claimed that “rootless” Jews posed a political threat to 
European people and tried to infiltrate in any number of disguises. It called for clarity on 
“who was a Jew and who was not,” for the removal of Jewish scholars, who were to be 
placed in a special section marked ‘Judaica’ and any reference prefaced with an 
explanation of the author’s origins (a practice Schmitt already followed, often adding 
“the Jew” before Stahl, Spinoza, etc).168 Although many of these measures were soon 
adopted, meaning that Schmitt helped draft the persecution of Germany’s Jewish 
population, the event itself was ill attended and did nothing to stop his ‘encirclement.’ 
 
Schmitt’s response was to retreat from his justifications of the internal mutations of the 
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Nazi state where his pen was “scratching in vain,” as one party ideologue put it, and 
focus on the less controversial issues of international legal order. This built on his 
Weimar writings on international law and warfare. Whilst these earlier texts had been 
precisely targeted polemics highlighting the hypocrisies and uncertainties of the emerging 
international legal order and bemoaned the perilous state of German sovereignty under 
the Versailles Treaty, his new international political thought took on a more politically 
activist and policy-ambitious tone. In a series of short books and articles Schmitt 
authored his theory of Großraum, which would reshape international legal order around a 
number of continental power blocks, autonomous from one another, that would not 
interfere in each other’s spaces. Schmitt consciously shaped his arguments in appealing 
legalese, drawing his example from the Monroe Doctrine, whereby the U.S. claimed a 
hemispheric sphere of influence, and aimed these texts at an international audience. It 
was clear however that these texts amounted to a legitimation for the expansion of Nazi 
Germany eastwards, and a polemical rejection of the right of other powers, principally of 
course the U.S. and Britain, to interfere in a German-dominated European space. It was 
also clearly an attempt to ingratiate himself with the Nazi regime by playing his role as 
Crown Jurist, whilst staying out of the controversies and rivalries internal to the 
“movement.” Schmitt’s Großräume were characterized by a hierarchy where one 
hegemonic state would dominate the others and relate to other Großräume in a kind of 
pumped-up Westphalian order. It indicated, however, Schmitt’s decisive break with the 
state, a move echoed in his 1938 book The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas 
Hobbes. He later claimed that this was a veiled critique of the Nazi state but the vulgar 
anti-Semitism scattered throughout it makes this defense unconvincing. It still seemed 
that Schmitt wanted to please, even if there was clearly a gap between Schmitt, as a still 
somewhat free thinker, and the increasingly blinkered mania of Nazi ideology. 
 
(v) The Experience of the Cell: Arrest and Interrogation 
 
The theory of Grossraum might have represented Schmitt’s attempt to formulate a new 
Europe-wide German Reich in order to keep pace with Nazi expansion, but this 
expansion made his formulations increasingly unlikely as Germany drew inexorably 
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towards total war. During the war, Schmitt began to drift from the Nazi state as it became 
increasingly clear that victory would elude Germany and Hitler was leading the country 
into ruin. He played his part in its propaganda machine, travelling to Spain, Portugal, 
Romania and Hungary as a “cultural ambassador,” lecturing to jurists and dignitaries. He 
lectured on the importance of jurists as the guardians of the law and the long influence of 
Roman law in Europe that bound it together.169 Strongly at odds with the official 
celebration of German law in Nazi ideology and the miserable deterioration of the 
country’s juridical system, some have seen it as a tactic to distance himself from the 
regime as its enemies closed in. 
 
At the end of the war, Schmitt was drafted as an air raid warden as Berlin fell – an ironic 
role for the thinker for whom air war signalled the final cataclysmic erasure of European 
order.  In early 1945 his friend Popitz was executed for his role in a plot to kill Hitler, and 
this might have signalled the final death knell for Schmitt’s hopes of reconstituting 
political form around the German state. Not only had Popitz been his friend, and more 
recently host, but also in a way Schmitt’s political mentor, an example of the classical 
politics of Prussia. As he watched his dreams of a European Grossraum collapse in the 
rubble of Berlin, Schmitt saw also the death pangs of the old European certainties and the 
possibilities of the new politics he had hoped to salvage from the cauldron of interwar 
frictions. His writings from this period increasingly looked beyond the war and beyond 
the horizon of the state but were ever more strongly framed by myth and eschatological 
theology.  Land and Sea, published in 1942, and originally written as a geopolitical fairy 
tale for his daughter Anima, was characterised by a flight away from the destruction 
being wrought around him into a mix of world-historical musing and geo-elemental 
mythology that signalled his growing separation from the realities of the war.  
 
In the months after the end of the war Schmitt was drafting a defence of a friend, a 
businessman named Friedrich Flick, who was to go on trial at Nuremberg.170 But he was 
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soon to be interned as a possible defendant himself. He was first arrested in the autumn of 
1945 when US forces held him as a ‘security threat’. He was released the following year 
but in March 1947 was re-arrested and taken to Nuremburg for interrogation by the US 
lawyers Robert Kempner and Ossip K. Flechtheim. Both lawyers were German-Jewish 
émigrés. His library was taken from him and he spent a year under interrogation, 
defending himself as a scholar innocent of the charges being levelled against him – that 
he had provided the legal legitimation for Nazi expansion in Europe. He was released in 
May 1947 without charge and returned to Plettenberg as a ‘freelance scholar.’ The 
“experience of the cell” was very difficult for Schmitt and he recorded his experience of 
an identity crisis bordering on a psychic breakdown in Ex Captiviate Salus, published in 
1950, his only autobiographical book. The period of detention was a time of delirious 
self-questioning when Schmitt faced his own moral failures and complicity in the 
catastrophic ruin of all he valued. He came to find the answer to the question ‘Who was 
Carl Schmitt?’ “Murky and unclear.”171 
 
It seems that the chill of imprisonment and the difficulty of facing both his own past and 
Europe’s future drove Schmitt back to religion.172 The religious charge that entered 
Schmitt’s work did not seem to be confined to the rhetorical flourish of biblical 
references he was growing fond of, or indeed the conceptual frame of political theology 
used to structure arguments, but the product of genuine renewal of faith born of despair. 
 
(vi) The Retreat into Silence: Post-War ‘Exile’ 
 
“What are you going to do now?” Robert Kempner had asked Schmitt as he was released 
from interrogation. “Retreat into the security of silence” Schmitt replied.173 In truth, 
however, this silence was only a lowering of voice. Schmitt was excluded from holding 
an academic post in the new Federal Republic because he refused to sign the certificate of 
de-Nazification, fearing it would admit that his life’s work was ideologically tainted. He 
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clung to the image that he had always been conceptually aloof and apart from the regime. 
He depicted forced retirement in Plettenberg as a form of ‘inner exile’ and referred to his 
house as ‘San Casciano,’ Machiavelli’s house in exile, and signed his letters ‘Benito 
Cereno,’ after the captain of the mutinous slave ship in Melville’s story of the same 
name.174 But Schmitt’s ‘retreat’ was far from complete and he was desperate to maintain 
both relevance and influence even as he became increasingly concerned with his own 
self-image and reception. As Jan-Werner Müller argues, he remained an éminence grise 
in his internal exile “paradoxically both absent and present in the public intellectual life 
of the Federal Republic.”175 If his exclusion from academic posts left him outside the 
official channels of intellectual influence he sought to build an “epistolary 
empire”176placing him at the centre of an “intellectual freemasonry” that stretched across 
Europe and taking in many of the conservative scholars of the new Republic and the 
major thinkers of post-war Europe.177  Like a spider at the centre of its web, Schmitt 
would issue polemical bursts, in print, first under pseudonyms and then again in his own 
name, engaging with issues of the day and exercising his “anxiety to influence” via his 
chain of interlocutors.178 
 
Schmitt kept up lively correspondences with figures as diverse as Raymond Aron, 
Alexandre Kojève, Emile Cioran, Julien Freund and his old “hostile brother” Ernst 
Junger, and San Casciano became a place of pilgrimage for the Jewish scholar Jacob 
Taubes, the Maoist Joachim Schickel and various members of the West German Right 
including Ernst Forsthoff, a former student of Schmitt’s who sat on the supreme court 
and shaped the constitutional decisions of the new Republic.179 Through a string of 
former students, old acquaintances and new apprentices, Schmitt constructed a group of 
advocates for his cause who would resuscitate his reputation and maintain not only his 
work’s continued relevance but his status as a ‘classic’ of modern political thought.180 
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Throughout the post war period Schmitt, perhaps in keeping with this semi-public 
“taboo,”181 began to fall deeper into a literary style laced with allusion, mysterious 
suggestion and a tone suggestive of a world-weary sensitivity to the apocalyptic horizon 
of modern technological civilization. In part, this was the result of Schmitt’s increasing 
immersion in the language of eschatological theology, a tendency that betrayed a 
strengthening of faith after the death of his second wife in 1950. His last major book, 
Political Theology II, published in 1970, bore witness to the shift in Schmitt’s views on 
the political relevance of theology, bearing a position closer to politicized theology if still 
remaining far remote from Christian holy practice as it took increasingly eschatological 
views of history, where party politics was accelerating history towards an end. On the 
other hand it was a symptom of his frequent recourse to self-mythologisation and the 
construction of an ‘Arcanum’ of which he, in a position of unique world-historical 
perception, held the key and which the “initiate” could hope to benefit.182 Living on a 
pension secured by business friends and cementing the fame he had built before the war 
in Italy and Spain through new translations, new advocates (notably his daughter, Anima, 
in Spain, who had married the conservative judge Alfonso Otero Valera) and occasional 
lecturing engagements there and at home, Schmitt’s influence began to creep back. Gopal 
Balakrishnan argues that after the war Schmitt became a “living period piece, to all 
appearances an intellectual invalid from an antediluvian world.”183 But as Jan Werner 
Müller painstakingly shows, tracing Schmitt’s post-war influence in European thought, 
this is far off the mark. 
 
As Müller argues, Schmitt maintained a close commentary on the day-to-day politics of 
the Federal Republic and won new disciples precisely because his often “deeply 
antimodern assumptions” seemed to be “far ahead of [their] time,” placing Schmitt at 
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once in the role of a world-historical clairvoyant and a representative of timeless classical 
categories, out of joint with the nihilism of mass consumer society and the blunt 
ideological forcefields in which Europe was tied.184  Schmitt died in 1985 at the age of 
96, when Europe was still in the Cold War, but his reputation was rising with a tide of 
conservatism in West Germany. His death came at a moment when the legacy of Nazism 
was a hotly contested issue in German intellectual life, with Jürgen Habermas and the 
revisionist historian Ernst Nolte battling publicly in the pages of Die Zeit the following 
year, in what is known as the Historikerstreit or ‘Historians’ Quarrel.’185 The context was 
set in West Germany for a full reappraisal of Schmitt’s work, and shortly after his death, 
in 1986, Helmut Quaritsch, a former pupil of Schmitt’s, gathered friends and scholarly 
disciples for the first conference dedicated to Schmitt in Speyer. The conference opened 
the floodgates to Schmitt’s academic respectability in Germany and the subsequent 
spread of his reception in Anglophone scholarship. Schmitt, the great opportunist who 
yearned for ‘power over history’ would no doubt have been pleased that his work had 
found a new audience in the heart of enemy territory where it became one of the major 
intellectual sticks with which to beat his old enemies – liberalism and the United States – 
precisely at the moment of their supposed historical triumph. 
 
(2) The Bricoleur: Intellectual Context 
 
(i) The Sphinx  
 
The German legal thinker Erich Schwinge declared in 1930 that Carl Schmitt was “the 
sphinx of German public law, because from the first moment he avoids precise 
classification.”186 This ambiguity is not only the product of Schmitt’s prose style, his 
promethean conceptual output and the debate over the relationship of his thought to his 
political choice, but also because of the difficulty in situating him in the intellectual 
lineages of German political thought and specifically that of the early twentieth century 
milieu from which he emerged; more broadly, in modern European thought and 
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conservative philosophy. This was in part because Schmitt was decisively shaped by his 
Catholic provincial and petty-bourgeois background insofar as he was “without 
conventional allegiances or sentiments,” he was able to readily [turn] his back on the 
good old days of pre-war Germany.”187 Thus he was freed from many of the usual 
associations of the German political thought, both liberal and conservative, that one 
might expect of a man of his time and in hindsight of his later politics. It was also 
because he had an “extraordinarily diversified endowment of cultural capital” that let him 
read across many European languages and opened up horizons of debate, both historic 
and contemporary, that he could freely draw upon to enrich his analysis of the problems 
facing twentieth century politics and occasionally to lead it down esoteric blind alleys or 
to catastrophic dead ends.188 Thirdly, Schmitt kept a great variety of intellectual company 
across his life, from the Dadaist artist Hugo Ball in his early Munich days, the French 
Catholic Renouveau context of Bonn, to his friends on the left in the German 
Sociological Association such as Otto Kirchheimer and Karl Mannheim and Wilhelm 
Stapel, A.E. Günther and Prince Karl Anton von Rohan associated with the “conservative 
revolution” of the 1930s – and of course his Nazi protector Göring, his fascist hero 
Mussolini and the broad spectrum of post-war correspondents and disciplines that shaped 
his late “revival” in Germany and beyond. These three elements: his lack of intellectual 
and affective investment in the “old order;” his intimate knowledge of sprawling 
multilingual mass of readings and the breadth of his social and professional 
acquaintances make Schmitt’s intellectual cartography “difficult to map.”189 As 
Balakrishnan argues, it often appeared as if Schmitt sought to keep his intellectual 
distance from those he engaged with even as he was reckless in his headlong rush to 
serve the forces of reaction in Weimar and Nazi regimes.190 Even as Schmitt is hard to 
situate within the typical intellectual lineage of the German conservatism of his day he 
can nonetheless clearly be classified as a Conservative. But the question of what type of 
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conservative is harder to answer.  
 
(ii) A Conservative Revolutionary?  
 
Jan-Werner Müller has argued that Schmitt “embodies a European political sensibility 
which is rather inadequately described with the concept, conservatism – ‘radical 
conservative’ or ‘reactionary modernist’ come closer to the mark, but they still miss 
it.”191 What we encounter in Schmitt, Müller continues, “is a mindset that could best be 
described with the term philosophical or anthropological conservatism – which might or 
might not be realized in particularly conservative positions centered on gradual change in 
actual politics.”192 Although Müller’s attempt to define the nature of Schmitt’s 
conservatism perhaps settles on a too broad a terminology, it nevertheless has much to 
recommend it. Müller’s identification of Schmitt’s thought with a European, rather than a 
strictly German perspective, on the one hand and a ‘sensibility’ open to positions not so 
typically identified as conservative on the other opens the possibility of a more nuanced 
approach to understanding Schmitt’s relationship to the broader trajectory of modern 
European conservative thought than those that too easily capture him under labels such as 
‘reactionary modernist’ or ‘conservative revolutionary.’193 
 
In Herf’s account, ‘reactionary modernists’ were those in the Weimar Republic who, like 
Schmitt, were caught in the tension between reactionary stances on the location and 
distribution of political and economic power and a willingness to embrace the 
transformative powers of technology and mass politics after the experience of the First 
World War and the revolutionary transition from Reich to Republic.194 Schmitt noted he 
was one of those “impressed with the speed of historical change” but he remained 
cautious of untrammelled historical acceleration that would deliver Europe from 
meaningful order into the hands of technologically-induced nihilism. Thus, the ambiguity 
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of Schmitt’s relationship to technology sets him at a considerable distance from thinkers 
such as Ernst Jünger, with whom Herf too easily conflates him.  
 
Jünger’s one time secretary, the Swiss conservative Armin Mohler, coined the term 
‘conservative revolution’ after the Second World War in an attempt to distinguish various 
thinkers of the Weimar Far Right from National Socialism. Mohler listed Jünger, 
Schmitt, Spengler and the early Thomas Mann among others as ‘conservative 
revolutionaries’ who stood in relation to Hitler as Trotksy had to Stalin.195 His aim was to 
rehabilitate these taboo figures in order to develop an anti-liberal and anti-socialist 
conservatism that could escape the taint of Nazism whilst providing a Rightist alternative 
to the new post-war Federal Republic.196 The tensions within the concept of a 
‘conservative revolution’ certainly pointed to the structural contradictions between the 
reactionary ends and the revolutionary means that frequently defined Schmitt’s political 
positions. However, Schmitt sat uneasily amongst Mohler’s ragbag of Weimar 
reactionaries due to his deep institutional complicity with the Nazi regime. Although 
Mohler was keen to highlight Schmitt’s distance from Nazism, there was a clear contrast 
to figures such as Jünger and Spengler whose relationship to the regime always remained 
more critical.197 
 
Although neither ‘reactionary modernist’ nor ‘conservative revolutionary’ quite meet the 
mark of defining Schmitt’s conservativism, both help to identify something of the 
paradoxical tendencies operating in his work. Indeed, one of the most characteristic, if 
unusual, aspects of Schmitt’s thought was the ambiguous tension between seemingly 
antimodern categories such as theology and myth, with a sharp analysis of the effects of 
technology and mass society on twentieth century politics. As Müller notes, “Schmitt had 
no illusions about re-enchanting the world or returning to an ideal past. But neither was 
he prepared simply to accept certain elements of modernity such as unrestrained 
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development of technology and the supposed rise of mass society.”198 Müller perhaps 
overstates Schmitt’s opposition to mass society, for although he remained ambivalent 
about an unconstrained rise of mass politics he acknowledged that it was an irreversible 
presence in the twentieth century, even if its energies had to be channelled. Hence, in 
works such as The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1923), Constitutional Theory 
(1928), Legality and Legitimacy (1932) and his ‘high’ Nazi treatise State, Movement, 
People (1933) Schmitt does not oppose the power of the masses but rather evokes them 
as a source of legitimacy for the state. Nonetheless, it was precisely Schmitt’s 
simultaneous rejection of a return to a lost political past and his acceptance of the post-
revolutionary realities of mass politics that made him hard to locate within the intellectual 
bloodlines of German conservatism.  
 
What Schmitt shared most ardently with the traditions of German conservatism that had 
gained intellectual and political traction since the late nineteenth century was the desire 
for political renewal. Like many conservatives in Germany, shocked by the political 
suicide of the old Prussian order in the First World War and the burst of revolutionary 
energy it unleashed, Schmitt wanted to see a renewal of politics in a state form that would 
provide authority and stability. Where he differed strongly was that he did not conceive 
of this renewal as a ‘restoration’ that would somehow turn the clock back to some idyll of 
traditional authority. Schmitt’s recognition that the pre-revolutionary Germany was 
buried and traditional authority decentered by the tumultuous shake up of the early 
century left Schmitt with little time for the leitmotif of restoration. Balakrishnan notes 
that restoration was for Schmitt “the always farcical agenda of reactionary Don 
Quixotes.”199 Rather, the renewal Schmitt envisaged was one that would recognize the 
irreparable historical losses from which a new Germany had been born and draw on the 
revolutionary energy of the masses to build new forms of legitimate authority. The 
attempt to conceive of new forms of authority on the shifting bedrock of the 
revolutionary masses often opened a profound conceptual gulf between Schmitt’s thought 
and some of the key traditions of German conservatism. Indeed, Schmitt remained distant 
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from three pillars of German conservative thought that one might expect him to identify 
with: Nationalism, romanticism and Catholicism.  
 
Gopal Balakrishnan compares Schmitt to a bricoleur who, unencumbered by the 
conventional investments of German conservatism, “could pick up selected pieces, 
innovate, improvise and recombine.”200 This magpie-like intellectual tendency allowed 
Schmitt to slip between the cracks of German conservatism. This practice of conceptual 
collage makes it hard to locate Schmitt’s thought within the intellectual currents of the 
time and gives his writing the ambivalence of precisely aimed polemics that seem 
nonetheless strangely out of time. A brief overview of some of these eclectic influences 
not only provides a contextual frame in which to situate Schmitt’s thought but also helps 
to account for the scope and endurance of his influence.  
 
(iii) The German View of the State 
 
Although never a prisoner to its confines Schmitt remained focused on what the German 
political scientist Wilhelm Hennis called the “problem of the German view of the 
state.”201 As Müller notes, this ‘German view of the state’ was oriented towards the 
distinction between state and society, investing the former with metaphysical foundations 
and operating from the perspective of the executive.202 Schmitt was clearly a man of this 
tradition of state thinking but he had a difficult relationship with its philosophical 
founding father, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). References to this 
towering figure in modern German philosophy and political thought are rare in Schmitt’s 
work but he nonetheless casts his shadow over Schmitt’s work. There are three principle 
elements of Hegel’s thought that Schmitt draws on or tackles although often obliquely: 
the separation of state and society; the state as a totality; and the concept of historical 
dialectics.  
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The concept of state separated from and standing above civil society is perhaps the key 
aspect of Hegel’s thought that Schmitt adopted. Although in developing a concept of a 
state transcendent of society Schmitt draws on the seventeenth century English 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes and the thinker of nineteenth century Catholic Counter-
Revolution such as de Maistre and Donoso Cortes rather than Hegel, his influence is 
discernible. Much of Schmitt’s Weimar work was dedicated to a polemical diagnosis of 
the collapse of the nineteenth century liberal state under twentieth century political 
conditions. The liberal state of the nineteenth century was fundamentally grounded on the 
Hegelian distinction between state and society and this was being eroded in the early 
years of the new century. In his attempts to formulate a concept of state adequate to 
weather the winds of twentieth century politics Schmitt would return repeatedly to the 
necessity of a firm distinction between state and society.  
 
In a sense however there were two Hegels that emerged in Schmitt’s early thought each 
of which had a relationship to this distinction. On the one hand, Schmitt identified the 
bureaucratic ‘clerks’ of the nineteenth century liberal state to represent the Hegelian 
‘spirit of history’ in the nineteenth century. But by the twentieth century the ‘spirit of 
history’ had moved on and these bureaucrats became representatives of an outmoded 
politics. In Schmitt’s view the old Hegelian separation of state and society that taken 
shape in the liberal state was being undermined by liberal pluralism on the one hand and 
eclipsed by the rise of the politicized masses on the other. In his first text published after 
joining the Nazis, 1933’s State, Movement, People, Schmitt declared the day Hitler was 
elected Chancellor was the day “Hegel died.”203 But the funeral of the clerks’ Hegel 
strangely marked the birth of a new Hegel in Schmitt’s thought: the Hegel of the total 
state. Indeed, in his writings from the early Nazi years Hegel became for Schmitt a source 
of intellectual renewal with a powerful vision of political totality in which new forms of 
legitimacy could be conceived. Schmitt argued that Hegel’s concept of the state as a 
‘political totality’ could provide a framework for thinking of the new German state form 
as a “concrete order or orders, the institution of institutions.”204 Hence, his concept of a 
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‘qualitative total state’ that could reassert the distinction between state and society against 
its erosion by twentieth century liberalism drew directly on Hegel’s thought. Although 
Schmitt developed this ‘totalitarian’ reading of Hegel in aid of the Nazi regime he saw 
the true “world-historical residence of Hegel’s spirit” in Fascist Italy.205 As Schmitt 
definitively moved away from the state in the late 1930s, so these references to Hegel 
dropped from his work.206  
  
Schmitt had an ambivalent relationship to the Hegelian conception of dialectics as the 
immanent motor of historical change. On the one hand, Schmitt repeatedly critiqued the 
progressive or teleological reading of Hegelian dialectics in both liberal and Marxist 
thought. In his 1922 Roman Catholicism and Political Form Schmitt criticized the liberal 
idea, influenced by Hegel, that structural antitheses within society could be resolved in a 
dialectic synthesis in a ‘higher third’.207 For Schmitt this represented a typical liberal 
attempt to avoid the inherently conflicting nature of politics cast in the terms of Hegelian 
philosophy.208 Likewise Schmitt critiqued the Marxist rendering of Hegel’s philosophy of 
history in historical materialism. In The Critique of Parliamentary Democracy Schmitt 
mounted a critique of the Marxist concept of ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat,’ arguing 
that it was based on a conception of history determined by an ideological metaphysics.209 
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Although Schmitt lauded Marxism for the powerfully motivating myth of the proletarian 
dictatorship, it ultimately reduced history to a number of necessary subjects that could not 
account for the persistent presence of the political.210  
 
On the other hand however, Schmitt located struggle at the very foundations of his 
conception of historical change. Not only did Schmitt argue that politics was founded on 
the relationship between friend and enemy, but in his attempts to explicitly develop a 
philosophy of history he evokes the dialectical tensions driving epochal changes. For 
example, in The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations (1929) Schmitt argues that 
modern European history has been driven by a dialectical tension arising from successive 
attempts to neutralize political conflict and the new conflicts this has generated. In his 
1942 book Land and Sea he likewise located a dialectical tension at the heart of historical 
change although in this instance he pointed to the changing relationship of technology 
and ‘spatial consciousness’ to the geo-elemental forces of land and sea. Further, at the 
core of Schmitt’s critique of liberalism is the idea that the liberal attempt to remove the 
friend-enemy distinction from politics by appealing to universal categories results in its 
dialectical escalation into absolute enmity. Although Schmitt makes no direct reference to 
Hegelian dialectics in these works it seems unlikely that a German thinker of his 
generation who is obviously aware of Hegel’s work and preoccupied with issues of state 
legitimacy would not bear the influence of Hegel.211  
 
Schmitt’s conception of historical change thus wore traces of Hegelian dialectical 
philosophy, but his avowed influence was rather the sociological methods of Max Weber. 
Schmitt attended Weber’s lectures during his time in Munich and was greatly impressed, 
and his imprint is clear on Schmitt’s work from the early 1920s. Schmitt’s attempts to 
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grapple with the relationship between secularization and state legitimacy were in part 
prompted by Weber’s work and placed squarely in his lineage. Although Schmitt 
developed his thought in a direction strikingly at odds with the normativism of the older 
scholar, his work was squarely in Weber’s lineage.212 Indeed, the first three chapters of 
Schmitt’s Political Theology were originally published in 1923 as part of a Festschrift to 
the recently deceased Weber.213 Although marking his respect for Weber, the book also 
staked Schmitt’s differences. Schmitt departed from Weber in understanding 
secularization not as a process of progressive rationalization but as one that left intact a 
structural role for theological concepts within the modern secular state, its leading 
concepts being shadowed by theological predecessors. Although Schmitt was keen to 
distinguish the methodology he introduced in Political Theology from Weber’s, his 
“sociology of concepts” remained deeply indebted to the late master of German sociology 
in its emphasis on the role of concepts in shaping historical developments.214  
 
(iv) Latin Reaction  
 
If Schmitt’s thought was shaped by the ‘German problem of the state’ and the question of 
historical legitimacy plaited from strands of Hegelian philosophy and the Weberian 
sociology Schmitt’s conceptual armoury was drawn from beyond these German 
traditions. During his years in Bonn Schmitt turned to the traditions of Catholic thought 
in search of a source of stability amidst the ferment of early Weimar. As noted above 
Schmitt was not principally drawn to the medieval revivalism of his conservative 
Catholic peers but rather to the rabid anti-utopianism of the French and Spanish counter-
revolutionaries of the nineteenth Century. In the early nineteenth century French 
reactionary, Joseph de Maistre, and the former Spanish ambassador to Berlin, Juan 
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Donoso Cortes, he found orientation for his attempt to cement the authority of the state 
against the revolutionary masses. The staunch conception of sovereignty and the 
cataclysmic vision of civil war that these arch-conservatives of the nineteenth century 
provided the young jurist with conceptual weapons to do battle with his own post-
revolutionary tumult in Weimar Germany. Schmitt understood the revolution that these 
Catholic reactionaries had chiselled their positions against to now be catching up to 
Germany. The German state had managed, in Schmitt’s view, to keep at bay the legacy of 
1848 with incremental shifting of power within a parliamentary system overseen by 
Prussian militarism.  
 
Balakrishnan notes that although Schmitt found historical relevance in the nineteenth 
century counter-revolution, these ‘Latin’ sources stood beyond the canon of early 
twentieth century German conservatism.215 They had a profound affect in shaping the 
strong pulse of anti-universalism that runs through Schmitt’s work. Rather than oppose 
universalism with a typically Volkish emphasis on German cultural superiority, these 
thinkers allowed Schmitt to emphasize the personal nature of all authority and the 
necessity of a strong unified locus of decision-making to assert itself against and nihilistic 
charge of the revolutionary masses. Schmitt parted ways with these reactionaries however 
insofar as they, like the German romantics he lambasted, remained fixated on restoration 
of lost privilege. Although Schmitt found a supplement, indeed an antidote, to German 
state theory in these ‘Latin’ reactionaries, and he employed them as a battering ram 
against a supposedly impotent German liberalism, they nonetheless failed to provide him 
with a point of orientation within an age of mass politics. Although Schmitt drew 
extensively on these thinkers in Political Theology he soon moved on to try to 
accommodate his understanding of state authority with new forms of political community 
in light of mass politics. Donoso Cortes’ claim that at the core of modern politics lay a 
stark choice between “the dictatorship from above and the dictatorship from below… the 
dictatorship of the dagger and that of the sabre” soon appeared inadequate to account for 
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the realities of twentieth century mass politics in Schmitt’s view.216 Nonetheless 
Schmitt’s attraction to the ‘classical’ perspective of ‘Latin’ political thought never left 
him and accounts indeed for his consistent admiration of Mussolini’s Italy.217 
 
(v) The Hobbes of the Twentieth Century  
  
From his school days Schmitt had been adept at languages and just as his knowledge of 
French, Spanish and Italian had opened up vistas of ‘Latin’ reaction closed to many 
German conservatives, his acquaintance with English allowed him to keep abreast of 
intellectual developments in the Anglophone world. His writing shows his familiarity 
with contemporary debates in English across a number of disciplines and at the edges of 
political and legal theory. This was of particular importance in shaping his analysis of 
international law and the way in which the United States discursively shaped the 
legitimacy of its interventionist foreign policy. However, Schmitt’s analysis of nineteenth 
and twentieth century Anglophone political thought is overshadowed by the influence of 
one towering figure: the seventeenth century philosopher Thomas Hobbes.  
 
Hobbes was arguably the thinker to whom Schmitt’s struggle to salvage the state form in 
the twentieth century was most indebted. Indeed, so profound is Schmitt’s debt to the 
English philosopher that he has been referred to as the “Hobbes of the Twentieth 
Century.”218 In The Concept of the Political Schmitt argued that Hobbes’s had correctly 
identified the core of the state in the relationship between protection and obedience.219 
For Schmitt, Hobbes had correctly identified the state’s ability to provide security and 
protection against enemies, both internal and external, as the lynchpin of the state as it 
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218 The moniker was originally used by the German political theorist Helmut Rumpf but was popularized in 
English by George Schwab. See: George Schwab, Introduction to Political Theology: Four Chapters on the 
Concept of Sovereignty, by Carl Schmitt (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1996), xl.  
219 In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt memorably argued that “protego ergo obligo is the cogito ergo 
sum of the state.” See: Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 2007), 52. 
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guaranteed the obedience of the people and hence the stability of political order. Thus, 
Weber’s claim that the state was defined by the monopoly on the legitimate use of 
violence and Hegel’s insistence on the state’s separation above society both rested in 
Schmitt’s eyes on the fundamental relation between protection and obedience Hobbes 
had highlighted in his 1651 book Leviathan. Schmitt credited Hobbes with a particularly 
clear understanding of the state as his work was born of the English civil war of the 
seventeenth century. This period of heightened political tension had allowed Hobbes to 
perceive the core of the state in the nexus of protection and obedience, a relationship 
again being thrown into relief by the collapse of state order at the beginning of the 
twentieth century and the tensions within the Weimar Republic more specifically.  
 
Schmitt afforded Hobbes the honour of dedicating one of his most important books to his 
work, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes published in 1938.220 This 
text marks a re-evaluation of Hobbes’ thought within Schmitt’s work and is of crucial 
importance to the trajectory of his thought. In a sense this book acts as the pivot around 
which Schmitt’s thought turns away from the state as the bearer of modern political form. 
Here Schmitt argued that the origins of the crisis of the twentieth century state were 
embedded in the very foundations of the modern European state as theorized by Hobbes 
in Leviathan. The subtitle of the book ‘The Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol’ 
indicated that Schmitt now regarded the Hobbesian state of modern Europe to have failed 
in its attempt to guarantee the relationship between protection and obedience. Schmitt 
returned to Hobbes’s work to locate the fundamental cleavage in the foundations of the 
state opened by his distinction between private religious belief and outward public 
obedience. For Schmitt, his intellectual hero had missed a fatal flaw in the conception of 
the state that ultimately led to its historical redundancy as the modern bearer of political 
form.221 Thus, Schmitt’s attempt to save the state and his eventual move beyond it in 
                                                
220 The other political thinker to whom Schmitt dedicated an entire, albeit slim, book was Donoso Cortes. 
See: Carl Schmitt, “Donoso Cortes in Berlin” Telos 125 (2002), 87-99. Schmitt did however, dedicate two 
books of literary criticism to single authors the first a more marginal book from 1916 dedicated to the work 
of his friend, the expressionist poet Theodor Däubler, and the second a book on Shakespeare’s Hamlet from 
1956. See: Carl Schmitt, Theodor Däublers 'Nordlicht' - Drei Studien über die Elemente, den Geist und die 
Aktualität des Werkes. (Berlin: Duncker & Homblot, 1991); and Carl Schmitt, Hamlet and Hecuba (2009). 
221 This is one of Schmitt’s most openly anti-Semitic works and he adopted the discursive style of Nazi 
regime. He argued that ‘Jewish’ thinkers such as Baruch Spinoza, Friederich Stahl (a Protestant of Jewish 
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search of alternative political forms can be tracked through his relationship to the great 
English philosopher of state.  
 
(vi) Partisan Brothers  
 
The German state tradition of Hegel and Weber, the ‘Latin’ thinkers of the nineteenth 
century Catholic counter-revolution and Hobbes’s English Leviathan provided three legs 
of Schmitt’s particular authoritarian concept of the state.222 However, Schmitt’s work was 
not confined to conservative thinkers or those associated with state theory as he was just 
as well acquainted with radical thinkers of the Left. Schmitt was a thinker squarely on the 
Right who favoured strong forms of centralized authority and theorized forms of 
executive-led order and popular sovereignty against the claims or individual freedom or 
class revolt. However, as Balakrishnan notes, one of Schmitt’s “intellectual virtues was a 
willingness to read and engage seriously with the arguments of people at the other end of 
the political spectrum.”223 This was a tendency that characterized the self-styled 
“intellectual adventurer”224 from his early student days when he was reading the anarchist 
‘young Hegelian’ Max Stirner, through to his late 1963 book The Theory of the Partisan 
which he peppered with references to Che Guevara, Mao and Lenin.225 Although, these 
engagements were often polemical Schmitt nonetheless shared intellectual affinities with 
certain of his “partisan doubles.”226 The points of convergence coalesced around two 
points in particular; the deterioration of political unity in the liberal world of pluralist 
self-interest and a critique of the totalitarian potential of modern technologies of state 
shaped by Enlightenment reason. 
                                                                                                                                            
descent), and Moses Mendelssohn were guilty of exploiting the gap between private belief and public 
obedience for their private ends and hence of undermining the state. Schmitt claimed after the war that the 
book contained a veiled critique of the Nazi regime and whilst there are certainly elements that might be 
construed as critical of the state, any critique was heavily veiled in an anti-Semitic discourse obviously 
meant to appeal to a Nazi readership. 
222 This is an oddly distorted reactionary alternative of the claim that Marx’s thought was based on three 
sources; German philosophical idealism; French socialist thought; and British political economy. 
223 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 9. 
224 This was how Schmitt defended his thought himself whilst under in interrogation at Nuremberg by 
Robert Kempner. “I am an intellectual adventurer …and so thoughts and ideas emerge. I take the risk.” 
Quoted in Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 255. 
225 Carl Schmitt, The Theory of the Partisan: An Intermediary Commentary on the Concept of the Political, 
(New York: Telos Press, 2007). 
226 Balakrishnan, “The Age of Identity?,” New Left Review, 16 (2002), 133. 
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In his ferocious 1926 attack on liberal democracy, The Critique of Parliamentary 
Democracy, Schmitt drew on the work of French revolutionary syndicalist George Sorel. 
Schmitt followed Sorel’s claim that a political myth was needed around which the 
revolutionary masses could unify and awaken from the slumber of particular self-interest. 
Although for Sorel the great political myth of the age was that of the revolutionary 
‘general strike’ Schmitt saw in his work an understanding of the conceptual glue needed 
to join political community to authority. To Schmitt’s mind this powerful understanding 
of the ‘political idea’ was missing not only in liberalism but also in a German 
conservatism still fixated on elite opinion makers and the return to old privileges. For 
Schmitt, Sorel had tapped into a basic truth about how to orient conservative politics in 
an age of mass politics even if his political orientation was the opposite of his own. 
Further evidence of Schmitt’s, perhaps grudging, respect for the revolutionary Left’s 
understanding of the ‘mythic’ element of politics can be found in his discussion of the 
Hungarian Marxist György Lukác’s History and Class Consciousness227 and his appraisal 
of the powerful motivating enmities of Leninist thought.228 To Schmitt’s mind the Left 
had understood the importance of myth as a means for asserting political unity against the 
pluralist dissolution of bourgeois society.229 
 
Schmitt’s critique of the excesses of political ‘reason’ drew him intellectually close to the 
Left of German sociology and the Frankfurt School in particular.230 Although Adorno and 
                                                
227 Lukács receives a brief mention in The Critique of Parliamentary Democracy but as Balakrishnan notes 
Schmitt returned to commend Lukács’s work in his post-war notebooks. Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 73. 
228 Schmitt discussed the powerful motivating force of class enmity in early work such as Dictatorship 
(1921) and The Critique of Parliamentary Democracy (1923; 1926) but returned to discuss Leninist enmity 
with a mix of reverence and fear in The Theory of the Partisan in 1963.  
229 It was also on this point that Schmitt’s awareness of the tradition of Left messianism in Germany in the 
early twentieth century become crucially important. Schmitt was familiar with Ernst Bloch’s seminal 1918 
book The Spirit of Utopia from his time as a wartime sensor in Munich (Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 277 
n17). He was also acquainted with the work of Walter Benjamin, in particular The Origin of German 
Tragic Drama (1925), Benjamin’s Habilitation thesis which he had sent Schmitt in 1930 in manuscript 
form with a letter noting his intellectual debt. The utopian impulse found in Bloch and Benjamin stands in 
blatant contrast to Schmitt’s supremely anti-utopian thought, which at times indeed had a specifically 
antisemitic flavour.  
230 The English scholar Ellen Kennedy caused a minor academic scandal when she suggested that 
Habermas and other Frankfurt School thinkers had drawn on Schmitt’s arguments against liberal 
democracy. See: Ellen Kennedy, “Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School,” Telos 71 (1987), 37-66. 
However, it is clear that in his early work, such as 1962’s The Structural Transformation of the Public 
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others were keen to whitewash the Frankfurt School of any association with Schmitt in 
the postwar years he nonetheless had relationships with several members during the 
Weimar Years.231 The Frankfurt School legal scholar Otto Kirchheimer had been 
Schmitt’s most brilliant student at Bonn and they remained in correspondence for some 
years, and he had made an acquaintance of Karl Mannheim through the German 
Sociological Association in Berlin, where Balakrishnan speculates he may have 
encountered the early projects of the School.232 Schmitt rarely mentions his associations 
with the Frankfurt School directly and it is hard to know if they exerted any strong 
influence on his thought. There are certain similarities between the critique of 
Enlightenment rationalism’s legacy in modern technologies of state found in Schmitt’s 
work and that of Adorno and Horkheimer although it seems likely these resulted from a 
common attempt to investigate the antinomies of liberal society in the age of mass 
politics rather than any direct chain of influence.233  
 
Schmitt, sometimes known as “the Lenin of the bourgeoisie”, was above all an astute 
reader of twentieth century Marxism.234 Schmitt largely ignored the economic categories 
of Marxist thinking and approached it as a political phenomenon.235 Indeed, in 1979, 
towards the end of his life, Schmitt was to claim “I am a Marxist in so far as I have traced 
the economic concepts of Marxism to their political end; I am not a Marxist, because I 
have recognized the economic surplus as a purely political surplus on the proletarian side 
                                                                                                                                            
Sphere, Habermas had drawn on Schmitt whom he referred to as the “most intelligent and significant 
German theoretician of the state.” Quoted in Müller, A Dangerous Mind, 1. The foremost champion of the 
Frankfurt School’s second generation was soon to rapidly distance himself from Schmitt however and in 
more recent years has cast himself as the chief exorcist of Schmitt’s ghost within German intellectual life.  
231 Adorno famously edited out any reference to Schmitt from collections of Benjamin’s writings, as did 
Hannah Arendt in the first collection of his work to be published in English, 1968’s Illuminations. See: 
Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (New York: Schocken Books, 1969). 
232 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 102. 
233 See: Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment (London: Verso, 1997); 
Schmitt, “Ethic of State and Pluralistic Ethic” (1930); Carl Schmitt, “The Way to the Total State” (1931) in 
Four Articles, 1931–1938, edited by Simona Dragachi (Washington DC: Plutarch Press) 
234 Ulrich Preuss, “Political Order and Democracy: Carl Schmitt and his Influence.” in The Challenge of 
Carl Schmitt, ed., Chantal Mouffe, (London: Verso, 1999), 159. 
235As Jorge E. Dotti notes, Schmitt’s interpretation “focuses on the political side of Marxism and puts the 
strictly economic details of Marx’s system to one side, without becoming aware of its complications, and 
even accepting the validity of its explanation of surplus value.” See: Dotti, “From Karl to Carl: Schmitt as a 
Reader of Marx”, 93. 
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as well.”236 Indeed, if we understand Schmitt’s reading of Marxism as political, in 
Schmitt’s sense of the relation between friends and enemies, then it was the tightly 
wound sense of enmity at the heart of proletarian class struggle that Schmitt admired. 
However, Schmitt saw contradictory tendencies in Marxism. On the one hand, Schmitt 
found in the Marxist concept of class struggle a powerful expression of the foundational 
role of enmity in politics. On the other hand, he located in it a dangerous impulse towards 
a form of universalism that would respect no boundaries, and thus undermine the 
distinction upon which the modern political order of the state rested. Hence, those texts 
where Schmitt approaches Marxism are always laced with an ambivalent mix of grudging 
respect and polemical hostility.237  
 
His second major work Die Diktatur, published in 1921, carried the subtitle “From the 
Beginning of the Modern Conception of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class 
Struggle.”238 The Preface was dedicated to the debate on the dictatorship of the proletariat 
between Karl Kautsky and Lenin and Trotsky. Schmitt was particularly interested in the 
legitimation of dictatorship on the basis of class enmity and returned to the theme in 
1923’s The Critique of Parliamentary Democracy as noted above. Despite being critical 
of what he regarded as Marxism’s adherence to a metaphysics of historical progress, 
Schmitt admired the political power of the proletarian class struggle and indeed 
understood it to have necessitated the politics of state aligning itself with the new realities 
of mass politics. As Balakrishnan notes, Schmitt “recognized the European Right would 
now be forced to operate on a political terrain historically occupied by the Left.”239 Thus, 
Schmitt’s thought not only found a social spur in the tradition of revolutionary Marxism 
but a conceptual catalyst for the development of his own thought. Schmitt believed that 
the future of the twentieth Century was likely to be Bolshevik unless the forces of state 
                                                
236 Müller, A Dangerous Mind, 169. A source is not provided.  
237 For example, Schmitt’s analysis of proletarian dictatorship in chapter 4 of The Critique of Parliamentary 
Democracy points to the presence of both tendencies within Marxist thought. As noted above this is a text 
that displays at once a respect for the Left’s capacity to produce unity and generate political ideas and a fear 
of its capacity to collapse the political differences on which state order rests. See; Schmitt, The Critique of 
Parliamentary Democracy (1988). 
238 This is Balakrishnan’s translation (Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 39) but it is also the subtitle the English 
translation due for publication with Polity Press in late 2012 will carry.  
239 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 38 
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authority could provide an alternative motivating myth to the proletarian class struggle.240 
The challenge for conservative politics at the start of the twentieth century, as Schmitt 
saw it, was to harness the force of the revolutionary masses to renew state power with the 
use of a powerful new political myth. Italian fascism had been successful in doing so in 
the 1920s as it had opposed the myth of class struggle with the more powerful myth of 
the nation.241 Indeed, Schmitt briefly put his belief in the idea that the Nazi state could do 
this within Germany.  
 
However, in the wake of the Second World War it appeared to Schmitt that the European 
state had been eclipsed and emptied out in Europe by the competing technologically 
driven universalisms of liberalism and Marxism, represented by the imperial force of the 
United States on one side and the Soviet Union on the other. None of the notes of 
admiration for the political ‘totality’ of the Soviet Union found in his Weimar work 
appear in his post-war writings, although his critique was largely reserved for the United 
States and the new Federal Republic of Germany. By the time he came to write The 
Theory of the Partisan in 1963 Schmitt largely equated the Soviet state with a dangerous 
universalisation of enmity he identified with Lenin’s understanding of international class 
struggle. Rather than provide a sense of difference on which order could be built, Leninist 
thought dissolved the possibility of order by making class enmity absolute and hence, for 
Schmitt, dissolving all boundaries and limits on conflict. This reflected the distinction he 
introduced in to his work between ‘real’ and ‘absolute’ enemies, the former providing the 
framework for order but the latter destroying it. Whilst in his work from the early 1920s 
Schmitt identified the Marxist concept of class struggle with a powerful sense of enmity, 
by 1963 he argued that class struggle was inherently based upon universal categories of 
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and hence the conflicts that emerged between them 
                                                
240 Schmitt’s 1929 text “The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations” opened by claiming twentieth 
Century Europe lived in the “eye of the more radical brother,” the Soviet state which had taken the vitality 
of European nineteenth century to its technological conclusion beyond a spiritually sagging Europe. See 
Carl Schmitt, “The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations,” in The Concept of the Political by Carl 
Schmitt (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 80-81. 
241 Schmitt closed The Critique of Parliamentary Democracy by reflecting on the power of Mussolini’s 
national myth that he argued had channelled the energies of the masses into forms of political unity and 
enmity even more powerful than that of proletarian class struggle but crucially remained within the bounds 
of the state. See: Schmitt, The Critique of Parliamentary Democracy (1988), 65-76. 
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would be inherently unlimited. Thus, whilst Schmitt still insisted that Marxist class 
struggle contained a powerful sense of enmity it was destructive of order, as it provided 
no grounds for limiting conflict, the true aim of political order in Schmitt’s mind. 
However, Schmitt argued that Mao’s revolution in China represented a form of class 
enmity that restrained the dangerous universalism of Leninist thought by limiting itself to 
the national frame. Hence, Maoist China represented an autochthonous antidote to the 
boundary-defying sweep of Leninist class enmity. The antinomies of Marxist thought 
perhaps most clearly revealed to Schmitt the janus-faced power of the political, at once 
able to provide the starkest of distinctions on which order could be built and 
simultaneously burst the walls of civility and exceed all limits. 
 
One group of political and legal thinkers who exerted a profound influence on Schmitt’s 
work that I have not examined here are the German legal positivists of the early twentieth 
century. Considerable length will be devoted to an analysis of Schmitt’s polemical 
engagement with liberalism in later chapters. In so far as Schmitt developed some of his 
principle works from the Weimar era, such as Political Theology (1922), Constitutional 
Theory (1928) and Legality and Legitimacy (1931) as polemics against legal positivism, 
and particularly Hans Kelsen, these thinkers played a crucial negative role in shaping his 
work.  
 
Schmitt’s work not only drew on these diverse strands of political and legal thought. He 
frequently looked to other spheres of thought such as theology, geography, aesthetics and 
history to find concepts, draw analogies and sharpen arguments. His work is full of 
literary and historical allusions and frequently makes use of art historical analogy whilst 
some of his most fundamental conceptual frameworks derive from Christian theology.242 
This reflected Schmitt’s identification with a ‘classical’ form of thought that pre-dated 
the development of academic specialization.243 Schmitt’s focus always fell on what might 
                                                
242 A fascinating insight into the breadth of Schmitt’s reference is provided by the contents of his library 
compiled by the Carl Schmitt Gesellschaft and available at: http://www.carl-schmitt.de/download/biblio-
cs.pdf 
243 As Balakrishnan notes, Schmitt was a product of a time when new disciplines and new disciplinary 
boundaries were emerging in German academia but “before the consolidation of the social sciences as an 
institutional complex on the post-war world” (Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 4). 
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be called the political outside of the legal system and hence his jurisprudence thinking 
needed to address and draw on diverse elements from other spheres. These engagements 
thus marked an attempt to find conceptual resources to tackle the questions of political 
foundations of legal order from beyond the limits of jurisprudence thinking.   
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Chapter 3: Knowing Your Enemy / Reading Schmitt 
 
 
Any attempt to approach Schmitt’s work faces particularly challenging interpretative 
problems. As Balakrishnan notes Schmitt’s work “presents a set of highly specific and 
unusual problems” concerning the “relationship between the textual and biographical 
planes” of his career.244These problems are of course most pressing in the relation of his 
work to his involvement with the Nazis and anti-Semitism. This chapter will focus on 
these troubling issues in the hope that a way to navigate the difficult terrain between the 
‘textual and the biographical planes’ can be found. Schmitt himself noted the difficulty of 
distinguishing the political from the merely theoretical, famously claimed that, “all 
political concepts, images, and terms have a polemical meaning. They are focused on a 
specific conflict and are bound to a concrete situation.”245 Hence, it is important to try to 
understand the relationship between his theoretical work and his understanding of the 
‘concrete situation’ of twentieth century Germany. I hope to show in later chapters how 
Schmitt’s conception of the spatial order bore on his decision to support the Nazi regime 
as an alternative to a failing liberal state and conversely how his vision of a New 
European spatial order was shaped by a deep anti-Semitism. But it is first important to 
establish how to approach the relationship between his theoretical work and his 
controversial political affiliations and racial views more broadly.  
 
(1) Nazism: Crown Jurist or Benito Cereno? 
 
“I am the last conscious representative of the jus publicum Europaeum; 
its last teacher and student in an existential sense, and I am 
experiencing its demise as Benito Cereno experienced the journey of 
the pirate ship.”  
 Carl Schmitt, 1950246 
 
                                                
244 The Enemy, 3. 
245 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 30. 
246 Quoted in Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt, 177. 
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This was how Schmitt characterized himself in the autobiographical reflections he 
published in 1950, washed up on the shores of Germany’s new Federal Republic. Benito 
Cereno, the captain of a mutinous slave ship in Herman Melville’s story of the same 
name, was an alias Schmitt had adopted as a distancing tactic even in his wartime 
correspondences. Ernst Jünger reported that in 1941, during a walk around the “skulls 
and masks” of the Musee de l’Homme in Paris, Schmitt told him that the situation of the 
“white captain dominated by black slaves” was “similar to that of conservative 
intellectuals in Nazi Germany.”247 As Jan-Werner Müller and Raphael Gross have shown, 
Schmitt devoted much of his time attempting to cleanse his record and champion his 
resuscitation during his years as a taboo figure on the fringes of the fledging democratic 
republic.248 Taking on the guise of Melville’s fictional skipper steering a ship for 
rebellious slaves was part of a concerted effort Schmitt undertook to distance himself 
from National Socialism through self-mythologizing in the aftermath of the war. Casting 
the Nazis as, presumably, barbarous slaves driving the Reich to shipwreck allowed him to 
take on the role of the wise leader reduced to ‘following orders’.249 According to the logic 
of this allegory, although Schmitt may have appeared in a leading position in the Nazi 
state, as Cereno initially appeared in control of the slave ship in Melville’s story, he was 
in fact merely carrying out demands on pain of death.250 This attempt to find absolution 
in a literary guise revealed that he was aware, even during the war, that his relation to 
                                                
247 Julia Hell, “Katechon: Carl Schmitt's Imperial Theology and the Ruins of the Future,” The Germanic 
Review 84 (2009), 285. 
248 See Introduction and Chapter 5 of Gross, Carl Schmitt and the Jews (2007), and the detailed probing of 
Schmitt’s self-mythologizing in the entirety of Müller’s A Dangerous Mind (2003). 
249 The irony being that Schmitt’s attempt to show himself as a victim of world-historical circumstance 
swept up in events over which he exerted no control displayed precisely the ‘banality’ of his evil, to use 
Hannah Arendt’s famous phrase. William Scheuerman gives a convincing alternative reading of Schmitt’s 
use of the Cereno allegory. He argues that the identification of the slaves is steeped in ambiguity and that 
they can just as easily be a stand-in for Schmitt’s new ‘piratical’ masters, the Americans. Indeed, Schmitt 
identified the United States as a distasteful racial ‘melting pot’ much like the ship in Melville’s story. This 
would of course mean that Schmitt was casting himself a victim, not just of the Nazis, but also, and indeed 
more so, of Germany’s new post-war American masters. See: Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt, 175-181. 
Whichever way this literary allusion is read it at any rate seems clear that Schmitt was always closer to 
Benito Mussolini than Benito Cereno! 
250 Although obviously meant to exonerate Schmitt, his self-characterization as Benito Cereno 
paradoxically left him by analogy in the position of a technician of state, precisely the role of the new 
‘clerks’ of liberal modernity he had vented to so much anger against. Driving the ship of state to the 
directions of his Nazi slave-masters Schmitt, as Cereno, actualized the remark Jünger made some years 
later in 1949: “The old chivalry is dead … wars are conducted by technicians.” Quoted in Müller, A 
Dangerous Mind, 144. 
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Nazism would become a decisive interpretative lens in the reception of his work. 
Balakrishnan argues in The Enemy that it was because he wanted to avoid his entire body 
of work being tainted with ideological contamination that he refused the de-Nazification 
process.251 Thus, rather than admit guilt and leave his work under a dark shadow, Schmitt 
sought to refuse the charge of guilt in order to keep the record of his work clean. Of 
course this refusal had quite the opposite effect, and in fact entrenched the opinion that 
after the war he remained an unreconstructed reactionary, holding the same opinions that 
had led to him to willingly act in the name of the Nazi state. The stakes of this decision 
were high and cost Schmitt his Chair at the University of Berlin and any future academic 
position in Germany. This decision not to engage with de-Nazification, as so many others 
had done, certainly does not tally with the characterization of Schmitt as an arch-
opportunist. The question still remains as to whether this choice was driven by 
ideological opposition to the new Federal Republic, or tremendous intellectual vanity 
masquerading as principle, or some combination of both. Balakrishnan notes in the 
concluding chapter of his biography that it was the democratic system and ‘natural law’ 
jurisprudence of the new West German republic, the ‘indirect’ powers of the United 
States, and the supposed ‘Jewish elites’ on which Schmitt vented his vitriol after the war, 
not the defeated National Socialists.252 
 
For those approaching his writings, Schmitt’s inexcusable political choice raises in stark 
terms, what Peter Caldwell refers to as, “the central problem of intellectual history: how 
to relate text and context.”253 For some the concentration camps “haunt every word 
Schmitt writes, no matter how illuminating.”254 It is not surprising then that many writing 
about his thought respond to “an affective requirement to condemn Schmitt’s 
                                                
251 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 255-257. Denziafication was a serious of juridical processes introduced by 
the allies in the years after the war to ensure that the German government, institutions, press, culture were 
rid of Nazi influence. Many people in the American Zone, where Schmitt resided, were required to fill out a 
background check to assess their culpability for Nazi crimes and graded accordingly for the purposes of re-
education.  
252 Ibid, 257. 
253 Peter Caldwell, Foreword to Carl Schmitt and the Jews, by Raphael Gross (Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2007), xv. 
254 Mitchell Dean, “Nomos: Word and Myth” in The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt, ed., 
Louiza Odysseys and Fabio Petito (London: Routledge, 2007), 248.  
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politics,”255“an obligation to give an account of what in his work is worth the effort.”256 
Although many European intellectuals of Schmitt’s time favoured fascism, including 
Heidegger, Benn and Jünger in Germany, and Céline, Gentile, Croce, Pound, Eliot and 
Yeats, Schmitt is not the “typical case of an intellectual flirting with fascism.”257 The 
situation is “more acute” in his case “since he alone of the high intelligentsia which opted 
for Fascism, was a political thinker of the first rank … and he was more institutionally 
complicitous than any of the others in this constellation.”258 Schmitt was not then typical 
of those “European intellectuals drawn to the ‘seductions of unreason’, the apparent 
glamour of ‘the intellectual romance of fascism’ – in Wolin’s terms – because he was too 
significant politically.”259 The fact that Schmitt keenly played the role of legal advisor 
and jurisprudence propagandist for a regime that slaughtered millions on the basis of a 
racist ideology, brutally eliminated its political opponents (including many involved in 
emancipatory movements) and spread war across Europe and beyond, raises the 
hermeneutical stakes high indeed. It is understandable then that Schmitt’s Nazi 
complicity “continues to evoke supercharged partisan judgements on how to evaluate this 
episode in terms of what he wrote and did before and … after.”260 Balakrishnan correctly 
notes the responses these questions usually elicit: “unsympathetic commentators 
denounce him as a Fascist or an opportunist; sympathetic commentators either present 
neatly sanitized, apologetic accounts of the relationship between his writings and his 
political allegiances, or – worse – portray him as someone with dark, arcane insights into 
‘the political’.”261  
 
In order to negotiate a more satisfactory hermeneutical path that does not fall into either 
of these polemical camps and develop an interpretive approach that treats Schmitt as an 
object of sober critical reflection rather than an “affectively charged symbol” it is 
                                                
255 Atkinson, David, “Remembering Nazi Intellectuals,” in Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt, ed., 
Stephen Legg (London: Routledge, 2011), 202. 
256 Tracy B. Strong, Foreward to The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and 
Failure of a Political Symbol, by Carl Schmitt (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008), vii. 
(Hereafter The Leviathan) 
257 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 7. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Atkinson, “Remembering Nazi Intellectuals,” 202. 
260 Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 6. 
261 Ibid, 9. 
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necessary to probe further into how Schmitt’s Nazism should be contextualized textually 
and historically.262 Can his Nazi writings be separated from his broader thought, and can 
his work be separated from his political life?  
 
As Peter Caldwell argues, it is remarkable how many “readings of Schmitt, even when 
critical, have tended to separate [his] ideas from his personal beliefs” either by simply 
ignoring them or identifying his Nazism as an aberrant ‘phase’ easily quarantined to the 
Nazi years.263 Such arguments were typical of a broad tendency in the early years of the 
Federal Republic to characterize Nazism as a coarse anti-intellectual movement without 
any relationship to ‘thinkers.’264 This was one of a number of ‘distancing techniques’ 
used to paper over the widespread complicity of the German public with the Nazi regime, 
something particularly acute in administrative and bureaucratic bodies such as academia, 
where any historical reckoning was displaced onto an Allied sanctioned discourse of 
‘collective guilt’.265 Jan-Werner Müller and Raphael Gross have both shown that this 
wider tendency was intensified in Schmitt’s case, because his post-war reception in 
Germany was largely transmitted through former and current students and friends, keen 
to act as his advocate.266 Indeed, Schmitt was first introduced to Anglophone audiences 
by Joseph Bendersky and George Schwab, two quasi-apologists in close friendly contact 
with Schmitt clearly working under his spell. As Gross notes, these personal contacts 
partly enabled Schmitt to stage-manage his own reception and promote the view that his 
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involvement with the Nazis was a quickly disavowed mistake that has little or no bearing 
on the content of his thought as a whole. The most common argument is that Schmitt’s 
decision to join the Nazi party in 1933 signalled a ‘break’ in his thought as a result of an 
opportunistic drive for power and prestige, or a moral lapse, rather than marking any 
continuity with his previous conceptual positions or political ideas.267 Bendersky, for 
example, argues that Schmitt’s decision to support the Nazis revealed “a personal 
weakness so far as moral principles are concerned.”268 Schwab, likewise, argues that, 
“intoxicated by what he believed to be the recognition of his own importance and 
convinced he was finally in a position to make a difference, Schmitt either became 
oblivious to what was unfolding or deceived himself.”269  
 
This argument at once separates Schmitt’s Nazism from his political thought, relegating 
the former to a moral lapse or personal ambition, and neatly periodises this failing to the 
early years of his Nazi involvement. Much is made of the denunciation of Schmitt in the 
SS journal Das Schwarze Korps in 1936, which Günter Maschke characterized as “life 
threatening.”270 Schmitt’s fall from Nazi grace is taken to indicate a second ‘break’ after 
which he returned to his pre-1933 positions after a brief fascist lapse. Although Schmitt 
may have had reason to be frightened after his outing by the SS, it is certainly 
exaggerated to argue, as Schwab does, that “Schmitt entered the Third Reich as a marked 
man” or to characterize him either as “an anti-Nazi” or “an antiracist” due to his 
opposition to the party during the final years of the Weimar Republic and the fact he had 
twice married Slavic women.271 Even if 1936 did “constitute a watershed for Schmitt” 
and his relationship to National Socialism, his subsequent attempts to radicalize the Nazis 
anti-Semitic politics within jurisprudence, his attempted theoretical legitimation of 
German expansion in his Grossraum work and his role as a roving ‘cultural ambassador’ 
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for the Nazi state as late as 1944 seem rather inexplicable.272 The claim that Schmitt’s 
writings on Grossraum were an attempt to limit himself to a “a domain he thought would 
leave him out of the limelight” is hardly credible.273 This argument would quarantine 
Schmitt’s Nazism within the 1933-1936 period, and seems to follow closely on from the 
claim Schmitt made during his post-war interrogation that he “considered it possible to 
give meaning to [the Nazi] catchwords” until 1936, after which time he realized he was 
misguided.274 Although there are arguably veiled critiques of the Nazis discernible in his 
writings from the late 1930s and 1940s, like The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas 
Hobbes (1938), The Historical Condition of European Jurisprudence (1943) and Land 
and Sea (1943), the idea that these amounted to much more than a protective distancing 
from a regime in which he had lost favour and which was clearly heading to defeat, let 
alone some sort of ‘resistance,’ is very hard to defend. After the publication of the 
Glossarium, Schmitt’s private journals from the years 1947-1951, in 1991, it was 
“difficult to focus on the stimulating and brilliant texts he had written outside of their 
political context” as Peter Caldwell argues.275 The diaries were riddled with anti-Semitic 
paranoia, making it much harder to attribute Schmitt’s engagement with the Nazis to 
‘mere’ opportunism. The Glossarium revealed that even after Nazi defeat, and when the 
full horrors of the Holocaust were becoming apparent, Schmitt’s private writings were 
still riddled with anti-Semitism, making it much harder to maintain the “opportunism” 
thesis. If these diaries had shown that Schmitt’s private thoughts were still saturated with 
anti-Semitism after the war, the 2003 publication of his diaries from the years 1912-1915, 
again flooded with anti-Semitic sentiment, made the idea of a clean break between the 
Nazi years and his other intellectual output even harder to sustain.276 It would seem given 
the content of his pre and post-war diaries that Schmitt’s “rock bottom” years of 1933-
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1936 were not simply an opportunistic abscess on an otherwise spotless intellectual 
career that can be isolated and ignored.277  
 
Such apologist arguments which seek to isolate Schmitt’s Nazism to the 1930s or portray 
his complicity with the regime as a character flaw separable from his contributions to 
modern political thought are less frequent today in Schmitt’s Anglophone reception, 
despite the continued partisan efforts of Schmitt’s character referees at Telos. This is 
perhaps because such arguments reflect the hermeneutic concerns of an earlier generation 
which have less relevance to a new generation of thinkers increasingly distant from 
Europe’s ‘dark century’ and looking for neglected sources of revitalization for stale 
political categories left over from it. Perhaps, however, this separation of corpus and 
complicity in Schmitt scholarship is a signal that an earlier generation of his intellectual 
advocates decisively shaped the terms of debate concerning his work. It remains 
commonplace for contemporary work on Schmitt to acknowledge his Nazi involvement 
as important before moving swiftly on to engage specific points of his work, if the 
concern is raised at all. Chantal Mouffe, Schmitt’s most tireless advocate on the 
Anglophone Left, presents a particularly clear example of such an approach.278 Of course 
when the reception of Schmitt’s work is so broad and so often engaged with particular 
problems to which his thought is considered germane, it cannot reasonably be expected 
that every article provide a detailed account of his Nazi involvement or elaborate an 
ethical position towards it. It can reasonably be assumed that in most cases the readership 
is aware of Schmitt’s Nazi complicity.  The problem arises when so much recent 
Anglophone literature seeks to utilize Schmitt’s concepts shorn of any relation to their 
political and historical context. Whether this is the result of his intellectual minions’ 
efforts or not, Schmitt would doubtless have welcomed his current status as a  ‘classic’ of 
political thought for whom a conceptual engagement with no justification is required. If, 
however, we consider Schmitt’s Nazism to be a persistent problem in interpreting his 
work and recognize some form of continuity between this period and his thought as a 
                                                
277 Schwab, Foreword, lii, n53. 
278 Mouffe, On the Political (2005) 
 108 
whole, on the one hand, and between his work and his life, on the other, how is this 
continuity assessed? 
 
Whilst attempts to isolate Schmitt’s Nazi writings from his oeuvre as a whole or to mark 
a clean separation between his life from his work are evidently fraught with difficulty, 
arguments on behalf of continuity across Schmitt’s thought and between his thought and 
his political choices are likewise problematic. There is a danger that a continuity thesis 
may on the one hand posit Schmitt’s Nazism as the necessary product of his work, and on 
the other reduce his entire corpus to his Nazism and hence disqualify it as tainted. In my 
view these should be avoided as they rely on deterministic or reductionist accounts of 
both Schmitt’s work and the relationship between his work and his decision to support 
National Socialism. Firstly, an argument for continuity between Schmitt’s Nazi writings 
and his work as a whole must not reduce Schmitt to a ‘Nazi thinker,’ where his Nazi 
work is either inevitable, given his previous writings, or over-determines his entire 
oeuvre. Such a reading cannot stand up to the scrutiny of a rigorous textual or contextual 
analysis which tracks the development of his thought across the changing historical 
circumstances of a career that lasted across seventy years and four periods of German 
statehood. Although it can be argued that Schmitt’s post-war writings were to a large 
degree shaped by his attempt to manage his record and reception through intellectual 
sycophants and his own intricate commentary on earlier work, his writings from the 
Weimar period were marked by a staggered conceptual development and a number of 
sharp oscillations in response to turbulent historical circumstances he was trying to keep 
pace with. Therefore any reduction of Schmitt’s corpus to his Nazi output alone adopts a 
crude form of historical determinism that leaves little scope for understanding the 
complex relationship between his work, his life and his historical circumstances. This is 
not to say that his Nazi era writings can be sidelined or ignored but that they must be 
contextualized in relation to both his previous conceptual development and the volatile 
historical situation he crafted his work within. A deep immanent criticism probing the 
internal lacunae of Schmitt’s oeuvre, such as that carried out by Galli, or a “diachronic 
contextualization” between his life and work that typifies Balakrishnan’s method are 
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more subtle and suitable methods of contextualization than a naïve and polemical 
historicism that sees Nazism as the necessary outcome of Schmitt’s earlier thought.  
 
Secondly, whilst an argument stressing a continuity between Schmitt’s work and his life 
and his Nazi writings and his work as a whole must avoid identifying his political choices 
as necessary, it must seek to identify tendencies in his thought which made them possible. 
The British political theorist Mark Neocleus is surely correct when he argues that 
Schmitt’s decision to join the Nazis was not only possible but “probable given the 
theoretical contours of his work.”279 However, when Neocleus argues that Schmitt’s 
Nazism follows “logically, theoretically, politically from his [theoretical] premises” he in 
fact makes his political choices ‘logically’ determined by his thought.280 It is important to 
avoid this easy slippage between probability and determination in assessing the 
relationship between Schmitt’s Weimar and Nazi era thought. Although his support for 
the Nazis was far from a “mere personal aberration” or even a total “intellectual break”, 
to consider it “built into the theoretical premises of his work” leaves no room for the 
element of personal decision that Schmitt exercised in joining the Nazi regime.281 Such 
an argument removes Schmitt’s political affiliations from their historical context and 
understands them purely on the level of a spurious logical causation drawn from a 
necessarily selective reading of his work. As Carlo Galli notes, if Schmitt’s Nazi phase 
“fully realized all of the risks inherent on the structure of Schmittian thought” it none-the-
less “does not occur necessarily or automatically, but … instead requires a conscious 
personal will.”282 In other words it is precisely the fact that there was nothing in Schmitt’s 
thought that made his decision inevitable that means it represents such an enormous 
ethical failure.  
 
This in no way rules out the importance of the tendencies in Schmitt’s thought that 
brought him to the point of ‘howling with the wolves’ in 1933. Rather it understands 
these tendencies strictly as tendencies that made his decision possible or even likely as 
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opposed to causes that determined it. This allows for a more complex reading where 
Schmitt’s Nazism was the result of conceptual tendencies, “the bureaucratic baptism of 
an already essentially fascist argument”, and a decisive act of personal will.283 Schmitt’s 
decision, as his defenders suggest, represents an immense personal moral failure, but it 
must be read in relation to the political leanings already present in his thought. For many 
years during the Weimar Republic, Schmitt had formulated a conception of totalitarian 
statehood focused around a strong Presidential executive and built upon a substantive 
homogeneity grounded in a national myth. In the later years of the interwar Republic, 
Schmitt had conceived of such a political form as an authoritarian Presidential system 
that could replace the liberal constitution. Although during the Papen and Schleicher 
chancellorships Schmitt saw this Presidential system as a way to exclude the Nazis and 
the Communists from power, it is clear that he considered the Communists the more 
serious threat.284 Indeed, the Nazis provided much of the trappings of what Schmitt had 
conceived under the name ‘qualitative total state,’ including the strong centralized 
executive, a decisive conception of state sovereignty and a clear national myth built upon 
a particularly forceful understanding of homogeneity. Indeed, the Nazis arguably gave a 
forceful actualization to his understanding of an anti-liberal democracy based upon 
homogeneity and given direction by a dictatorial power, something he had been arguing 
was not a contradiction since the early 1920s. Even if the Nazi state eventually perhaps 
represented not so much a ‘qualitative total state,’ which emphasized a classical 
distinction between state and society, but rather an intensification of the ‘quantitative 
total state’ that eroded the distinctions between state and society and laws and measures, 
there was still ample common ground for Schmitt to find elective affinities with the 
regime in 1933. Given his previous commitment to an authoritarian form of state, it is not 
surprising that, believing he was presented with a choice between chaos and Hitler, 
Schmitt vouched for the latter.285 Even by 1941, when it was clear that the Nazis had 
brought about a state of complete legal indeterminacy, and he had been pushed to the 
fringes of power under Goering’s protection, the idea of a greater German Reich 
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dominating Europe held strong appeal to Schmitt. He saw in it a revitalization of political 
form beyond the state, which he had increasingly come to question. Thus, although some 
sympathetic readers, like Schwab, have read Schmitt’s 1938 genealogy of the modern 
European state in The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes as a critique not 
only of the state, but also of Nazism, the idea of a Nazi-dominated Germany opened up 
precisely the avenue for thinking political form beyond the state that this book had made 
necessary. It is arguable that Schmitt always remained at something of an ideological 
distance from the Nazis and was never what Schwab calls a “Hitlerian Nazi”, committed 
to the coarsest forms of biological racism.286 However, The fact that he seemingly had 
few qualms about throwing his reputation behind the regime and joining in the anti-
Semitic chorus suggests that his affiliation did not lie only in opportunism but with the 
sense of a possibly shared political purpose.  Schmitt’s critique of liberalism does not 
necessarily lead to Nazism, just as his concept of sovereignty does not necessitate 
dictatorship nor his concept of the political presuppose or lead to anti-Semitism. It is 
clear however that this conceptual matrix, formulated by an anti-Semite with a taste for 
authoritarianism who believed himself to be at the epicentre of an epochal crisis, certainly 
helped bring him to the point where he could leave one paradigm of state behind and step 
into the uncertainties of a fascist future.287  
 
It is imperative therefore to develop a hermeneutic approach that avoids either an easy 
separation or a reductive continuity between Schmitt’s Nazi writings and his work as a 
whole and his work and his political life. An interpretive approach that emphasizes 
separation and sees Schmitt’s Nazism as an intellectual aberration or an opportunistic 
lapse too easily facilitates a clear separation between phases of his thought and between 
his work and his political involvements. It risks absolving Schmitt of personal 
responsibility and repressing the affinities his work shared with Nazi ideology and 
practice even if a gap existed between them. Conversely, an approach that foregrounds 
continuity and understands Schmitt as a ‘Nazi thinker,’ whose earlier thought led 
naturally to his fascist complicity, reduces the complexity of the relationship between 
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Schmitt’s evolving thought and developing historical events. It renders Schmitt’s 
historical choices inevitable and makes Nazism the secret hermeneutic key to his entire 
intellectual corpus. What is required then is an additional approach that neither reduces 
Schmitt’s entire life to his Nazi period nor over-determines his corpus with his Nazi 
writings, whilst none-the-less remaining sensitive to the tendencies in his thought that led 
him to make the free, and for that reason ethically inexcusable, choice to join the 
Nazis.288 Such a reading contends that any serious study of Schmitt’s work cannot reduce 
his thought to his Nazism nor clearly separate one from the other. It offers an interpretive 
framework for understanding how Schmitt’s decision to join the Nazis represents a 
rupture with certain elements of his thought whilst remaining consistent with others. 
Further, it allows this decision to be evaluated as a choice made in a specific set of 
historical circumstances. The latter point does not provide a defence of Schmitt but rather 
attempts to show that he acted both opportunistically to further his career and in the belief 
that through the Nazi regime he might realise his authoritarian political vision at the 
expense of parliamentary democracy and Germany’s Jews. 
 
(2) Anti-Semitism: The “Jewish Complex” 
 
“In fending off the Jew, I fight for the work of the Lord.”  
Carl Schmitt, 1936289 
 
To what extent was Schmitt’s decision to join the Nazis and his political thought more 
broadly shaped by anti-Semitism? That Schmitt was anti-Semitic has been beyond 
question since the publication of his pre- and post-war diaries. The claim, made by his 
                                                
288 As Adam Sitze argues, following Carl Galli, the task is not “to ‘quarantine’ Schmitt’s Nazism between 
1933 and 1936 in order to free the rest of his thought for ‘use’. Nor, is it to follow a ‘deeply ambivalent 
logic of taboo, to treat the whole of Schmittian thought as if it were tainted, as though Schmitt’s anti-
Semitism were … akin to a contagious and communicable disease, an incurable illness’ against which a 
total immunization is needed.” Rather, “it is to understand Schmitt’s Nazism as the extreme actualization of 
a potential for regression and domination that is internal not external to Schmittian thought, but also, as 
Horkheimer and Adorno argued, the Enlightenment itself.” See: Sitze, Introduction, xxviii. 
289 Henrich Meier, The Lesson of Carl Schmitt: Four Chapters on the Distinction Between Political 
Theology and Political Philosophy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 154. Schmitt opened 
his address to the conference he had organized on the ‘Jewish influence’ on German Jurisprudence with 
these words quoted from Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf. 
 113 
more apologist protégés such as Georg Schwab, that the anti-Semitic outbursts that 
typified his Nazi-era work was merely an opportunistic attempt to shroud his work in the 
rhetoric of the day does not stand up in light of his private reflections. The paranoid 
reflections revealed in the Glossarium were not only not meant for public consumption, 
but came after Nazi defeat, when he had no stake in pleasing them and the full horrors of 
the Nazi lager was apparent. However, the question remains as to whether or not 
Schmitt’s anti-Semitism played a determining role in his decision to join the Nazis in 
May 1933 or in shaping his political theory more broadly. As argued above, there are 
clear affinities between aspects of Schmitt’s political thought and Nazism that are not 
strictly identifiable with anti-Semitism but rather arise from a shared concept of 
totalitarian state. Thus, it seems fair to argue that Schmitt’s affiliation with Nazism was 
not based on anti-Semitism alone. However, this fact does not deny that anti-Semitism 
had some degree or influence on Schmitt’s commitment to National Socialism or 
provided a point of connection despite an ideological gap. It seems there are two crucial 
concerns to be addressed here.  If Schmitt’s anti-Semitism was not opportunistic was it 
conceptually structural; if it was structural, what role did it play? Secondly, what 
character did Schmitt’s anti-Semitism have? Was it racial or rather, as some have argued, 
more ‘philosophical’; ‘traditional’; ‘Christian’; ‘political’? How should this taxonomy of 
anti-Semitism be assessed in relation to Schmitt’s thought and his political career?  
 
The argument that Schmitt’s anti-Semitism was confined to his Nazi writings and served 
only to please the regime in order to excuse past criticism and advance his career holds 
little water, given the revelations seeping from the pages of Schmitt’s diaries. This 
‘opportunism’ thesis, favoured by Schmitt’s acolytes, was of course employed, under 
Schmitt’s influence, as part of an attempt to excuse his Nazi involvement. The most 
important aspect of this was to cleanse his intellectual corpus of the inevitable fascist 
taint. Hence the argument that his Nazism could be put down to a break explicable in 
terms of a personal moral failure rather than any intellectual continuity or precedent 
found in his work. Denying his anti-Semitism was a way to deny that anti-Semitism had 
any structural role in his thought. The denial of anti-Semitism does not stand up to 
scrutiny, but does it necessarily follow that the anti-Semitism was structural?  
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This is the argument powerfully presented by Raphael Gross in his recent book Carl 
Schmitt and The Jews.290 The central claim of Gross’s study, originally published in 
German in 2000, and translated into English in 2007, is that “anti-Semitism and Nazism 
stamped Schmitt’s thinking in a basic way.”291 Gross contends that the “Jews and ‘the 
Jewish’ had defining importance for Schmitt’s work as a whole” becoming “increasingly 
foundational for his legal theory” as his thought developed.292 As Peter Caldwell notes in 
his Foreword to the English edition, “Gross’s strong claim is that anti-Semitism is not 
incidental to Schmitt but pervades his thoughts on law and state.”293 Gross therefore 
argues that Schmitt’s theory cannot be dissociated from anti-Semitism and presented in 
some supposedly ‘purified’ state. In Gross’s argument, anti-Semitism cannot be separated 
out from Schmitt’s oeuvre precisely because it forms an integral part of it. Gross’s book 
argues that Schmitt’s thought is structured around a series of conceptual oppositions to 
particularism, universalism and historical acceleration, behind which lies his anti-
Semitism. As Tracy B. Strong notes, for Gross ‘the Jew’ “lies under one pole of each of 
the binary oppositions that Schmitt works with: the Jew is ‘enemy’, the ‘Antichrist.’ 
Lacking spatial and territorial definition they undermine all notions of ‘nomos’.”294 
Hence, ‘the Jews’ become a stand-in for a series of enemies in opposition to whom 
Schmitt forms his thought.  
 
Gross goes further however by arguing that not only is anti-Semitism an integral part of 
Schmitt’s thought but lies at its foundational core. For Gross, Schmitt’s work “achieves 
its unity through ideas that take up anti-emancipatory and secularized anti-Jewish 
theological motifs of Catholic and Protestant origin.”295 Anti-Semitism is thus for Gross 
the key lens through which Schmitt’s work should be understood, the hermeneutic key to 
his supposed ‘arcanum.’ Although his argument is persuasively made, I would argue that 
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Gross analysis goes too far in positing anti-Semitism as the structural foundation of 
Schmitt’s thought.  
 
Such a response, one that welcomes Gross’s study and lauds its scholarly erudition, but 
seeks to temper its conclusion that Schmitt’s thought can be reduced to an anti-Semitic 
core, was evidently common in the initial reception of the book’s German edition. In the 
Afterword added to the 2007 English edition, Gross lists 21 reviews that appeared in 
German and French between 2000 and 2005, including one from Schmitt’s long term 
advocate, the former leftist journalist Günter Maschke. As Gross notes, the main criticism 
levelled as his book was that although it “locates the inner unity of Schmittian oeuvre in 
its anti-Semitism, that is actually merely one facet of the oeuvre, since there is no inner 
core to Schmittian theory but only an ‘abundance of facets.’”296 There are to my mind 
two serious hermeneutical problems that arise in Gross’s reading. The first relates to how 
he reads Schmitt’s thought itself, and the second to how he reads its reception. In the first 
instance, by reducing Schmitt’s thought to an anti-Semitic ‘core’ and arguing that a 
fixation on Jew-hatred fuelled his entire intellectual production, he reads him principally 
as a “demonologist ... never satisfied with sober findings.”297 This leads Gross to dismiss 
rather too quickly the possibility that Schmitt presents troubling questions to political 
thought that require serious attention, even if they cannot ever be dissociated or 
abstracted from his anti-Semitism. Secondly, by understanding Schmitt to have 
principally carved out his thought in relation to his Jewish ‘enemy’ he not only over-
determines every aspect of Schmitt’s work but also risks even the nature of his anti-
Semitism itself. He argues in his concluding remarks that the ‘substance’ of Schmitt’s 
‘concrete order thinking’ “can only be found in Aryanism, which itself can be defined 
only in terms of not being Jewish.”298 Although certainly anti-Semitic, Schmitt’s thought 
does not claim anything to do with the concept ‘Aryan,’ and Gross thus risks reducing 
anti-Semitism to Aryanism, which is grossly at odds with his own account of the diverse 
appearances of anti-Semitism even when limited to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
in France and Germany. Thirdly, by reducing his thought to anti-Semitism, Gross 
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provides a deterministic account of Schmitt’s involvement with the Nazis. As he argues, 
the fall of the state to the Nazis in 1933 “merely offered Schmitt the chance to express the 
confrontation [with the Jews] in far more direct and radical terms.”299 Gross’s reduction 
of Schmitt’s decision to involve himself with Nazi power to a predetermined response 
saps Schmitt’s move of political and ethical weight. As noted above, there are more 
complex ways in which to interpret Schmitt’s decision than are offered by opportunism, 
ideology or simply hatred of Jews. 
 
The second major problem is in how Gross accounts for Schmitt’s reception. Gross 
convincingly shows how Schmitt scholars in Germany and the U.S. have consistently 
underplayed, ignored or actively suppressed Schmitt’s anti-Semitism, effectively 
excluding it from serious consideration. Gross’s book goes a long way to exposing this 
mix of systematic negligence and repression and some way to addressing it. However, in 
his conclusion, Gross makes the highly dubious jump between Schmitt’s advocates, who 
have actively sought to exclude anti-Semitism from the discussion of his work, and those 
who critique positivism more generally. This conflation makes an enormous intellectual 
leap across a gaping chasm of necessary distinctions. Indeed, in a conclusion typified by 
sloppy and polemical thought vastly at odds with the extreme rigour of the rest of the 
book, Gross even goes so far as to suggest an inherent relationship between the “post-war 
renaissance of anti-positivist understanding of law and scholarship” in “many academic 
circles in Europe and North America” (a thinly veiled critique of post-structuralism and 
the Frankfurt School) with the “book burnings of may 1933.”300 As detailed above, there 
are of course more or less explicit engagements with Schmitt’s amongst many post-
structuralist and Frankfurt school critical theorists, but a Derrida or a Kirchheimer remain 
very distant from a Goering or a Rosenberg, even if both sets share certain intellectual 
lineages with Schmitt. Gross’ claim that those who draw on Schmitt’s work uncritically 
risk carrying on reactionary and anti-Semitic tradition is a point well taken. To suggest 
however, that critiques of positivism, driven by political and ethical orientations 
markedly distinct to Schmitt, necessarily lead themselves into intellectual waters shared 
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with Nazism is a claim bordering on intellectual historical paranoia. Schmitt can 
doubtless be considered “an important representative of this intellectual current [anti-
positivism].”301 Further, his life may “forcefully demonstrate how unproblematically anti-
positivism and Nazism could harmonize” but the suggestion that Schmitt and anti-
positivism share the same trajectory as such or that Schmitt’s anti-positivism made his 
Nazism necessary is baseless.302 Gross ends his book with a dismal argument that 
collapses Schmitt to anti-Semitism, anti-Semitism to Nazism, and Nazism into a shared 
trajectory with anti-positivism.  
 
Despite these serious flaws in his conclusions, Gross’ book remains an invaluable guide 
to the question of how to relate Schmitt’s thought to his Nazism and his anti-Semitism 
that is absolutely unmatched in any other study available in English. It does however 
require the exercise of some critical distancing from Gross’ project which ultimately 
appears driven by the demands of a polemical reduction. Hence, although he is correct to 
identify the connection between anti-Semitism and the core oppositions in Schmitt’s 
thought, Gross presents it as a hidden foundation on which these other oppositions rely, 
rather than as a connected element with which they resonate. In my view, Schmitt’s anti-
Semitism is not the structural foundation on which other enmities lie but one of a number 
of enmities that exist in a mimetic complex that allows for conceptual convergences. 
Anti-Semitism is thus not the centre of Schmitt’s thought but one of a number of centres 
that resonate with each other in his ‘polycentric’ conceptual framework. This accounts 
for the paranoid nature of his “Jewish Complex” which finds the influence of ‘the Jewish’ 
scattered in the most contradictory of places.303 Hence, in his speech at the 1936 
conference he organised on the influence of ‘the Jewish’ on German jurisprudence and 
the threat presented by “Jewish chaos and Jewish legality ... anarchist nihilism and 
positivist normativism … raw sensualist materialism and abstract moralism.”304 
Likewise, during his post-war internment, Schmitt could identify his “new masters”, the 
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United States, with the victory of the Jews.305 For Schmitt, behind this “singular lord of 
the world, this poor Yankee” stood “his primeval Jews”, a reference to the returning 
German-Jewish émigrés like Robert Kempner who interrogated him at Nuremburg.306 
The United States was for Schmitt the heir of all he had identified with ‘The Jewish’ in 
Europe: pluralism; particularism; universalism; relativistic science; technological and 
economic thinking; spacelessness; the ethnic ‘melting pot’; historical acceleration. 
Bolshevism was perhaps the only one of his stereotypical connections that Schmitt did 
not find mirrored in the new ‘lords of the world’.  
 
The question remains however as to what character Schmitt’s anti-Semitism took. Should 
it be understood as a prejudice understood principally in racial terms or informed rather 
by religious, political and philosophical categories? This is of some importance in 
assessing anti-Semitism’s structural relation to his thought as a whole but also its role in 
his relationship to National Socialism. Whilst he never retracted the statements he had 
made during the Nazi years when he was publicly airing his anti-Semitism, Schmitt 
consistently denied after the war that he was anti-Semitic. Rather, he argued his 
comments could only be said to be “judenkritisch – ‘critical of the Jews.’”307 This 
tenuous distinction between a ‘base’ biological anti-Semitism such as that of the Nazis, 
and one of a supposedly more cerebral form that Schmitt displayed, is a common feature 
of the literature on Schmitt. For example, George Schwab argues that Schmitt was not 
guilty of “the biological Nazi version of anti-Semitism [but] rather than the traditional 
Christian form.”308 Tracy B. Strong likewise distinguishes between the biological anti-
Semitism of the Nazis and Schmitt’s apparently “noncrude anti-Semitism.”309 “Schmitt’s 
anti-Semitism” Strong argues “is first and foremost an anti-Judaism”, defined by 
traditional European Christian prejudices.310 In Strong’s case, the aim is not to excuse 
Schmitt’s anti-Semitism but to understand its conceptual structure more clearly. In 
Schwab’s case, however, these distinctions are employed to ensure that Schmitt’s anti-
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Semitism, and hence his thought more broadly, is held apart from Nazi ideology. Indeed, 
he argues that, “The charge of anti-Semitism cannot be sustained. Schmitt’s relapse into a 
narrow, exclusionary theology, although it overlapped with Nazi and anti-Semitism and, 
as such, added to the poisoned atmosphere, lacked the cornerstone of Nazi ideology, a 
hodge-podge theory of race.”311 Regardless of the arguments, such distinctions 
immediately present two problems. Firstly, can this distinction between a biological anti-
Semitism and a supposedly non-biological anti-Judaism stand, especially in the context of 
the Nazi years? Secondly, does this distinction itself serve to divert attention from the 
role that anti-Semitism, even of a supposedly ‘non-crude’ form, had in Schmitt’s thought 
more broadly? 
 
The first thing to note here, as Strong rightly does, is that the demarcation between a 
biological anti-Semitism and a more ‘traditional’ anti-Judaism “would have been moot in 
the Germany of that time.”312 Whilst the distinction might hold some conceptual water 
and indeed be important for assessing the nature of Schmitt’s views and their impact on 
his thought, they clearly “mattered little if you were in Auschwitz.”313 Hence, these 
dubious delineations between forms of anti-Jewish sentiment are of little relevance in 
how Schmitt’s anti-Semitism is assessed historically or politically. In other words, 
whether or not Schmitt shared the biological anti-Semitism of the Nazis, he was still 
willing to share in this discourse at a moment when his voice served to legitimate their 
racist policies, if not influence them directly in any significant way. Indeed, as Strong 
notes “his pronouncements … during the 1933-1936 period are of a violence that goes 
well beyond a genteel bourgeois anti-Semitism.”314 Schmitt’s identification with an “anti-
Semitism of reason” proves no defence of his relationship with the Nazis’ biological anti-
Semitism, as he was willing to publicize and ratchet up his own hatred to meet the 
requirements of the regime.315 Regardless of what conceptual differentiation may have 
been possible between Schmitt and the Nazis on ‘the Jewish Question’ his support for the 
regime amounted to the same historically and politically.  
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The question of whether a distinction between anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism is of 
importance in assessing the role of Jews and ‘The Jewish’ in Schmitt’s thought is 
however a more complicated matter. This concerns the role that anti-Semitism played in 
Schmitt’s conceptual framework rather than his political adventurism and thus bears 
directly on how to assess its structural position in his thought. As has been argued above 
anti-Semitism represents one of a number of central categories and concerns through 
which Schmitt structures his thought. It enters in to chains of metonymic association with 
liberalism, pluralism, universalism, particularism, historical acceleration and 
spacelessness, often acting as a point of resonance where a number these concepts 
converge. As Strong argues, for example, Schmitt’s anti-Semitism “is of a piece with his 
reasons for opposing pluralism and indirect powers.”316  
 
It is specifically in relation to Schmitt’s understanding of political theology, however, 
that anti-Semitism has most significance in his work. Schmitt’s political reading of 
theology and the importance he attributed to the ghost of theological categories within 
political thought and conceptions of history is of crucial importance here. Schmitt’s anti-
Semitism represents, as Strong notes, “the oldest form of anti-Semitism given a new 
twist: the denial of Christ as the Messiah constitutes a threat to the possibility of political 
order.”317 The fact that Christ has come as Messiah is not simply a religious event but a 
political one, one that anoints secular authority as the representative of God’s law on 
earth. Thus, secular authority, in Schmitt’s view, represents the highest law on earth for a 
Christian. The origins of Schmitt’s anti-Semitism thus lie in the belief “that the event of 
Christianity is political rather than religious.”318 That Jews, in Schmitt’s view, do not 
accept this means that they “will always be in contradiction to a unified society for the 
reason that [they claim] a source of right (Recht) that is external to the society (God’s 
Law).”319 Thus, on the basis of this idiosyncratic political reading of theology Schmitt is 
able to identify Jews with all those who open a rift between authority, association and 
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awe and undermine political order, which again amounts to an identification with his 
usual set of villains through a chain of association.320 The Jews, in Schmitt’s view, were 
politically inclined by theology to undermine order and thus represented a threat to the 
political community that needed to be protected against: an enemy. Interestingly, as part 
of his strained defence of Schmitt, Schwab draws attention to the fact that the German 
lawyer’s views on the Jews had altered since the foundation of Israel: “On numerous 
occasions Schmitt expressed the view to me that the situation of the Jews dramatically 
changed with the creation of the state of Israel. ‘At last they [Jews] again have contact 
with a soil they can call their own.’” Seemingly Schmitt’s anti-Semitism was thus deeply 
tied to their status as a ‘rootless’ Diaspora without land and hence disruptive of the nomic 
relationship between ‘order and orientation’. Such a view would potentially support the 
forced ‘resettlement’ of European Jews in their ‘homeland’, a topic hotly debated in Nazi 
circles and one Schmitt alluded to vaguely in his Grossraum writings during the late 
1930s and early 1940s. 321 
 
It is on this point that there may be a connection between the role of anti-Semitism in 
Schmitt’s conceptual framework and his decision to throw his weight behind the Nazi 
regime. As has been argued, Schmitt understood political order to be facing an epochal 
crisis in the twentieth century and Germany to be at the vanguard of this historic slide 
towards catastrophe. Hence, his thought was preoccupied with ways in which a political 
form could be ensured in order to dam the flood of disorder. In Schmitt’s view, order had 
to assert itself against those forces which threatened political form; parliamentarianism; 
communism; universalism; the indirect power of capital; Anglo-Saxon imperialism; Jews. 
Although for a time Schmitt stood in opposition to the Nazis alongside the communists, 
whom he saw to be carrying out a pincer movement on the stability of the German state 
his so-called ‘Jewish complex’ may have helped push him in the direction of the Nazis. 
He had argued since the early 1920s that sovereignty depended on homogeneity, and 
hence the Jews, understood as an ‘alien’ people within Germany, could easily be 
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identified as the enemy within, who needed to be excluded in order to constitute national 
identity. Thus, as Gross argues, the Jews became the ‘concrete enemy’ upon whom 
Schmitt’s understanding of the crisis of political form came to turn. The Jews, insofar as 
Schmitt identified them with those forces undermining order, could not only be identified 
as the political enemy but the enemy of the political, the invisible force hollowing out 
order from within.  
 
Schmitt made precisely this association, not only in his public diatribes during the Nazi 
years but also in his private diaries in the aftermath of World War II.322 It must remain 
uncertain however if this was the decisive factor leading Schmitt to Nazi involvement, 
but it seems undeniable that it would have affected his decision in some way and at the 
very least made an affiliation more agreeable. Whether Schmitt had a different 
understanding of anti-Semitism to the Nazis is of little importance in assessing the 
importance of his co-operation with the regime, but it helps understand how he could 
have made this decision. In the final instance, however, Schmitt’s anti-Semitism cannot 
provide a definitive interpretive key to understanding his relationship to Nazism, much 
less his thought as a whole. It remains structurally woven into the constellation of 
oppositions through which Schmitt viewed the world, and as such cannot be separated out 
from his thought, much less denied. Although it took an unusual form that needs to be 
understood within the broader complex of his thought, it was in many respects not 
unusual for a conservative intellectual or his time. As George Mosses has argued,  
“German anti-Semitism is part of German intellectual history. It does not stand outside of 
it.”323 Hence the intellectual work still required is to examine Schmitt’s anti-Semitism 
both textually and contextually, locating it in relation to his thought as a whole and in the 
intellectual currents of his time within Germany and Europe more broadly. Although this 
exercise lies beyond the scope of this study, its necessity hangs heavy on Schmitt’s work.  
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(3) A Critical Schmittology 
 
The Italian Schmitt scholar, Carlo Galli has referred to himself as a “non-Schmittian 
Schmittologist” and this seems a fitting description for the hermeneutical approach I 
adopt here.324 It is an approach that considers Schmitt’s ideas to be worthy of rigorous 
investigation but is careful to maintain at a critical distance from its object of study. On 
the one hand, it values the contextualization of Schmitt’s work in relation to the 
complexities of his biography and the historical situation from which it emerged and in 
which it developed, and indeed the multiple historical and national contexts in which it 
has been received. On the other hand, it is sensitive to the fact that Schmitt’s work raises 
questions that do not dissolve in historicization and which still demand answers. 
Although in engaging with Schmitt I recognize that his work is irreducibly problematic, I 
nonetheless believe he identified problems that “transcend both his own answers and his 
own times.”325 In the following chapters I will seek to outline Schmitt’s conceptual 
architecture but do so in order to probe its theoretical foundations and test the limits of its 
use. It should be underlined however that although my reading seeks to approach 
Schmitt’s corpus as a whole my interest is in the role of spatial concepts in his work and 
is by necessity deeply selective. There is much that will be sidelined in order to pursue 
my argument. I do not propose therefore to expose the many faces of this ‘sphinx’ but 
rather to sketch a portrait of Schmitt as a spatial thinker. 
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Chapter 4: Political Form / Spatialising the Political  
 
 
In order to identify the important role that spatial concepts play in Schmitt’s thought it is 
necessary to briefly outline some of the core concepts running through his work. The 
account of Schmitt’s thought given here cannot hope to be comprehensive. It will instead 
focus on those concepts most relevant to the task of elucidating the role of space in his 
work. This inevitably means that some concepts will be elaborated more fully than 
others. Rather than providing a synoptic overview of Schmitt’s entire oeuvre it aims to 
establish a conceptual framework within which the analysis of Schmitt’s thought carried 
out in the subsequent chapters can take shape. This chapter seeks primarily to outline the 
conceptual underpinnings of Schmitt’s ‘ideal type’ of political order - the modern 
European state form  - and its importance for understanding the role of space in his 
thought as a whole. Given that Schmitt’s thought does not follow a clear trajectory of 
linear development, the analysis here will not provide a chronological account of his 
output. Rather, it will shuttle back and forth between works in order to synthesize those 
elements most important to reconstructing the architecture of his thought and elucidating 
the role of space within it. Focus will nonetheless fall for the most part on his work from 
the 1920s. It was during this period that Schmitt established the conceptual framework 
and introduced many of the central terms that underpin his work as a whole. It is against 
the backdrop of this conceptual framework that the development of his later work from 
the mid 1930s, where spatial concepts take on a more explicit role, can be understood. 
Finally, as the purpose is to explicate the structuring role of spatial concepts in Schmitt’s 
thought, critical commentary will be kept to a minimum in this chapter. 
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(1) The Father of All Things: The Primacy of The Political 
 
Adam and Eve had two sons, Cain and Abel. Thus begins the history of 
humanity. Thus appears the father of all things [= Heraclitus’s famous 
description of war]. This is the dialectic tension animating the 
movement of world history, and world history is not yet at an end. 
Carl Schmitt, 1947326 
 
“The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is 
that between friends and enemy.” 327 If any one statement had to be singled out as the 
most important in Schmitt’s thought it would doubtless be this famous definition of the 
political. It is not an understatement to say that the political is the central concept in 
understanding Schmitt’s thought. All other concepts and structures in his thought relate in 
some way to the political, including his conceptions of space. So what then is the political 
for Schmitt? In his 1927 book The Concept of the Political Schmitt set out to define the 
foundations of those phenomena we refer to as ‘political,’ or the origin of politics. 
Schmitt conceives the political therefore as a more fundamental concept than politics. 
Indeed something can be considered politics because it displays the character of the 
political, i.e. the distinction between friend and enemy. Schmitt develops this concept on 
the basis that “various relatively independent endeavours of human thought and action” 
each have their “own criteria which express themselves in a characteristic way.”328 Just as 
the moral, the aesthetic and the economic have their own defining distinction, between 
good and evil, beautiful and ugly, profitable and non-profitable respectively, so too the 
political is defined by the distinction between friend and enemy. “All action with a 
specifically political meaning can be traced” to this distinction.329 There are two points 
that immediately arise here: the relationship of the political to other spheres of social 
relations and the defining role of enmity.  
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In Schmitt’s view, the political refers to a sphere of human relations that can be 
distinguished from all others. The political is “independent” of other spheres of human 
relations such as the moral, the aesthetic and the economic “in the sense that it can 
neither be based on any one antithesis or any combination of other antitheses, nor can it 
be traced to these.”330 The “autonomy of the political becomes evident” he argues, “by 
virtue of its being able to treat, distinguish, and comprehend the friend-enemy antithesis 
independently of other antitheses.”331 However, the political is not a pure sphere. It can 
draw on and emerge from antitheses found in other spheres of human relations such as 
the moral, the economic, and so on. What makes an antithesis political is the degree of 
intensity with which it is drawn. ‘The distinction” Schmitt writes “of friend and enemy 
denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or 
dissociation.”332 “The political” Schmitt contends, “is the most intense and extreme 
antagonism, and every concrete antagonism becomes that much more political the closer 
it approaches the most extreme point, that of the friend enemy grouping.”333 Hence, the 
political enemy “need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an 
economic competitor … but he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient 
for his nature that he is, in a specifically intense way, existentially something different 
and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.”334 It is important to 
note that the political is not a concept, in Schmitt’s eyes, “indicative of substantial 
content.”335 Hence, although it may be judged that the enemy “intends to negate his 
opponent’s way of life” this cannot be determined by pre-existing substantive 
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categories.336 As Schmitt notes the political “can contain and comprehend different 
contents” although it will always designate the most intense form of distinction.337 
Because it has “no substance of its own …the political can be reached from any terrain,” 
Schmitt argues, and can emerge within any social sphere where an antithesis grows 
intense enough to produce existential conflict.338    
 
The most striking aspect of Schmitt’s concept of the political is that he defines politics 
through enmity. Thus, for Schmitt, within the friend-enemy distinction “resides the very 
essence of political existence.”339 Further, given that “war follows from enmity” it 
becomes a central category in the sphere of the political.340 “The core of the matter” he 
bluntly stated in 1937 “lies in warfare.”341 Yet, war, Schmitt warned, is “neither the aim 
nor the purpose nor even the content of politics. Nevertheless, as an ever present 
possibility it is the leading presupposition which determines in a characteristic way 
human action and thinking and thereby creates a specifically political behaviour.”342 The 
political, Schmitt argues, “does not reside in the battle itself … but in the mode of 
behaviour which is determined by its possibility.”343 War, is thus for Schmitt not the aim 
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of politics, but its horizon, the “most extreme possibility [from which] human life derives 
its specifically political tension.”344 In Schmitt’s view therefore, the possibility of war is 
inscribed in the very foundations of the political and as such acts as a point to which all 
politics must be oriented. 
 
The fact that Schmitt defines the political through enmity should not be understood as a 
celebration of war.345 Schmitt does not, as some suggest, conceive of the political as a 
“realm of permanent war.”346 The friend-enemy distinction, he argues, “neither favours 
militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism,” but is rather a sober recognition of the 
‘possibility’ of war.347 War does not have to be “common, normal, something ideal, or 
desirable” but it cannot be excluded from possibility.348 Indeed, according to Schmitt, 
only by recognizing the inherently conflictual nature of politics can the worst excesses of 
war be managed. Thus, even if war cannot be eradicated or overcome by acknowledging 
it as an ‘ever present possibility’ it can be limited. At the core of Schmitt’s concept of the 
political thus lies a peculiar double movement that makes antagonism the foundation of 
politics on the one hand and on the other makes politics the art of managing this 
antagonism. Hence, the political itself contains a moment of depoliticization, an inherent 
self-limitation of enmity.  
 
                                                
344 Ibid, 35. 
345 Indeed, despite the suggestion of Jeffrey Herf in Reactionary Modernism (1984), Schmitt stands at a 
considerable distance from his friend and fellow conservative, Ernst Jünger on precisely this point. In texts 
such as Storm of Steel (1920), Total Mobilization (1933) and On Pain (1934) Jünger celebrated the 
spiritually invigorating power of modern warfare as an antidote to the deadening effects of liberal 
democracy. Herf argues that Schmitt and Jünger both sought to celebrate a vision of military action that 
would fuse reactionary politics with technological prowess (see Reactionary Modernism, Chapter 5). 
However, this conflation of Schmitt and Jünger is unwarranted as Schmitt’s entire understanding of politics 
is based around the attempt to recognize the structural importance of war in order to limit and manage it 
rather than celebrate it.  
346 Neocleous, “Friend or Enemy?,”, 18. See also Mark Neocleous, ‘Perpetual War, or 'War and War 
Again': Schmitt, Foucault, Fascism’ in Philosophy and Social Criticism 22 (1996), 47-66. In 1932 Schmitt 
quite clearly qualifies his conception of the political to avoid such a misreading, already made by Hermann 
Heller. “It is by no means as though the political signifies nothing but devastating war and every political 
deed a military action, by no means as though every nation would be uninterruptedly faced with the friend-
enemy alternative vis-à-vis every other nation.  And, after all, could not the politically reasonable course 
reside in avoiding war?” See: Schmitt, Concept of the Political, 33. 
347 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 33. 
348 Ibid, 33. 
 129 
It is one of the many paradoxes at the heart of Schmitt’s concept of the political that a 
politics defined by antagonism can limit warfare. Schmitt argues that by providing clearly 
defined distinctions between friend and enemy, the political structures and therefore 
controls conflict, allowing conflict to be managed. This paradoxical structure turns on the 
concept of the enemy. The enemy for Schmitt is “something existentially different and 
alien” that threatens one’s “way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order 
to preserve one’s own form of existence.”349 This definition at first seems to propose an 
understanding of the friend-enemy distinction based upon war between groups defined by 
essentialized identities. However, when examined more closely it reveals something quite 
different. 
 
Schmitt’s concept of enmity is qualified in two ways. He distinguishes between two 
different sets of enemies, public and private enemies and ‘real’ and ‘absolute’ enemies. 
Schmitt introduces these distinctions to ensure that the limited conflict ‘proper’ to the 
political is understood. Firstly, the political enemy is “solely the public enemy” Schmitt 
states, “hostis, not inimicus”.350 Thus, the political enemy is distinguished from the 
private enemy and need not be hated personally. “An enemy exists” he argues “only 
when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar 
collectivity.”351 Indeed, conversely “everything that has a relationship to such a 
collectivity of men … becomes public by virtue of such a relationship.”352 Thus, the 
political as the relation between friend and enemy is limited to the public sphere.353  
 
Secondly, the political enemy is for Schmitt a ‘real’ enemy that emerges in a ‘concrete 
situation’. The enemy, like all political concepts for Schmitt, is “focused on a specific 
conflict and [is] bound to a concrete situation.”354 The political resides, he argues, in 
                                                
349 Ibid, 27 
350 Ibid, 28. This draws on the distinction between public and private enemies in Plato’s Republic (Ibid, 28 
n9). 
351 Ibid, 28. 
352 Ibid, 28. 
353 The political does not therefore concern conflicts between individuals. Likewise it does not concern the 
conflicts between groups internal to the political entity unless they grow intense enough to take on a 
political character, i.e. bringing fighting collectives together. In this case the political entity has collapsed 
into a state of civil war. 
354 Ibid, 30. 
 130 
“clearly evaluating the concrete situation and thereby being able to distinguish correctly 
the real friend and the real enemy.”355 In The Concept of the Political Schmitt opposes 
this ‘real’ enemy bound to a ‘concrete situation’ to concepts of enmity that appeal to 
universal terms such as ‘humanity’. Although, as Schmitt notes, it was increasingly 
common in the twentieth century for war to be discussed in humanitarian terms “the 
concept of humanity excludes the concept of the enemy, because the enemy does not 
cease to be a human being.”356 “Humanity as such” Schmitt notes, “cannot wage a war 
because it has no enemy.”357 Or rather enmity takes on “an especially intensive political 
meaning” as one group claiming to fight in the name of all humanity turns their opponent 
into the enemy of humanity, the ‘inhuman’.358 A war waged against the enemy of 
humanity “is then considered the absolute last war of humanity.” Schmitt argues that: 
“Such a war is necessarily unusually intense and inhuman because, by transcending the 
limits of the political framework, it simultaneously degrades the enemy into moral and 
other categories and is forced to make him a monster that must not only be defeated but 
also utterly destroyed. In other words, he is an enemy who no longer must be compelled 
to retreat to his borders only.”359  
 
Schmitt distinguishes between a ‘real’ enmity tied to a ‘concrete situation’, where the 
warring parties recognize each other as legitimate political adversaries opponents and 
respect each other’s borders, and an ‘absolute’ enmity that respects no limitation and 
leads towards a horizon of annihilation.360 Thus, the political enemy considered as both 
public and ‘real’, but only public and ‘real’, presupposes limits on the nature and scope of 
political conflict.361 For Schmitt therefore the enemy plays the paradoxical role of both 
                                                
355 Ibid, 37. 
356 Ibid, 54. 
357 Ibid, 54. 
358 Ibid, 54. 
359 Ibid, 36. 
360 For more on the nature of the ‘absolute enemy’ see Carl Schmitt, The Theory of the Partisan (New 
York: Telos Press, 2007), 89-95. 
361 Schmitt clearly had in mind here the inter-state order of modern European international law he identified 
as the jus publicum Europeaum in later works such as The Nomos of the Earth. In his description of the jus 
publicum Europaeum Schmitt highlights the central importance of the mutual respect that warring parties 
within Europe awarded each other. Each considered the others as sovereign equals and approached as ‘just 
enemies’ who did not have to be annihilated in defeat. Hence conflict was ‘bracketed’ to the conflict 
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the source of conflict and the means of its limitation. But it is only the ‘real’ public 
enemy that can play this role not the private or ‘absolute’ enemy. 
 
The enemy is also a crucial category for Schmitt as he understands political identity to be 
constituted through the friend-enemy relation. Hence, any political entity is dependent on 
an enemy to constitute its identity. “The political entity” Schmitt argues “presupposes the 
real existence of an enemy and therefore coexistence with another political entity.”362 An 
entity without an enemy is not, for Schmitt, a political entity. Further, any political entity 
that fails to identify its enemy will cease to be a political entity. As such the very 
existence of the political entity is defined by its ability to identify the enemy. Schmitt 
argues that “The political entity is by its very nature the decisive entity” and its existence 
turns on the question of its capacity to decide on the enemy.363 “In the orientation towards 
the possible extreme case of an actual battle against a real enemy, the political entity is 
essential, and it is the decisive entity for the friend-or-enemy grouping”.364 Either the 
political entity identifies the enemy or otherwise as, Schmitt states bluntly, “the political 
entity is nonexistent.”365 Political identities are thus relational and situational for Schmitt, 
determined by specific conflicts with ‘real’ enemies in ‘concrete’ situations rather than 
finding a basis in absolute concepts or essentialist categories. Indeed, it is precisely 
because the political lacks its own substance that these conflicts can arise in any sphere of 
human relation: the economic, the moral, the religious, and so on. As noted above it is the 
degree of intensity of an antithesis that produces a political relation and not the substance 
of the difference itself. Hence, Schmitt argues that, “the friend-enemy grouping is 
existentially so strong and decisive that the non-political antithesis, at precisely the 
moment at which it becomes political, pushes aside and subordinates its hitherto purely 
religious, purely economic, purely cultural criteria and motives to the conditions and 
                                                                                                                                            
between states and the conflict between states was limited by the consideration of opponents as equal, 
purely political, opponents.  
362 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 53. 
363 Ibid, 44. As Schmitt writes, “In any event, that grouping is always politics which orients itself toward 
this most extreme possibility [war with the enemy]. This grouping is therefore always the decisive human 
grouping, the political entity. If such an entity exists at all, it is always the decisive entity, and it is 
sovereign in the sense that the decision about the critical situation, even if it is the exception, must always 
reside there” (Ibid, 38). 
364 Ibid, 39. 
365 Ibid, 39. The political entity either decides on the enemy or not, “it exists or it does not exist” (Ibid, 44). 
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conclusions of the political situation at hand.”366 Other forms of identity can therefore 
become political if they grow intense enough that their defining antithesis could lead to 
warfare. However, whilst these relations may be of the utmost intensity, warfare is 
nonetheless limited as it takes place between ‘real’ public enemies tied to a ‘concrete’ 
situation.  
 
Although Schmitt understands political identities to be grounded in situational relations 
as opposed to essentialist substances, they nonetheless take shape in relation to the 
possibility of existential conflict. It is from this existential conflict that political existence, 
indeed even human life as such, receives its ultimate meaning for Schmitt. Existential 
conflict should be understood here to indicate ‘concrete’ life and death struggles 
involving the possible loss of human life. Schmitt is explicit in stating that, “the friend, 
enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to 
the real possibility of physical killing.”367 Precisely “by virtue of [its] power over the 
physical life of men, the political community transcends all other associations or 
societies” Schmitt argues.368 Although Schmitt argues a world without politics “might 
contain many very interesting antitheses and contrasts, competitions and intrigues of 
every kind,” he notes that, “there would not be a meaningful antithesis whereby men 
could be required to sacrifice life, authorized to shed blood, and kill other human 
beings.”369 Thus, the political is the source of a meaning more fundamental than that 
found in other spheres of human life, indeed it concerns the very question of existence as 
such. War, “the physical killing of human beings who belong to the side of the enemy … 
has no normative meaning” he argues, “but an existential meaning only.”370  Hence, for 
                                                
366 Ibid, 38. 
367 Ibid, 33. 
368 Ibid, 47. 
369Ibid, 35. The political tension between friend and enemy gives human life an ‘especially decisive 
meaning’ for Schmitt. He writes: “War is still today the most extreme possibility. One can say that the 
exceptional case has an especially decisive meaning which exposes the core of the matter. For only in real 
combat is revealed the most extreme consequences of the political grouping of friend and enemy” (Ibid, 
35). 
370 Ibid, 49. Schmitt argues that there can be no justification for war other than the real ‘concrete’ threat of 
the enemy. Another justification would lead human lives to destruction for a purpose that lacked an 
existential meaning. He writes: “There exists no rational purpose, no norm no matter how true, no program 
no matter how exemplary, no social ideal no matter how beautiful, no legitimacy nor legality which could 
justify men in killing each other for this reason. If such physical destruction of human life is not motivated 
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Schmitt, the political, as the engine of existential meaning, stood against the growing loss 
of meaning in a modern age he understood to be nihilistic.371 In Schmitt’s view the 
“specifically political tension” that arises from the friend-enemy distinction is the very 
locus of meaning in history. In other words, the possibility of existential conflict provides 
a locus of meaning otherwise lacking in human life. The friend-enemy relation was for 
Schmitt “the dialectic tension animating the movement of world history” and it is for this 
reason that he consistently insists through out his work on the primacy of the political. 372  
 
(2) Political Conditions: Ontology, Anthropology, History 
 
It should be clear that the political carries out a lot of conceptual work in Schmitt’s 
thought. It defines the essence of politics as antagonism, but limits political conflict to the 
war between ‘real’ public enemies who assume each other as equals. Further, it 
constitutes political identities through mutual enmity and grounds the meaning of human 
history in the possibility of existential conflict between them. But if the political is a 
                                                                                                                                            
by an existential threat to one’s own way of life, then it cannot be justified. Just as little can war be justified 
by ethical and juristic norms. If there really are enemies in the existential sense as meant here, then it is 
justified, but only politically, to repel and fight them physically” (Ibid, 49). Obviously this is at odds with 
Schmitt’s claim that it is physical combat itself rather than its justifications from which existential meaning 
arises. In Schmitt’s logic the moment of conflict itself would produce an existential meaning and any 
antithesis would become political in this moment of heightened intensity. However, Schmitt contorts his 
arguments in this way in order to insist on the limited scope of the friend-enemy distinction.  
371 I will return to discuss this in more detail below but Schmitt understood European historical 
consciousness to be increasingly governed by concepts of mechanistic reason from which no meaning 
could be derived. The spirit of the age betrayed a focus on material needs which was incapable of focusing 
on any higher meaning in human existence. As he wrote in 1923 a “mechanism of production serving 
arbitrary material needs is called ‘rational’ without bringing into question what is most important – the 
rationality of the purpose of this supremely rational mechanism.” See: Carl Schmitt, Roman Catholicism 
and Political Form, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 15. 
That Schmitt conceived of the political as something standing against nihilism shows the accusation that 
Schmitt’s thought amounted to a ‘nihilistic opportunism’ made by Karl Löwith in 1935 was misplaced. 
Schmitt posited his concept of the political against nihilism, precisely as an answer to the loss of meaning 
in history. See: Karl Löwith, “The Occasional Decisionism of Carl Schmitt” in Martin Heidegger and 
European Nihilism, ed. Richard Wolin, 137-158. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. 
372 Quoted in Gross, Carl Schmitt and the Jews, 196. The manner in which Schmitt argues war as a source 
of historical meaning here should be contrasted with the critique of Romanticism he mounts in Political 
Romanticism. There Schmitt lambasts ‘political romantics’ for lacking the ‘moral seriousness needed for 
real political decision making. It can be seen that for Schmitt the ultimate source of ‘seriousness’ is the 
possibility of ‘existential conflict’ with the ‘real’ enemy. Political romantics are thus those who above all 
want to avoid thinking about war. This echoes strongly with the claim Schmitt advanced in The Concept of 
the Political that liberals seek above all to avoid decisive violent confrontations that might risk their life. 
See: Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 71. 
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foundational concept in Schmitt’s thought, what are its conceptual foundations? To what 
category of thought does the political belong? Schmitt does not systematically categorize 
the foundations of the political but his understanding can nonetheless be pieced together. 
In my view, the political can be understood to draw on three principal conceptual 
registers: the ontological, the anthropological and the historical. To put it schematically: 
for Schmitt the existential fact of difference (the ontological) creates the conditions for 
conflict in human societies (the anthropological) and hence the need to establish political 
order to manage conflict (the historical). If these ontological and anthropological 
conditions make the political an inescapable part of human existence, the political order 
that arises in response always remains determined by specific historical conditions. I will 
briefly examine the ontological and anthropological conditions of the political below 
before turning to the more complex question of the relationship Schmitt traced between 
the political and the possibilities for political order in the historical conditions of 
modernity.  
 
(i) Dishevelled Humanity: The Political Pluriverse  
 
In The Concept of the Political Schmitt declares that, “the political world is a pluriverse, 
not a universe.”373 At the most basic level of analysis, his definition of the political as 
friend-enemy relations presupposes the existence of multiple political entities. Difference 
is thus the most primary and foundational fact of the political. Schmitt does not elaborate 
a theory of the grounds of political difference but rather takes it as the guiding 
assumption on which he bases his arguments. Difference is simply what there is, in 
Schmitt’s terms. In a 1930 article he wrote that the “world of objective spirit is a 
pluralistic world; pluralism of races and peoples, of religions and cultures; of languages 
and of legal systems… even the political world is in its nature pluralistic.”374 Hence, 
political difference follows from the very difference inherent to existence. Humanity 
                                                
373 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 53. 
374 Schmitt, “Ethic of State and Pluralistic State,” 204. 
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could not be considered a unity, at least politically, for Schmitt. Rather, it was defined by 
difference: “dishevelled,” as he claimed.375 
 
Although Schmitt rarely uses the words ‘ontology’ or ‘ontological’ and does describe his 
concept of the political in these terms he clearly sought to claim some degree of 
ontological validity for the concept.376 Indeed, the fact that he spoke of political 
differences in ‘existential’ terms indicates that he understood them to have some basis in 
the most fundamental level of existence as such. It is tempting in light of Schmitt’s Nazi 
involvement and his anti-Semitism to read his conception of political as being 
essentialist, or in other words to read his concept of the political as grounded in an 
understanding of fixed essential differences.377 However, at numerous points in his work 
Schmitt emphasizes the historical fluidity of political differences and their essentially 
contingent co-ordinates in ‘concrete’ situations. Indeed, as highlighted above, the 
political is defined by the intensity as opposed to substance of political differences. 
Nonetheless, the political is for Schmitt defined by the difference essential to human 
existence as such. Rather than being concerned with the nature of specific differences 
Schmitt’s concept of the political seeks to tarry with the ‘existential’ fact of difference 
itself. Indeed, it is precisely because differences are ever-changing that the possibility of 
conflict cannot ever be overcome. In other words, the fact that differences are not fixed 
means that the political is shaped by ‘concrete’ situations and can arise from any social 
sphere. This ontological indeterminacy at the heart of human existence is the essential 
                                                
375 In a 1937 article on piracy Schmitt argued that in the view of liberal international law “all humanity – 
which is otherwise so dishevelled – suddenly appears as if united on a single front.” Quoted in Daniel 
Heller-Roazen, “Enemies of the Deep,” Cabinet 35, (2009). See:   
http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/35/heller-roazen.php 
376 As indicated in Chapter 1, many readers have interpreted Schmitt’s concept of the political in relation to 
Heidegger’s distinction between the ontological and ontic levels of existence, or rather mapped the 
distinction between the political and politics against that between Being and beings. See for example: 
Arditi (2008); Marchart (2007); Mouffe (2005); Prozorov (2008). However, Schmitt himself makes only 
minor references to Heidegger in his work. Schmitt was certainly aware of Heidegger’s work and indeed 
his decision to join the Nazi party may have been influenced to some degree by the letter of prompt he 
received from the latter.  
377 What is beyond doubt the most subtly articulated and rigorously defended version of this argument can 
be found in Gross, Carl Schmitt and the Jews (2007). In Chapter 3 I addressed some of those points where I 
believe Gross goes too far in attributing an essentialist understanding of difference to Schmitt, specifically 
with regard to the significance of his anti-Semitism for interpreting his work as a whole.  
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crux of the Schmitt’s conception of the political. It is precisely because humanity is 
‘dishevelled’ that conflict always remains possible and hence order is needed. 
 
(ii) A Dangerous and Dynamic Being: The Need for Order 
 
The very fact that human existence is defined by ontological difference raises the 
problem of order for Schmitt as he understood conflict to be born of difference. Out of 
ontological difference arises the political significance of human nature. ‘One could test 
all theories of state and political ideas” Schmitt argues, “according to their anthropology 
and thereby classify these as to whether they consciously or unconsciously presuppose 
man to be by nature evil or by nature good.”378 For Schmitt, all political concepts turn on 
the question of “whether man is a dangerous being or not, a risky or a harmless creature” 
and ultimately “the anthropological distinction of good and evil.”379 In The Concept of 
the Political Schmitt argues that, “all genuine political theories presuppose man to be 
evil, i.e., by no means an unproblematic but a dangerous and dynamic being.”380 As such 
political order is required to tame a ‘problematic’ human nature. The human being, as 
Schmitt writes elsewhere, is “a cowardly rebel in need of a master.”381 To deny the 
‘dangerous and dynamic’ element of human nature is therefore to deny the need for such 
a master. Hence, as Schmitt notes anarchistic political theories rely on a political 
anthropology where man is ‘by nature good’. “The natural goodness of man” he argues, 
“is closely tied to the radical denial of state and government. One follows from the other 
and both foment each other.”382  
 
Although Schmitt appeals to the concept of ‘original sin,’ his main point of orientation 
remains the real possibility of friend-enemy antagonisms.383 “Because the sphere of the 
                                                
378 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 58. Indeed, this has become one of the textbook distinctions of 
modern political thought with Hobbes and Rousseau representing the evil and good readings of human 
nature respectively. 
379 Ibid. 
380 Ibid, 61. He cites a list that includes Machiavelli, Hobbes, Bossuet, Fichte, de Maistre, Donoso Cortés, 
H. Taine, and Hegel. 
381 Schmitt, Roman Catholicism and Political Form, 33. 
382 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 60. 
383 It would be easy given Schmitt’s Catholicism and his avowed interest in political theology to read his 
political anthropology simply as a political doctrine of ‘original sin.’ For recent examples of his argument 
see: William Hooker, Carl Schmitt’s International Thought (2008); Simon Critchley, The Faith of the 
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political is in the final analysis determined by the real possibility of enmity, political 
conceptions and ideas” could not, Schmitt argued, “very well start with an 
anthropological optimism. In Schmitt’s view this would dissolve enmity, and thereby, 
every specific political consequence.”384 Those political thinkers who start by presuming 
human nature is evil “are always aware of the concrete possibility of an enmity.”385 In 
Schmitt’s view the very possibility of a concrete enmity means that human nature must 
be considered politically volatile and in need of restraint. Any form of political thought 
that presupposes man to be good or supposes political organization can do without 
ordering authority, in Schmitt’s view, fails to acknowledge the ‘ever present possibility’ 
of the friend-enemy grouping. At best this amounts to a dangerous utopianism for 
Schmitt. In Schmitt’s terms a sober understanding of the political necessitates an 
understanding of politics based on order. Where there is difference there is the possibility 
of conflict and where there is the possibility of conflict there is the need for order. Order 
is not therefore inherent either to the ontological conditions of human existence or the 
anthropological state of human nature. Rather, it has to be produced through political 
action and institutions, and is thus historically determined. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Faithless (London: Verso, 2011). Doubtless this argument has some veracity and indeed Schmitt makes 
prominent mention of original sin in several works. However, he is always careful to distinguish the official 
Catholic doctrine from a more radical Protestant understanding of humanity’s fallen state and point to the 
political significance of this difference. As he notes in Roman Catholicism and Political Form “the 
antithesis of man ‘by nature evil’ and ‘by nature good’ – this decisive question for political theory – is in no 
sense answered by a simple yes or no in the Tridentine Creed. In contrast to the Protestant doctrine of the 
total depravity of natural man, this Creed speaks of human nature as only wounded, weakened, and 
troubled, thus permitting of some gradations and adaptations” (Schmitt, Roman Catholicism and Political 
Form, 7-8). This is a point he also makes in Political Theology when discussing the work of the Spanish 
counter-revolutionary philosopher of the nineteenth century Donoso Cortés. See: Schmitt, Politica 
Theology, 57. Thus, I think Schmitt’s objection against a theological reading of political anthropology 
should be taken seriously at least at the time The Concept of the Political was written in 1928. As he notes 
there “theological interference generally confuses political concepts because it shifts the distinction usually 
into moral theology. Political thinkers such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, and often Fichte presuppose with their 
pessimism only the reality or possibility of the distinction friend and enemy” (Schmitt, The Concept of the 
Political, 65). Thus, it remains the ever-present possibility of real conflict that means political order is 
required in Schmitt’s view, rather than a theological presupposition of humanity’s fallen state.  
384 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 64. 
385 Ibid, 65. 
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(iii) Janus-Faced Grounds: The Paradox of The Political 
 
Here then a question necessarily arises. How is order to be produced if ontological 
difference and the ‘dangerous and dynamic’ nature of humanity cannot be overcome? 
Schmitt’s answer is that the political itself provides the foundation of politics. The 
radicality of Schmitt’s work lies in this claim that the very cleavage of antagonistic 
difference that divides human society should be the grounds for order. Political difference 
itself is the inescapable foundation for political order in Schmitt’s view. Although order 
is necessary precisely because of the possibility of conflict implicit in difference, it can 
nonetheless only be constituted on the basis of the very same difference. Schmitt’s 
concept of the political circulates around this paradoxical relationship between difference 
and order: difference requires order and order requires difference. As difference is, for 
Schmitt, embedded in the ontological and anthropological conditions of human existence 
political order cannot hope to be overcome difference. Rather, order must base itself upon 
difference and struggle against it. Hence, whilst order is grounded upon difference, 
difference exceeds all order. The concept of the political contains both understandings of 
difference simultaneously: as a force that both grounds and exceeds order.  
  
For Schmitt political order thus rests upon the paradoxical foundations of difference. The 
foundations are thus constituted precisely through the cleavage of difference that runs 
through them. The concept of the political is, as Carlo Galli argues, Schmitt’s attempt to 
define this ‘double-sided origin’ of politics.386 The concept of the political indicates that 
for Schmitt grounding order and ungrounding difference are not opposed concepts but 
rather locked in an embrace within the political.  As the Finnish political theorist Mika 
Ojakangas has pointed out, foundation and rupture are not opposed terms for Schmitt but 
rather coterminous. For Ojakangas, the core of Schmitt’s thought lies in the paradox of a 
“founding rupture” where foundations are laid in moments of rupture and all foundations 
are necessarily ruptured.387 On the one hand order must always rely on an act of 
                                                
386 This is Adam Sitze paraphrasing of Galli’s conception rather than a direct quotation. Sitze shows at 
length how Galli’s work focuses on a critical appraisal of Schmitt’s analysis of the ‘Janus-faced’ origins of 
politics in the concept of the political. See Sitze, Introduction, xxvi and xiv. 
387 Mika Ojakangas, The Philosophy of Concrete Life, (Bern: Peter Lang, 2006), 38. Ojakangas argues that 
each of Schmitt’s key concepts is defined by such a ‘founding rupture’, not only the political but the 
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founding, which must in Schmitt’s view be an act that confirms or indeed produces 
difference. Yet, on the other hand, order must always seek to limit difference, to manage 
it through acts of unifying. Hence, Schmitt’s thought is defined by a deep structural 
tension between foundational indeterminacy and the demand for order.388 This tension 
however does not represent a logical flaw in his argument but rather provides the 
generative force of his work. His thought is characterized by a dialectical tension that 
refuses the moment of synthesis – an oscillation without resolution. 
 
Encapsulated in Schmitt’s concept of the political is therefore an extremely complex and 
productive understanding of difference. Difference at once lays and dissolves the 
foundations for all order. Inherent to the political is both an ordering principle and a 
restive element of disruption. To use somewhat worn Derridian terminology, Schmitt 
locates in the political both the conditions of possibility and impossibility of political 
order. Further, by locating the foundations of political order in difference Schmitt implies 
that it is necessarily contingent. If difference is an ontological condition and the 
possibility of conflict inherent to human nature, then any attempt to produce order must 
ultimately remain contingent.389 Difference does not make all political order impossible, 
just any definitive or final form of order. The ontological and anthropological conditions 
of the political ensure thus that all forms of political order are determined by their 
specific historical conditions. Hence, Schmitt sets his thought in opposition to forms of 
political thought that presume to locate stable foundations for order in supposedly 
universal principles, such as reason or humanity, or suppose politics to be necessarily 
determined by processes such as economic exchange or the unfolding spirit of History.390 
Galli argues that the necessary contingency of political order makes politics a tragic affair 
                                                                                                                                            
sovereign exception, the people’s ‘existential total decision’ on the constitution, the act of land 
appropriation, nomos, and so on. 
388 See: Rowan, “A New Nomos or Post-Nomos?” (2011). 
389 Indeed, it is this necessary contingency of all order implicit in Schmitt’s concept of the political that puts 
his work in close proximity to post-foundational thinkers and accounts for some of his recent appeal within 
Continental political thought on the Left. See for example: Arditi (2008); Marchart (2007); Mouffe (2005); 
Prozorov (2008). 
390 Schmitt thought has a difficult relationship to historical necessity as his later work is increasingly 
determined by a Christian eschatological conception of history based upon the second coming of Christ. By 
framing his political thought on this basis Schmitt ultimately risks grounding politics in a form of 
transcendental determination.  
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for Schmitt.391 Politics remains caught in the process of attempting to establish order in 
the knowledge that it is must ultimately fail. Indeed, Schmitt’s consistent focus on the 
need for strong political authority needs to be understood against the backdrop of his 
acute conceptual sensitivity to the ultimately fragile nature of political order.  
 
A further paradox remains to be drawn out. Insofar as the political provides the 
foundations of political order in Schmitt’s view, it involves a certain degree of 
depoliticization. Politics involves a moment of politicization, of recognizing conflict and 
rendering it explicit, and a moment of depoliticization, of managing the destructive force 
of this conflict. In Schmitt’s view whilst the possibility of conflict cannot be totally 
annulled, given that it emerges from irreparable ontological and anthropological 
conditions, it can nonetheless be limited. As noted above, the friend-enemy distinction 
provides a minimal structure within which conflict can be limited. The very principle of 
enmity itself contains the germ of depoliticization. Enmity is, as William Rasch has 
noted, a “structuring principle” for Schmitt.392 Hence, the binary structure of antagonistic 
difference itself provides a sort of minimal ground on which to frame political order. 
However, this ‘structuring principle’ inherent to enmity does not produce a determinate 
form of political order.  Political order is, in Schmitt’s analysis, always determined by 
specific historical conditions. Thus, although the political emerges from ontological and 
anthropological conditions, the manner in which it takes shape as order is determined by 
historically specific conditions.  
 
(3) Political Form: Secularisation & Spatialisation 
 
The Concept of the Political opens with the claim, “the concept of the state presupposes 
the concept of the political.”393  Hence, Schmitt presents his concept of the political as an 
attempt to think of the fundamental structure of politics rather than the specific historical 
determination of the state. However, it is clear that he nonetheless worked from within 
the specific framework of the modern European state and it structured the way in which 
                                                
391 Galli, “The Critic of Liberalism”, 30. 
392 Rasch, “Lines in the Sand,” 253. 
393 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 19. 
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he conceived of the political as such. Thus, although the political is an attempt to 
conceive of politics as beyond the state, it fundamentally takes the state as the starting 
point of its reflections. However, the fact that Schmitt takes the state as the basis for his 
reflections does not mean that his concept of the political can be simply identified with 
the modern European state. Indeed, his work traces the emergence of the state as the 
historically specific form the political takes in the conditions of European modernity. By 
examining Schmitt’s account of the modern state’s historical emergence in Europe, it is 
possible to identify the process by which he understands the political to take form. 
 
The core concept in Schmitt’s thought here is political form. I will argue that political 
form is the specific way that Schmitt sees political order taking shape in the specific 
historical conditions of modernity. Although this concept receives scant attention in the 
Anglophone secondary literature, I believe it is crucial to understanding one of the most 
important conceptual frameworks running throughout Schmitt’s thought as a whole and 
specifically the structural role of spatial concepts within it. However, to understand the 
role political form plays in Schmitt’s thought it is important to return to highlight two 
crucial historical processes Schmitt identifies in the emergence of the modern state: 
Secularization and spatialisation. 
  
(i) Secularization 
 
The concept of political form appears first in Schmitt’s 1923 book Roman Catholicism 
and Political Form.394 In this early work Schmitt offers an account of the nature of the 
                                                
394 As Gopal Balakrishnan notes, the book was conceived and mostly written in 1922 at the same time as 
Schmitt was penning the better-known Political Theology. Balakrishnan argues that the fact the two books 
were composed simultaneously attests to the astonishing protean nature of Schmitt’s writing as in his 
reading they have dramatically opposed positions. Balakrishnan argues that whilst Roman Catholicism and 
Political Form is focused on an understanding of the role of both universality and Catholicism in politics 
Political Theology emphasizes difference and a thoroughly secular understanding of politics. See: 
Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 51. To my mind, this interpretation involves a substantive misreading of the 
book on the Roman Catholic Church. Whilst Schmitt discusses the specifically powerful form of political 
universality represented by the Roman Catholic Church in Medieval Europe he is explicit in arguing that 
the conditions of modernity no longer allow for such a universal concept of politics, indeed quite the 
opposite, and that the role of Catholicism in politics can no longer be leading. In fact his reading of the 
Roman Catholic Church is largely undertaken in the spirit of ‘conceptual analogy’ as outlined in his theory 
of secularization in Political Theology and is part of the same attempt to come to terms politically with the 
historical process of secularization. 
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political power of the Roman Catholic Church in Medieval Europe. Typical of Schmitt’s 
work, it was a polemical text that presented the Medieval Roman Catholic Church as a 
critical counterpoint to the political institutions of contemporary Europe. In particular 
Schmitt looked at the specifically political form of thinking in Roman Catholicism in 
contrast to the depoliticizing ‘economic thinking’ dominant across the political spectrum 
of early twentieth century Europe in Schmitt’s eyes. In Schmitt’s view this ‘economic 
thinking’ was dissolving the ability of the political to take form in twentieth century 
Europe. Nevertheless this book was by no means a call for a Catholic politics. Indeed, 
Schmitt fell out of favour with Bonn’s Catholic literati and the Catholic Centre Party by 
denying a political role for Catholicism in contemporary politics. “The alliance of throne 
and altar” he wrote, “will not be followed by an alliance of office and altar, also not of 
factory and altar.”395 Rather, his analysis of the Medieval Roman Catholic Church should 
be read in line with the theory of secularization Schmitt outlined in his Political Theology 
written simultaneously. In that text Schmitt famously claimed that “all significant 
concepts of the modern theory of state are secularized theological concepts.”396 Hence, 
Schmitt presented a political reading of the Roman Catholic Church that emphasized its 
success as an institution of political order in Medieval Europe. His aim was explicitly not 
to argue that the Catholic Church should, or even could, play such an ordering role in 
early twentieth century Europe but rather to examine the formal structure of Medieval 
Roman Catholicism as a model of political order. 
 
Schmitt presented an image of the Roman Catholic Church as a powerful political 
institution that successfully brought order to Medieval Europe. It was able to do so, in his 
view, because it represented a unique political form - “a complex of opposites, a 
complexico oppositorum.”397 This complexico oppositorum was, in Schmitt’s view, able 
to embrace all antitheses within a higher unity that neutralized them politically. The 
central strength of the Roman Catholic Church for Schmitt was therefore its ability to 
mediate between unity and difference. It did not do so by appeal to a ‘higher third’ that 
                                                
395 Schmitt, Roman Catholicism and Political Form, 24. 
396 Schmitt, Political Theology, 36. 
397 Schmitt, Roman Catholicism and Political Form, 7. Although he does not attribute the concept, 
presumably expecting a Catholic readership to recognize its origins, Schmitt draws this idea from the 
fifteenth century German philosopher and Cardinal Nicolas of Cusa. See also: Sitze, Introduction, xxxiii. 
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would provide a dialectical synthesis, but rather by providing an umbrella structure in 
which differences could co-exist with conflict.398 As a complexico oppositorum the 
Roman Church rested upon a uniquely powerful political universalism that did not seek 
to flatten differences but rather embrace them within a higher overarching structure. 
Schmitt saw in the Church’s ability to maintain unity precisely by embracing difference 
“a specific formal superiority over the matter of human life such as no other imperium 
has ever known.”399 For Schmitt, Roman Catholicism drew the power that had sustained 
it across centuries precisely from its “formal character,” or in other words the fact that it 
stood formally above other differences in order to embrace them.400  
 
However, the “essence” of this political form lay, in Schmitt view, in “the political idea 
of Catholicism.”401 The political idea was that the Church represented the power of Christ 
on earth through “an unbroken chain” linking the Pope to the “concrete person of 
Christ.”402 “The formal character of Roman Catholicism” Schmitt argued “is based on a 
strict realization of the principle of representation.”403 By representing the idea of 
Christ’s power on earth the Catholic Church was able to legitimize its authority and bring 
unity to Christian Europe. Hence, Schmitt understood the power of the Roman Catholic 
Church to rest upon a conceptual matrix that fused authority, association (in the sense of 
the political unity of a people) and idea through the means of representation. Although 
Schmitt dropped the concept of the complexico from his conceptual vocabulary after this 
                                                
398 Schmitt, Roman Catholicism and Political Form, 9. Indeed, although Schmitt does not mention Hegel 
by name he clearly conceives the Catholic complexico in direct opposition to Hegelian dialectics. Indeed, 
for Catholicism “is categorically something other than the ‘higher third’ of German philosophy of nature 
and history. To it belong neither the despair of antithesis nor the illusory optimism of their synthesis” (Ibid, 
11). Schmitt depicts the need for a ‘higher third’ as a weakness common to Romantic and Marxist thought 
that prevents them from understanding the representative power of Roman Catholicism and hence, for 
Schmitt, the power of representation in politics. 
399 Ibid, 8. 
400 Ibid. Both Balakrishnan and Gross have seen in Schmitt’s emphasis on the formal power of Roman 
Catholicism the influence of Charles Maurras, the founder of Action Française. Maurras had laid emphasis 
on the ‘classical’ form of politics which he saw being dissolved in the nineteenth and twentieth Century 
with the rise of the socialist masses. Maurras was an avowed agnostic but appealed to Catholicism as a state 
religion in France because he believed it had the power to bring about social cohesion necessary for 
national unity. There are obvious similarities between the two thinker’s views on the unifying formal 
properties of Catholic institutions but as noted above Schmitt stood against any formal role for Catholicism 
in political life. See: Balakrishnan, The Enemy, 55-57; and Gross, Carl Schmitt and the Jews, 89-100. 
401 Schmitt, Roman Catholicism and Political Form, 8. 
402 Ibid, 14. 
403 Ibid, 8. 
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book, he carried the concept of political form and the conceptual matrix on which it 
rested into his future work.  
 
The collapse of the Roman Catholic complexico was one of the founding events of 
European modernity, in Schmitt’s account. It above all represented a crisis of political 
form, as the ordering framework of Medieval Europe was dissolved along with the 
universal authority of the Catholic Church. This crisis of political form at the beginning 
of the modern age would have a profound impact, in Schmitt’s view, on the development 
of political order in modern European and world history. In his work between the early 
1920s and the early 1950s Schmitt built up an account of modern European, and 
subsequently world, history book-ended by two crises of political form. The first was 
produced by the collapse of the Catholic complexico in the sixteenth Century and the 
second by the dissolution of the state in the twentieth. The period between these crises 
was characterized, in Schmitt’s account, by the emergence of the state as the defining 
political form of modernity. Schmitt thus understood his own reflections as responses to a 
crisis of the state form but located the deep historical roots of the crisis he was living 
through in the collapse of the complexico.  In order to understand the manner in which 
Schmitt conceived of the crisis of political form in the Twentieth Century it is therefore 
important to return to his analysis of the shift that took place between the collapse of the 
Medieval Catholic order and the modern state.  
 
An account of the political effects of secularization on modern European history provides 
a crucial analytical backbone running through Schmitt’s corpus. Although Schmitt 
largely does not address it in the pages of Roman Catholicism and Political Form the 
process of secularization was both a symptom and a cause of the collapse of the Roman 
Catholic complexico and hence the political form on which Medieval European political 
order had rested. The matrix of association, authority and idea on which the political form 
of the complexico had rested unravelled as the Roman Catholic Church could no longer 
claim to represent Christ’s authority on earth in the wake of the Protestant Reformation. 
The Reformation had disputed the legitimacy of the Papacy’s claim to represent Christ’s 
power and, its authority undermined, the Church could not bind Europe together. Without 
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being able to claim indisputable authority to represent Christ on earth, the Church was no 
longer able to stand above political differences in order to embrace them but instead 
became embroiled in those differences. In the wake of the Protestant Reformation 
Christian theology did not represent a unifying power within Europe but a divisive 
influence. In Schmitt’s view the resulting collapse of political form saw unifying 
authority crumble and the binds of political association unfurl unleashing a century of 
widespread religious civil war across Europe. The conflict was all the more vicious 
because there were competing claims to absolute legitimacy grounded in the theology 
involved. Schmitt returns many times in his work to emphasize the importance of this 
bloody state of religious civil war for the birth of modern European political order. This 
period of brutal creedal strife was indicative for Schmitt of what it meant for an age to be 
without political form and he found echoes of this Europe-wide civil war in the twentieth 
century when Europe once again became a battlefield of absolute wars of annihilation.404 
 
From this great period of turmoil in European history emerged the problem of how to 
produce a new political form that could restore order and limit conflict. Theological 
claims could not provide a basis for European order as they were in fact provoking 
conflict. Theological ideas were no longer able to provide grounds for the partial 
depoliticization needed for political order and were incapable of providing the conceptual 
glue to bind authority and association together in a stable political form. Thus, a new 
basis for political form had to be found in order to quash the religious civil wars that had 
torn Europe asunder in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. From this cauldron of 
sectarian ferment came the defining question of modern politics, the central question 
                                                
404 The comparison between the twentieth century with the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries runs 
throughout Schmitt’s work. Both periods were for Schmitt defined by the collapse of a powerful and lasting 
political form and the emergence of civil wars that exceeded the borders of one state or political entity, or 
rather dissolved the very possibility of making such distinctions. Indeed, I will argue below it is the very 
collapse of these distinctions which signals for Schmitt a crisis of political form. Further, and not 
incidentally, Schmitt located in both periods a profound ‘spatial revolution’ that reconfigured the 
relationship between politics and spatial order in ways that dissolved the divisions of categories of older 
political forms. Another period that Schmitt understood to share a world-historical ‘elective affinity’ with 
the Twentieth Century was the age of early Christianity in Europe. This period became an increasingly 
important reference point for Schmitt’s later work and he particularly emphasized the texts of Saint Paul. A 
Christian, Schmitt argued, could not help but notice the 'great parallel' between the middle years of the 
twentieth century and the early days of Christianity defined by the Roman civil wars. See: Carl Schmitt, 
“Three Possibilities for a Christian Concept of History” in Telos 147 (2009), 168. 
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lurking unspoken behind Schmitt’s work: how can political order be produced without 
theological grounds? According to Schmitt the answer to this epochal question appeared 
in the seventeenth century in the form of the modern secular state. The paradigmatic 
modern institution provided a secular ground on which to conduct politics that provided a 
neutral alternative to the controversial disputed grounds of theology. The new secular 
European state removed politics from the conflicted sphere of religion by distinguished 
private religious belief and public political association. The neutral sphere of the secular 
state provided the conditions for the necessary degree of depoliticization and once again 
allowed warfare to be limited by removing claims about the justice of conflict grounded 
in theology.  
 
The waves of religious civil war that flooded across Europe in the shadow of the 
collapsing authority of the Catholic Church were dammed by the neutralizing power of 
the new secular state. This powerful new political form acted as an ordering institution 
precisely to the extent that it removed politics from the realm of theology, but without 
theological grounds it needed to find a new form of foundation. It is here that the 
importance of space becomes clear in Carl Schmitt’s thought.  
 
(ii) Spatialisation  
 
The modern secular state emerged in Schmitt’s eyes as a powerful new ordering 
institution to address the crisis of political form created by the collapse of the Medieval 
Catholic complexico. It provided a secular sphere in which to conduct politics and 
neutralize religious conflict and answer to the fundamental question of modern politics: 
how to produce order without theological grounds. The question remains however as to 
how the state form provided foundations for political order in European modernity. 
Schmitt’s work contains a number of answers each of which play a role in his account of 
modern European, and world, history; the establishment of a distinction between public 
political association and private religious belief; the establishment of a new form of 
authority in the European state sovereign; the growth of European colonialism in the 
‘New World’; the construction of a new system of international law based on the 
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limitation of war between legally equal European states; the spreading influence of 
concepts of immanence in political thought. Rather than one of these factors taking 
precedence Schmitt understood them to enter into a complex constellation that provided 
an unsteady historical balance in which a Eurocentric global order could take shape. 
However, I argue below, this fragile constellation rested above all on one aspect of 
Schmitt’s conception of state form – the division of space. 
 
In Schmitt’s view, lacking theological grounds on which to claim universal authority, the 
modern secular state had to ground itself on difference. In other words, the difference 
inherent to the political became the grounds for political form. In Schmitt’s account the 
state produced political order by formalizing this principle of political difference in the 
division of space. Or rather, the minimal structure provided by the friend-enemy 
distinction took form in spatial division. The political form of the state was therefore in 
Schmitt’s view fundamentally grounded on a spatialisation of the political. Thus, for 
Schmitt, in the absence of theological foundations, political order was produced through 
the division of space. The spatialisation of the political was therefore the state’s answer to 
the fundamental question of modern politics – how to produce order in the absence of 
theological foundations.  
 
The state therefore mapped the distinction between friend and enemy against the 
distinction between inside and outside in Schmitt’s view. Schmitt argued however that 
this spatialisation of the political on which the state form rested emerged within the 
specific historical conditions of the Eurocentric world order in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Hence, the distinction between inside and outside was not simply a 
topological abstraction but took shape within the ‘concrete’ historical situation of Europe 
during this period. The state form was, in Schmitt’s view, founded upon two sets of 
fundamental inter-related inside-outside distinctions: between the new states within 
Europe on the one hand and between Europe and the colonial New World on the other.405 
                                                
405 In a series of later works written during the late 1930s and 1940s such as The Leviathan in The State 
Theory of Thomas Hobbes (1938), Land and Sea (1942) and The Nomos of the Earth (1950) Schmitt 
expanded the number and complexity of the intertwined inside-outside relations on which the modern 
Eurocentric world order rested. To the relationship between states inside Europe and that between Europe 
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In the first instance, the relationship between the new European states was managed by 
proscribing the power of each sovereign to a specific limited space. The border between 
states marked the limits of sovereign power but also constituted the frame within it 
operated. Within the borders of the state the sovereign held power and could ensure unity, 
order and peace. Beyond the border was the realm of the other, of potential disorder and 
war. Hence, in Schmitt’s conception of the state, the spatialisation of the political along 
the inside-outside distinction produced a structural framework for the limitation of 
conflict both internal to the state and between states. Firstly, the threat of the external 
enemy produced unity within the state ensuring the internal differences were politically 
neutralized. Second, by limiting conflict to that between states it could be formalized and 
managed. States of war and peace could clearly be distinguished as could warring and 
neutral parties. Hence, whilst the possibility of war could not be escaped, it could be 
fought ‘in form.’ It could be ‘bracketed’ so order was ensured internal to each state and 
between them.  
 
The second crucial structural inside-outside distinction was between Europe as a 
collective of sovereign states and the ‘free space’ of the New World colonies.406 
Although, Schmitt argued that the ‘spatial revolution’ signalled by the emergence of 
modern geometric sciences and the European conquest of the ‘New World’ had 
contributed to the collapse of the Medieval Catholic complexico, European colonialism in 
the ‘New World’ nonetheless created the conditions for the emergence of the modern 
secular state within Europe.407 Schmitt argued that by making a clear distinction between 
                                                                                                                                            
and the rest of the world was added the distinction between the ‘inner’ private space of the individual 
subject and the ‘outer’ public space of the state on the one hand, and on the other the relationship between 
land and sea. These distinctions at first helped to cement the spatialisation of the political in the state form 
although they grew to become destabilizing agents that contributed eventually to its despatialisation and 
ultimately to the collapse of the state form in Schmitt’s eyes. I will return to the importance Schmitt gave to 
these distinctions for the fate of the political form of the modern state in later chapters. 
406 From the late 1930s Schmitt increasingly turned his attention to analyzing the longer-term historical 
development of the state form and its emergence within a wider global context of international law and 
European colonialism. It will return to these reflections in later chapters. 
407 Schmitt thus locates the conditions of possibility for the modern European state in the spread of 
colonialism in the New World. To a degree, Schmitt’s depiction of European modernity as fundamentally 
predicated on colonialism perversely makes his thought something like a postcolonialism of the Right. 
From a self-consciously Eurocentric position he offered an analysis of the fundamental constitutive role 
 149 
the space of Europe and the space of the New World in international law, Europe could 
be designated as a space of relative order. On the one hand, the sense of collective 
superiority with which the European powers regarded themselves in relation to the New 
World allowed a system of international law to emerge based on the mutual respect and 
legal equality of European sovereign states. Hence, war between these parties took place 
within the limits of mutual respect. Each state regarded the other as a ‘just enemy’ that 
could be fought but not vanquished. On the other hand, these limits could exist within 
Europe to the extent that war was unlimited in the ‘free space’ of the colonial New World 
where competition between European powers was given free reign. Hence, conflict could 
be limited within Europe to the extent that the New World provided an exterior realm 
where conflict could take place without limits. The inside-outside distinction between 
Europe and the New World spatialised the political insofar as Europe became a space 
where differences were relatively depoliticized and the New World a space where they 
could be freely politicized. 
 
For Schmitt, therefore, the political form of the modern European state was founded on a 
spatialisation of the political inscribed in two sets of inside-outside relations: between 
states within Europe and between Europe and the colonial New World. However, in 
Schmitt’s account the political form of the modern state rested precariously on a complex 
conceptual architecture fundamentally embedded in this spatialisation of the political. In 
what follows I will examine some of the ways in which Schmitt understood the political 
form of the state to take its bearings from this spatialisation of the political.  
 
(4) The State as Political Form: Authority, Association, Idea 
 
(i) Unity & Difference 
 
In the concept of political form, Schmitt had sought to identify not simply the historically 
specific nature of Roman Catholic complexico but the essential task of an ordering 
                                                                                                                                            
colonialism played in creating the conditions necessary for the emergence of the modern European nation 
state that resonates with some of the arguments made by canonical thinkers of postcolonialism such as 
Frantz Fanon (1965) and Edward Said (1978). 
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institution as such.  The new political form of the secular state had to carry out the work 
of the medieval complexico within the secular conditions of modern Europe: to mediate 
between unity and difference and provide a structure for the fusion of authority, 
association and idea.408 The political form of the Roman Catholic complexico of the 
medieval period was based upon the Church’s ability to mediate between unity and 
difference. It had done so by representing a powerful political idea that allowed it to 
produce a form of authority that stood above other antithetical differences and draw them 
together. In this way the authority of the church mediated between the universal idea of 
Christ’s power and the political differences internal to Europe. This mediation allowed 
the Church to provide a framework for neutralizing conflict without eradicating 
difference. By contrast, the modern state relied upon the constitutive division between 
inside and outside and hence did not establish a universal unity that could embrace all 
differences. Rather, it provided a partial or relative unity that embraced certain 
differences in order to neutralize them whilst remaining constitutively founded upon the 
difference excluded to the outside. This mediation took place along the borderline 
between states whereby unity was guaranteed inside the state and difference located 
outside the state. Likewise, the European state system itself constituted a relative unity to 
the extent that political differences were partially neutralized within Europe with un-
neutralized difference excluded to the ‘New World’. In both cases it was the spatial 
division itself that marked the point of mediation between unity and difference. A unity 
immanent to the field of difference was necessarily a proscribed unity, one that could 
unify some differences and not others. These limits of unity were precisely located along 
the lines of spatial division on which the new political form of the state took shape in 
Schmitt’s view. 
 
                                                
408 The peculiar nature of Schmitt’s historiography should be noted here. Whilst he located the concept of 
political form in the Roman Catholic complexico of Medieval Europe he both developed his historical 
reflections from the perspective of the twentieth century state and understood the structure of the state in 
terms of the concept of political form he had identified in the pre-modern era. Hence, his historical analysis 
folds back on itself and ultimately focuses on an abstract conceptual apparatus, political form, that he seeks 
to identify in different historical conditions. This is not only a weakness in Schmitt’s approach to 
historiography but also accounts for his failure to imagine any solution to the crisis of twentieth century 
politics than a reaffirmation of the apparatus of political form, first in the shape of the state and 
subsequently beyond the state from the late 1930s.  
 151 
(ii) Authority, Association, Idea 
 
The second role Schmitt had identified for the political form of the Medieval Catholic 
complexico was to provide a framework for binding authority, association and idea. 
However, the modern European state had to produce a conceptual complex of authority, 
association and idea without the appeal to theological grounds but rather bind it to the 
spatial division between inside and outside the state. Firstly, an authority needed to be 
found which could maintain and enforce the distinction between inside and outside. 
Second, the members of the political community had to bind themselves to the state’s 
authority and unify around it, which I refer to as association. Thirdly, a powerful political 
idea was needed that could fuse this relationship between authority and association to the 
concept of political difference inscribed in the division of space. The modern European 
state therefore relied on balancing the spatial binary between inside and outside and the 
triadic conceptual matrix between authority, association and idea underlying political 
form. It is in relation to this triadic structure matrix underlying political form that some of 
the key concepts in Schmitt’s work find their spatial importance. Below I will highlight 
the importance of understanding three of the key concepts in Schmitt’s thought, 
sovereignty, homogeneity and myth, in relation to the matrix of authority, association and 
idea Schmitt understood to structure political form. I will briefly show the significance of 
their relation to maintaining the fundamental spatialisation of the political.   
 
(iii) Authority / Sovereignty 
 
Schmitt understood the modern conception of sovereignty to be the political authority 
specific to the new political form of the state that arose in the seventeenth century in 
Europe.409 This was a concept intimately bound up with the spatialisation of the political 
in Schmitt’s thought.  
 
                                                
409 Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty was indebted primarily to the theories of Jean Bodin and Thomas 
Hobbes and indeed he frequently identified the ‘ideal form’ of the Hobbes’s state and the realities of the 
states that emerged in continental Europe from the seventeenth century.  
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Modern political form rested on a spatialisation of the political and this necessarily 
involved a political act of dividing space. Hence, the spaces of modern politics were for 
Schmitt eminently political spaces rather than natural spaces.410 The distinction between 
inside and outside emerged through political action rather than a pre-given order implicit 
in the natural geographic features of the earth.411 This action therefore requires an agent, 
a subject capable of spatialising the political. Schmitt identifies this subject with 
sovereignty. The sovereign was the ‘form-giving power’ capable of producing the 
distinction between inside and outside, of dividing space. Sovereignty, to echo Foucault, 
is made for cutting. By identifying the enemy and deciding on the exception the 
sovereign is granted the fundamental role of defining the limits of the political 
community - the question of who is included in the community and who is the enemy to 
be excluded. In the modern state form this question of inclusion and exclusion turns on 
the relationship between inside and outside. Hence, in its capacity to identify the enemy 
the sovereign held the power to decide on the spatialisation of the political, the 
fundamental division of space at the foundations of state order.   
 
For Schmitt, the sovereign’s capacity to produce foundational distinction between inside 
and outside and hence spatialise the political sets it above other institutions or powers in 
the political community. Thus, it is following the sovereign’s ability to mark the 
distinction between inside and outside that a distinction between state and society can be 
made. By standing above society the sovereign has the power to decide on the 
fundamental spatialisation of the political and hence holds a monopoly on politics within 
the state. Further, the crucial relationship between protection and obedience that regulates 
the relationship between state and society and draws authority and association together 
rests on the fact that the sovereign is the force capable of standing above society and 
identifying the enemy. The state form, in Schmitt’s view, therefore requires a robust form 
of sovereign authority in order to ensure that the spatialisation of the political can be 
maintained.  
                                                
410 This is a point made by Carlo Galli in Political Spaces and Global War (2010) two books deeply 
indebted to a Schmittian understanding of the relationship between modern state and spatial ordering.  
411 This is not to say that Schmitt totally ignores the natural differentiation in geographic space but that the 
decisive relationship to spatiality is defined by human, and political, acts. 
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(iv) Association / Homogeneity 
 
Although, Schmitt argued, the political world was essentially a pluralist unity, it was 
nonetheless necessary to provide order. The important question was the “correct placing” 
of pluralism.412 There was a place where it was correct to locate pluralism and a place 
where it was correct to locate unity. The spatialisation of the political in the state form 
above all marked a division between pluralism and unity. Inside the state was a space 
defined by political unity whilst political difference was confined to the exterior. This 
was not to deny the existence of social differences within the state but rather to neutralize 
political differences. The ordering task of the state was to ensure that internal social 
differences did not become political. If these differences became political, civil war 
would loom and the state form would risk dissolution.  
 
It is for this reason that Schmitt consistently emphasizes the homogeneity of the political 
community throughout his work. Although it takes shape in different contexts and has a 
different cadence, the demand for the homogeneity of the political community can be 
found in Schmitt’s work from the early 1920s such as The Crisis of Parliamentary 
Democracy to his work from the late 1930s and 1940s on Großraum order.413 It is 
important to note that this homogeneity was not a natural homogeneity or one necessarily 
resting on ethnic basis, but rather a political homogeneity. Schmitt insisted on 
homogeneity to ensure that the political community was unified under a single authority 
so that the state could maintain its monopoly of the political and hence limit conflict. 
Whilst it was certainly possible that this homogeneity may also be defined in ethnic terms 
it was not by definition ethnic in Schmitt’s conception. The essential point was that 
political difference should remain outside the state rather than within it. Hence, the 
question of unity turned on the ‘correct placing’ of pluralism and the division between 
inside and outside. 
 
                                                
412 Schmitt, “Ethic of State and Pluralist Ethic,” 204. 
413 It of course needs to be noted here that in the former case homogeneity was developed in relation to the 
democratic constitution and the latter the geopolitical order of an expanding German Reich. 
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Schmitt argued that after 1848 Europe had entered irrevocably into an age of mass 
politics. Whilst his 1922 book Political Theology drew on the French and Spanish 
counter-revolutionary thinkers of the nineteenth century such as de Maistre and Donoso 
Cortés and emphasized the exertion of sovereign power against the masses by the time he 
came to write The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy a year later he had already 
recognized that mass politics was not in fact inimical to state sovereignty. It could, in 
fact, Schmitt argued, be the source of a renewal of state sovereignty and a means of 
strengthening political form. Schmitt noted that democracy had become an unquestioned 
conceptual presupposition for the political thought of the time. Democracy, if shorn of its 
liberal trappings, could in Schmitt’s view provide a powerful basis for state unity. He 
argued that there was already a powerful conception of homogeneity at work within the 
fundamental democratic principle of the identification of ruler and ruled. In his 1923 
book The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy Schmitt sketched a conception of 
democracy based on the homogeneity of the people to which he opposed the pluralism of 
liberalism. Schmitt even went so far in his 1928 legal treatise Constitutional Theory as to 
develop a radical concept of constituent power and democratic popular sovereignty based 
around the public declarations of a homogenous people. This was entirely compatible for 
Schmitt with a strong political homogeneity which would provide the political 
association necessary to ground political form in a clear distinction between inside and 
outside.  
 
(v) Idea / Myth 
 
In Schmitt’s view, if authority and association were to be bound together they required 
the conceptual glue of a political idea. Just as the political form of the Medieval Roman 
Catholic Church had brought about unity in Christian Europe on the basis of a powerful 
political idea, i.e. the Church’s representation of Christ’s power on earth, the modern 
state form required an idea that could gather the political community under sovereign 
power. In Schmitt’s account the political idea operative in the Catholic complexico had 
drawn its power from the theological, and therefore universal, power of Christ. However, 
as argued above, the modern state’s claim to legitimacy was not theological or universal 
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but rather had to be located in political difference itself. Hence, the state form required an 
idea of political difference on which to forge the union of authority and association. Only 
then could the state ensure a clear distinction between inside and outside. It was this that 
led Schmitt to examine the importance of myth in twentieth century politics. 
 
Schmitt argued that since the mid-nineteenth century two powerful political myths of 
political difference had emerged in Europe both of which were based on concepts of stark 
political difference: class conflict and nationalism. Both provided a powerful motivating 
force to draw association and authority into an effective political unity although there 
were differences between them. Whilst nationalism provided a political idea that could 
ground the political form of the state, class conflict would tend to dissolve the 
foundations of the state form. The former produced conditions for the spatialisation of the 
political whilst the latter undercut them. The concept of the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie were not specific to any one state, so the myth of class conflict could not be 
spatialised against the inside-outside distinction of the state form. The myth of the nation 
was by contrast contingent and particular, and could easily be mapped against the 
spatialisation of the political differences represented by the European state system. 
Hence, from Schmitt’s perspective, the myth of the nation had superior ‘form-giving’ 
properties. He looked to Mussolini’s Italy as an example of the superior power of the 
nationalist myth to the socialist myth. Indeed, Schmitt even argued that the success of 
Bolshevism in Russia could be put down to the Marxist theory of communist dictatorship 
being aligned to the long-standing tradition of Russian nationalism rather than to any 
inherent power.  
 
The need for a myth of political difference to provide a political idea that could support 
the state form was particularly pressing in the twentieth century in Schmitt’s view for two 
reasons. Firstly, the modern European state was born of a process of neutralization, 
secularization, and since the seventeenth century Europe had passed through a serious of 
leading political ideas, all of which tended towards neutralization. There had been from 
the beginning a contradiction in the state form between the principle of political 
difference, inscribed in the spatial division between inside and outside, and the governing 
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ideas of European modernity, such as reason, humanity, economics, or technology. 
Hence, the political ideas on which the European state had attempted to found itself had 
run counter to the very principle of political difference that provided its most 
fundamental foundation. These had been depoliticising ideas that stood in tension with 
political form. In the second instance, the development of competing political ideas in 
Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries risked allowing social differences to 
become politicized. Hence, the spatialisation of the political in the state form risked being 
dissolved in the growing intensity of political antagonisms within the state. This threat 
was particularly acute under the conditions of mass politics in Schmitt’s view. Whilst the 
example of Italy, and even Soviet Russia, showed that the masses might respond to the 
power of the nationalist myth and cohere around a sovereign authority, the intensity of 
their attachments risked dragging Europe into a state of civil war based upon a plurality 
of myths.   
 
(5) Towards a Crisis of the Political Form 
 
The modern European state emerged, in Schmitt’s view, from the pandemonium of 
religious civil war unleashed by the collapse of the Medieval Catholic imperium. In lieu 
of theological grounds, it founded political form by producing clear inside-outside 
relations. But this seemingly mighty product of European history relied on a precarious 
balance of elements that threatened to come undone. On the one hand, the matrix of 
authority, association and idea on which the political form of the state relied always 
threatened to unwind and dissolve the political importance of the inside-outside 
distinction. On the other, the inside-outside distinction was being blurred by the 
emergence of powerful new developments in technology, the distribution of global power 
and the spread of universalist ideas which threatened to weaken the fusion of authority, 
association and idea through which the state produced order. In both cases the risk was 
that the fundamental spatialisation of the political on which the state form rested would 
fall apart. The despatialisation of the political would signal a profound crisis of political 
form that would see the entire ‘house of cards’ on which European and indeed global 
order was built topple into a state of nihilistic global civil war. 
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The stakes of such a despatialisation of the political were thus dangerously high in 
Schmitt’s view. It was precisely such a process that Schmitt understood to be underway 
in the twentieth century however, when maintaining the inside-outside relationship and 
the fusion of authority, association and idea in the state form became increasingly 
difficult. It was against this horizon that Schmitt attempted to theorize the manner in 
which the state form might be reinforced in the conditions of the twentieth century. 
Eventually understanding this to be impossible, Schmitt turned away from the state form 
in order to search for new political forms that might respatialise the political.  
 
In the next chapter I will examine some of the factors that Schmitt identified as leading to 
the crisis of the state in the twentieth century from the perspective of the spatialisation of 
the political developed here. This will highlight Schmitt’s polemical engagements with 
liberalism as a set of ideas and practices inimical to the production of political form. It 
will provide a context for understanding Schmitt’s attempt to find a solution to the crisis 
of the state, first in an authoritarian Presidential regime under the Weimar constitution 
and then in the National Socialist regime, and his search for new political forms beyond 
the state.  
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Chapter 5: The Crisis of the State / Despatialising the Political  
 
 
“The liberal, secular state lives off preconditions which it cannot itself 
guarantee.”  
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, 1976414  
 
(1) State Crisis 
 
Carl Schmitt’s thought was fundamentally oriented towards order. In his view the 
paradigmatic ordering institution of the modern age was the state. However, paraphrasing 
him, we might say that the concept of the state presupposes the concept of political form. 
In the era of the modern European state political form rested in turn on a fundamental 
spatialisation of the political or rather the relations of friend and enemy being formalized 
in a spatial division between inside and outside. On the basis of this fundamental spatial 
division rested a series of other distinctions through which state order was guaranteed in 
Schmitt’s view: difference and unity; state and society; domestic and international; war 
and peace; political and non-political; historical meaning and nihilism. In the ‘ideal form’ 
of European state order sovereign states produced order by holding a monopoly over the 
decisive power to make this founding division in space. They thus neutralized political 
differences internally, but recognized each other as equal and just enemies with the same 
power. The potential for existential struggle between states generated historical meaning, 
but their equality allowed wars between them to be limited. As guarantor of this relative 
peace and stability, the state stood above society and justly demanded obedience in 
return.  
  
In Schmitt’s eyes the twentieth century was above all defined by a crisis of the state. And 
for him a crisis of the state meant a crisis of political form. The first half of the twentieth 
century was a twilight period for Schmitt marked by the unravelling of the order the state 
had brought to Europe and the world for nearly four centuries. Just as the state had 
                                                
414 Quoted in Müller, A Dangerous Mind, 4.  
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emerged in the seventeenth century from the crisis of political form sparked by the 
collapse of the medieval Catholic complexico its dissolution at the beginning of the 
twentieth signalled a re-emergence of the fundamental question of political form. The 
crisis of the state in the twentieth century was therefore for Schmitt an epochal crisis that 
marked the end of one era and the possible emergence of another. 
 
By the early years of the twentieth century the state had started to lose its monopoly on 
the political and hence the ability to guarantee the spatialisation of the political on which 
modern political form rested. He therefore understood the crisis of the state to be both the 
result and the cause of a despatialisation of the political. The state was increasingly 
unable to produce a clear distinction between inside and outside, thus undermining 
political form. Historical processes undermining the state’s ability to produce clear 
inside/outside distinction were dissolving its monopoly on the political. The erosion of 
this distinction threatened the entire fragile edifice of differentiations, mediations and 
limitations on which domestic and international order rested. Schmitt feared the world 
would slide into a state of formless nihilism characterized by the total breakdown of all 
legal distinctions and a catastrophic convergence of domestic and global civil wars. Thus, 
the withering of the state did not promise an earthly paradise in Schmitt’s view but an 
apocalyptic anti-utopia.  
 
Schmitt identified various processes that he believed were undermining the state’s ability 
to spatialise the political. These processes emanated from sources both internal and 
external to the state but were eroding the very possibility of the state to effectively 
distinguish between inside and outside. The politicization of social differences within the 
state was weakening the ability of sovereign authority to identify its enemies and 
constitute the foundational spatial ‘cut’ necessary for order. The growth of the United 
States as an imperial power and the moralization of warfare in international law had 
created asymmetric sovereignties that effectively denied weaker states the power to 
define their own boundaries whilst legitimizing the ‘pan-interventionism’ of the U.S. 
Thus, in Schmitt’s eyes, a confluence of internal and external factors had produced a 
dangerous political chiasmus subverting the spatial foundations of the state form.  
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Although Schmitt acknowledged that Europe’s “more radical brother” looming in the 
East played a part in this unravelling of the state form, he consistently identified 
liberalism as the central culprit.415 Indeed, one of the main threads running through 
Schmitt’s work was a polemical engagement with what he considered to be liberal 
despatialisation of the political. His work can be understood as a series of attempts to 
assert the spatialisation of the political against the despatialising tendencies of liberalism, 
first within and then beyond the state form. Hence, Schmitt’s theorization of the state 
during the 1920s and early 1930s was shaped by a polemical struggle against liberal 
despatialisation. It was a battle Schmitt eventually understood the state to lose but, 
through his engagement, he developed the conceptual armoury he used to imagine new 
political forms and new spatialisations of the political beyond the state. Therefore, in 
order to grasp how Schmitt conceived of the relationship between space and political 
order it is important to understand the ways in which he considered liberalism to have 
undermined state form in the twentieth century. 
 
(2) The Age of Neutralisations and Depoliticisations 
 
Throughout Schmitt’s work he consistently advanced an understanding of historical 
development as fundamentally determined by shifts in dominant conceptual frameworks. 
The political form of any specific historical period found its conditions of possibility in 
the governing unquestioned philosophical concepts of the day. Hence, in attempting to 
grasp his diagnosis of twentieth century state crisis, it is necessary to examine his account 
of the leading conceptual frameworks of the day. There are four texts dotted across 
Schmitt’s corpus in which he explicitly focuses comments on his conceptual history; 
Political Theology (1922); The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations (1929); Land 
and Sea (1944); and Three Possibilities for a Christian Concept of History (1950).416 
                                                
415 Schmitt, “The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations,” 81.  
416 Schmitt’s understanding of the role of concepts in historical development exerted a strong influence on 
the practice of ‘conceptual history’ developed by the late German historian and philosopher Reinhart 
Kosselleck. For an insightful analysis of the relationship between these two thinkers see Müller, A 
Dangerous Mind, 104-116. 
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There are subtle but significant shifts in the way Schmitt formulates his ‘conceptual 
history’ between these texts.417  
 
Schmitt’s first account of the influence of concepts on the historical development of 
modern European political form appears in his 1922 book Political Theology. In this text 
Schmitt argued that each epoch of modern European history was governed by a 
‘metaphysical image’ that provided a unique form of historical consciousness and set the 
terms of its political possibilities.418 “The metaphysical image that a definite epoch forges 
of the world” Schmitt argued “has the same structure as what the world immediately 
understands to be the appropriate form of its political organization.”419 “Metaphysics” 
Schmitt argued, quoting the nineteenth century Scottish philosopher Edward Caird, “is 
the most intensive and the clearest expression of an epoch.”420 Hence, to comprehend the 
crisis of the state in the twentieth century one had, in Schmitt’s view, to grasp the 
governing metaphysical concepts of the day. He approached the crisis of the state 
therefore as a political symptom of the ‘metaphysical image’ of the age.  
 
In examining the historical development of European metaphysics Schmitt claimed to 
have discovered that “everything in the nineteenth century [and thereafter] was 
increasingly governed by conceptions of immanence.”421 In Schmitt’s peculiar conceptual 
history it was precisely this sin of nineteenth century metaphysics that was visited upon 
the twentieth century state. Concepts of immanence fundamentally undercut the state 
form by opposing the ideas of transcendence and differentiation on which sovereign 
                                                
417 Whilst avowedly positioned against any form of historical-materialism it is not clear how Schmitt 
understood the relationship between these determining philosophical concepts and social processes. It 
appears, in the latter two texts cited, that governing philosophical concepts are shaped at least in part by 
social processes, including the development of new technologies of industrial production, warfare or 
transport and patterns of colonization. Schmitt never explicitly theorizes this relationship or builds a 
general picture of the influence social processes have exerted on historical consciousness except in specific 
cases of technologies of war and transport and the spread of European colonization. 
418 Schmitt, Political Theology, 46. Political Theology was conceived as a work of historical sociology and 
bore an obvious debt to Marx and Weber although he distinguished his own method of inquiry as a 
“sociology of concepts.” (Ibid, 45)  
419 Schmitt, Political Theology, 46. Liberalism, he argued a year later, “should be understood as a 
consistent, comprehensive metaphysical system” emanating from the “rationalist spirit.” See: Schmitt, The 
Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 35. 
420 Schmitt, Political Theology, 46. 
421 Ibid, 49. 
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power rested. Schmitt argued that until the nineteenth century all established conceptions 
of political legitimacy had fundamentally rested on some concept of transcendence 
modelled on theology.422 Hence, in his view the modern concept of sovereignty was a 
secularized version of religious authority. However, by attempting to ground political 
order in concepts of immanence political thought in the nineteenth and twentieth century 
increasingly unmoored the state from sovereignty’s traditional sources of legitimacy in 
transcendence. Schmitt did not consider it impossible that new forms of state legitimacy 
could take root in conceptions of immanence. For example, “the democratic thesis of the 
identity of the ruler and ruled” was for Schmitt a paradigmatic concept of state in the ‘age 
of immanence’ but also a potential source of political renewal.423 However, Schmitt 
remained fearful that concepts of immanence were inimical to political form insofar as 
they failed to provide any basis for the differentiation needed for political form. The 
‘metaphysical image’ of the age provided no space in Schmitt’s view for the possibility 
of a radical ‘outside’, a different state of affairs. More specifically, concepts of 
immanence provided no framework for coping with an exceptional moment of radical 
disorder to which ordering authority would need to respond. Hence, in Schmitt’s mind, 
immanence undermined sovereignty by failing to take into account the radical differences 
at the heart of human existence: both the threat that political differences presented to 
order and the fact that it was founded in the spatialisation of such differences. 
 
Schmitt expanded the historical perspective of this ‘conceptual history’ in his 1929 text 
The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations. Schmitt presented here his first formal 
attempt to develop a philosophy of history but he acknowledged that it was Eurocentric 
                                                
422 Importantly, Schmitt does not posit a radical break in the nineteenth century whereby political 
legitimacy suddenly shifts grounds from conceptions of transcendence to those of immanence. Rather, 
Chapter 3 of Political Theology traces the growing influence of metaphysical concepts of immanence on 
theories of political legitimacy from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. The change is gradual but it 
is in the nineteenth century that immanence becomes the fundamental metaphysical conception. He notes 
that the “philosophy of state” of the seventeenth and eighteenth century was still committed to “the 
transcendence of the sovereign vis-à-vis the state.” See: Schmitt, Political Theology, 49. 
423 Schmitt, Political Theology, 49. In Schmitt’s view however democracy was hopelessly compromised by 
the union with liberal parliamentarianism. Hence, in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy and his 1928 
treatise Constitutional Theory Schmitt sought to fashion a radically anti-liberal theory of democracy with 
which to revitalize the state I will return to Schmitt’s reactionary redaction [or reduction?] of democracy 
below in the discussion of the total qualitative state.  
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rather than global in scope.424 Cast in the style of Oswald Spengler’s contemporary 
bestseller The Decline of the West (1918-1923), this short but ambitious text traced a 
genealogy of the governing philosophical frameworks and their political significance 
across four centuries of modern European history.425 The concept of the ‘metaphysical 
image’ of the age found in Political Theology was replaced with the concept of changing 
central domains that governed philosophical thought and conceptions of politics alike. 
Schmitt argued that, “since the sixteenth century Europeans moved in several stages from 
one central domain to another.”426 Across these four centuries, he noted, “the intellectual 
vanguard changed, its convictions and arguments continued to change, as did the content 
of its intellectual interests, the basis of its actions, the secret of its political success, and 
the willingness of the great masses to be impressed by certain suggestions.”427 In his view 
each of these successive historical stages roughly corresponded to a century and each was 
governed by a ‘central domain’: the seventeenth century by the metaphysical; the 
eighteenth century by the humanitarian-moral; the nineteenth century by the economic; 
and finally, the twentieth century by the technological.  
 
The key to understanding the nature of political thought in any period of modern 
European history therefore lay, for Schmitt, in identifying the ‘central domain’ from 
which it emerged. From the domain of metaphysics in the seventeenth century arose 
Hobbes, Leibniz and Spinoza, from the humanistic-moral domain of the eighteenth arose 
Kant and Rousseau, from the economic domain of the nineteenth arose Marx, and so on. 
However, Schmitt argued that not all of these shifts were equally significant and some 
signalled more fundamental change than others. “The strongest and most consequential of 
                                                
424 In contrast to the specifically European perspective Schmitt adopted here, in Land and Sea (1942) and 
Nomos (1950) both written during the war years, he develops a philosophy of history that is global in 
scope. Europe remains the origin from which the ‘global’ perspective can be understood philosophically 
but the book traces Europe’s politically decentering within the ‘world’ it has helped constitute as a totality.  
425 Unlike Spengler, Schmitt did not characterize his narrative as essentially one of decline. Indeed, he 
claimed to leave the question open whether the succession of stages he traced in modern European history 
should be interpreted as an a move “upwards or downwards, as an ascent or a decline.” See: Schmitt, “The 
Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations,” 82. Indeed, although the text clearly wears the imprint of 
Spengler’s influence Schmitt describes his vision as one common to “the previous German generation … 
under the spell of a cultural decline” out of sync with the emergence of a new generation who see in 
technology the hope of a new future. See: Ibid, 92. 
426 Ibid, 82. 
427 Ibid, 83. 
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all intellectual shifts in European history”, he argued, was the move from Christian 
theology to ‘natural science’ in the seventeenth century.428 “Until now” Schmitt claimed, 
“this shift has determined the direction of all further development.”429 As noted in the 
previous chapter it was in this shift from a theological to a secular domain that Schmitt 
located the emergence of the modern state as a response to religious war in Europe. 
“Following the hopeless theological disputes and struggles of the sixteenth century, 
Europeans” Schmitt argued “sought a neutral domain in which there would be no conflict 
and they could reach common agreement.”430 Thus, the central political institution of 
modern European history emerged from the most profound shift in the ‘central domains’ 
of European intellectual life.  
 
However, Schmitt argued that the true significance of this shift lay in revealing “an 
elemental impulse” that he argued was central to the subsequent course of modern 
European history - “the striving for a neutral domain.”431 At the centre of Schmitt’s text 
lay the claim that since the sixteenth century European thought had fundamentally 
“moved in the direction of neutralization.”432 The people of Europe had, in his view, 
collectively shifted from one ‘central domain’ to another “hoping to find minimum 
agreement and common premises allowing for the possibility of security, clarity, 
prudence, and peace.”433 In Schmitt’s account this search for neutrality provided a 
powerful dialectic that drove the movement of modern European history from one 
‘central domain’ to another. Europe, Schmitt argued, had “wandered from a conflictual 
domain to a neutral domain, and always the newly won neutral domain [had] become 
immediately another arena of struggle, once again necessitating the search for a new 
neutral domain.”434 In each successive phase of neutralization, Schmitt argued, the 
antitheses that emerged became even sharper and more intense. This culminated in 
Schmitt’s view of the twentieth century as a time when a deluded belief in the neutrality 
                                                
428 Ibid, 89. 
429 Ibid. “All generalizing ‘laws’ of human history” Schmitt wrote, “stand in the shadow of this great 
process.” (Ibid) 
430 Ibid. 
431 Ibid. 
432 Ibid. 
433 Ibid. 
434 Ibid, 90. 
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of technology was leading Europe towards an intensification of absolute warfare in the 
name of absolute peace. 
 
“Above all the state” Schmitt argued, “derives its reality and power from the respective 
central domain, because the decisive disputes of friend-enemy groupings are also 
determined by it.”435 However the search for neutrality that characterized these 
successive ‘central domains’ increasingly tended towards a state of “absolute 
depoliticization.”436 Rather than providing a conceptual basis for the formalization of the 
friend-enemy distinction in the state, the ‘central domains’ of European thought were 
increasingly undermining the importance of the friend-enemy grouping as such. 
Depoliticization was not inimical to the state as such. Indeed, insofar as the state aimed to 
provide order by limiting conflict, a degree of neutralization and depoliticization was its 
fundamental operation. Hence, by Schmitt’s account, the modern secular state emerged as 
a way to neutralize and depoliticize religious conflict in seventeenth century Europe. The 
more absolute became the governing concepts of neutrality the more they tended towards 
an absolute depoliticization. Thus, in Schmitt’s view, the dialectical movement between 
successive ‘central domains’ led to an intensification of neutralizations and hence deeper 
and deeper contradictions between the state form and the governing concepts of European 
thought. Schmitt claimed that the tendency towards despatialisation that accompanied the 
move towards neutrality in European thought reached its apogee in the technological 
thinking of the twentieth century. “The twentieth century began” Schmitt argued “not 
only as an age of technology but of the religious belief in technology.”437  
 
(3) Enemies of the State: Positivism, Pluralism, Universalism  
 
In Schmitt’s view the growing tendency in European thought to move towards 
depoliticisation and despatialisation ultimately culminated in the crisis of the liberal state 
in the twentieth century. As previously noted, Schmitt did not simply identify the ‘central 
domain’ of technological thinking with liberalism. Rather, it lay behind all forms of 
                                                
435 Ibid, 87. 
436 Ibid, 95. 
437 Ibid, 85. 
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politics in the twentieth century, including the communism of the Soviet Union.438 
However, it was in the liberal states of Europe, and specifically the Weimar Republic, 
that Schmitt located the historical breaking point of the state form that had provided order 
for nearly four centuries.439 Although he argued it was “essential liberalism be 
understood as a consistent, comprehensive metaphysical system” Schmitt never provided 
such a systematic analysis.440 Rather, following the protean trajectory of his polemical 
method he attacked distinct aspects of liberal thought in different texts, although 
depoliticization always remained the common denominator of his acrimony. In what 
follows I will briefly examine three aspects of liberal thought that I consider the most 
important in understanding Schmitt’s critique of liberalism’s corrosive effects on the state 
form: positivism, particularism and universalism. By grasping his critique of these three 
aspects of liberalism, we are better able to understand his vision of how the state might 
recover its ‘form-giving’ power and reassert the spatialisation of the political and his 
eventual search for new political forms beyond the state. 
 
(i) Positivism: The Machine State  
 
“No norm is valid in a vacuum.”441 This statement cuts to the core of two problematic 
conceptions of the state Schmitt identified with liberalism at the start of the twentieth 
century: the state as a seamless system of legal norms and the state as a giant mechanism. 
In Schmitt’s view both images of the state rested ultimately on metaphysical ideas of 
                                                
438 As early as 1922 in Roman Catholicism and Political Form Schmitt had located a common root for 
European liberal and Russian Bolshevik thought in ‘economic thinking,’ but in “The Age of Neutralizations 
and Depoliticizations” he argued that the Soviet state was in certain respects ahead of its European 
neighbours in embracing the technological spirit of the age. “The Russians,” he argued, “have taken the 
European nineteenth century at its word, understood its core ideas and drawn the ultimate conclusions from 
its cultural premises. We always live in the eye of the more radical brother, who compels us to draw the 
practical conclusion and pursue it to the end” (Ibid, 81). 
439 Indeed, it seems likely that Schmitt did not consider the Soviet state be suffering from the same crisis as 
the liberal states of Europe. Indeed, he remarked that in Soviet Russia “a state arose which is more 
intensely statist than any ruled by an absolute prince.” (Ibid, 81) Indeed, in his view, this intensified 
statehood came precisely through the embrace of technology. Hence, he did not consider technological 
thought and the state form to be necessarily opposed.  
440 Schmitt, Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 35. 
441 Schmitt, “Ethic of State and Pluralistic State,” 199. 
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immanence.442 He located the former view in legal positivism, the dominant conceptual 
framework in German constitutional law since the mid nineteenth century, and the latter 
in the philosophical foundations of the Continental European state laid by Thomas 
Hobbes in the seventeenth century. Both were, in Schmitt’s eyes, weakening the state 
from within and contributing to its inability to constitute political form. 
 
Legal positivism, as Schmitt depicted it, conceived of the legal order as an uninterrupted, 
self-enclosed system of legal norms. It held Schmitt’s view that the “state, meaning the 
legal order, is a system of ascription to a last point of ascription and to a last basic 
norm.”443 The influence of this conception of state on the interpretation of the Weimar 
constitution was one of the most consistent targets of Schmitt’s polemic during the 1920s 
and 1930s. Hugo Preuss and Max Weber, two towering figures in early twentieth century 
German liberalism, had helped craft the constitution and its most prominent proponent in 
the years of the republic was Hans Kelsen, something of an intellectual nemesis for 
Schmitt.444 His attacks on legal positivism (and Kelsen in particular) had brought Schmitt 
recognition from senior figures in the Federal government.445  
 
The crux of Schmitt’s critique of the legal positivist’s vision of the state was that it left 
the state vulnerable by eliminating sovereignty. “All tendencies of modern constitutional 
development” by which he meant legal positivism, “point towards eliminating the 
sovereign.”446 Kelsen, Schmitt argued “solved the problem of sovereignty by negating it” 
quoting the great positivist’s claim that “the concept of sovereignty must be radically 
                                                
442 See respectively: Schmitt, Political Theology, Chapter 3; and Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory 
of Thomas Hobbes, Chapter IV. The latter drew on conceptions of self-regulating systems from natural-
scientific thinking that emerged in the seventeenth century according to Schmitt’s 1937 article “The State 
as Mechanism in Hobbes and Descartes” included as an appendix in The Leviathan in the State Theory of 
Thomas Hobbes.  
443 Schmitt, Political Theology, 19. 
444 For detailed accounts of the role of legal positivism in Weimar jurisprudence and the conflict between 
Kelsen and Schmitt see: Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law; 
Arthur Jacobson and Bernhard Schlink, ed., Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis, (Berkley, CA: University 
of California Press, 2000); Ellen Kennedy, Constitutional Failure: Carl Schmitt, in Weimar, (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2004); Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt (1999). 
445 See for example: Balakrishnan, The Enemy (2000); and Kennedy Constitutional Failure (2000). 
446 Schmitt, Political Theology, 7. 
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repressed” as evidence.447 This conception of a legal order from which sovereignty had 
been expunged was fundamentally flawed, because it failed to provide an answer to the 
crucial question of state: who decides? From the perspective of legal positivists such as 
Kelsen, the subjectivism of this ‘decisionist’ question left the door open to a degree of 
personal discretion that could only lead to the abuse of power and even dictatorship. As 
Schmitt noted, for legal positivists “all conceptions of personality were aftereffects of 
absolute monarchy.”448 But in Schmitt’s view, this depersonalized conception of legal 
order in effect left the state vulnerable. It provided no mechanism for dealing with the 
“case of extreme peril” that threatened the very existence of order as such.449 Such a state 
of exception required a decisive sovereign subject, first to identify it and then to enact 
measures to restore order. “It is precisely the exception that makes relevant the subject of 
sovereignty, that is, the whole question of sovereignty,” Schmitt declared.450 Hence, the 
personal aspect of the law could not be totally removed as the stability of the state relied 
upon the subjective capacity of the sovereign to decide on the exception.   
 
Legal positivism eliminated the personal element of sovereignty in the belief that all 
norms could be ascribed for all situations. “Whether the extreme exception can be 
banished from the world is not a juristic question,” Schmitt noted, rather, it relied on 
“philosophical-historical or metaphysical” convictions.451 Thus, in Schmitt’s view legal 
positivism was a form of state theory based on immanence, i.e. the ‘metaphysical image’ 
of the age, and failed to consider the state within the unpredictable realities of the 
concrete political situation.452 The positivist ‘law state’ (Gesetzesstaat) simply supplied a 
system of norms abstracted from any relation to a concrete situation where the question 
of ‘who decides’ could be ignored. For Schmitt it was a state theory designed for a 
vacuum, but as Schmitt reminded his readers “all law is ‘situational law.’”453 
 
                                                
447 Ibid, 21. 
448 Ibid, 30. 
449 Ibid, 6. 
450 Ibid, 6. Italics mine.  
451 Ibid, 7. 
452 Ibid, 7. 
453 Ibid, 13. 
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The situation in which these debates took place was far from ‘normal’. The seething 
political tensions that were rending the Weimar Republic were putting serious pressure 
on its brittle constitution and the state’s ability to maintain order. In this context the 
interpretation of the constitution became a highly politicized issue.  A liberal positivist 
interpretation tried to minimize the personal influence of the President within the state. In 
Schmitt’s view this undercut the capacity of the state to act decisively in order to 
maintain order. He considered liberal thought to be leaving the state too weak to deal 
with the concrete realities of political turmoil in the age of mass politics.  
 
Legal positivism represented for Schmitt the ‘metaphysical image’ of the age in the field 
of jurisprudence. In Political Theology he argued that it was a product of the growing 
tendency for concepts of immanence to govern all aspects of thought from the nineteenth 
century. However, in The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes from 1938 
and the article “The State as Mechanism in Hobbes and Descartes” from the previous 
year, Schmitt identified deeper historical roots for the positivist conception of state. The 
vision of a fully rationalized state system that would run itself without the need for 
personalized sovereign power had its origins, Schmitt argued, in the seventeenth century. 
Schmitt claimed that this barren mechanistic conception of the state that was undermining 
political form in the twentieth century had in fact emerged first in the work of his great 
intellectual mentor Thomas Hobbes. “The positive law state (Gesetzesstaat) began as a 
historical type in the nineteenth century. But the idea of the state as a technically 
completed, manmade magnum-artificium, a machine … was first grasped by Hobbes and 
systematically constructed by him into a clear concept.”454 Thus, the legal positivism that 
emerged in the nineteenth century not only mirrored the intellectual vogue for 
immanence but reflected a “four-hundred-year-long process of mechanization” sparked 
by Hobbes. As Schmitt bluntly stated in 1937, “because of Hobbes, the state becomes a 
‘huge machine.”455 
 
                                                
454 Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan, 45.  
455 Ibid, 98. 
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This ‘general technologization’ of the European state was problematic for Schmitt in two 
ways.456 As an empty rational mechanism, the state was paradoxically too weak and too 
strong. The state conceived as a rationally functioning system of legal norms or 
mechanism of rule lacked a political idea. Schmitt argued that by conceiving it as a 
machine “western liberal democrats agree with Bolshevik Marxists that the state is an 
apparatus that the most varied political constellations can use as a technically neutral 
instrument.”457 This mechanistic neutrality not only meant the state could be harnessed 
by diverse political ideas, but tended towards the eradication of the political idea as such. 
As a machine, the state kept the semblance of political form but was hollowed out and 
lacked the glory associated with the highest political concepts of an earlier age. Without 
the centrifugal force of the political Idea binding political form together, the relationship 
between authority and association, protection and obedience on which the state was 
founded unravelled. The rational state machine could treat all the citizens alike but the 
citizens would treat it only as an inert instrument to be used for their own diverse ends. 
The mighty Hobbesian Leviathan had become a “stato agnostico,” unable to produce 
unity and subject to a divisive plurality of interests.458 The twentieth century state was 
rationally perfect but politically formless.  
 
In this situation, medieval legal notions such as the right to resistance become merely 
“disturbances that needed to be put aside.”459 “The endeavour to resist the leviathan, the 
all-powerful resistance-destroying, and technically perfect mechanism of command, is 
practically impossible,” Schmitt notes.460 The machinery of the state can break down, for 
example, in the case of civil war, but has nothing to do with any notion of a right to 
resistance. “There are no points of departure for a right to resist” Schmitt argues. “It has 
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no place whatsoever in the space governed by the irresistible and overpowering huge 
machine of the state. It has no starting point, location, or viewpoint: it is ‘utopian’ in the 
true sense of that word.”461 This is an image of a technological state that has lost its 
relation to space. It is without orientation and ultimately without order.  
 
Written and published in 1938 at the height of Nazi power, Schmitt’s critique of the 
technical state is ambivalent. It is not clear however whether it amounted to a veiled 
critique of the Nazi state, as Georg Schwab has suggested.462 What is stated in no 
uncertain terms however is that Schmitt associates the horrific image of a mechanical 
state grinding down all resistance from a population ruled by pure command with liberal 
positivism. The machina machinarum of the liberal positivist state was at once 
irresistibly powerful and utterly disorientated. In Schmitt’s eyes, it pushed its citizens into 
insecurity at the same time as it failed to provide any political idea around which to orient 
their unity, or association. The seemingly technical perfection of the state could not 
conceal its inability to constitute political form.  
 
(ii) Pluralism: The ‘Hamletization’ of the State 
 
Schmitt’s conception of political form started with difference. As he stated in The 
Concept of the Political, “the political world is a pluriverse, not a universe.”463 In this 
sense, he argued, “every theory of state is pluralistic.”464 As argued previously, the 
question of the unity of the state was therefore not one of denying pluralism in Schmitt’s 
view but rather of its “correct placing.”465 Put simply, Schmitt’s conception of the 
modern European state presupposed that political differences existed between states but 
not within states. This is not to say of course that the social body internal to the state was 
not characterized by plurality but simply that these internal differences were social and 
not political. The state form thus turned precisely on the ‘correct placing’ of political 
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difference in Schmitt’s view. But in order to make the ‘cut’ between inside and outside 
the sovereign power had to be able to act as a force representing the unity of the state and 
conversely the sovereign identification of the enemy produced this unity.466 Thus, the 
state, as the bearer of sovereign power, had to stand above the differences of society as a 
uniquely political force invested with the capacity to both represent and produce the unity 
of the political community. Without this sense of unity, political difference could not be 
excluded to the outside of the state and conversely if political difference was not 
excluded the unity of the state would be undermined. It was precisely this relationship 
between unity and difference that the pluralism of liberal parliamentarianism unravelled 
in Schmitt’s mind.  
 
Liberalism, in Schmitt’s view, undermined the unity of the state precisely because it 
misplaced pluralism and allowed it to develop within the state. This in turn allowed the 
politicization of internal social relations and hence undercut the spatialisation of the 
political into a strict inside-outside relation. Thus, insofar as liberalism misplaced 
pluralism it misplaced the political. Schmitt argued that the institutions of liberal 
parliamentarianism facilitated this misplacement of the political by providing a 
mechanism for particular interest groups to pursue their own ends through the state at the 
expense of the state. In Schmitt’s view liberal thinkers sought to defend the pursuit of 
particular interests in the form of a ‘pluralist’ theory of state that was “polemically 
directed against” and sought to “relativize the established unity of the state.”467 This had 
two effects. 
 
Firstly, the growth of pluralism undermined the unity of the state as the public’s loyalities 
were divided. The state became only one of a number of associations that citizens were 
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attached to. Schmitt found the clearest expression of this ‘plurality of loyalities’ in the 
work of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ ‘pluralists’, G.D.H. Cole and Harold I. Laski. In their vision, 
Schmitt argued, “the state … becomes a social group or association which at most stands 
next to, but never above, the other associations.”468 For Schmitt the individual imagined 
by such pluralist theorists lived “in a multiplicity of unordered, equally valid social 
obligations and loyalty relationships” from religious communities, unions, political 
parties, clubs, families, and so on.469 In this “complex of duties, in the ‘plurality of 
loyalties,’ there is” Schmitt argued, “no ‘hierarchy of duties’, no unconditional 
prescriptive principle of super- and subordination.”470 Hence, the bonds of association on 
which the unity of the ‘public’ relied were loosened. Rather than the primary bearer of 
the ‘public’ the state became “an object of compromise among the powerful social and 
economic groups, an agglomeration of heterogeneous factors, political parties, combines, 
unions, churches, and so on, which come to understandings with each other.”471 Such a 
state no longer held a monopoly over politics but was, as Schmitt noted, “at most a 
pouvoir neuter, an intermediary, a neutral mediator, a moment of equilibrium between 
the conflicting groups, a kind of clearing office, a peacemaker.”472 This meant that the 
decisive friend-enemy relation shifted from inter-state relations to intra-state relations and 
the state was no longer able to effectively identify the enemy and constitute its own 
identity.  
 
Secondly, liberal pluralism created the conditions for the collapse of the distinction 
between state and society. Rather than stand above political differences in order to 
neutralize them the state in fact became embroiled within them. On the one hand, Schmitt 
argued that the state was reduced to the object of competition between social groups and 
the political parties that represented them. On the other hand, the state became the 
instrument by which each different social group sought to control their competitors and 
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underwent a process Schmitt referred to elsewhere as Hamletization.473 The danger in 
Schmitt’s mind was that a state rendered indecisive by pluralist dissolution would not be 
able to manage the growth of internal enmities. The “political unity is the highest unity” 
Schmitt noted, “because it decides, and has the potential to prevent all other opposing 
groups from dissociating into a state of extreme enmity – that is, into civil war.”474 
Hence, for Schmitt, behind the polite debating chambers of parliament lurked the spectre 
of civil war.  
  
(iii) Universalism: The Absolute Enemy 
 
In The Concept of the Political Schmitt argued that liberalism typically operated by 
displacing the political into the spheres of economics and ethics. By displacing politics 
into the supposedly neutral and universal grounds of economics and ethics, liberalism 
was, in Schmitt’s account, attempting to bring about an ‘absolute depoliticization’. In 
Schmitt’s view this appeal to universal categories presented two dangers. Firstly, at the 
most obvious level by claiming a universal basis for politics in the domains of economics 
and ethics, liberalism sought to deny the constitutive role of difference in political form. 
These realms offered no categories of differentiation and hence undermined the 
foundations of the state form in the spatialisation of the political. This much was implicit 
already in the concept of depoliticisation as argued above. However, the second move in 
Schmitt’s analysis is more unexpected. Schmitt claimed that the liberal appeal to 
universal categories did not bring about a genuine depoliticisation but rather produced an 
escalation of political conflict. Rather than eradicate political difference liberal 
universalism made it absolute. Thus, in Schmitt’s view the escalation of the political and 
depoliticisation were paradoxically different sides of the same coin.   
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This paradox arose from the fact that “state and politics cannot be exterminated.”475 
Whilst the political could be displaced into other spheres and new vocabularies, it could 
not be overcome. Hence, Schmitt insisted that,  “the world will not become depoliticized 
with the aid of definitions and constructions ... which circle the polarity of ethics and 
economics.”476 Instead the political would persist, despite liberal depoliticization, and 
would adopt the universal terminology of economics and ethics. Schmitt offered a 
corrective to the former German Foreign Minister Walter Rathenau’s famous declaration 
that economics had become the destiny of the political by noting, “it would be more exact 
to say that politics continues to remain the destiny, but what has occurred is that 
economics has become political and thereby the destiny.”477  
 
Schmitt noted that liberals adopted the universalist categories of economics and ethics 
precisely not to overcome politics but rather to conceal their own political aims. He paid 
particular close critical attention to the manner in which the term ‘humanity’ was evoked 
in liberal politics and repeatedly paraphrased Proudhon’s famous dictum on property: 
“whoever says humanity wants to cheat.”478 Hence, ‘humanity’ was not a term used to 
deny politics but, as Schmitt argued, “quite on the contrary, [had] an especially intensive 
political meaning.”479 Schmitt noted that “to invoke and monopolize such a term 
probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being 
human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity; and a war can thereby be driven 
to the most extreme inhumanity.”480 Thus, when adopted as a political category the 
supposedly universal category of humanity had its own inverse, its own enemy. Indeed, 
in Schmitt’s view the nature of the enmity that arose was particularly intense. When 
brought into the universal sphere of ethics, the friend-enemy distinction became absolute.  
 
Schmitt argued that the emergence of the absolute enemy of humanity was especially 
important for understanding the transformations in the nature of war in the twentieth 
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century. In his view, liberal thought had profoundly influenced the conduct of war and 
the theorization of international law since the end of the First World War. The concept of 
humanity had played a particularly pivotal role in these transformations. “When a state 
fights its political enemy in the name of humanity” Schmitt noted, “it is not a war for the 
sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept 
against its military opponent.”481 The concept of humanity was an “especially useful 
ideological instrument of imperialist expansion” Schmitt argued “and in its ethical-
humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle of economic expansion.”482 Hence, adopting the 
universalist terminology of humanity had, in Schmitt’s eyes, become the characteristic 
means by which liberal powers pursued expansionist wars in the early years of the 
twentieth century. Hence, although liberal states claimed to operate purely on the basis of 
the non-political spheres of economics and ethics spheres, Schmitt argued that they were 
in fact pursuing a ruthless expansion of their political interests in the name of humanity. 
He argued that: 
 
“A war waged to protect and expand economic power must, with the 
aid of propaganda, turn into a crusade and into the last war of humanity. 
This is implicit in the polarity of ethics and economics, a polarity 
astonishingly systematic and consistent. But this allegedly non-political 
and apparently even antipolitical system serves existing and newly 
emerging friend-and-enemy groupings and cannot escape the logic of 
the political.”483  
 
The crucial problem with liberal universalism in Schmitt’s view was that it removed all 
limitations on warfare. Given that for Schmitt the limitation of war was the principle aim 
of political order ‘the liberal way of war’ was perhaps the most important aspect in the 
destruction of the state form and the spatialisation of the political on which it was 
grounded. The concept of humanity allowed the intensification of enmity beyond the 
limits that the concept of justis hostis had placed on warfare in Schmitt’s account of the 
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modern European state system. By claiming to wage war in the name of a universal 
principle of justice, liberal states produced an unjust enemy that did not require the 
respect afforded enemies within the modern European order of states. Cast in opposition 
to humanity, Schmitt argued that, “the adversary is thus no longer called the enemy but 
the disturber of the peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of humanity.”484 By 
conducting war on the basis of universal categories such as humanity, it was removed 
from the spatial constraints that the state from had placed upon it. Schmitt argued that 
universal concepts like humanity have the “potential for a most awful expansion and a 
murderous imperialism.”485 Absolute enmities were untethered from any concrete spatial 
situation and could become globalized. “With the help of … a universal concept” like 
humanity, Schmitt noted, “every distinction may be negated and every concrete 
community ruptured.”486  
 
The horizon of liberal humanitarian war was thus for Schmitt a formless worldwide 
liberal imperium, a formless chaos of absolute enmity indistinguishable from a state of 
global civil war. However, as the 1930s began Schmitt still believed it might be possible 
to salvage the state by harnessing the spatialisation of the political to the new 
technological means that could intensify the bonds between authority, association and 
idea.  
 
(4) The Total Eclipse of the State  
 
For Schmitt these tendencies had coalesced into a profound crisis of the liberal state in 
the early twentieth century. The spatialisation of the political in the state form was being 
undermined by the liberal tendency towards depoliticization and the status of the state 
was, for Schmitt, becoming increasingly tenuous. However in Schmitt’s view liberalism 
did not so much produce an absolute depoliticization of the state as much as a total 
politicization of society, as I now will show. The early years of the twentieth century in 
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Europe were thus paradoxically defined by the simultaneous collapse and totalization of 
the state.  
 
Schmitt argued that a new form of state had emerged that held the key to understanding 
the political crisis of the day: the total state.  As the Weimar Republic entered into a 
period of renewed crisis in the politically polarizing fallout of the 1929 Wall Street crash 
Schmitt turned to the concept of the total state to explain the dynamic political 
situation.487 He did not consider the concept of the total state to be the product of 
speculative theorizing but to reflect the political realities, or, as he put it in 1931, “the 
concrete constitutional conditions” of the moment.488 The emergence of the total state 
was contemporarily as yet, a process still underway. “One may already talk” Schmitt 
wrote, “of a transition to the total state.”489 However, by February 1933, the month after 
Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor, he felt confident enough to simply declare, “there is a 
total state.”490 Schmitt identified two different total states at play in the turmoil of the 
early 1930s and he believed that the fate of the state form turned on the difference 
between them.  
 
There was in Schmitt’s view a liberal ‘quantitative total state’ and a fascist ‘qualitative 
total state,’ and they were to be sharply distinguished.491 Schmitt presented the liberal 
‘quantitative total state’ as the origin of the crisis of state form and the fascist ‘qualitative 
total state’ as a possible solution, a potential source for the renewal of state form. He 
argued that the ‘quantitative total state’ dissolved the state’s spatialisation of the political 
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whereas the ‘qualitative total state’ might provide the conditions for its respatialization. 
The manner in which Schmitt understood the difference between these two forms of total 
state does much to explain his decision to support the Nazi regime in 1933 and indeed his 
subsequent turn away from the category of the state in search of new bearer of political 
form in the late 1930s. The total state was in a sense Schmitt’s last attempt to find a 
source of renewal for the state form before moving on to seek out new spatializations of 
the political.  
 
(i) Liberal Leviathan 
 
The ‘quantitative total state’ was for Schmit the paradoxical end product of liberal 
depoliticization. It perfectly described, in his view, the “mess” of the final Weimar 
years.492 The ‘quantitative total state’ was marked above all by the collapse of the 
distinction between state and society that had been the pillar of the nineteenth century 
liberal state. This growing interpenetration of society and state was for Schmitt 
principally the result of the democratic thesis of the identity between ruler and ruled. He 
had already noted in The Concept of the Political that democracy “blurs the boundaries 
between state and society” and “must do away with all the typical … nineteenth century 
antithesis and divisions pertaining to state-society.”493 This had brought about a fusion of 
state and society in which each came more and more to resemble the other. “Society 
organized itself in the image of the state” he wrote, leaving “social and economic 
problems [to] automatically become state problems.”494 It was no longer possible to 
distinguish “between the state-political and the societal-unpolitical spheres.”495 In such a 
situation the state “seizes all the social, that is to say, everything that has to do with the 
common life of human beings.”496 Such a state, Schmitt argued, ‘indiscriminately gets 
into all spheres of human existence … because generally it cannot make any distinctions 
any longer.”497  
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Crucially however, the liberal state was for Schmitt “total in a purely quantitative sense, 
of mere volume, and not of intensity and political energy.”498 ‘Today’s German state” he 
wrote in 1933, “is total out of weakness and absence of resistance, by its inability to hold 
out against the assault of the parties and of organized interests.”499 It was by answering 
the demands of social interest groups organized into parties that the liberal state had 
become total in Schmitt’s views. Hence, the pluralist state had been rendered total. The 
pluralist state “must bow to everybody’s wishes, please everyone, subsidize everyone and 
be at the beck and call of conflicting interests at one and the same time.”500 Thus, the 
‘quantitative total state’ is a totality born of weakness in Schmitt’s eyes. It was a state 
that had “neither the ability nor the willingness to form a responsible government, 
capable of action.”501 On the one hand, Schmitt argued that this liberal total state could 
“no longer make any distinction either between economy and the state or between the 
state and the various walks of social life.”502 On the other hand, the state was unable to 
forge a unified political will. Rather the ‘quantitative total state’ was characterized by a 
“pluralistic dispersion” of loyalties.503 The “political monopoly” of the political parties 
saw “the political will itself … parcelled out among some five party lists.”504 In the 
parliamentary system the political will was “diverted at source into five channels and in 
five different directions so that it may never flow together in one stream.”505 Thus, the 
expansion of the ‘quantitative total state’ into society was undermining the state’s ability 
to make decisions and to provide unity. The pluralism of the ‘quantitative total state’ was 
undermining the state’s ability to produce political form. ‘Its foundations” became, 
Schmitt noted, “an uncertain terrain contested from several sides.”506 As such the 
‘quantitative total state’ was threatened to bring about a dangerous despatialisation of the 
political that would see the decisive friend-enemy distinction shift from the boundaries 
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between states to the relations between interest groups within the state. Thus behind the 
‘quantitative total state’ lay the horizon of civil war in Schmitt’s view. Chaos would 
probably already have reigned in Germany, Schmitt argued, “were it not for one of the 
last pillars of the Weimar constitutional order, the President of the Reich.”507 Schmitt 
published this in February 1933, just weeks after Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor, and 
thus he still appeared to be committed to a revitalization of the Weimar state under an 
authoritarian President rather than the Nazi movement. 
 
(ii) Nazi Behemoth 
 
If the ‘quantitative total state’ had, in Schmitt’s view, expanded in ‘quantity’ and 
‘volume’, the ‘qualitative total state’ by contrast grew in ‘quality’ and ‘intensity’. The 
liberal state was totality born of weakness but, for Schmitt, the ‘qualitative total state’ 
was a totality born of increased power. It was, he wrote, “by far the stronger state … total 
with regard to quality and energy.”508 The ‘quantitative total state’ came about through a 
collapse of the categories of state and society that had produced a pluralist dissolution of 
the people’s will. The ‘qualitative total state’, on the other hand, maintained the status of 
the state above society but did so by producing and representing the unified will of the 
people. ‘Behind the formula of the [qualitative] total state” was the acknowledgment, 
Schmitt argued, that, “the present day state has got new means and possibilities of 
tremendous power.”509 It was by drawing on these that the ‘qualitative total state’ grew in 
power. Particularly important for Schmitt were the new mediums of mass persuasion, 
cinema and radio, as they allowed “the creation of a ‘public’ … a collective opinion.”510 
The ‘qualitative total state’ was based on the idea that “the new power means belong 
exclusively to the state and serve to increase its power.”511 It had, Schmitt argued, “no 
intention to hand down the new means of power to its own enemies and destroyers.”512 
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The new technical means of control and persuasion were not, however, the true source of 
the ‘qualitative total state’s’ difference from the ‘quantitative total state’. The real 
difference lay in the intensity of its political association created by the ‘qualitative total 
state’. In stark contrast to the pluralism of the ‘quantitative total state’, Schmitt argued 
that it did not “allow the development of any sort of forces hostile to the state, that 
obstruct the state and disrupt its internal life.”513 It understood that the task of the state 
was to provide unity internally and identify the enemy externally. “Such a state,” he 
wrote, “can discriminate between friend and enemy.”514 Indeed, Schmitt noted, that, “in 
this sense …every genuine state is a total state.”515 State theorists, he argued, had “long 
known that the political is total, and new are only the new technical means, the political 
efficiency of which must become clear to anyone.”516 Thus, in Schmitt’s eyes the 
‘qualitative total state’ carried out the work of the ‘classical’ state in providing political 
form but harnessed the new technological means needed to produce unity in an age of 
mass politics. In contrast to the liberal state this new ‘qualitative total state’ understood 
the importance of identifying the enemy and hence the proper spatialisation of the 
political.  
  
Schmitt did not yet explicitly take National Socialist Germany as the model for the 
‘qualitative total state’ in his 1933 article The Further Development of the Total State in 
Germany but rather looked to the example of Italian fascism. The ‘qualitative total state’ 
was total with “regard to quality and energy, in the way the fascist state calls itself a 
‘stato totalitario’.”517 Indeed, although the term ‘qualitative total state’ only appears in 
Schmitt’s work in the early 1930s, his depiction built on ideas he had developed during 
the 1920s with Mussolini’s Italy firmly in mind. As previously noted, as early as 1923 in 
The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Schmitt had lauded the success of Italian 
fascism. Schmitt had opposed the powerful fusion of authority, unity and myth in the 
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fascist state to the dissolution of the liberal state under the weight of the contradictions 
between liberal pluralism and democratic homogeneity.  
 
The fascist state was indeed the model for the radically anti-liberal conception of 
democracy that Schmitt first outlined in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. Schmitt 
argued that the democratic identity of ruler and ruled was the unmovable presupposition 
of twentieth century European politics which had been irrevocably shaped by the 
appearance of the politicized masses after 1848. Although in its union with liberal 
pluralism democracy was undermining the state, and leading to its quantitative 
expansion, Schmitt argued that it could nonetheless be reconciled with state form. Indeed, 
if suitably yoked to authority and a powerful political idea, democratic homogeneity 
could provide a strong basis for the reinvigoration of the state form in the conditions of 
mass politics. This was precisely what Schmitt argued the fascist state had done in Italy – 
produced a radically anti-liberal form of democratic state built upon a strong central 
authority and a powerful myth of national unity. Hence, in Schmitt’s view the 
fundamental principle of democracy – the identification of ruler and ruled – was 
compatible with dictatorship. The crucial aspect of democracy, in Schmitt’s reading, was 
that the will of the people fundamentally dictates the terms of the state. There was no 
contradiction in Schmitt’s mind between a declaration of the people’s will and its 
representation in a strong form of authority. As Schmitt wrote in the Preface to the 1926 
re-issue of The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, “dictatorial and Caesaristic methods 
not only can produce the acclamation of the people but can also be a direct expression of 
democratic substance and power.”518  
 
Schmitt further elaborated the relationship he understood might exist between 
representative authority and the democratic will of the people in his 1928 book 
Constitutional Theory. Although the conception of constituent power Schmitt advances in 
this work is at times surprisingly radical for a man clearly on the far Right of the political 
spectrum by 1928, his formulations nonetheless betray the influence of Mussolini’s Italy. 
The radical Caesarist conception of democratic dictatorship linking a strong centralized 
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authority to the public declaration of an homogenous peoples’ will was clearly designed 
to side-step the pluralist formalities of liberal democracy. The homogenous will of the 
people and the strong central authority was for Schmitt a unity of unities to stand against 
the pluralist dissolution of the state he identified in parliamentary liberalism at the start of 
the twentieth century. Hence, the similarities between the authoritarian theory of 
democracy he developed during the 1920s and the concept of the ‘qualitative total state’ 
at the beginning of the 1930s are striking. Indeed the latter clearly finds its seed in the 
former. But if the concept of the ‘qualitative total state’ built on ideas Schmitt had earlier 
developed it arguably provided the frame within which he moved from supporting a 
transformation of the Weimar Republic into an authoritarian Presidential system to 
National Socialism.  
 
In State, Movement, People, a text he published in 1933, Schmitt attempted to formulate a 
theoretical conception of the new Nazi state. Schmitt explicitly identified the nascent 
Nazi order in Germany as an example of a ‘qualitative total state’ alongside the 
‘totalitarian’ states of Italy and the Soviet Union. By May 1933 Schmitt had decided that 
Nazism represented the best chance for the renewal of the state form and hence the 
spatialisation of the political. But if Schmitt had been quick to herald the rebirth of the 
state in the Nazi movement he soon considered it to have decisively killed of his most 
revered historical institution. Even the ‘qualitative total state’ Schmitt had hoped would 
prevent the collapse of the European order of states was not strong enough to resist the 
new powers and the new spatializations of the political that were emerging by the middle 
years of the twentieth century. 
 
(5) Beyond the State: Respatialising the Political 
 
The Nazi years were a period of transition for Schmitt’s thought that saw him move from 
a critique of the German welfare state to a new geopolitical ordering of the planet. Over 
the course of the 1930s many of the key concerns and categories of Schmitt’s Weimar 
output were replaced with a new set of terms, themes and conceptual frameworks. As 
argued previously, this does not mean that Schmitt’s work can be easily divided into two, 
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or even three, phases defined by clearly marked breaks. Rather, the transformation is 
better understood as a series of gradual shifts that take place against the background of a 
wider theoretical continuity. The deep concerns motivating Schmitt’s work from the 
Weimar period remain fundamental but the conceptual framework for approaching it 
changes. Hence, Schmitt continued to be preoccupied with the question of how to found 
political form, and hence with the search for a way to spatialise the political, but his work 
nonetheless, underwent two important shifts of focus that bear directly on these concerns.  
 
He moved away from the category of the state in search of new political forms and new 
spatializations of the political. This shift away from the state brought Schmitt to examine 
the spatialisation of political order more directly and hence spatial themes become a more 
explicit focus of his work. Thus, the 1930s marked a period when Schmitt began to look 
beyond the state for new sources of political form and sought out new conceptual 
resources for this task. By the start of the 1940s the centre of gravity of Schmitt’s thought 
had moved dramatically from the internal problems of the liberal constitutional state to 
speculations on what new macro-political forms might stabilize global order through new 
planetary spatializations of the political. These new concepts of political form and new 
theoretical frameworks will provide the focus of subsequent chapters but below I will 
firstly provide a brief account of the theoretical transition that Schmitt’s thought 
underwent during the 1930s.    
 
The first element of Schmitt’s move from beyond the state as the bearer of political form 
came in On the Three Types of Juristic Thought published in early 1934. Here Schmitt 
sought to lay out a new framework for juridical thought that would move beyond the 
positivism he had criticized in liberal thought and the decisionism he had opposed it with. 
In their place Schmitt proposed what he referred to as ‘concrete order thinking’. The 
starting point for ‘concrete order thinking was neither the impersonal norm nor the 
personal decision but the existing institutional order and its historical development. This 
was not a rejection of the decisionistic framework that he adopted during the1920s but 
rather a tacit acknowledgement of its limitations. Drawing on the work of the French 
legal theorist Maurice Hauriou, Schmitt emphasized the importance of institutions for the 
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legal order rather than the objective norm or the subjective acts of decision. Thus, now 
Schmitt sought to understand the personal decisionism of the sovereign power within the 
broader social and historical context of pre-existing legal institutions. On the Three Types 
of Juristic Thought was part of Schmitt’s attempt to provide theoretical legitimation for 
the Nazi regime. However, it also marked a serious attempt to establish a sociologically 
and historically richer understanding of the institutional framework of European political 
order beyond the boundaries of the state form. The framework of ‘concrete order 
thinking’ emerged not simply from Schmitt’s attempt to legitimize Nazi order but from 
the existing trajectory of his thought away from the state form. Indeed, ‘concrete order 
thinking’ remained the principal framework within which Schmitt developed his thought 
even after Nazi defeat.  
 
The move beyond the state signalled by the emergence of ‘concrete order thinking’ in 
1934 was hastened after Schmitt lost favour in the Nazi regime after 1936. Despite his 
eager attempts to provide legitimation for the new regime some remained suspicious 
about Schmitt’s dedication to the Nazi cause. He was subject to attack both from within 
the Nazi establishment and from his former friend and student Waldemar Gurian now 
living in exile in Switzerland. Although Hans Frank and Herman Goring provided 
protection for Schmitt after he was denounced in the SS publication Das Schwarze Korps 
he still considered himself at risk. Thus, after 1936 Schmitt turned his attention away 
from attempts to theorize the nature of Nazi order. Instead he took up two projects that 
led him further from the state. The first was an increasing focus on a critique of 
international law since the Treaty of Versailles. This was work that Schmitt had been 
engaged in since the 1920s but which he looked at with renewed vigour after his 
marginalization from domestic debate. This allowed Schmitt to work on a set of concerns 
that were less controversial and hence escape the criticism that had been targeted at him 
within the regime. It gave him the opportunity to understand more clearly the eclipse of 
the modern European state within the broader context of transformations in international 
law and the distribution of global power. The second project was a historical genealogy 
of the modern European state that accounted for the internal roots of its collapse. This 
work, which culminated in the publication of The Leviathan in the State Theory of 
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Thomas Hobbes in 1938, marked something of a final testament for the state within the 
trajectory of Schmitt’s thought. In this book he outlined how the failure of the state form 
was not simply the result of liberalism in the twentieth century but was inscribed in the 
very foundations of the state form. Indeed, some readers have even detected veiled 
critiques of the Nazi state in The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes, 
although the textual evidence for this is ambivalent. It certainly seems likely given his 
wider move away from the state that his opinion of the Nazi state had dimmed 
considerably by 1938.  
 
From 1939 Schmitt’s work displayed a new enthusiasm for theorizing the Nazi Reich and 
found renewed favour with the regime. However, this was no longer a theorization of the 
National Socialist state but was part of his broader attempt to imagine new political forms 
and new spatializations of the political beyond the state form. Schmitt’s study of 
international law and the genealogy of the modern European state between 1936 and 
1938 led him to the belief that new ordering institutions were needed to reflect new 
concrete realities that had emerged in global politics. The rising global power of the 
United States had not only decisively shifted global power away from Europe but also 
eclipsed the state form as a viable subject for the conduct of international politics. 
Schmitt argued that in place of the state new institutions with wider reach were needed to 
provide order under these new conditions. In Schmitt’s view the rapidly rising power of 
the Nazi Reich in Continental Europe produced an opportunity to conceive of a Europe-
wide political unity dominated by an imperial Germany. Drawing on the example of the 
U.S. Monroe Doctrine in the nineteenth century Schmitt began to develop a theory of 
Grossraum order which would see international order constituted around a number of 
continental imperial powers. Thus, Schmitt’s Grossraum order was at once an attempt to 
legitimize the imperial expansion of the Nazi Germany and an attempt to theorize a new 
foundation for international order in a new political form that would replace the now 
redundant state and produce a new continental spatialisationthe political. 
 
The Grossraum theory Schmitt developed from 1939 marked the emergence of spatial 
themes as an explicit focus in his work. As I have argued, spatial concepts played a 
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crucial structural role in Schmitt’s work from the start of the 1920s but they remained 
largely implicit and were not directly theorized. However, the process of looking for new 
political forms beyond the state led Schmitt towards an explicit focus on the spatial 
themes from the late 1930s. This search, conducted within the conceptual framework of 
the ‘concrete order thinking’, led Schmitt to fundamental questions concerning the 
foundations of political form. Hence, it was by questioning the ‘concrete’ institutional 
foundations of political form that spatial themes emerged as the explicit focus of 
Schmitt’s thought. The theory of Großraum order was Schmitt’s first attempt to develop 
an explicit concept of the spatial foundations of order but this question increasingly 
preoccupied his thought in the 1940s and 1950s. The search for new political forms 
capable of producing new spatializations of the political was thus not simply a matter of 
legitimizing the expansion of the Nazi Reich. This was the immediate context in which 
began this phase of his work but the horizon of his investigation was wider. In Schmitt’s 
view, with the eclipse of the state form in the middle years of the twentieth century, the 
globe had entered into a world-historical crisis of political form. Beyond the state lay the 
more profound question of a new spatial order of the earth.  
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Chapter 6: The Nomos of the Earth / Spatial Order  
 
 
(1) Space in Schmitt’s Late Work  
 
Carl Schmitt’s spatial thought is most often identified with his late work dating from the 
1940s onwards, with much attention centred on his 1950 book The Nomos of the Earth. It 
has been common, therefore, for Anglophone readers, notably within International 
Relations and Geography, to focus almost exclusively on Schmitt’s late postwar work 
and on The Nomos of the Earth in particular when examining spatial themes in Schmitt’s 
work. The impression given by the existing Anglophone literature is that Schmitt’s work 
undergoes a ‘spatial turn’ sometime in the 1940s. However, it has been one of the central 
claims of this thesis that spatial concepts in fact play a central structuring role across 
Schmitt’s entire oeuvre and are not simply identifiable with one phase of his output. As 
argued in the preceding chapters, Schmitt’s work from the 1920s and 1930s was centred 
on the category of the state, an institution he understood to provide ordering form by 
spatialising the relations between friend and enemy. Despite this continuity in the 
importance of spatial concepts in Schmitt’s work, a transformation can nonetheless be 
discerned. Although spatial concepts play an important structural role in his work from 
the 1920s and early 1930s they remain largely implicit: the unspoken theoretical 
principles on which his thought rested. However, by the time he published The Nomos of 
the Earth in 1950 the position of spatial concepts in his work had undergone a marked 
change. Spatial concepts were no longer simply an implicit structural element of his 
thought but the explicit focus of his work, thematically foregrounded and formally 
theorized.  
 
The shift in the use of spatial concepts in his work was not, however, the result of a clean 
break or ‘turn’ but was rather took place gradually over a number of years. As argued in 
the previous chapter, this process of change was the result of a confluence of developing 
intellectual trajectories and a variety of personal and political factors during the 1930s 
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and early 1940s. Firstly, Schmitt made a shift in the early 1930s from a ‘decisionistic’ 
framework to ‘concrete order thinking’ that led him to an increasing focus on the deeper 
socio-historical and institutional basis of political order. Secondly, an increasing focus on 
the critique of international law led him to examine the shift in global power from Europe 
to the United States and the changing nature of twentieth century warfare. Thirdly, in the 
late 1930s Schmitt carried out a critical genealogy of the modern European state that 
located its emergence and decline within a broader historical and geographic context of 
modern world history. Finally, in the context of Nazi expansion in Europe during the late 
1930s and early 1940s, Schmitt attempted to theorize a new form of anti-universalist 
global spatial order based on a number of continental empires, or Großräume. Thus, from 
the late 1930s spatial concerns increasingly became the focus of Schmitt’s work. The 
question of the spatialisation of the political came to be explicitly theorized in the concept 
of nomos, or spatial order. By the early 1940s the concept of a global spatial order, or the 
nomos of the earth, had become the governing framework within which Schmitt 
developed his thought.  
 
It is therefore justified to split Schmitt’s work into early and late phases and note the 
difference in the role of spatial concepts in the two phases. However, the break between 
these phases should not be exaggerated or the continuities overlooked. In this chapter and 
those that follow I will argue that Schmitt’s late spatial thought should be understood in 
direct relation to the question of political form. Although political form itself is not a 
central category in Schmitt’s late work a conception of political order founded on spatial 
division remains crucial and indeed moves into relief in the concept of nomos. Thus, 
whilst I will examine the conceptual development of Schmitt’s late spatial thought in the 
following chapters, I will also stress the continuities with the concept of political form I 
have argued underlies Schmitt’s spatial thought as a whole.  
 
It is important to note here that I will not approach Schmitt’s late works in the order that 
they appeared or chart the development of his late spatial thought in a strictly 
chronological manner. Rather, I will take a more thematic approach that highlights the 
importance of different concepts and texts within the broader trajectory of his work as a 
 191 
whole. Thus, this chapter will focus on The Nomos of the Earth although it was published 
in 1950, some years after Schmitt had already produced major works addressing 
explicitly spatial themes such as The Großraum Order of International Law with a Ban 
on the Intervention of Spatially Foreign Powers (1939-1941) and Land and Sea (1942). I 
start with The Nomos of the Earth because it represents Schmitt’s most mature 
contribution to spatial thought and helps to frame the concerns of his late work as a 
whole. In the following chapter I will return to address The Großraum Order of 
International Law with a Ban on the Intervention of Spatially Foreign Powers alongside 
the much later text, The Theory of the Partisan (1963). Although these texts appeared 
over twenty years apart in very different personal and political circumstances they 
represent Schmitt’s two major attempts to imagine new forms of spatial order in the wake 
of the state form. In the final chapter I will turn to examine the concepts of history that 
underpin the ideas of spatial order in Schmitt’s late work. I will argue that Schmitt’s late 
thought draws upon myth and theology to construct a unique ‘spatial history’ of 
modernity, the significance of which has often been overlooked in existing studies of his 
work. 
 
(2) The Nomos of the Earth  
 
In recent years The Nomos of the Earth has been given many labels, from a “fascist 
epic”519 to a “missing classic of IR”520 to Schmitt’s “magnum opus.”521 There is some 
consensus that it is the most significant book Schmitt produced in the postwar era and 
arguably in his entire oeuvre.522 It marks his most sustained attempt to understand the 
nature of the relationship between space and political order, and provides an original and 
provocative history of modern international law from the fifteenth to the twentieth 
century. Although originally published in 1950, it was largely written in Berlin between 
1942 and 1945 whilst war raged across Europe. Schmitt noted that he faced “all sorts of 
                                                
519 Gopal Balakrishnan, “The Geopolitics of Separation,” New Left Review 68 (March-April 2011), 67.  
520 Odysseos & Petito, Introduction, 2. 
521 Hooker, Carl Schmitt’s International Thought, 3. 
522 As noted in Chapter 1 the book has received an enthusiastic if often critical reception across a number of 
disciplines in the Anglophone academy since its publication in English translation in 2003.  
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restraints and restrictions” whilst writing the book.523 In the Foreword, written in 1950, 
Schmitt twice noted that the book’s subject matter and the situation in which it was 
composed were “overwhelming.”524 This should be read not simply to refer to the 
difficulties of wartime writing, but also the fact that in the immediate aftermath of 
German defeat Schmitt was interned by American forces and interrogated at Nuremburg 
on two separate occasions. Hence, the book was structured around a series of curious 
silences in order to shield its author from further accusation. Indeed, he warns in the 
Foreword that he will “avoid mention of contemporary affairs and break off at many 
points” to “avoid unnecessary controversy.”525 Thus, there is no mention of several 
matters we might have expected Schmitt to comment on given his previous work, the 
theme of the book and the context in which it appeared. He makes no mention of 
National Socialist expansion in Europe, World War II and the occupation of Europe by 
American and Soviet Forces. Even his work on Großraum  order, carried out in the late 
1930s and early 1940s, goes largely unmentioned. These omissions are obviously 
prompted by Schmitt’s perhaps prudent desire to ‘avoid unnecessary controversy’ at a 
time when he had just been released without charge from interrogation at Nuremburg. 
They are evidently part of a concerted effort by Schmitt to ‘cleanse’ his record and 
present his work as acceptable sober and ‘objective’ analysis.526  
 
Schmitt’s desire to avoid incriminating topics left the book oddly truncated and 
seemingly without conclusion despite being nearly 300 pages long. The theoretical and 
historical trajectories the book followed led him inevitably towards a critique of Europe’s 
postwar settlement and the continued expansion of U.S. power but it was precisely these 
                                                
523 Schmitt, The Nomos, 38. The book’s English translator Gary Ulmen notes that this primarily indicated a 
lack of access to sources. Indeed, Ulmen notes tht the original German edition included many minor errors 
that were corrected in the English edition following Schmitt’s stated wishes (Ibid, 35). It is safe to assume 
that Schmitt also considered the occupying forces a ‘restraint and a restriction’ on what he might write 
given that he had only recently been released from interrogation in Nuremburg. Indeed, Schmitt insinuates 
this himself in the book’s 1950 Foreword as I mention below.  
524 Within a few lines of each other he writes, “the given subject and the present situation are 
overwhelming” and “both the theme and the situation are overwhelming.” Schmitt, Nomos, 38-39. 
525 Schmitt, Nomos, 38-39. 
526 He claims indeed that his aim is to “present new ideas objectively.” (Ibid, 39) This was indeed the 
defence Schmitt offered of himself whilst under interrogation at Nuremburg. See: Carl Schmitt, “On 
Großraum, The Hitler Regime, and Collaboration (I-III); Answers to Allegations,” Telos 72 (1987), 97-
129. 
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things that he left implicit. Like his other works, The Nomos of the Earth was a polemical 
engagement with the political conditions of the day, but his critique remains to be read 
between the lines. During the 1950s Schmitt published a number of short corollaries to 
stand in for the original publication’s missing conclusion. Hence, the book in fact 
remained unfinished until the mid 1950s when these supplements were added. Further, 
the book represented the culmination of the work Schmitt had carried out in late 1930s 
and early 1940s and gathered together the various strands of his thought during this 
period.527 The ideas contained within it are at once the result of previous work and the 
springboard for subsequent efforts. The Nomos of the Earth is thus best understood as the 
centrepiece of a wider span of work stretching from the late 1930s to the mid 1950s.  
 
The book itself is a complex and sweeping work of vast ambition. The reader cannot help 
but be immediately struck by the magnitude and erudition of the work, whatever the 
failings of Schmitt’s perspective and argument might be. The book contains several core 
elements and can be broken down into broad sections. Firstly, Schmitt outlines a concept 
of nomos that indicates the inherently spatial foundations of legal and political order. 
Second, he provides an account of the rise of the first global spatial order of the earth, the 
Eurocentric global order he referred to as the jus publicum Europaeum. Thirdly, he 
mounted a critique of the various factors contributing to the collapse of this spatial order 
of the earth in the twentieth century. Lastly, Schmitt indicated what he considers to be the 
most pressing question for political thought in the shadow of this collapse: what form the 
new nomos of the earth might take. In the remainder of the chapter I will briefly address 
each of these elements in turn, highlighting their importance to understanding Schmitt’s 
late spatial thought.  
 
 
                                                
527 Schmitt largely avoided his work on Großraum order here however. This work had its inception in the 
context of theorizing Nazi expansion in Europe and Schmitt wanted to avoid any further association with 
the Nazi regime especially given that his Großraum work had already brought him under suspicion. The 
English edition of the book includes three such corollaries dating from 1953 – 1957. Interestingly although 
the concept of Großraum appears in one of these corollaries, “The New Nomos of the Earth,” (1953) no 
mention is made of its original inception in the context of theorizing Nazi expansion in Europe. I will return 
to address the way in which Schmitt presented his Großraum theory in this 1955 text below and will 
investigate his original formulation in the following chapter.  
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(3) Nomos as Concept: Order & Orientation 
 
(i) Ordnung und Ortung  
 
Nomos, Schmitt argued, indicates a fundamental “unity of space and law, order and 
orientation.”528 It is a concept that points, for Schmitt, to the necessarily “spatial context 
of all law,” or rather the fact that “all law is law only in a particular location.”529 “The 
word, understood in its original spatial sense,” he wrote, “is best suited to describe the 
fundamental process involved in the relation between order and orientation.”530 “It 
constitutes the original spatial order,” he wrote, “the source of all further concrete order 
and all further law.”531 Nomos, for Schmitt, indicates that all order is, at the most 
fundamental level, spatial order. Hence, all forms of political, legal and social order rest 
upon the foundational unity of law and space represented by a nomos. “All subsequent 
regulations of a written or unwritten kind,” Schmitt argued, “derive their power from the 
inner measure of an original, constitutive act of spatial ordering. This original act is 
nomos.”532 Thus, regardless of the specific form a political order takes and the 
particularities of its normative content, it necessarily rests, for Schmitt, on a “structure-
determining convergence of order and orientation.”533 Nomos therefore concerns the most 
fundamental question of legal foundations, or as Schmitt writes, “the existential question 
of jurisprudence.”534 It is, in Schmitt’s view, the most fundamental concept of legal order, 
from which all else emerges and on which all else rests. 
                                                
528 The first chapter of The Nomos of the Earth carries the title ‘Law as a Unity of Order and Orientation’. 
In the original German Schmitt renders order and orientation with the rhyming couplet of Ordung und 
Ortung. The Italian political theorist Thalin Zarmanian translates Ordnung und Ortung as “order and 
localisation.” See: Thalin Zarmanian, “Ordnung und Ortung/order and localisation” in ed. Stephen Legg, 
Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos (London: Routledge, 2011), 291. 
Zarmanian uses the term ‘localisation’ rather than ‘orientation’ to underline not only the concrete spatial 
particularities implied in Schmitt’s concept but also the dynamic and active nature of Ortung. Hence, any 
crudely geographically determinist reading of the relationship between order and orientation is avoided as 
the active nature of nomic ordering is emphasized.  
529 Schmitt, The Nomos, 98.  
530 Ibid, 67. 
531 Ibid, 48. 
532 Ibid, 78. 
533 Ibid, 78. 
534 Ibid, 38. Schmitt enigmatically noted in the 1950 Foreword to The Nomos of the Earth that the 
‘existential question of jurisprudence’ was at that time, in his view, “sundered between theology and 
technology” (Ibid, 38). This comment can be understood in relation to the fundamental battle Schmitt 
 195 
 
Nomos therefore indicates, for Schmitt, a foundational unity of space and law. However, 
this should not be understood to presuppose a neutral, universal or undifferentiated 
concept of Space on which order rests. Rather, in Schmitt’s view, nomos points to the 
process by which order is grounded in the differentiation of spaces. Nomos above all 
concerns spatial difference. It is, he notes, a “fence-word.”535 For Schmitt, therefore, 
order is not simply founded in space but through foundational acts of spatial 
differentiation. Schmitt notes that nomos was originally the Ancient Greek word for “the 
first of all subsequent measures, for … the first partition and classification of space, for 
the primeval division and distribution.”536 Thus, for Schmitt, the foundations of nomos, 
and hence all subsequent order, rested on the division of space. Schmitt argues that, 
“nomos is the measure by which the land in a particular order is divided and situated” but 
“also the form of political, social, and religious order determined by this process.”537 
Hence, in Schmitt’s view these foundational acts of division simultaneously ordered 
space and spatially situated order. For Schmitt therefore, it was through these 
foundational acts of spatial division that an order took tangible form. “Nomos,” he wrote, 
“is the immediate form in which political and social order of a people becomes spatially 
visible – the initial measure and division.”538 Hence, by dividing space an order became 
visible and took a clear form.539 The nomic division of space not only laid the foundations 
for order but further gave that order an inherently representational form.  
 
(ii) The Forgotten Nomos 
 
Schmitt argued that the original meaning of nomos as spatial order had been forgotten in 
European legal and political thought, a lapse of cultural memory he understood to have 
                                                                                                                                            
staked out between those forces driving the world towards a ‘spatial chaos’ and those capable of producing 
spatial order. The former Schmitt identified with those who had placed a utopian hope in technology and 
the latter with those who might stand in as a Katechon, an obscure biblical figure Schmitt takes from Saint 
Paul’s Epistles to the Thessalonians, capable of restraining the end of the world (Ibid, 59-62). 
535 Ibid, 75. 
536 Ibid, 67. 
537 Ibid, 70. 
538 Ibid, 70. 
539 Schmitt noted that in a nomos, “measure, order, and form, constitute a spatially concrete unity” (Ibid, 
70). 
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had far-reaching consequences in the twentieth century. “The word nomos,” he noted 
“has undergone many changes in its more than three-thousand-year history, and it often is 
difficult to retain the big picture, given the etymological and semantic assessments at any 
particular time.”540 Schmitt undertook an etymological excavation of the word in 
European thought stretching from Greek antiquity to the twentieth century in order to 
understand how the original meaning of nomos as spatial order had been lost. He 
concluded that, “the original meaning was destroyed by a series of distinctions and 
antitheses. Most important amongst them was the opposing of nomos and physis, where 
nomos became an imposed ought dissociated from and opposed to is.”541 “Originally” 
Schmitt argued, “the word did not signify a mere act whereby is and ought could be 
separated, and the spatial structure of a concrete order could be discarded.”542 But by the 
twentieth century, Schmitt noted, “the Greek word nomos [had been] transformed from a 
spatially concrete, constitutive act of order and orientation  - from an ordo ordinans 
[order of ordering] into a mere enactment of acts in line with the ought and, consistent 
with the manner of thinking of the positivistic legal system, translated with the word 
law.”543 Thus, for Schmitt, in losing sight of the original meaning of nomos, legal thought 
was severed from its necessary relationship to space. Legal acts were no longer conceived 
in relation to a particular concrete situation but had become abstracted into free-floating 
norms. 
 
In Schmitt’s view therefore the historical erasure of nomos as spatial order had 
culminated in the system of abstract norms and measures he identified with legal 
positivism.544 However, Schmitt understood the roots of the problem to lie much deeper 
in the past. Indeed, although he based his understanding of nomos on a return to the 
original Greek term Schmitt argued that, “in antiquity nomos already had lost its original 
                                                
540 Ibid, 341. 
541 Ibid, 69. 
542 Ibid, 69. 
543 Ibid, 78. 
544 Hence, Schmitt developed his critique of the forgetting of the spatial nature of nomos in relation to the 
critique of legal positivism he had developed in his Weimar work (see the previous chapter). I will return to 
the relationship between his readings of nomos and legal positivism below.  
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meaning.”545 He notes that the link between nomos and spatial order had been lost “since 
the Sophists” and “already in Plato, nomos signified a schedon – a mere rule.”546 The 
Greek legacy of rendering nomos as a mere law was compounded by the Roman orator 
Cicero who Schmitt notes, “translated nomos as Lex.”547 Nonetheless, Schmitt’s critique 
of interpretations that detached the concept of nomos from its original spatial meaning is 
squarely aimed at legal positivists. Indeed, Schmitt argued that returning to the original 
meaning of “the word nomos is useful … because it shields perceptions of the current 
world situation from the confusion of legal positivism, in particular from the muddle of 
words and concepts characteristic of nineteenth century jurisprudence dealing with 
domestic matters of state.”548 In Schmitt’s view it was precisely the “legislative excesses” 
of positivism that made it “necessary to recall the word’s original meaning and its 
connection to the first land-appropriation.”549 Schmitt sought therefore to employ the 
concept of nomos polemically against the ‘spaceless’ jurisprudence of positivism. 
Understood as spatial order, the concept of nomos could direct thought away from 
abstract ‘oughts’ towards the concrete question of legal foundations, which positivist 
thought always tried to occlude.550 In other words, by returning nomos to its original 
                                                
545 Ibid, 67. Even this point would seem to undermine much of the value of his philological argument 
Schmitt reiterates it a few pages later: “The original spatial character of the word nomos could not hold in 
Greek antiquity either” (Ibid, 75). Schmitt laid great emphasis on the etymological roots of the word nomos 
in making the claim that it should be understood as spatial order and carried out extensive philological 
work to back his argument in the opening chapters of The Nomos of the Earth and again in Nomos – Nahme 
– Name the corollary published in 1957. However, his argument is riddled with inconsistencies and when 
the etymological evidence does not suit he simply disregards it. 
546 Ibid, 167. Schmitt makes considerable polemical mileage from drawing parallels between the Greek 
Sophists and legal positivists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, at points in his critique of 
the formalist normativism that he argued had obscured the original meaning of nomos the two groups seem 
to merge into one.  
547 Ibid, 342. Schmitt argued that, “the consequences of this fusion with a Roman legal concept are still 
with us.” He again equates the anti-nomic legacy of classical legal thought with the development of legal 
positivism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He agreed with the Spanish Romanist Alvaro d’Ors 
“that the translation of nomos with Lex is one of the heaviest burdens that the conceptual and linguistic 
culture of the Occident has had to bear. Anyone familiar with the further development of the law-state and 
the present crisis of legality knows this to be true” (Ibid, 342). Hence, Schmitt casts Cicero as the forefather 
of Kelsen. 
548 Ibid, 69. 
549 Ibid, 69. Indeed, Schmitt argued that, “the intellectual trick of the postulate ‘not men, but laws’ is easy 
to see through, if one knows the linguistic history of nomos” (Ibid, 342). Hence, he hoped that by returning 
to original meaning of nomos abstract formalism of positivistic legal thought could be undermined. 
550 Schmitt argued that, “jurists of positive law, i.e. of constituted and enacted law, have been accustomed 
in all times to consider only the given order and the processes that obtain within it. They have in view only 
the sphere of what has been established firmly, what has been constituted: in particular, only the system of 
a specific state legality. They are content to reject as ‘unjuridical’ the question of what processes 
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meaning as spatial order Schmitt sought to posit an alternative framework for 
understanding law to that presented by positivism’s abstract system of norms.551 His 
stated aim was to “restore to the word nomos its energy and majesty.”552 However, for 
this to happen he argued it was necessary for “human thinking again [to] be directed to 
the elemental orders of its terrestrial being here and now.”553 
 
(iii) The Law of the Land 
 
The category of land was of primary importance in Schmitt’s account of nomos. In his 
view the unity of law and space, order and orientation, meant above all that law was tied 
to the earth. “Law,” Schmitt noted “is bound to the earth and related to the earth.”554 The 
earth was, for Schmitt, the “terrestrial fundament, in which all law is rooted, in which 
space and law, order and orientation meet.”555 In other words, nomos indicated that law 
was literally grounded in the division of land. “The great primeval acts of law,” he 
argued, are wedded to “terrestrial orientations: appropriating land, founding cities, and 
establishing colonies.”556 Thus, the appropriation and division of land lay at the root of 
every spatial order, and hence, in Schmitt’s view, every other form of social, legal and 
                                                                                                                                            
established this order” (Ibid, 82). This emerged in Schmitt’s view from the rationale of “a state 
bureaucracy, which has no interest in the right of its origin, but only in the law of its own functioning” 
(Ibid, 82). 
551 It is on this point that the relationship between the concept of nomos as spatial order and the theoretical 
framework of ‘concrete order thinking’ Schmitt laid out in 1934 becomes most apparent.  
552 Ibid, 67. It is worth noting that Schmitt mentions in passing his “great respect for the efforts of Wilhelm 
Stapel and Hans Bogner, who have given nomos the meaning Lebensgesetz [law of life].” However, 
Schmitt notes his opposition firstly to the word Leben on the basis that it has “degenerated into the 
biological” and secondly to the word Gesetz, which he argues ‘unlike the Greek word nomos … is not an 
Urwort [primeval word].” “It is deeply entangled in the theological distinctions between Jewish law and 
Christian grace – the (Jewish) law and the (Christian) gospel … [and] expresses only the positivistic artifice 
of what is enacted or obliged – the mere will to compliance” (Ibid, 70 n10). The difficulty of deciphering 
Schmitt’s complex relationship to German conservatism and anti-Semitism are clearly seen in this passage. 
On the one hand he commends these thinkers of the ‘conservative revolution’ and opposes the use of the 
term Gesetz on anti-Semitic grounds tacitly equating Jews with positivism. On the other, he rejects their 
biological interpretation of law as a conceptual ‘degeneration’ (Ibid, p 70 n10). 
553 Ibid, 39. 
554 Ibid, 42. 
555 Ibid, 47. In discussing the primacy of the land in the concept of nomos Schmitt uses the words ‘earth, 
‘land’ and ‘soil’ interchangeably. Stuart Elden has noted that this terminological instability has implications 
for Schmitt’s discussion of territorial sovereignty in The Nomos of the Earth. See: Elden, “Reading Schmitt 
geopolitically” (2010). Elden correctly notes that Schmitt pays insufficient attention to the conceptual shifts 
indicated by the different terms employed at different times and in different contexts across modern 
European history.  
556 Schmitt, The Nomos, 44. 
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political order that rested upon it. As he noted, “appropriating land and founding cities 
always is associated with an initial measurement and distribution of usable soil, which 
produces a primary criterion embodying all subsequent criteria.”557 Thus, Schmitt argued 
that all subsequent order emerged from the primary division of land. 
 
The land did not only provide a material foundation for order but also represented a 
fundamental source of juridical meaning in human existence. “Every ontonomous and 
ontological judgement,” Schmitt wrote, “derives from the land.”558 “In mythical 
language,” he noted, “the earth became known as the mother of law” and signified a 
“three-fold root of law and justice.”559 In this mythical frame “the earth is bound to law in 
three ways. She contains law within herself, as a reward of labour; she manifests law 
upon herself, as fixed boundaries; and she sustains law above herself, as a public sign of 
order.”560 The crucial point for Schmitt was that the land, insofar as it was divisible, had 
an inherently representational quality that allowed order to become visible in fixed lines 
and clear demarcations. Thus, the ‘terrestrial fundament’ contained within it the capacity 
to ground order precisely because it could be carved into a representational form by the 
appropriation and division of the land.  
 
In contrast to the land, Schmitt argued that, “the sea knows no such apparent unity of 
space and law, order and orientation.”561 Unlike the land, the sea lacked an inherently 
representational quality. It could not be divided nor bear fixed lines and hence, in 
Schmitt’s terms, provided no ground order. “On the sea,” Schmitt noted, “fields cannot 
be planted and firm lines cannot be engraved.”562 The sea, Schmitt argued “has no 
character, in the original sense of the word, which comes from the Greek charaessein, 
meaning to engrave, to scratch, to imprint.”563 “On the waves,” Schmitt wrote, “there is 
                                                
557 Ibid, 45. Schmitt argued further that, ‘all subsequent legal relations to the soil … and all institutions of 
the walled city or of a new colony are determined by [the] primary criterion” of land appropriation (Ibid, 
45). I will return below to the centrality of land appropriation in Schmitt’s account of nomos.  
558 Ibid, 45. 
559 Ibid, 42.  
560 Ibid, 42. This echoes Schmitt’s claim that the institution of nomos is defined by the three-fold 
relationship between appropriation, distribution and production that I will discuss below.  
561 Ibid, 42. 
562 Ibid, 42. 
563 Ibid, 43. 
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nothing but waves.”564 In the traditions of pre-modern law, the sea was considered a 
lawless ‘free’ space where “there were no limits, no boundaries, no consecrated sites, no 
sacred orientations, no law, and no property.”565 “Land and sea were completely different 
orders,” Schmitt claimed.566 On land there was law. “On the sea, there was no law.”567 
However, Schmitt noted that since the emergence of global maritime empires, law had 
been extended into the ‘free’ space of the sea in radical acts of sea-appropriation. Hence, 
the sea had become part of the global nomos of the earth alongside the land. This nomos, 
that had emerged in the modern period, rested not only on the land but rather “on a 
particular relation between firm land and free sea.”568 Thus, in Schmitt’s view the sea 
could become part of spatial order as long as it maintained a relation to the foundational 
element of the earth, which remained primary.  
 
Writing in 1950, Schmitt acknowledged that, “it is conceivable that the air will envelop 
the sea and perhaps even the earth, and that men will transform their planet into a 
combination of produce warehouse and aircraft carrier.”569 Hence, he clearly saw that the 
emergence of air power might eclipse the existing foundations of spatial order in the 
relationship between land and sea. “If the domination of airspace is added as a third 
dimension” to land and sea, Schmitt argued, “still other new spatial orders [will] arise.”570 
Although such a transformation might alter the relationship between order and 
orientation, law and space, it would not erase the foundational importance of land.  
Hence, Schmitt argued that even after the advent of air-war and the development of new 
technologies of communication and transport an “approach to the study of international 
law based on the concept of land-appropriation is still meaningful.”571 Indeed, one of the 
major flaws in existing approaches to international law was the fact that it sought to elide 
the fundamental importance of land-appropriation and the division of the earth. By 
                                                
564 Ibid, 43. 
565 Ibid, 43 
566 Ibid, 353. 
567 Ibid, 44. 
568 Ibid, 48.  
569 Ibid, 49. Schmitt argued that if this were to occur new “amity lines will be drawn, beyond which atomic 
weapons and hydrogen bombs will fall,” although he still clung “to the hope that we will find the normative 
order of the earth, and that the peacemakers will inherit the earth” (Ibid, 49).  
570 Ibid, 80.  
571 Ibid, 80. 
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employing the concept of nomos Schmitt therefore intended to bring jurisprudence back 
down to earth. Against the groundless abstractions of legal positivism and the boundary-
defying dimensions of air power, he sought to reassert the fundamental question of 
concrete spatial foundations and the primary division of the land.  
  
(iv) Land-Appropriation 
 
The act of land-appropriation or “Landnahme” is central to Schmitt’s account of 
nomos.572  For him land-appropriation was the most fundamental process in establishing 
law, the “primeval act in founding law.”573 It was, for Schmitt, the “archetype of a 
constitutive legal process.”574 As the fundamental constitutive act of a spatial order, it 
created “the primary legal title that underlies all subsequent law.”575 The act of 
appropriating land “creates,” Schmitt wrote, “the most radical title, in the full and 
comprehensive sense of the term radical title.”576 Hence, if all order rested on spatial 
order, all spatial order rested in land-appropriation. All further forms of law and order 
were derived from this foundational “process of order and orientation.”577 Thus, the act of 
land-appropriation needed to be distinguished from other forms of law. “In the strictest 
sense, law is mediation,” but nomos, understood as land-appropriation, “is precisely the 
full immediacy of a legal power not mediated by laws: it is a constitutive historical event 
– an act of legitimacy, whereby the legality of a mere law first is made meaningful.”578 
 
It was important that the historical reality of these acts of legitimacy was recognized. 
Land-appropriation should not be thought of “as a purely intellectual construct,” but 
should rather be considered “a legal fact, to be a great historical event, even if, 
historically, land-appropriation proceeded rather tumultuously.”579 Indeed, “in some 
                                                
572 Ibid, 80.  
573 Ibid, 45. 
574 Ibid, 47. 
575 Ibid, 46.  
576 Ibid, 47. Schmitt makes frequent use of the term ‘radical title’, derived from the English philosopher 
John Locke, throughout his discussion of land-appropriation. 
577 Ibid, 80. “At this origin of land-appropriation, law and order are one: where order and orientation 
coincide, they cannot be separated” (Ibid, 81). 
578 Ibid, 73. 
579 Ibid, 46. 
 202 
form, the constitutive process of land appropriation is found at the beginning of the 
history of every settled people, every commonwealth, every empire. This is true as well 
for the beginning of every historical epoch.”580 Schmitt claimed that “Not only logically, 
but also historically, land-appropriation precedes the order that follows from it … It is the 
reproductive root in the normative order of history.”581 The statement “in the beginning 
was the fence,” therefore does not merely point to the mythical foundations of law but the 
real historical processes through which order is founded.582 “Every new age and every 
new epoch in the coexistence of peoples, empires, and countries, of rulers and power 
formations of every sort, is founded on new spatial divisions, new enclosures, and new 
spatial orders of the earth.”583 Schmitt argued that “the history of colonialism in its 
entirety is … a history of spatially determined processes of settlement in which order and 
orientation are combined.”584 
 
The historically determining process of land-appropriation “grounds law in two 
directions: internally and externally.”585 Internally, the act of land-appropriation 
established the fundamental division of space on which all forms of ownership and 
property relations of the land-appropriating group were based. Every form of property 
“remains dependent on the common land-appropriation and derives legally from the 
common primeval act.”586 “To this extent,” Schmitt wrote, “every land-appropriation 
internally creates a kind of supreme ownership of the community as a whole.”587 Thus, 
whilst any spatial order necessarily included some degree of internal distribution of 
space, Schmitt argued that this division was “only a consequence of land-appropriation; 
… the effluence and effect of the radical title” established by the land appropriation.588 
                                                
580 Ibid, 48. 
581 Ibid,  48. 
582 Ibid, 74. Schmitt takes this statement from the German linguist Jost Trier. Schmitt approvingly quotes 
Trier’s claim that “the enclosure gave birth to the shrine by removing it from the ordinary, placing it under 
its own laws, and entrusting it to the divine” Ibid, 74. This seems to have had an influence on Schmitt’s 
conception of land-appropriation as the naming of a sacred space I will address below. Schmitt builds on 
Trier’s work in his claim that, “law and peace originally rested on enclosure in the spatial sense” (Ibid, 74). 
583 Ibid, 79. 
584 Ibid, 81. 
585 Ibid, 45. 
586 Ibid, 45. 
587 Ibid, 45. 
588 Ibid, 81. 
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Externally, the land-appropriating group is confronted with other similar land-
appropriating powers. In this case, Schmitt argued, land-appropriation represented a legal 
title in international law in one of two ways. Either land “is extracted from a space that 
until then had been considered to be free” or land “is extracted from a formerly 
recognized owner and master.”589 However, although every nomos depended on land-
appropriation, “not every land-appropriation, not every alteration of borders, not every 
founding of a new colony creates revolutionary change in terms of international law, i.e. 
is a process that constitutes a new nomos.”590 Whether a land-appropriation constituted a 
new nomos depended on “whether there is free land to be had, and whether there are 
accepted forms for the acquisition of non-free land.”591 When there was neither ‘free’ 
land nor accepted ways for land to be legally acquired, then land-appropriation would 
neither found a new nomos nor take place within the existing nomos. Such acts would 
thus not produce spatial order but rather spatial disorder.  
 
Finally, Schmitt argued that there was a fundamental relationship between land-
appropriation and the act of naming. He claimed his concern was with “the legal-
historical meaning of the relation between Nahme and name, power and name-giving.”592 
Although Schmitt leaves the question of whether there is an etymological connection 
between the words Nahme and name open it is clear that he employs the word landnahme 
for land-appropriation precisely to imply this connection.593 He argued that, “a land-
                                                
589 Ibid, 45-46. Schmitt does, however, immediately qualify this by introducing a further distinction 
between forms of land appropriation. “There are” Schmitt repeats “two different types of land-
appropriations: those that proceed within a given order of international law, which readily receive the 
recognition of other peoples, and others, which uproot an existing spatial order and establish a new nomos 
of the whole spatial sphere of neighbouring peoples” (Ibid, 82). Technically, in Schmitt’s terms, both forms 
of land-appropriation that extract land previously considered ‘free’ and those that extract land from a 
previous owner, could take place within an existing system of international law and receive legal 
recognition and on the other hand found a new nomos of the earth. Thus, there is a degree of slippage 
between these two sets of land-appropriations that seems to indicate Schmitt had not fully worked the 
relationship between these various concepts of land-appropriation and how they related to the historical 
case of European colonialism.    
590 Ibid, 82. 
591 Ibid, 81. 
592 Ibid, 348. 
593 Indeed, in one of the most peculiar and troubling passages of the corollary ‘Nomos – Nahme – Name’, 
published in 1957, Schmitt draws the connection between a woman taking the name of her husband in 
marriage to the naming of land in land-appropriation precisely on the basis of the relationship between 
Nahme and naming.  
 204 
appropriation is constituted only if the appropriator is able to give the land a name.”594 
This was a crucial aspect of land-appropriation because “in a name and in name-giving a 
third orientation of power takes effect; the tendency to visibility, publicity, and 
ceremony.”595 This was particularly important for Schmitt as he claimed a name thus 
“overpowers the satanic attempt to keep power invisible, anonymous, and secret.”596 This 
seems to indicate that land-appropriation not only made order visible performing the 
representative task of political form but further was “able to make Nahme a sacred 
act.”597 Land-appropriation, it seemed, not only produced an ordered space but a sacred 
space that provided orientation in a struggle against invisible satanic forces. I will return 
to discuss the significance of this theological dimension of Schmitt’s conception of 
spatial division in the final chapter.  
 
(v) Appropriation, Distribution, Production 
 
If land-appropriation was the foundational act upon which a nomos was grounded, it was 
not sufficient alone to explain the nature of spatial order. Rather, turning once again to 
the etymology of the word nomos, Schmitt argued that spatial order was defined in fact 
by three “primal processes of human history,” appropriation, distribution and 
production.598 Each of these processes was “part and parcel of the history of legal and 
social orders.”599 He located all three meanings in the Greek root of nomos, the verb 
nemein. “Nomos,” Schmitt noted, “is the nomen actionis of nemein [to appropriate].”600 
Hence, the first meaning of nomos for Schmitt was appropriation. “The second meaning 
of nemein is teilen [to divide and distribute].”601 Nomos therefore indicated a 
                                                
594 Ibid, 348. 
595 Ibid, 349. The reference here to a third tendency of power relates to Schmitt’s reading of the German 
Jesuit theologian P. Erich Przywara who argued that power tended toward secrecy, centrality and visibility.  
596 Ibid, 349.  
597 Ibid, 348. Schmitt noted that, “nomos can be described as a wall, because, like a wall, it, too, is based on 
sacred orientations” (Ibid, 70). For a deeper examination of the act of land-appropriation as a sacred act see 
Mika Ojakangas, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Sacred Origins of Law’ in Telos, 147 (2009), 34-54.  
598 Schmitt, The Nomos, 352. 
599 Ibid, 327. 
600 Ibid, 345. 
601 Ibid, 326. 
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“fundamental process of division and distribution, of divisio primaeva.”602 Finally, 
Schmitt noted that the “third meaning of nemein is weiden [literally, pasturage] … the 
productive work that normally occurs with ownership.”603 Hence, a nomic order was 
constituted through a sequence of processes from the appropriation of land, its division 
and distribution into a certain set of property relations and the productive use of this 
property. Therefore a nomos did not only concern the foundations of legal order but 
addressed “the basic questions of every social and economic order.”604 
 
The problem for Schmitt was that the sequence and evaluation of these processes 
changed in accordance with transformations “in methods of production and manufacture, 
even changes in the image people have of themselves, of their world, and of their 
historical situation”605 These changes had profound effects on how the fundamental 
questions of social and economic, as well as legal, order were understood. For Schmitt, of 
course, appropriation came first as it was the most fundamental element of any order. 
This was a fact he considered to have been forgotten in modern political and legal 
thought, which operated on the basis that “no longer is anything taken, but only divided 
and developed.”606 Schmitt claimed that “doctrinaire thinkers” had ingeniously “shifted 
attention away from appropriation and distribution to production.”607  He argued that 
there was “something utopian about constructing social and economic systems in terms of 
mere production.”608 This was a utopian belief that Schmitt considered characteristic of 
both liberal and socialist thought. Yet “precisely because socialism raised the question of 
the social order as one of division and distribution, it once again raised the old problem, 
of the sequence and evaluation of the three original processes of social and economic 
life.”609  
                                                
602 Ibid, 326. 
603 Ibid, 327. 
604 Ibid, 324. 
605 Ibid, 328. 
606 Ibid, 346. Indeed, Schmitt noted that an unnamed American political scientist had written to him 
claiming that, “land-appropriation is over and done with” (Ibid, 347). 
607 Ibid, 335. 
608 Ibid, 335. 
609 Ibid, 333. One exception here is Marx, whom Schmitt considers a thinker particularly attuned to the 
nature of modern appropriation. In Schmitt’s reading Marx’s thought did not focus on distribution, as did 
that of many socialists, but rather on a powerful new form of appropriation, what Schmitt called “industry-
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It was crucial, in Schmitt’s view, to return to address the sequence of appropriation, 
distribution and production, as the primacy of appropriation could again be brought to 
light. That the industrial powers of East and West both argued for the primacy of 
production not only led to a dangerous utopian belief that mankind could give and divide 
without taking, but concealed continuing appropriations under layers of ideology.610 This 
was especially important as far as the question of world unity was concerned. “Has 
humanity today” Schmitt asked in 1953, “actually ‘appropriated’ the earth as a unity, so 
that there is nothing more to be appropriated? Has appropriation really ceased? Is there 
now only division and distribution? Or does only production remain?”611 If this was so, 
then further questions followed: “who is the great appropriator, the great divider and 
distributor of our planet, the manager and planner of unified world production?”612 Thus, 
the supposed eclipse of appropriation in production bore directly on the question of who 
the decisive subject of global order was. Indeed, the question of appropriation had 
become “even more serious with the appropriation of [outer] space.”613 “We have no 
right,” Schmitt warned, “to close our eyes to the problem of appropriation, and to refuse 
to think about any more about it.”614 
 
(vi) Nomen Actionis: Groundless Ground 
  
One crucial aspect of the concept of nomos in Schmitt’s thought is its strange dual nature. 
The word indicates at once a verb and a noun. Or rather it is a peculiar type of noun, “a 
nomen actionis, i.e., it indicates an action as a process whose content is defined by the 
verb.”615 Schmitt thus figures nomos as both an act of ordering and an institutional order. 
                                                                                                                                            
appropriation [Industrie-Nahme]” (Ibid, 334). Schmitt rather disingenuously uses Lenin’s arguments 
against imperialism to claim that Marx’s desire to appropriate property from the appropriators was the 
strongest, most modern form of imperialism. 
610 “Only a god,” Schmitt noted, “can give, divide, and distribute without taking” (Ibid, 345). Hence, in 
claiming to have reached the stage where production could take place without appropriation mankind was 
claiming the status of gods in Schmitt’s mind.  
611 Ibid, 335. 
612 Ibid, 335. 
613 Ibid, 347. 
614 Ibid, 347. 
615 Ibid, 326. 
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He uses nomos to refer to both the foundational acts of land-appropriation on which order 
rests and the ‘concrete order’ that emerges from these acts. Hence, by rendering nomos a 
nomen actionis Schmitt inscribes indeterminacy into the very foundations of his concept 
of spatial order. This duality within the concept of nomos reflects the deep tension 
between order and indeterminacy that structures Schmitt’s work as whole.616 Thus, 
although the concept of nomos represents Schmitt’s core attempt to theorize the 
‘concrete’ social, geographic and historical rootedness of order, he nonetheless 
emphasizes the fact that it ultimately rests upon contingent acts of political power in land-
appropriation. In the figure of land-appropriation Schmitt casts the structural tension he 
located at the heart of political existence between order and indeterminacy in directly 
spatial terms.617 On the one hand, Schmitt argues that land-appropriation literally grounds 
order in the earth. On the other hand however, these acts reveal the ultimate 
groundlessness of order, its foundation in contingent processes of grounding.618  
 
The significance of this tension for Schmitt was that insofar as every spatial order relied 
upon acts of land-appropriation, it was historically contingent. Precisely for this reason, 
the concept of nomos and the category of land-appropriation had enduring relevance. 
Thus, whilst Schmitt argued that the “constitutive processes” of land-appropriation “are 
certainly not everyday occurrences … neither are they simply matters of bygone times 
and only of archaeological or antiquarian interest.”619 Thus, not only could the historical 
development of spatial order be traced through successive patterns of appropriation, but 
the end of reigning nomos of the earth could also be foreseen. “As long as world history 
                                                
616 For further comment on this structural tension between order and indeterminacy in Schmitt’s thought 
see Chapter 4. For an account that specifically relates this structural tension to the concept of nomos in 
Schmitt’s work see Rowan, “A New Nomos or Post-Nomos?” (2010). 
617 Hence, the structure of the ‘founding rupture’ that Ojakangas locates at the heart of Schmitt’s thought 
can be considered to be eminently spatial. Land-appropriation both marks a rupture that divides space and a 
new foundation for order. See: Ojakangas, “Carl Schmitt and the Sacred Origins of Law” (2009); and 
Rowan, “A New Nomos or Post-Nomos?” (2010) 
618 The metaphorics of grounds and groundlessness lie at the core of Canadian philosopher Michael 
Marder’s recent book on Schmitt. See: Michael Marder, Groundless Existence: The Political Ontology of 
Carl Schmitt (London: Continuum 2010). This text offers perhaps the most rigorous analysis of the 
ontological elements of Schmitt’s thought to date. One flaw that can be identified in Marder’s analysis is 
that the importance of spatiality in Schmitt’s thought is downplayed. Regardless, his work deserves further 
engagement and represents a significant contribution to the debates around the relationship between 
spatiality and ontology in the German jurist’s corpus. 
619 Schmitt, The Nomos, 78. 
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remains open and fluid,” Schmitt argued, “as long as conditions are not fixed and 
ossified: in other words, as long as human beings and peoples have not only a past but 
also a future, a new nomos, will arise in the perpetually new manifestations of world-
historical events.”620 He wrote The Nomos of the Earth in the context of what he 
considered to be a period of world-historical transition, when the world existed “on the 
threshold of a new stage of human spatial consciousness and global order.”621 Although 
the shape of the new nomos of the earth was not yet fully apparent, its contours would 
take shape from the collapse of the old. It was in fact the attempt to grasp the collapse of 
the old order of international law that drew Schmitt to the question of the nomos of the 
earth in the first instance. Thus, in order to understand his late spatial thought, it is crucial 
to first grasp his account of the rise and fall of the Eurocentric global order that lies at the 
heart of The Nomos of the Earth.  
 
(4) Nomos as Institution: Jus Publicum Europaeum 
 
(i) The Eurocentric Earth: The First Global Nomos  
 
“There had always been some kind of nomos of the earth,” Schmitt argued.622 “In all the 
ages of mankind, the earth has been appropriated, divided and cultivated.”623 However, 
every pre-global nomos had been “purely terrestrial” and “every powerful people 
considered themselves to be the centre of the earth,” to rule over a domicile of peace and 
freedom beyond which chaos reigned.624 Each bounded world sought to protect itself 
from the disorder beyond by building “a fence, a line, a Chinese wall” and marking its 
limits with mythical concepts like the Pillars of Hercules.625 “Humanity had” Schmitt 
noted, “a mythical image of the earth but no scientific understanding of it as a whole.”626 
Because there was no “concept of a planet ... a jus gentium [international law] capable of 
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623 Ibid. 
624 Ibid. 
625 Ibid, 352. 
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encompassing the whole earth and all humanity was impossible.”627 Thus, while distinct 
nomoi had always existed, there was “no spatial ordering of the earth as a whole, no 
nomos of the earth in the true sense,” before the world emerged as a globe.628 
 
This first nomos of the earth was eclipsed in the fifteenth and sixteenth century with the 
European discovery of the New World and the opening of the world’s oceans. Schmitt 
argued that “no sooner had the contours of the earth emerged as a real globe – not just 
sensed as myth, but apprehensible as fact and measurable as space – than there arose a 
wholly new and hitherto unimaginable problem: the spatial ordering of the earth in terms 
of international law.”629 “The new global image … required a new spatial order,” he 
argued, precisely because “the struggle over the land- and sea-appropriations of the New 
World began immediately after its discovery.”630 In other words, a new form of order was 
needed that was adequate to address the new conflicts that emerged alongside the new 
spaces. Thus, from the “new planetary consciousness of space” emerged a new nomos of 
the earth, the first spatial order that encompassed the earth as a whole.631  However, 
although the new nomos of the earth that emerged from the European appropriations of 
land and sea was global in scope, “Europe was still the centre of the earth.” Thus, the 
second nomos of the earth was both global and Eurocentric. Further, in contrast to the 
first nomos of the earth, the new global order of the earth encompassed not only 
terrestrial spaces but, for the first time, the world’s oceans. A distinction was made 
between ‘firm land’ divided into states, colonies, protectorates and spheres of influence, 
and ‘free sea,’ although this was the first time that the free spaces of the sea had become 
part of a comprehensive spatial order of the earth. Thus the “main characteristics of this 
second nomos of the earth lay first in its Eurocentric structure and second in that … it 
encompassed the oceans.”632 From this global spatial order emerged the historically 
unique form of international law that Schmitt argued ordered the world from the sixteenth 
to the twentieth century, the jus publicum Europaeum.  
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631 Ibid. 
632 Ibid, 352. 
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At the centre of The Nomos of the Earth lies an account of the historic rise and fall of the 
global spatial order that Schmitt claimed had borne the jus publicum Europaeum. His 
periodization of the jus publicum Europaeum is slippery, in part perhaps because he 
attempts to describe gradual processes of emergence and dissolution, but it is most often 
identified with the period between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries.633 The 
tremendous achievement of the jus publicum Europeaum was the limitation of war 
through the division of space.  Schmitt argued that, “from the sixteenth century to the end 
of the nineteenth century, there was real progress, namely a limiting and a bracketing of 
European wars.”634 Hence European international law achieved a humanization and a 
rationalization of warfare, at least in Continental Europe that was “nothing short of a 
miracle.”635 This “arose solely,” in Schmitt’s view, “from the emergence of a new spatial 
order.”636 More specifically it rested upon two forms of spatial division: one the 
distinction between Europe and the ‘free’ space of the New World, and the other the 
distinction between ‘firm land’ and ‘free sea.’ Schmitt’s analysis of the collapse of global 
spatial order in the twentieth century and the possibilities he considered for a new nomos 
of the earth need to be understood against the background of this bracketing of war in a 
double division of space.   
 
(ii) Beyond the Line 
 
Schmitt argued that “the struggle among European powers for land-appropriations made 
necessary certain divisions and distributions” on which order could be established.637 In 
response to this demand, a new form of thinking about international law emerged that 
Schmitt called “global linear thinking.”638 This was at the most basic level a form of 
                                                
633 At various points Schmitt offers different periodizations, that the jus publicum Europaeum lasted “for 
400 years,” (Ibid, 49) then “300 years,” (Ibid, 140) and finally, “for more than two centuries” (Ibid, 181). In 
the 1955 corollary The New Nomos of the Earth he offered at least a precise end date claiming that, “the 
Eurocentric nomos of the earth lasted until World War I,” (Ibid, 352) but tendered no such precise start 
date.  
634 Ibid, 140. 
635 Ibid, 151. 
636 Ibid, 140. 
637 Ibid, 87. 
638 Ibid, 87.  
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dividing up the lands and seas newly opened by European appropriations with the use of 
lines that could provide ordering orientations. Schmitt notes that despite the superficial 
character of ‘global linear thinking’ it managed to nonetheless express the fact that the 
new spatial order concerned both the planet as a globe, and its ordering through spatial 
division.639 The question of drawing global lines “was political from the start” and “could 
not be dismissed as ‘purely geographical.’”640 Although Schmitt argued that, as 
“scientific, mathematical, or technical disciplines, geography and cartography certainly 
are neutral,” they could, “as every geographer knows,” be instrumentalized in highly 
political ways.641 Hence the nature and location of global lines of order was a politically 
charged question over which there had been historical struggle. Three phases of ‘global 
linear thinking’ had taken shape since the European appropriations of land and sea in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: first was the Spanish-Portuguese rayas; followed by the 
English-French ‘amity-lines’; and finally, America’s unilateral declaration of the Western 
Hemisphere as its zone of influence.  
 
The important transition in understanding Schmitt’s conception of the jus publicum 
Europaeum took place between the Spanish-Portuguese rayas and the English-French 
‘amity-lines’.642 The rayas were the first global lines drawn after the European 
discoveries of the New World and carved the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans into areas of 
Spanish and Portuguese control. Schmitt understood these lines, passed into law in the 
Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) and the Treaty of Saragossa (1526), to remain largely within 
the worldview of the Medieval Christian Empire, as the Roman Pope still acted as a 
common authority with the ultimate right to recognize the division of the New World. By 
contrast, the ‘amity-lines’ that appeared in secret verbal clauses of the Treaty of Cateau-
Cambrésis in 1559 emerged from the lack of a common authority that could arbitrate 
                                                
639 Interestingly Schmitt here notes here that ‘global linear thinking’ was “conceptually clearer and 
historically more accurate” than other such designations “such as Friedrich Ratzel’s word ‘hologaic’ 
[literally, whole earth]” which failed to capture the division of the globe (Ibid, 88). This is one of only two 
mentions Ratzel receives in The Nomos of the Earth, the other concerning the development of the seas as a 
human ‘space’ (Ibid, 283). 
640 Ibid, 88. 
641 Ibid, 88. 
642 Schmitt attached great significance to the emergence of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth 
century but I will address this below as it concerns the collapse rather than the constitution of the jus 
publicum Europeaum.  
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between parties of a shared faith. They were “modern … to the extent that they had 
replaced the old theories and formulas inherited” from the Medieval Christian world, the 
product of the competition between Catholic and Protestant powers in Europe.643 These 
lines marked the point at which “Europe ended and the ‘New World’ began,” the point at 
which ‘European public law’ ended.644 Within the line, Europe was a place of legally 
bracketed war but “beyond the line,” Schmitt argued, “was an ‘overseas zone in which, 
for want of any legal limits to war, the law of the stronger applied.”645  Through the 
development of amity lines the European powers constructed a space of freedom ‘beyond 
the line’, a “conflict zone”646 where “force could be used freely and ruthlessly.”647 
“Everything” Schmitt noted, “that occurred ‘beyond the line’ remained outside the legal, 
moral, and political values recognized on this [the European] side of the line.”648  
 
The amity lines established in the late sixteenth century thus marked a fundamental 
distinction between European and non-European spaces with different legal statuses and 
governed by different rules of war. There were two types of ‘open’ space, two spaces of 
freedom ‘beyond the line’ in which European powers could act without restraint: the 
‘free’ land of the New World and the ‘free sea.’ Both played a role in the construction of 
the jus publicum Europaeum but the essential point for Schmitt was the fundamental 
distinction the amity lines established between a European space of order defined by 
legally bracketed war and a disorderly non-European space ‘beyond the line’ where force 
could be tested freely. He argued that the bracketing of war within Europe was dependent 
on the emergence of the distinction between European and non-European space marked 
by the amity lines. As he noted, “the designation of a conflict zone outside Europe 
                                                
643 Ibid, 95. “Geographically,” the amity lines “ran along the equator of the Tropic of Cancer in the south, 
along a degree of longitude drawn in the Atlantic Ocean through the Canary Islands or the Azores in the 
west, or a combination of both” (Ibid, 93). 
644 Ibid, 93. 
645 Ibid, 93-94. 
646 Ibid, 95. 
647 Ibid, 94. Interestingly, Schmitt notes that the state of exception in English law “was analogous to the 
idea of a designated zone of free and empty space,” ‘beyond the line’ (Ibid, 98). This is a rather minor point 
mentioned only in passing in The Nomos of the Earth but something that Giorgio Agamben seized upon in 
his reading of the spatiality of the exception in Homo Sacer. See for example: Agamben, Homo Sacer, 36-
38. 
648 Schmitt, The Nomos, 94. 
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contributed … to the bracketing of European wars.”649 The identification of non-
European space ‘beyond the line’ as a free space of competition was thus in Schmitt’s 
view “a tremendous exoneration of the internal European problematic.”650 
 
In Schmitt’s account, therefore, the bracketing of European war rested precisely on the 
distinction between the interstate order of Continental Europe and ‘free’ spaces of 
competition ‘beyond the line.’ On the one hand the ‘open spaces’ of the New World and 
the ‘free sea’ played the role of the constitutive outside of European legal order, 
confirming its status as a realm of higher order separated from the space of disorder 
beyond. On the other hand, conflict between European powers could be displaced from 
European soil into the conflict zone ‘beyond the line.’651 Hence the bracketing of war in 
Europe, which Schmitt considered to be the miraculous achievement of the jus publicum 
Europaeum, was dependent on the clear distinction between a European space where the 
relation between states was governed by international law and non-European spaces 
where powers were able to exercise force freely without legal constraint. Continental 
Europe could thus be constituted as a realm of relative depoliticization insofar as it was 
clearly distinguished from a realm ‘beyond the line’ where the political was 
unconstrained and homo homini lupus.652 
 
 
 
                                                
649 Ibid, 97-98. Again Schmitt noted elsewhere in the book that, “the appearance of the vast free spaces and 
the land-appropriation of a new world made possible a new European international law amongst states” ( 
Ibid, 140). 
650 Ibid, 94. In the foreword to The Nomos of the Earth Schmitt talked about powers able to “relieve their 
struggles” in ‘free’ spaces of competition. It is possible therefore that Schmitt understood the conflict zones 
‘beyond the line’ to act as areas where Europe could ‘relieve’ its inner tensions and shed the excess 
energies of the political.  
651 The zone of conflict ‘beyond the line’ hence allowed conflict to be limited and legally managed within 
European space as it had been under the Medieval Christian Empire, according to Schmitt’s earlier analysis 
in Roman Catholicism and Political Form. Just as the higher authority of the Catholic Church had allowed 
antitheses to exist within Europe without all out war between powers, so too the spaces of the New World 
acted as a way for antitheses within Europe to be managed. The appropriation of the New World thus 
produced something like a colonial complexico that produced a form of mediating order without the need of 
a higher authority whose legitimacy was based on theological claims.  
652 Schmitt argued that although Hobbes’s state of nature was “a no man’s land” that did not mean it 
existed “nowhere.” Rather, Schmitt argued, “Hobbes locates it, among other places, in the New World” 
(Ibid, 96). 
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(iii) Firm Land & Free Sea 
 
In Schmitt’s account, a balance of powers was able to emerge within Europe because the 
‘free’ space of the New World allowed competition and conflict between European 
powers to be outsourced to colonial lands ‘beyond the line.’ However, this balance of 
power between states within Europe relied on a second foundational spatial distinction – 
that between land and sea. Hence the jus publicum Europaeum was based on a “dual 
balance,” between the territorial states within Europe, and between land and sea.653 “The 
separation of firm land and free sea was,” Schmitt noted, “the basic principle of the jus 
publicum Europeaum.”654 Hence, for Schmitt, land and sea were “divided into two 
separate and distinct global orders within the Eurocentric world order that arose in the 
16th century.”655 “From the perspective of the jus publicum Europeaum,” Schmitt argued 
that, “all land on the earth belonged either to European states or to those of equal 
standing, or it was land free to be occupied, i.e., potential state territory, or potential 
colonies.”656 By contrast, “the sea remained outside any specific state spatial order: it was 
neither state or colonial territory nor occupied space.”657 The sea “was free of any type of 
state spatial sovereignty.”658 Each realm had “its own concepts of enemy, war, booty, and 
freedom” and hence, “land and sea confronted each other as two separate worlds.”659 
However, Schmitt argued that it was precisely “the antithesis of land and sea” that 
provided “the universal foundation of global international law.”660 “The total decision for 
international law in the 16th and 17th centuries culminated in a balance of land and sea – 
in the opposition of two orders that determined the nomos of the earth precisely in their 
mutual tension.”661 
 
Schmitt argued that the key to balancing the tensions between land and sea was England, 
which from the seventeenth century emerged as the great European maritime power. 
                                                
653 Ibid, 352. 
654 Ibid, 183. 
655 Ibid, 172. 
656 Ibid. 
657 Ibid. 
658 Ibid. 
659 Ibid. 
660 Ibid. 
661 Ibid, 173. 
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“The island of England,” Schmitt wrote, was “the connecting link between the different 
orders of land and sea.”662 Through its dominance of the seas England was able to 
institute a “sovereign of the balance of land and sea.”663 England was able to assume this 
“world-historical intermediary position” because it alone had taken the “step from a 
medieval feudal and terrestrial existence to a purely maritime existence.”664 By 
completing the “transition to the maritime side of the world” England was able to prevent 
a “maritime equilibrium of the sea powers” developing and gained sole dominance of the 
maritime side of the nomos of the earth.665 England became “the representative of the 
universal maritime sphere of a Eurocentric global order, the guardian of the other side of 
the jus publicum Europeaum.”666 From its position of maritime dominance, England at 
once “balanced the whole terrestrial world” and “determined the nomos of the earth from 
the sea.”667 England hence occupied a unique position of power in Schmitt’s view. Not 
only was it the dominant global sea power but also the principal force upholding the 
balance between land and sea on which the internal equilibrium of Continental European 
land powers rested. England had “the decisive spatial perspective” without which “there 
would have been no European international law.”668 Schmitt thus regarded the fate of the 
jus publicum Europaeum, and specifically the bracketing of war in Europe, to rest to a 
large extent with the English power to dominate the seas and balance the relations 
between land and sea.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
662 Ibid, 173. Schmitt pays little heed to the historical development of the internal politics of the British 
Isles and consistently refers to Great Britain simply as England. Further, he identifies in numerous places 
England as an island rather than simply the dominant country or crown within the complex and shifting 
relations between the countries of the British Isles. However, as early as 1938 in The Leviathan in the State 
Theory of Thomas Hobbes Schmitt had noted the significance of the fact that England did not adopt the 
form of centralized state that emerged in Continental Europe in the seventeenth century. The form of state 
that developed in England was, in Schmitt’s mind, defined rather by a more open legal system defined by 
the relations to the ‘free sea’ and ‘free trade.’  
663 Ibid, 173. 
664 Ibid, 173. 
665 Ibid, 173. 
666 Ibid, 173. 
667 Ibid, 173. 
668 Ibid, 145. 
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 (iv) Bracketing of War  
 
For Schmitt, the key achievement of the jus publicum Europeaum had been to create the 
conditions for “the rationalization and humanization of war, i.e., the possibility of 
bracketing war in international law.”669 Schmitt regarded it to be an “astounding fact” 
that European international law had achieved a bracketing of war for several centuries.670 
Schmitt noted that “this was achieved by limiting war to a military relation between 
states,” at least in the space of Continental Europe.671 Hence, Schmitt regarded the 
modern secular territorial state that emerged in Europe during the seventeenth century to 
be the agent of this bracketing of war. The state, Schmitt noted, “constituted the only 
ordering institution of this time” and hence was the core of the nomos of the jus publicum 
Europaeum.672 However, he noted that such an inter-state legal order in Europe was only 
possible “against the background of the immense open spaces of a particular type of 
freedom.”673  The balance of power between states within Europe that allowed war to be 
rationalized and humanized in law fundamentally rested upon the global spatial: on the 
one hand the distinction between land and sea and on the other that between Europe and 
the New World. 
 
This spatial division of the earth allowed the European states to collectively uphold a 
“special territorial status in international law.”674 Hence, Europe could be considered a 
realm of peace and order distinct from the disorderly ‘free’ spaces ‘beyond the line.’ 
Internally Europe was divided into a number of territorially bounded sovereign states that 
recognized each other as equals “living on common European soil and belonging to the 
                                                
669 Ibid, 141. 
670 Ibid, 148. Again Schmitt’s periodization of the successful bracketing of war is slippery. He at times 
notes that war was bracketed for ‘200 years’ and sometimes for ‘400 years’. However, I will focus here on 
the conceptual framework rather than test the historical details of Schmitt’s account of the jus publicum 
Europaeum.  
671 Ibid, 100. 
672 Ibid, 148. Schmitt noted here that the word ‘state’ referred to the concrete historical institution that 
characterized the period “from about 1492 to 1890” (Ibid, 148). Hence, he locates the eclipse of the state 
earlier than he did in his pre-war work. It is perhaps best to understand this periodization as marking the 
beginning of the state’s decline as the ordering institution of the global spatial order.  
673 Ibid, 148. 
674 Ibid, 148. 
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same European ‘family.’675 This mutual recognition allowed war between European 
states to become “somewhat analogous to a duel, i.e., a conflict of arms between 
territorially distinct personae morales [moral persons], who contended with each other on 
the basis of the jus publicum Europaeum, because European soil had been divided under 
their aegis.”676 The warring parties “both recognized each other as states” with the “same 
political character and the same rights.”677 “The equality of sovereigns made them 
equally legal partners in war” and hence they became collectively invested in its legal 
limitation. As a result war became solely an affair of states, a “purely state war,” that was 
conducted within formal constraints.”678 This “war in form” created the conditions, 
Schmitt claimed, for the “strongest possible rationalization and humanization of war”679 
ensured that Europe constituted as “a realm of relative reason.”680  
 
Schmitt argued that the bracketing of war in the jus publicum Europaeum turned on the 
fact that European states recognized each other as justis hostes, just enemies “both legally 
and morally on the same level.”681 By recognizing each other as equals European states 
produced “a concept of enemy able to assume legal form.”682 This had been made 
possible, in Schmitt’s view, because “the problem of just war had been divorced from the 
problem of justa causa, and had become determined by formal juridical categories.”683 
The justice of war was no longer “based on the conformity with the content of 
theological, moral, or juridical norms,” Schmitt noted “but rather on the institutional and 
                                                
675 Ibid, 41. Interestingly Schmitt notes that in contrast to the amity lines that marked the cleave between 
European and non-European space “the border between two territorial states of modern European 
international law did not constitute an exclusion, but rather a mutual recognition, above all of the fact that 
neighbouring soil beyond the border was sovereign territory” (Ibid, 52). 
676 Ibid, 141-142. Schmitt lays great emphasis on the importance of the ‘personification’ of European states 
noting that the balance of powers worked fundamentally on the basis of an “international personal analogy” 
(Ibid, 146). Indeed, Schmitt notes that “after 1648, with the Peace of Westphalia, the practice of political 
relations also was conceived of, in some measure, in terms of such constructions” (Ibid, 145). Hence, 
Schmitt’s account of the jus publicum Europaeum shares some degree of similarity with the standard 
account of ‘Westphalia’ in International Relations theory.  
677 Ibid, 142. 
678 Ibid, 141. 
679 Ibid, 141. 
680 Ibid, 142. 
681 Ibid, 147 
682 Ibid, 142. 
683 Ibid, 141. 
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structural equality of political forms.”684 In other words, Schmitt argued that by removing 
the question of just cause a new concept of just enemy could be recognized as the 
regulative basis of wars between European states.  
 
Schmitt argued that a series of important distinctions followed from this concept of justus 
hostis on the basis of which war could be legally formalized and hence bracketed. Firstly, 
Justus hostis made it possible “”to distinguish an enemy from a criminal.”685 European 
states could recognize each other as justi hostes and not as criminals who needed to be 
punished. Between such equals who regarded each other as just enemies a “non-
discriminatory concept of war” was possible.686 As Schmitt noted, “even if one accepts 
that ‘man is a wolf among men’ in the bellum omnium contra omnes [war of everyone 
against everyone] this has no discriminatory meaning, because also in the state of nature 
none of the combatants has the right to suspend equality or claim that only he is human 
and that is opponent is nothing but a wolf.”687 Secondly, and as a result, war could be 
sharply distinguished from peace. War with a legal and moral equal did not have to end 
with the enemy being vanquished or annihilated but “could be terminated with a peace 
treaty.”688 Thirdly, the concept of Justus hostis allowed combatants and non-combatants 
to be distinguished in two ways. On the one hand, wars were conducted “only between 
the armies of European states” rather than between civilian populations, so combatants 
and civilians could be differentiated.689 On the other hand, Schmitt argued it “created the 
possibility of neutrality” as states involved in the conflict, and third parties who were not, 
could likewise be distinguished.690 Hence, in Schmitt’s view, the concept of the Justus 
hostis allowed European ‘war in form’ to distinguish between enemies and criminals, war 
and peace, combatants and civilians, and warring and neutral parties. From these 
distinctions arose that “marvellous product of human reason,” the bracketed warfare of 
the jus publicum Europaeum.691 
                                                
684 Ibid, 143. 
685 Ibid, 142. 
686 Ibid, 147. As Schmitt noted, the enemy was no longer someone “who must be annihilated” (Ibid, 142). 
687 Ibid, 147. 
688 Ibid, 148. 
689 Ibid, 353. 
690 Ibid, 142. 
691 Ibid, 151. 
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(5) Collapsing Nomos: Spatial Chaos 
 
Despite its endurance across several centuries, the jus publicum Europaeum remained 
nonetheless a fragile order. In the first instance, it rested on a precarious balance between 
two spatial divisions: between Europe and the lands ‘beyond the line,’ and between land 
and sea on the other. These spatial distinctions were increasingly challenged by a 
combination of technological development and the self-assertion of new powers beyond 
Europe. Secondly, the principal achievement of the jus publicum Europeaum, the 
bracketing of war, only extended as far as the boundaries of Continental Europe and 
relied upon a concept of war increasingly undercut by the neutralizing tendencies of 
modern European thought. As the nineteenth century led into the twentieth these 
tendencies had begun to eat away at the basis of European international law and unravel 
the nomos of the earth. One crucial aspect of The Nomos of the Earth was Schmitt’s 
attempt to grasp these processes of world-historical dissolution. If his pre-war work had 
examined the crisis of the modern European state, his 1950 masterwork sought to 
contextualize this crisis in a wider collapse of the Eurocentric spatial order.  
 
The Nomos of the Earth offers a critical analysis of the factors contributing to the 
collapse of the jus publicum Europeaum at the start of the twentieth century. Schmitt 
provides a sweeping account of the convulsions of global politics and a rigorous 
dissection of the subtle shifts they effected in conceptions of international law from the 
late nineteenth to the mid twentieth centuries. Although his analysis of “world-political 
development” during this period is too rich to examine in its entirety here, the dominant 
factors ranged against the integrity of the jus publicum Europaeum can be identified.692  
His account of the collapsing nomos highlighted three core shifts that I will examine 
below: the collapse of the Eurocentric spatial order through the ‘relativization of Europe’ 
and the rise of U.S. power; the emergence of a discriminatory concept of war; and finally, 
the development of modern technologies of war that intensified the first two tendencies. 
 
                                                
692 Ibid, 225-226. 
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(i) The Eclipse of Europe 
 
Schmitt argued that by the early years of the twentieth century Europe had been eclipsed 
as the centre of global power relations. This had universal repercussions in Schmitt’s 
mind precisely because the jus publicum Europaeum had been a Eurocentric global order 
centred upon the special status of Europe in international law. For Schmitt, this 
“relativization of Europe” spelled the end of the nomos of the earth as it dissolved the 
foundational distinction between European and non-European space on which global 
spatial order rested.693 Although he argued that this process was gradual and came about 
through a complex matrix of factors Schmitt identified two principle causes, one 
emanating from within Europe and the other from beyond Europe: the failure of 
European jurisprudence to understand the concrete spatial basis of international law and 
the rise of the United States as a global power.  
 
Firstly, Schmitt argued that from the late nineteenth century European legal thought 
increasingly lost sense of Europe’s special spatial status within international law and 
overlooked the concrete spatial foundations of global order. This was a symptom of the 
growing influence of positivism in jurisprudence that Schmitt had critiqued within the 
sphere of domestic state law in the 1920s and 1930s. Building on his pre-war critique of 
positivist normativism, Schmitt argued that “European international law lost any sense of 
the spatial structure of a concrete order” and had become solely concerned with abstract 
systems of norms.694 This form of legal thought focused on norms was inherently 
‘spaceless’ and undermined the conception of Europe as a space defined by a distinct 
legal system. Thus European juridical thought at the beginning of the twentieth century 
was characterized by “spacelessness of a general universalism” and completely unable to 
grasp the concrete spatial foundations of international law.695 Insofar as legal positivism 
was unable to grasp the nomos of the earth, juridical thought fell into a deep 
disorientation. Schmitt argued that European jurisprudence was not only producing 
judgments that fell into deep contradiction with its own foundations but was 
                                                
693 Ibid, 217. 
694 Ibid, 220. 
695 Ibid, 230. 
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systematically excluding all foundational questions of political, economic and spatial 
basis of order from legal thought as “unjuridical.”696 
 
Schmitt argued that the influence of positivism in legal thinking directly undermined the 
spatial distinction between Europe and the ‘free’ space ‘beyond the line’ as a growing 
number of cases arose in which European and colonial lands were given “territorial 
parity” in law by European jurists.697 This fundamentally undermined the Eurocentric 
nature of the global spatial order by removing the legal distinction between European and 
non-European space on which the jus publicum Europaeum was based. Such cases were 
marked by a failure to understand the “different soils statuses” that underpinned the 
spatial order of the earth.698 European international law was dissolving its own 
foundations by appealing to universal and abstract norms that made no reference to their 
spatially concrete situatedness. Schmitt noted that this was evident between 1890 and 
1918 in the shift from a specifically European international law to a form of ‘international 
law’ understood to apply everywhere in the same way. The ‘spaceless universalism’ of 
this international law ate away at the spatial distinction upon which the specifically 
European international law of the jus publicum Europaeum had rested.  
 
However, if Schmitt located the decline of the Eurocentric nomos partly in the 
universalization and abstraction of European jurisprudence, a much more profound 
challenge emerged from outside Europe in the form of new global powers that challenged 
the Eurocentric division of the world. Although Schmitt focuses some attention on the 
rise of Japanese power in Asia the main focus of his analysis and critique is the rise of the 
United States to global eminence. Schmitt argued that by declaring the ‘Western 
Hemisphere’ its sphere of interest, the United States presented a challenge to spatial order 
of the jus publicum Europaeum, the first “counterattack of the New World against the 
Old.”699 The United State’s unilateral declaration of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 
established a third form of global line (following the European rayas and amity lines) 
                                                
696 Ibid, 239. 
697 Ibid, 218. 
698 Ibid, 221. 
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separating the space of the New World from European intervention.700 The Monroe 
Doctrine therefore produced a new continental sphere of international law that dissolved 
the distinction between ‘Old Europe’ and the New World that had provided the 
foundations for the jus publicum Europaeum. Further, Schmitt noted that although the 
Monroe Doctrine was declared unilaterally, it became key to the conduct of United States 
foreign policy as it was signed into bilateral treaties with other states in the Western 
Hemisphere, giving the U.S. extensive rights to intervention. Schmitt argued that these 
intervention treaties gave the United States ultimate sovereignty over the internal affairs 
of those states in its sphere of influence. In this continental sphere of influence the United 
States occupied a strange position of ‘absent presence’ within other states, or as Schmitt 
wrote, “a mixture of absence in principle and presence in practice.”701 Whilst such 
intervention treaties respected the territorial integrity of other states, in Schmitt’s view, 
they ‘hollowed out’ the substance of their sovereignty by ceding it to the U.S. Hence the 
Monroe Doctrine was both the recognition and the legitimation of the increased “spatial 
sovereignty” of the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere.702 
 
Schmitt noted that the application of the Monroe Doctrine was steadily extended during 
the early part of the twentieth century as the United States increasingly moved from an 
isolationist to an intervention approach to global affairs. Hence, Schmitt argued, that 
whilst the Monroe Doctrine had originally extended the U.S.’s “spatial sovereignty” to 
the continental space of Western Hemisphere, it gradually became the grounds for a 
“pan-interventionism” that was global in scope.703 Schmitt argued that American 
involvement in the First World War and post-war legal settlement in Europe spread the 
‘absent-present’ power of the United States into European affairs, ultimately signalling 
the complete eclipse of Continental Europe as a specific sphere of international law. 
When confined to the Western Hemisphere the Monroe Doctrine had originally had the 
potential to provide a new form of spatial order in Schmitt’s mind. However, as the 
                                                
700 Schmitt had already dwelt extensively on the Monroe Doctrine in several articles dating from the 1930s. 
I will examine these in the next chapter. 
701 Ibid, 217. 
702 Ibid, 253. 
703 Carl Schmitt, “The Großraum Order of International Law with a Ban on Intervention by Spatially 
Foreign Powers: A Contribution to the Concept of Reich in International Law” in Writings on War, ed., 
Timothy Nunan (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 90. 
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means by which the ‘pan-interventionist’ expansion of the United States was legitimized, 
it produced only a form of “spatial chaos.”704 Schmitt argued that the League of Nations 
founded in 1919 gave perfect expression to such a ‘spatial chaos’. On the one hand the 
‘Geneva League’ was based on the idea of a universal international law that applied 
equally across the globe and gave legal parity to powerful European states and relatively 
marginal former colonies alike. On the other hand, the United States, the world’s 
dominant “spatial power,” was not a signatory and operated by proxy through the 
supposedly independent states under its sphere of influence in the Western 
Hemisphere.705 Thus the rise of U.S. power did not only dissolve the formerly core 
distinction between European and non-European space but provided no firm spatial 
distinction on which a new nomos could be grounded.   
 
(ii) Discriminatory War 
 
The core achievement of the jus publicum Europeaum, in Schmitt’s account, had been the 
bracketing of war within Continental Europe. The fundamental division between 
European and non-European space had allowed Continental Europe to become a realm of 
relative order, characterized by ‘war in form’ between sovereign states that recognized 
each other as equals. Schmitt argued that the First World War revealed this bracketing of 
war to have definitely collapsed along with the spatial ordering of the earth. However, 
Schmitt argued that what emerged in the aftermath of this total war was not an attempt to 
establish a new spatial balance between states and a new bracketing of war but rather a 
new concept of war that made this ever more unlikely. In contrast to the non-
discriminatory concept of war that created the conditions for its rationalization and 
humanization in the jus publicum Europeaum, a new discriminatory concept of war 
appeared. If the old European international law had managed to replace a notion of just 
war with a concept of just enemy, Schmitt argued that the laws of war that emerged in the 
wake of the First World War reversed this process. A new concept of just war appeared 
and along with it a concept of an unjust enemy. This new concept of the enemy dissolved 
the grounds on which all the distinctions through which war had been limited in the jus 
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publicum Europeaum had been based. Rather than provide a structure for a new 
bracketing of war, the international legal frameworks that emerged after Versailles 
allowed for its escalation.  
 
Schmitt argued that the new discriminatory concept of war turned on the criminalization 
of ‘aggressive’ war had progressively come to dominate international legal thinking 
between 1919 and 1939. He tracked this new criminalization of ‘wars of aggression’ from 
its first appearance in the so called ‘war guilt’ clauses of the 1919 Versailles Treaty, 
through the Geneva Protocol issued by the League of Nations in 1924, to the 1928 
Kellogg Pact, where the condemnation of aggressive war became part of U.S. national 
policy. Rather than a conflict between two legally and morally equal belligerents, a 
discriminatory concept of war distinguished between the legal and moral status of the 
warring parties. On the one side was a legitimate party pursuing a just war and on the 
other was an unjust enemy now rendered a criminal in international law. Schmitt argued 
that the crucial distinction between enemy and criminal, the justus hostis, had therefore 
collapsed, turning war from a formal match of strength between equals into a punitive 
exercise against a criminal aggressor. “Interstate war in European international law had 
been replaced” Schmitt argued by “action against a criminal felon.”706 Further, as war 
became the legal pursuit of a criminal enemy, the concept of third party neutrality 
became increasingly untenable.707 When the justice and criminality of warring parties 
was enshrined within the framework of international law, non-combatant states could not 
uphold neutral status. By dint of their involvement in international legal agreements, third 
party states were already legally implicated in the conflict and were thus forced to take 
sides. Lastly, Schmitt argued that the distinction between war and peace became 
increasingly problematic as a peace treaty could not be signed with a criminal enemy on a 
different legal and moral footing. A war against an unjust criminal enemy could be 
considered as a series of punitive measures that could be pursued to the point of 
annihilation. This was a tendency he had already identified in the critique of humanitarian 
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wars ‘against war’ in pre-war works such as The Concept of the Political. From Schmitt’s 
standpoint, the emergence of a new discriminatory concept of war unravelled the lattice 
of distinctions on the basis of which European war had been bracketed in the jus 
publicum Europaeum.  
 
(iii) Technology & Spaceless War  
 
Technological developments at the beginning of the twentieth century intensified the two 
processes that were contributing to the collapse of the jus publicum Europaeum: the un-
bracketing of war with the loss of the Justus hostis, and the collapse of the Eurocentric 
spatial order with the rise of the United States as a global interventionist power. 
Technologies of transport, communication and military power rendered the spatial 
divisions on which order rested increasingly redundant, and the increasingly destructive 
capacity of these same technologies allowed the escalation of enmity. It was indeed 
principally in the sphere of warfare that the influence of technology on the collapse of the 
nomos of the earth was most visible. Although Schmitt acknowledged the importance of 
submarines on the transformation of war, his analysis focused largely on the appearance 
of air power and the new methods and conceptions of war that emerged as a result.  
 
Firstly, Schmitt noted that air power dissolved the traditional distinction between theatres 
of war that had characterized the jus publicum Europaeum. With the advent of air war it 
was “no longer possible, as it was before, to speak of a theatre of war.”708 He argued that 
the Eurocentric nomos of the earth had rested upon a distinction between land and sea, 
each of which had its own concepts of war, booty and the enemy tied to the specific 
spatial theatre of conflict. However the emergence of air power marked the dissolution of 
land and sea as distinct theatres of war and a collapse of the categories of warfare on 
which it had been bracketed. In air war “all institutions and principles” that made a 
bracketing of war possible “lose their meaning.”709 International law struggled to keep up 
with this “transformation in the spatial perspective” and was unable to account for the 
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changes effected by air war within the existed frames of land and sea war.710 By 
introducing a new vertical dimension into the conduct of war, air power rendered the two 
theatres of war, “the surfaces of both land and sea … indiscriminate.”711 Furthermore, air 
power allowed war to become increasingly intense as it became focused above all on 
destruction. In contrast to land war, orientated towards effective occupation of territory, 
and sea war, oriented towards prize booty, Schmitt argued that “the only purpose and 
meaning of an air raid is destruction.”712 Air war simultaneously brought about a collapse 
of spatial order and an escalation of warfare.   
 
Second, the increased destructiveness of air war created an intensification of enmity. The 
combatant who could effectively marshal air power had a decisive advantage over their 
opponent but a moral asymmetry followed directly from this technological asymmetry. 
“Intensification of the technical means of destruction,” Schmitt argued, “opens an abyss 
of an equally destructive legal and moral discrimination.”713 “If the weapons are 
conspicuously unequal,” he noted, “then the mutual concept of war conceived of in terms 
of an equal plane is also lacking.”714 The asymmetries of power resulting from the 
emergence of air war meant it was “no longer possible to realize the concept of justus 
hostis.”715 Schmitt claimed therefore that a discrepancy in military power intensified the 
discrimination against the enemy, the two processes running in tandem with each other, 
“superiority in weaponry” indeed taken to be “an indication of …justa causa.”716 Indeed, 
technologies of destruction would perhaps inevitably be used more freely in wars 
conducted as punitive measures against a criminal enemy. Given that war had been 
“transformed into a police action against trouble-makers, criminals, and pests, 
justification,” Schmitt argued that, “the methods of this ‘police bombing’ must be 
intensified.”717 Thus the development of new technologies was pushing “the 
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discrimination of the opponent into the abyss.”718  A crack had opened in the spatial order 
of the earth through which a terrifying vision of future war could be glimpsed – a world 
of spaceless wars where absolute enemies were annihilated through aerial bombardment 
in the name of justice.  
 
(6) The New Nomos of the Earth?  
 
The horizon of Schmitt’s work in The Nomos of the Earth was the question of what new 
global spatial order might emerge from the wreckage of the jus publicum Europaeum. 
The stakes of this task could not have been higher. The world depicted in The Nomos of 
the Earth faced a stark choice between an emerging state of global civil war and a new 
global spatial order that could respatialise the political and provide a new framework for 
limiting war. In the book’s Foreword, written in 1950, Schmitt posed the question of a 
new nomos of the earth as the decisive problem of the age. He nonetheless offered little 
indication of where an answer might be found. He noted only that a solution would no 
more be provided by new scientific discoveries than by “men on their way to the moon 
discovering a new and hitherto unknown planet that could be exploited freely and utilized 
effectively to relieve their struggles on earth.”719 He closed the Foreword by echoing the 
New Testament: “The earth has been promised to the peacemakers. The idea of a new 
nomos of the earth belongs to them.”720 But he offered no elaboration of what that idea 
might be. Indeed, the comments Schmitt made elsewhere in the book were just as 
sketchy. Although Part IV of the book, the closing chapter of the original publication, 
carried the title ‘The Question of the New Nomos of The Earth’ the question was not 
addressed there. Rather this was the section where Schmitt outlined the collapse of the jus 
publicum Europeaum and he indicated only that a coherent nomos of the earth was 
lacking.  
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A fuller answer had to wait until Schmitt took the question up again in a short text 
entitled ‘The New Nomos of the Earth’ published in 1955.721 Schmitt acknowledged that 
“today (1954), the world in which we live is divided into two parts, East and West, which 
confront each other in a cold war and, occasionally, hot wars.”722 However, it is obvious 
that Schmitt did not consider the Cold War to be more than a fleeting historical moment 
even though it had carved the world into opposing camps around a geopolitical and 
ideological faultline running through his native Germany.723 The Cold War division 
seemed to represent nothing more than the final collapse of the old nomos into an 
unstable dualism where both sides were equally determined by the ‘religion of 
technology’.724 Schmitt thus looked beyond the Cold War bipolarity to find a new nomos 
of the earth but argued that there were only three possibilities. “The first, and apparently 
the simplest,” was for one of the Cold War parties to emerge victorious. “The victor,” 
Schmitt argued, “would be the world’s sole sovereign” and “would appropriate the whole 
earth – land, sea, and air – and divide and manage it according with his plan and 
ideas.”725 Schmitt argued that advances in modern technology led many to assume this to 
be an inevitable course but warned that the belief in a unification of the world by 
technological means could only ultimately lead to destruction.726 The second possible 
nomos he foresaw was an attempt to recreate the balance of land and sea that typified the 
jus publicum Europaeum by using modern technology to combine the rule of the sea and 
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air. He noted that the United States had the power to play the role of a global hegemon 
that would none-the-less maintain the balance of the rest of the global spatial order.727 
This had the “greatest chance” of success in Schmitt’s view given that it had “accepted 
tradition and custom on its side.”728 Finally, Schmitt presented a third possibility that he 
clearly favoured. It was also based on the idea of a global balance but not under a single 
hegemonic power. Rather Schmitt argued that, “a combination of several independent 
Großräume or blocs could constitute a balance … and precipitate a new order of the 
earth.”729 This, Schmitt argued, was the most “rational”, presumably because it was based 
on territorial blocs rather than the ‘elements’ of sea or air.730 It would only work however 
if the Großräume were “differentiated meaningfully and … homogenous internally” but 
Schmitt gave no indication here of what this might mean. 731 
 
The idea of a new global spatial order based upon a number of large territorial blocs was 
not new to Schmitt in 1955. It had in fact been at the centre of his attempts to conceive a 
post-state world order since the late 1930s. Although it predated the question of the new 
nomos of the earth by some years, Schmitt’s Großraum theory represented his most 
sustained effort to develop a new form of spatial order from the wreckage of the jus 
publicum Europaeum. Schmitt makes no mention of this earlier work in The Nomos of 
the Earth or in the 1955 corollary. This is doubtless because he had originally developed 
the concept in part to theorize Nazi expansion in Europe and it was precisely these efforts 
that had led to his arrest and interrogation at Nuremburg. I will return to examine the 
theory of Großraum order and its relationship to Nazi policy in more detail in the next 
chapter. However, I want to pause here briefly to consider why Schmitt favoured this of 
the three possibilities for a new nomos of the earth he laid out for the reader.  
 
To understand why Schmitt favoured a global spatial order based around a number of 
Großräume it is necessary to ask what he hoped a new nomos would achieve. The 
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question of a new nomos of the earth was pressing for Schmitt because the alternative 
was a catastrophically violent spaceless disorder. Indeed, he argued that the twentieth 
century had become increasingly defined by such conditions after the collapse of the old 
Eurocentric nomos of the earth. The fundamental problem for Schmitt was that order had 
become increasingly untied from orientation and hence the political had become 
despatialised. Without a spatial framework within which enmity could be fixed to clear 
inside-outside distinctions, war could float free of all constraint. The central task of a new 
nomos of the earth was thus to provide a framework within which the political could be 
respatialised. By providing new spatial determinations between inside and outside it 
would allow new constraints on war to emerge and stand against the growing tide of 
spaceless disorder. However, in Schmitt’s view, powerful new political forms capable of 
producing these new spatializations were needed for such an order to emerge. In 
Schmitt’s view, a single world sovereign would erase all spatial differentiation and would 
thus utterly fail to provide a form capable of producing order. It could only, in Schmitt’s 
view, create the conditions for increasing spaceless disorder. A global balance overseen 
by one hegemonic power would provide a limited degree of spatial distinction but would 
replicate the precarious state of the jus publicum Europaeum, dependent on one power 
unable or unwilling to enforce its rule. A Großraum  order, by contrast, would establish 
clear spatial divisions and hence allow the respatializated of the political along the lines 
of new inside-outside distinctions. It represented for Schmitt the clearest chance for 
constructing a new spatial order of the earth.  
 
The search for a new nomos of the earth that shaped Schmitt’s late thought therefore 
involved an attempt to define new political forms that could respatialise the political after 
the eclipse of the European state system. The attempt to provide an answer to the crisis of 
political form in the wake of the state was synonymous with the attempt to define a new 
nomos of the earth. Although his late work focused more on developing a critique of the 
conditions that brought about a collapse of the state-centric jus publicum Europeaum he 
nonetheless identified two political forms that could potentially respatialise the political. 
The first, as noted above, was the concept of Großraum  that he developed principally in 
the late 1930s and early 1940s. The second emerged in Schmitt’s 1963 book The Theory 
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of the Partisan where he reflected on the nature of partisan warfare. Despite marked 
differences in the nature of these concepts and the contexts in which they were 
developed, both can be understood as attempts to imagine new political forms that might 
lay the foundations for a new nomos of the earth. In the next chapter I will examine each 
of these new political forms in turn in order to understand a new global spatial order 
might be possible once the horizon of the state form had been crossed.  
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Chapter 7: New Political Forms / Großraum and Partisan 
 
 
(1) Respatialising the Political   
 
For Schmitt the Second World War was definitive proof that the world existed in a state 
of ‘spatial chaos’. The war was a symptom of a dangerous despatialisation of the 
political, the result of the global bonds of order and orientation that had previously been 
provided by the modern European state system being undone. By the late 1930s Schmitt 
considered the state form to have been eclipsed as the ordering institution of international 
law and had already begun groping for a new political form capable of respatialising the 
political. Hence, although his wartime writings contextualized this eclipse of the state in 
the wider collapse of global spatial order Schmitt’s search for the decisive subject of a 
new nomos of the earth was well underway. Indeed, Schmitt’s work from the late 1930s 
up to the 1960s revolves around the attempt to find new political forms capable of 
respatialising the political in a new nomos of the earth.   
 
Schmitt took it as a given that such a new spatial order of the earth was necessary. The 
core question in his view was what nature it would take. “The development of the 
planet,” Schmitt wrote, “finally had reached a clear dilemma between universalism and 
pluralism, monopoly and polypoly.”732 However, Schmitt understood this “core question 
of the spatial structure of international law – the alternative of a plurality of Großräume 
or the global spatial unity of one world order, the great antithesis of world politics, 
namely the antithesis of a centrally ruled world and a balanced spatial order, or 
universalism and pluralism, monopoly or polypoly,” to have been systematically 
excluded from an international law increasingly governed by universalist concepts.733 The 
real stakes of this debate for Schmitt was therefore the opposition to the dominant 
universalist conceptions of global order. In his view universalist conceptions of global 
order could lead only towards an ever deeper ‘spatial disorder’ as they could not provide 
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the grounds for spatial differentiation and hence for political form. For Schmitt 
universalism was formless and without political form there could be no subject capable of 
spatialising the political and hence limiting war. By contrast pluralist conceptions of 
global order necessarily rested on some type of differentiation and hence could 
potentially provide the grounds for a political form capable of spatialising the political 
and fusing order and orientation once again. Schmitt thus conceived of a pluralist world 
order against the historical rush to separate the political from space, or rather war from 
spatial limitation, that he understood to characterize the twentieth century. His late 
thought included two attempts to formulate new political forms capable of standing 
against this headlong drive into the abyss of despatialisation: a Großraum order of large 
spaces and the figure of the partisan fighter. In this chapter I will look at each in turn, 
examining the ways in which Schmitt thought they might provide a ‘spatial fix’ to the 
problem of twentieth century world order. 
 
(2) Großraum 
 
Schmitt’s first attempt to imagine a new political form beyond the state that might be 
capable of respatialising the political came with the concept of Großraum. This was not 
only one of the governing ideas in Schmitt’s late spatial thought but perhaps the most 
controversial of his entire career due to its relationship to Nazi foreign policy. He first 
introduced the concept in The Großraum Order of International Law with a Ban on 
Intervention for Spatially Foreign Powers: A Contribution to the Concept of Reich in 
International Law, originally delivered as a lecture to a conference on National Socialist 
lawyers in Kiel and subsequently published in April, 1939 in the journal Deutsches 
Recht.734 The text was then published as a stand-alone book, several editions of which 
appeared between 1939 and 1941 as Schmitt made additions reflecting his expanding 
project and political developments.735 Although the text appeared to have little or no 
effect on Schmitt’s standing with the Nazi regime it was widely read both in Germany 
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and in translation in Japan and across Europe. It seemed likely that the book was 
designed to appeal both to the domestic regime and to international legal opinion across 
Europe. Hence, George Schwab’s claim that Schmitt turned to international law because 
it was “a domain he thought would leave him out of the limelight” is rather 
implausible.736 The Großraum Order was both an attempt to formulate a new basis for 
international law that reflected real changes in the distribution of global power and an 
attempt to provide theoretical legitimacy for Nazi foreign policy. As with Schmitt’s other 
important Nazi era writings The Großraum Order can neither be taken simply as a 
contribution to scholarly debate nor mere intellectual propaganda for the Reich. It was 
both, and any reading must attempt to stay sensitive to this fact whilst noting the tensions 
between them. I will return below to the question of the relationship between the text and 
the Nazi regime but will first provide a brief account of its major features.  
 
(i) The Economic Precedent 
 
Schmitt’s fundamental aim in The Großraum Order was to “introduce the concept of the 
concrete Großraum and its related concept of Großraum order into international 
jurisprudence.”737 He claimed that due to the eclipse of the state form it was “necessary to 
revise  … existing international legal theory through the concept of the nation but also to 
regard it from the point of view of spatial order.” (77) He noted that the idea of 
Großraum was not a conceptual novelty but in fact reflected already changed realities, a 
“concrete, historical-political concept of the present”: “the change in the dimensions of 
the earth and in the way space is conceived – a change that dominates current global 
political developments – is articulated in the word Großraum.”738 However, in Schmitt’s 
view, political and legal thought, mired in nineteenth century positivism, had been slow 
to come to terms with these changes. Although the concept had already appeared it was 
“characteristically not in the domain of the state but rather in the domain of technics, 
industry, commerce, and organization.”739 By the early years of the twentieth century 
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“Großraum economy” was already a “beloved buzzword” of economists and the spread 
of electricity and gas infrastructures across Europe had made Großraum a reality in the 
“energy economy.”740 Given the fact that the economy had become the determining 
political factor, Schmitt argued, that it was “of course, no coincidence that the theoretical 
and practical realization of the concept of the Großraum … lie first in the economic-
organizational sphere.”741 Hence, according to Schmitt, the world was already informally 
constituted by a “technical-industrial-economic” Großraum order but political and legal 
thought stubbornly refused to come to terms with these transformations.742 Schmitt’s aim 
therefore was to develop a concept adequate to the demands of addressing these new 
spatial and economic realities in the field of international jurisprudence.  
 
(ii) The Monroe Doctrine 
 
In attempting to find a model for a Großraum concept in international law, Schmitt 
turned to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. It was, Schmitt argued, “the first and until now, 
the most successful example of a Großraum principle in the modern history of 
international law.”743 It offered, Schmitt claimed, the “best approach and point of 
departure” for considering the concept of a Großraum in international law.744 Schmitt 
noted that although the Monroe Doctrine had a complicated history, knowing “periods of 
obfuscation and falsification,” its “original meaning [was] marked with three key phrases: 
the independence of all American states; non-colonization in this space; non-intervention 
of extra-American powers in this space.”745 With the proclamation of the Monroe 
Doctrine the United States unilaterally declared the American Continent to be a space of 
non-intervention free of foreign, and specifically European, interference and colonization. 
It provided, in Schmitt’s view, “the legal foundation for a unique Continental-American 
international law.”746 
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In this original form the Monroe Doctrine provided a “unique and important precedent” 
for thinking about continental large spaces in international law.747 However, Schmitt 
noted that the doctrine had a remarkable “elasticity with respect to changing political 
situations” and had morphed in line with the changing conceptions of American interests 
and foreign policy goals.748 Hence, Schmitt argued it had become a “justification for a 
capitalistic imperialism”749 in the hands of President Theodore Roosevelt.750 “An 
originally defensive concept of space that defended against the intervention of spatially 
foreign powers” thus became “the foundation of a ‘dollar diplomacy’” pursued in the 
defence of U.S. interests.751 President Woodrow Wilson oversaw a further mutation in 
Monroe Doctrine from “a concrete geographically and historically determined concept of 
Großraum into a general, universally conceived principle for the world.”752 The United 
States thus decisively left “behind its continental spatial principle and [bound] itself with 
the universalism of the British world empire.”753 The healthy core of the Großraum 
principle of international law of non-intervention” was thus transformed “into a global 
ideology that interferes in everything, a pan-interventionist ideology … under the cover 
of humanitarianism.”754 
 
At the time of its original proclamation in 1823 the Monroe Doctrine nonetheless 
expressed in Schmitt’s view, “a genuine principle of Großraum, namely the connection 
between a politically awakened nation, political idea, and a Großraum ruled by this idea, 
a Großraum excluding foreign interventions.”755 This fusion of a politically self-assertive 
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nation, a political idea and a continental large space lay at the “core of the great original 
Monroe Doctrine”756 The spatial aspect of the doctrine was crucial for Schmitt and he 
noted that it conceived of “the planet in spatial terms, in a modern sense, … something 
totally extraordinary and worthy of special attention in international law.”757 However, he 
argues that the core of a Großraum is the relationship between this spatial dimension and 
the assertion of a political idea. “A purely geographical conception may have great 
political-practical meaning but alone it does not represent a convincing legal principle,” 
Schmitt claimed.758 Referencing Haushofer, whom he refers to as “the master of 
geopolitical scholarship,” Schmitt notes that “the meaning of space and political idea do 
not allow themselves to be separated from one another.”759 There are, Schmitt claims 
“neither spaceless political ideas nor, reciprocally, spaces without ideas or principles of 
space without ideas.”760 Thus, a genuine Großraum is grounded upon the mutually 
constitutive relationship between a particular space and a specific political idea. 
However, Schmitt qualifies this further noting that, “it is an important part of a 
determinable political idea that a certain nation carries it and that it has a certain 
opponent in mind, through which this political idea gains the quality of the political.”761 
Thus, the fusion of a space and a political idea is crucially tied to a specific set of friend–
enemy relations. Indeed, this enmity governs the relations between the ordering nation 
and the ‘spatially foreign’ forces banned from intervention within the Großraum. 
 
 
(iii) European Großraum: Nazi Reich  
 
Schmitt argued that this core of the Monroe Doctrine, the fusion of a politically 
awakened nation, political idea and a continental large space ruled over by a principle of 
non-intervention, was “translatable to other spaces, other historical situations, and other 
friend-enemy groupings.”762 He stressed however that the aim of The Großraum Order 
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was not to imagine a ‘German Monroe Doctrine,’ but rather to identify its “core thought” 
in order to make it “fruitful for other living spaces and other historical situations.”763 
Indeed, Schmitt argued that this core idea, “namely the thought of the impermissibility 
under international law of interventions of spatially foreign powers in a Großraum ruled 
by a principle of order, ” was “reasonably translatable [in Europe] given the state of 
political reality.”764 Hence, rather, than theorise a ‘German Monroe Doctrine’ Schmitt 
claimed his work presented “an application of the idea of spatial order in international 
law appropriate to the current political and historical position of the German Reich and 
the East European space.”765 “Today” Schmitt noted, “a powerful German Reich has 
arisen. From what was once weak and impotent, there has emerged a strong centre of 
Europe that is impossible to attack and ready to provide a great political idea, the respect 
for every nation, as a reality of life determined through species and origin, blood and soil, 
with its radiation into the Middle and East European space, and to reject the interference 
of spatially alien and unvölkisch powers.”766 The rising “sun of the concept of Reich”767 
had thus created the conditions for the realization of a “völkisch Großraum order” in a 
loosely defined ‘Eastern European space’.768   
 
Schmitt noted that, “the Großraum is of course not identical to the Reich” but as the 
dominant nation Germany would provide the political idea on which this European 
Großraum was to be based.769 What precisely was this “National Socialist national idea” 
to be in Schmitt’s terms?770 It contained three fundamental aspects that deserve mention 
here. Firstly, the National Socialist Reich was to establish a Großraum order standing 
“between the old state order of the nineteenth century and the universalistic goal of a 
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global Reich.”771 It would, Schmitt argued, fulfil the “long due overcoming of the concept 
of the state in international law,”772 whilst “steering the world out of the … universalistic-
imperialistic world law” with which the “Western democracies” sought to replace it.773 
Secondly, it was to be “a concept of order based on national groups”774 and the “principle 
of mutual respect for every nationhood.”775 Such a concept implied “the rejection of all 
ideals of assimilation, absorption, and melting pots” and aimed to protect the “unique 
völkisch nature of every national group” from these “Western ideas.”776 The Großraum 
would be protected from the intervention of external ‘spatially foreign’ powers and 
internally divided into different national states, although of course all existing under the 
ultimate ‘spatial sovereignty’ of the German Reich.  
 
The third element was what Schmitt referred to as “the thoroughly unique Jewish 
problem.”777 The “political idea for the Central and Eastern European space” was of a 
Großraum “in which there live many nations and national groups, that are, however, not 
– apart from the Jews – racially alien from one another.”778 Schmitt distinguished his 
concept of Großraum from contemporary theories of Lebensraum, rather coyly noting 
that “[the] ‘demographic’ right to land can be seen as a universal foundation for a 
justification of territorial demands; it cannot, however, be seen as a concrete Großraum 
principle of international law in a specific sense that contains recognizable limitations 
and standards in itself.”779 Nonetheless, his work clearly gave an exceptional status to 
European Jews on the basis of race. The Großraum Order mentioned the Jews and their 
position within the Nazi-dominated Großraum only briefly and provided no indication 
about how this unique ‘problem’ should be addressed. The Jews did however play a 
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significant role in the opposition Schmitt drew between an empty neutral conception of 
space and the concept of Großraum. Schmitt argued that the theory of Großraum had 
superseded “the mathematical-neutral, empty concept of space … [with] a qualitative-
dynamic greatness.”780 The word Groß indicated “a qualitative escalation” rather than a 
“merely quantitative” increase in space.781 Schmitt identified this “empty concept of 
space,” that had now been overcome, with “the spirit of the Jew.”782 Hence, he placed the 
Jews in direct opposition to the theory of Großraum order as such. “The Jewish people,” 
Schmitt claimed, had not only historically been “an important fermenting agent in the 
dissolution of concrete spatially determined orders,”783 but their “misunderstanding … 
with respect to everything that concerns soil, land, and territory, is grounded in [their] 
style of political existence.”784 He thus ominously seemed to imply that the Jews were 
existentially alien to the new spatial order of the European Großraum. Schmitt quoted 
“the founder of a new science of space,” Fredriech Ratzel, to the effect that “coming to 
terms with space [is] the defining trait of all life.”785 Characterised precisely by the 
failure to ‘come to terms with space’ the Jews were excluded from Schmitt’s vision of a 
European spatially, politically, racially and even existentially. He provided no indication 
of what this meant for the fate of the Jews in the new European spatial order under the 
Nazi Reich. 
 
(iv) Nazism, Lebensraum, Geojurisprudence  
 
In the aftermath of Nazi defeat Schmitt was interned by American forces and interrogated 
in Nuremburg precisely on suspicion that his work on Großraum order had provided 
legitimation for Nazi war crimes in Eastern Europe. Although Schmitt was released 
without charge for lack of evidence his work and particularly his Großraum theory has 
been morally tainted ever since. What however was the nature of the relationship between 
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Schmitt’s Großraum work and Nazism? It seems safest to consider Schmitt’s work a 
sincere attempt to legitimize the expansion of the National Socialist Reich, whilst 
nonetheless acknowledging that Nazi policy was not shaped, and likely not even 
influenced, by his theoretical efforts. As Timothy Nunan notes, Schmitt’s Großraum 
theory “was the most confident and articulate – if not the official – [theorization] of the 
Nazi New Order in Europe.”786 However, in the late 1930s and early 1940s many in 
Europe outside Germany took Schmitt’s Großraum work to offer something like an 
‘official’ theory of the regime’s expansionist policy.787 Nunan notes, for example, that 
Schmitt’s work was reported on in the British newspapers The Daily Mail and The Times, 
the latter noting that Schmitt offered “a trustworthy guide” and a “precise definition” of 
Hitler’s aims in Eastern Europe.788 But as Balakrishnan claims this view was based upon 
an “immense overestimation of [Schmitt’s] role and stature.”789 Doubtless Schmitt’s 
Großraum work was widely read abroad – he noted himself in 1941 that Bulgarian, 
French, Italian, Japanese and Spanish editions were already published or in press – but 
this did not mean it was translated into Nazi policy.790 
 
The claim that Schmitt’s article had an impact on Nazi policy rests to a large degree on 
Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag of April 28, 1939. Hitler here responded to Roosevelt’s 
earlier telegram warning Germany and Italy against attacking or invading any 
‘independent nation’ in Europe by claiming that the U.S. President was a hypocrite and 
called for a German-led Monroe Doctrine for Europe. “We Germans,” he wrote, “support 
a similar doctrine for Europe – and above all for the territory and the interests of the 
Greater German Reich.”791 It is not clear if Hitler took this appeal to the Monroe Doctrine 
from Schmitt’s work and the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop had 
made reference to it in discussion with American state officials before the publication of 
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Schmitt’s work.792 However, Hans Frank, Schmitt’s protector within the Nazi 
establishment, advised him in a phone call to stay quiet about the origin of the idea as 
“the Führer prided himself on his originality.”793 Nevertheless, there seems little to 
indicate that Schmitt’s thought had any more influence on shaping the direction of Nazi 
policy. As Nunan notes, “little suggests that leading members of the Nazi regime were 
interested in a formal theory of empire that might do anything to limit the dynamism of 
expansion and genocide to the East.”794 Further, Nazi policy was far from coherent but 
was rather developing in tandem with German expansion making it difficult for those 
trying to construct theoretical frameworks around it. Indeed, in a note to the 1941 edition 
of the text Schmitt noted that “we resemble navigators on an unbroken voyage, and every 
book can be nothing more than a logbook.”795 Indeed, the rather modest discourse of a 
‘respect for every nation’ in which Schmitt formulated his theory of an Eastern European 
Großraum was profoundly out of step with the realities of genocidal slaughter that Nazi 
policy was pursuing in the East. Thus, it is perhaps a sounder approach to locate 
Schmitt’s concept of Großraum in relation to the wider intellectual debates in the Nazi 
era rather than identify it as a source of policy. Two concepts in circulation in the Nazi 
era to which Schmitt’s Großraum clearly related were Geojurisprudence and Lebensraum 
both of which were tied to the wider debate on geopolitics within Weimar and Nazi 
Germany.  
 
Geojurisprudence was a school of thought that attempted to integrate the insights of law 
and geopolitics, briefly gaining popularity amongst Right wing intellectual circles during 
the late Weimar and Nazi years. Although principally associated with the work of 
Manfred Langhans-Ratzeburg from the 1920s, Germany’s most eminent geopolitical 
theorist Karl Haushofer also contributed an article to this debate in 1928.796 Indeed, as the 
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American political scientist Andrew Gyorgy claimed this “surprising product of the 
artificial crossbreeding between geopolitics and other sciences”797 bore witness to the 
“all-pervasive influence of Haushofer’s ‘portmanteau science’” in German geo-sciences 
at the time.798 Already in 1944 Gyorgy had associated Schmitt with Geojuisprudence, 
claiming him to be its “foremost exponent.”799 However, in a polemical rush to condemn 
Geojurisprudence as a  “a National Socialist theory of international law based on the idea 
of ‘spatial purity,’” Gyorgy conflated Schmitt’s Großraum theory with the claim that 
“world powers have a natural right to their living space.”800 Thus, whilst Gyorgy 
described Geojurisprudence as an attempt to “introduce the Lebensraum doctrine into 
international law,” this did not accurately describe Schmitt’s conception of Großraum nor 
distinguish it from the biologically and racially defined concept of Lebensraum.801 From 
the distance of a half-century the geographer David T. Murphy offered a more sober 
assessment, noting that whilst Schmitt differentiated his concept of Großraum from the 
geographically determined ideas fashionable in German geopolitics his “application of 
Raum concepts to international law and state relations had been prefigured in the 1920s 
by geopolitical thinkers, including Haushofer and Manfred Langhans-Ratzeburg.”802 
Hence, whilst Schmitt employs insights from key thinkers of the German geopolitical 
tradition such as Hasuhofer and Ratzel his work stands at some distance from the more 
racially defined readings of other Geojurisprudence thinkers of the 1930s.803  
 
Both authors however note that Schmitt’s theory of Großraum failed to live up to its 
goals both conceptually and in terms of shaping policy, as did Geojurisprudence thinking 
more broadly. In the first instance, as Murphy argued, Geojurisprudence “was never able 
to devise a convincing reconciliation between its claims for geodeterministic 
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development of law and the realities it was attempting to explain.”804 The appeal to 
geography did not provide the groundings for law thinkers of Geojurisprudence, 
including Schmitt, had hoped for. “The temptation to turn to geography for the sources of 
law was,” as Murphy argued, “as much a chimera as was the effort to derive the sources 
of politics from geography.”805 It was, as Gyorgy noted, conceptually weak. “Neither law 
nor geography nor politics,” Geojurisprudence is simply “the projection of National 
Socialist power dreams and wishful spatial thinking into the sphere of jurisprudence.”806 
Further, as Gyorgy noted, “Nazi geojurists” found it “impossible to give a comprehensive 
description of international legal principles” because they were in “a constant state of 
flux and subject to change in time and space,” given the developing fronts of Nazi 
expansionist policy.807 
 
Despite the fact that Schmitt’s Großraum theory cannot be easily identified with the 
concept of Lebensraum the relationship between them is nonetheless tricky to 
disentangle. Hence, Nunan notes that although Schmitt’s concept of Großraum “may 
sound similar at first glance to Nazi Lebensraum theory …the relationship between the 
two is complex.”808 Nunan charts several points of divergence between Großraum and 
Lebensraum that deserve consideration. Firstly, he highlights the fact that in contrast to 
Lebensraum theory the central element of Schmitt’s Großraum is the ‘political idea’ 
rather than race or nationality. Secondly, although Schmitt describes the Jews as ‘racially 
alien’ he envisaged the European Großraum as a place where many nations would meet 
and co-exist, which doesn’t seem to imply implicit relationship between land and rights 
defined in racial or national-cultural terms. Thirdly, Nunan notes that Schmitt’s work was 
criticized by contemporary Lebensraum theorists such as Werner Daitz for having 
forgotten the primacy of racial homogeneity in his concept of Großraum order. 
 
Nevertheless, Nunan notes that despite the conceptual distance separating Großraum and 
Lebensraum Schmitt developed his work to support racialised Nazi foreign policies. 
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Firstly, Schmitt singled out the Jews as a separate ‘racially alien’ group who stood 
outside a new European order of ‘national groups’. Although he offers no detail on how 
“the Jewish Problem” (97) is to be addressed his celebration of the forced migration and 
resettlement of the German population from the Baltic states might be understood to 
provide some indication.809 Indeed, although Schmitt conceives of a Großraum order to 
be grounded upon a ‘political idea’ rather than racial or biological categories such as 
Lebensraum the distinction appeared to dissolve when viewed in relation to the context in 
which Schmitt was writing and the deep anti-Semitism evident in his later writings. 
Schmitt noted that the ‘political idea’ of a Großraum took shape with “a certain opponent 
in mind, through which this political idea gains the quality of the political.”810 Given 
these factors it is not hard to imagine that the specific ‘spatially foreign’ enemy against 
which the European Großraum was to be defined was for Schmitt the Jews. It is clear of 
course that Schmitt opposed a Europe of ‘national groups’ to the ‘melting pot’ of the 
United States but as several critics have noted his conception of the U.S. as a spaceless 
empire of assimilation shared much with his critique of the Jewish position within 
Europe.811 It is not beyond the imagination that Schmitt considered the U.S. to represent 
the ‘spatially foreign’ enemy outside Europe whilst the Jews were the ‘spatially foreign’ 
enemy within. Thus, although Schmitt’s theoretical articulation of Großraum is not 
grounded in the explicitly racial categories of Lebensraum it is nonetheless plausible to 
locate a deep-seated anti-Semitism in his apparently non-racial categories.  
 
(v) The Gross Failure of Großraum 
 
Despite his grand hopes of providing a theoretical framework for the respatialisation of 
world order it is clear that Schmitt’s vision of a Großraum order failed both conceptually 
and politically. Conceptually Schmitt’s Großraum failed on its own terms on a number of 
fronts. In the first instance it is not clear how Schmitt’s proposed Central and Eastern 
European Großraum related to the concept of Großraum as developed from the U.S. 
Monroe Doctrine. As Nunan correctly points out, the ‘Eastern European space’ was not a 
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clearly defined space and certainly did not take on the continental shape of the Western 
Hemisphere.812 Hence, one of the key factors necessary for a Großraum order was 
missing in the very case Schmitt sought to address. His work was thus caught in the 
antinomies of attempting to provide a theoretical model for the changing political 
dynamics of a specific geopolitical situation. Further, when read in relation to Schmitt’s 
broader conception of spatial order it is not clear how a Großraum order would provide a 
framework for governing the relations between political entities and limit warfare.  
Gyorgy noted that Schmitt’s work did “not offer any guidance to the legal relationships 
of individual greater areas, or Grossräume.”813 Großraum was a “failure from the very 
outset” because it failed to “set up legal norms governing the relationships of these 
regions inter se.”814  
 
Perhaps more serious from the perspective of Schmitt’s understanding of spatial order 
was the fact that his Großraum order hoped to achieve a balance of power between 
several large space powers that was planetary in scope. The problem with this, in 
Schmitt’s terms, was that it provided no space of ‘outside’ that could constitute the 
balanced relations between Grossräume, nor established the spatial division allowing 
ordering hierarchies to be established within to each Großraum. The European interstate 
balance of the jus publicum Europeaum had relied upon a double global spatial division 
between Europe and the New World and land and sea. A balance of power within Europe 
was achieved precisely because a constitutive outside existed where antagonism could be 
played out. Schmitt’s global Großraum order provided no such constitutive outside and 
seemed to simply place hope in the ordering capacity of spatial difference as such. The 
division of the globe into a number of Grossräume might allow for a respatialisation of 
the political, but without any clear mechanism for governing their relations and no 
‘outside’ into which antagonism could be displaced Schmitt provided no indication of the 
means by which war could be bracketed. This was a fatal oversight given that the 
limitation of war was for him the essential aim of political order. Thus, even within his 
own terms Großraum was a rather weak attempt to theorize a new nomos of the earth. 
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Schmitt’s Großraum theory was also a failure politically. His vision of a European 
Großraum led by a German Reich was reduced to rubble by the end of the Second World 
War. Further, the global reordering that emerged from the ashes did not take the form of a 
new nomos of the earth based upon a number of independent Großraum. In the years 
directly preceding the war Schmitt had argued that the informal realities of global power 
already reflected the existence of a Großraum order. Ironically, however the German 
attempt to formalize this regional hegemony in a policy of aggressive expansion led to a 
world war that erased this implicit balance between Grossräume. The Second World War 
had served to dramatically extend the global power of the United States and marked its 
decisive rejection of continental isolation in favour of global interventionism. The 
formerly sovereign states of Europe were maintained as hollowed out shells, the 
“meaningless fossils” of magni homines.815 Europe was partitioned between the 
universalist powers of East and West, both equally committed to the common 
civilizational horizon of technical-industrial development and the utopia of world unity. 
The Second World War had served as the catalyst for an intensification of the spatial 
disorder Schmitt already understood to have characterized the interwar years. In the 
immediate postwar years, Schmitt clung to the hope that a new nomos of the earth could 
be constructed around a global Großraum order but the new realities of global power 
made it appear the geopolitical fantasy of a reactionary Don Quixote. 
 
(3) The Partisan 
 
Schmitt’s last attempt to imagine a new political form capable of respatialising the 
political came in his short 1963 book on partisan warfare, The Theory of the Partisan. 
Here he sought to directly engage with what new relationships might be forged between 
the political and the spatial in late twentieth century conditions, seemingly defined by the 
complete domination of ‘technical-industrial’ universalism. However, the book strikes a 
rather minor key in contrast to the world-historical bombast of his mid-century writings. 
The author himself noted that The Theory of the Partisan was a “sketchy work” taking 
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“modest form” and its uncharacteristically uncertain tone contrasts sharply with the 
majority of Schmitt’s output.816 It appears the product of man desperately clinging to the 
latest developments in current affairs as he is increasingly swept out of time by the tide of 
change. Although he is keen to display his grasp on the contemporary moment, peppering 
his text with topical references to Che Guevara, Ho Chi-Minh and the Cold War ‘Space 
Race,’ Schmitt nonetheless oscillates between nostalgic glances to a lost world of order 
and an ominous apprehension of a catastrophic future. Since the early 1940s Schmitt had 
argued that the world was caught at a world-historical crossroads between a spaceless 
techno-industrial disorder and a new form of global spatial order. The Theory of the 
Partisan marked his last attempt to salvage the possibility of the latter from the growing 
inevitability of the former.  
 
The Theory of the Partisan marked an attempt to examine the changing concept of the 
political and hence of the enemy in the late twentieth century when everything was, in 
Schmitt’s view, flowing “into the force-field of technical-industrial development.”817 
Indeed, Schmitt subtitled the book ‘An Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the 
Political’ explicitly linking it to his earlier book, just in time for the publication of a new 
edition. In Schmitt’s view the nature of warfare, and hence the concepts of the political 
and the enemy, had undergone a radical transformation since the eclipse of the state form 
and the collapse of the jus publicum Europaeum. In the late twentieth century warfare 
had become increasingly untied from state bracketing as the global antagonisms of the 
Cold War were played out in civil wars and wars of decolonization. This had made 
partisan warfare, once a relatively obscure issue of interest mostly to military planners, a 
pressing concern in which the very nature of the political could be located. Schmitt 
argued that these changes had made the once marginal partisan into “a key figure in 
world-history.”818 He hoped that an investigation of this seemingly peripheral figure 
would therefore open a series of subsequent questions bearing on the concerns that had 
shaped his work. The book’s closing sentence stated that “the theory of the partisan flows 
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into the question of the concept of the political, into the question of the real enemy and of 
a new nomos of the earth.”819 
 
(i) Real & Absolute Enemies  
 
Schmitt first attempted to define the nature of the partisan, tracing the development of the 
concept from the Spanish guerrilla war in 1808 to the decolonization struggles of the 
1950s and 1960s. The most fundamental aspect of the partisan, on which “his essence and 
his existence” lay, was the fact that he stood outside the traditional bracketing of war 
between states.820 By pushing beyond these brackets the partisan moved from a realm of 
“conventional enmity” into a new and more intense realm of “real enmity.”821 Schmitt 
further qualified the ‘essence’ of the partisan in several ways, noting that they were 
defined by irregularity, mobility and intense political commitment.822 The irregular and 
mobile nature of partisans set them apart from state armies and their intensely political 
status distinguished them from mere criminals or pirates, from a “corsair on land.”823 
Despite these common defining features Schmitt argued that two distinct types of partisan 
had emerged in the late twentieth century, the “motorized” partisan824 and the “telluric” 
partisan,825 each of which bore relation to a specific type of enmity. The distinction 
between them provided a lens through which the changing relationship between space 
and the political could be understood in Schmitt’s view.  
 
The telluric partisan had a defensive character, tied to the protection and integrity of a 
particular space. Although their intense political commitment generated a ‘real’ enmity 
more intense than the ‘conventional’ enmity of bracketed state warfare it was still bound 
to a specific place and hence spatially limited. The telluric partisan was hence attached to 
a ‘real’ enmity and a specific place-based struggle. By contrast, the motorized partisan 
had an aggressive character detached from a particular place. The motorized partisan was 
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one who “leaves his own turf and becomes more dependent on technical-industrial 
means.”826 In adapting to the “technical-industrial environment” the motorized partisan 
develops an ‘absolute’ enmity unbounded from spatial limits and increasingly dependent 
on technologies of mass destruction.827 Hence, for Schmitt, the distinction between the 
two types of partisan turned on the question of the relationship between enmity and 
spatial limitation. The ‘real’ enmity of the telluric partisan is spatially limited, and 
therefore limited in intensity, whereas the ‘absolute’ enmity of the motorized partisan is 
unlimited in space and intensity. Therefore, although both types of partisan are defined 
by enmities that go beyond the bracketing of ‘conventional’ state warfare only the ‘real’ 
enmity of the telluric partisan has any inherent limitation. “The war of absolute enmity 
knows no bracketing” and has no inherent limitation.828 
 
(ii) The Last Sentinel of the Earth 
 
The distinction between a telluric partisan and a motorized partisan is significant within 
the trajectory of Schmitt’s late spatial thought as the former represents his last attempt to 
locate a new ordering subject capable of respatialising the political and limiting war. The 
telluric partisan was the last figure Schmitt identified as capable of standing against the 
techno-industrial force field of absolute enmity and spaceless war. This position of 
importance rested on the telluric partisan’s “specifically terrestrial” character,829 the fact 
that “[he] defends a piece of land with which he has an autochthonous relation.”830 
Writing in 1962, Schmitt reminded his readers that, “the names Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi-
minh, and Fidel Castro indicate that the tie to the soil, to the autochthonous population, 
and to the geographical particularity of the land – mountain ranges, forests, jungles, or 
deserts” remained a topical concern in world politics.831 However, Schmitt argued that the 
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telluric partisan had a relevance that went far beyond the latest communist revolution. 
“Until now,” he noted “the partisan always has been a part of the true earth; he is of the 
last sentinel of the earth as a not yet completely destroyed element of world history.”832 
Thus, for Schmitt, the telluric partisan was the last bearer of an order grounded in the 
earth that could fix enmity to spatial limitations in an age of air war, nuclear weapons and 
the appropriation of extraterrestrial space.  
 
In heralding the telluric partisan as the last agent of terrestrial order, Schmitt is drawn to 
celebrate an unusual mix of figures from the Right and Left of the political spectrum. 
Thus, Chairman Mao and Raoul Salan are both lauded for the spatial particularism of 
their struggles despite the fact that the former was the leader of a Communist revolution 
in China and the other of a failed coup against the French decolonization of Algeria.833 
Both presented resistance to the despatialisation and absolutization of enmity that grew 
from universalist political thought and the growing destructiveness of military 
technologies. However, he noted that even the telluric partisan can be “drawn into the 
force-field of irresistible, techno-industrial progress,”834 become “completely 
disorientated,” and morph into a motorized partisan.835 Indeed, Schmitt claimed that this 
was precisely the danger during the Cold War when “powerful central [agencies] of 
world politics” sought to use the partisan as a “transportable and exchangeable tool” that 
could be deployed in overt and covert wars and ‘deactivated’ when no longer useful.836 
Indeed, given the forces ranged against these last remaining telluric partisans Schmitt 
acknowledged that they might disappear “in the smooth-running fulfilment of technical-
functional forces just as a dog disappears on the freeway.”837 Perhaps even unfit for 
survival in the “thoroughly organized technological world” it seemed unlikely that the 
                                                
832 Ibid, 71. 
833 Indeed, Schmitt notes that Mao’s poem Kunlun outlines a “pluralistic image of a new nomos of the 
earth”  (Ibid, 59). The Theory of the Partisan is one of the hardest of Schmitt’s texts to situate politically. 
The book emerged from lectures originally delivered in Francoist Spain in 1962 and Salan emerges as the 
obvious hero of the piece. Although it is vehemently anti-Leninist many figures of the Communist Left 
including Mao and Ho Chi-Minh are celebrated, albeit with reservation. 
834 Ibid, 22. 
835 Ibid, 22. 
836 Ibid, 22. 
837 Ibid, 77. 
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telluric partisan could produce a new nomos of the earth.838 Even Schmitt himself seemed 
to acknowledge that the hope he placed in telluric partisan was little more than a world-
historical clutching at straws born of theoretical exhaustion. He ended the book by 
reflecting on a near distant future when the world will have slid into an “abyss” of 
absolute enmity, a time when “destruction will be completely abstract and completely 
absolute.”839 
 
(4) The End of Schmitt’s World 
 
Even before Schmitt came to write The Theory of the Partisan it was clear that his model 
of the political based on the clear division of space was no longer adequate to the times. 
His two attempts to conceive of a new political form capable of respatialising the political 
failed to gain traction in political reality. Further, despite Schmitt’s pretensions the 
concept of a Großraum order was conceptually weak and merely tried to refashion a new 
order from the remnants of an old world. Investing hope in the idea that marginal 
localized struggles could produce a new global spatial order was the sign of a chastened 
intellect. The world of the European spatial order that Schmitt had so soundly theorized 
and identified with so strongly had come to an end. But rather than accommodate himself 
to the new postwar world Schmitt instead seemed to conflate the end of the Eurocentric 
nomos with the end of the world itself.  
 
From the early 1940s Schmitt thought was increasingly defined by an eschatological 
“Christian concept of history” that saw the twentieth century world in a headlong rush 
into a nihilistic abyss of catastrophic destruction.840 The obscure biblical figure of the 
Katehon adopted from Saint Paul became a key reference point. The Katechon was a 
force capable of ‘restraining’ the mindless acceleration into a state of total disorder and 
disorientation.841 In this eschatological fantasy world the ‘spaceless disorder’ of the 
twentieth century came to represent the hidden handiwork of the ‘lawless one,’ the 
                                                
838 Ibid, 77. 
839 Ibid, 94. 
840 See for example: Schmitt, “Three Possibilities for a Christian Concept of History,” (2009) 
841 See: Schmitt, The Nomos, 59-62: and Schmitt, “Three Possibilities for a Christian Concept of History,” 
169-170. 
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Antichrist. Hence, in an act of supreme intellectual vanity Schmitt cast his struggle 
against his conceptual enemies – liberals, positivists, The United States, Leninists, Jews – 
as a cosmic struggle between order and disorder, nomos and anomie, Katechon and 
Antichrist. In his desperation to cling to orientation, it was Schmitt himself that had 
become disoriented. Rather than alter his understanding of the possible relations between 
space and the political Schmitt simply retreated into the satisfactions of apocalyptic 
pessimism. His last word on the future of spatial order came in a diary entry from 1948: 
“That is the new Nomos of the earth; no more Nomos.”842 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
842 Quoted in Gary Ulmen, Introduction to The Theory of the Partisan, by Carl Schmitt (New York: Telos 
Press, 2007), xx. 
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Conclusion: Limits & Engagements 
  
 
The main contention of this thesis has been that spatial concepts play a central structural 
role in Carl Schmitt’s thought. Put simply, my claim has been that Schmitt consistently 
conceived political order to be grounded in the division of space. I have argued that 
Schmitt’s thought was fundamentally orientated towards the problem of founding 
political order, and that he located the solution in spatial divisions upon which clear 
ordering distinctions could be based. In contrast to those readings that locate the spatial 
elements of Schmitt’s thought exclusively in his late work, I hope to have shown that 
such spatial divisions play a fundamental role throughout Schmitt’s oeuvre. Thus, I have 
argued that one of Schmitt’s key concerns was the spatial foundations of order even 
before he developed an explicit concept of spatial order in the idea of nomos. I hope to 
have demonstrated that the central category of Schmitt’s thought, the concept of the 
political, which he understood to indicate the inherent antagonism of political relations, 
had a crucial relationship to spatial division. For Schmitt, political order necessarily 
involved what I call the spatialisation of the political, or the mapping of political 
difference against a foundational division in space. This was the means by which the 
fundamental task of political order, the limitation of war, could be achieved, in Schmitt’s 
view.  
 
Hence, I have presented Schmitt’s work as a series of attempts to find political forms 
capable of producing and guaranteeing a stable spatialisation of the political and hence 
limiting war. Schmitt understood the modern European state to have successfully 
provided a formal order for several centuries, but to have been fallen into a profound 
crisis in the twentieth century. This prompted him to radically rethink the spatial 
foundations of order. Hence, I have argued that although Schmitt first conceived of the 
.for new political forms capable of respatialising the political beyond the state form. I 
have traced how this search led him to an explicit attempt to theorize the spatial basis of 
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order, in the concept of the nomos of the earth. I identified Schmitt’s two principal 
attempts to envisage new political forms and new spatializations of the political after the 
eclipse of the state; an international order based around a plurality of Großraum powers 
and the lonely figure of the partisan fighter. I concluded by arguing that even within 
Schmitt’s own conceptual framework these concepts failed to provide an adequate 
answer to the problem of founding a new spatial order and that by the 1960s Schmitt was 
left theoretically barren and staring into the abyss of a global spatial disorder he believed 
was endangering the very continuity of human history.   
 
This project advances the current understanding of Schmitt within Geography by 
providing a comprehensive account of his spatial thought. Existing engagements with his 
work within Anglophone Geography had focused on specific aspects or periods of his 
work without trying to identify the core of his spatial thinking or account for its 
development. Further, this thesis presents Schmitt as a spatial thinker, or rather as a 
thinker whose thought is fundamentally concerned with the relationship between space 
and politics, an argument that it is novel not only within Geography but also within the 
expansive secondary literature devoted to his work from other disciplines such as 
Political Theory and International Relations. Although a number of studies from other 
disciplines have read Schmitt’s work in relation to his biography and his controversial 
political involvements this is the first to do so from within Geography, and the first to 
offer a full assessment of his spatial thought in relation to his shifting personal fortunes 
and political allegiances. I hope therefore to have convincingly demonstrated that spatial 
concepts play a key structural role within Schmitt’s work and made a contribution to 
better understanding the nature of his thought both within Geography and beyond. 
However, questions remain as to how Schmitt’s work might relate to the core concerns of 
political geography and what the uses and limitations of his spatial thought might be 
today. How might the clearer understanding of Schmitt’s spatial thought that this thesis 
provides help assess existing readings of his thought and what new avenues of 
engagement with his work might it have opened for the future? It is to these questions 
that I turn briefly below by way of conclusion.   
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(1) Schmitt and Political Geography  
 
One of the aims of this thesis has been to make clear that although Schmitt stands outside 
the canon of thinkers usually associated with political geography his work bears on some 
of the discipline’s core concerns. If these core concerns can be considered to revolve 
around the relationship between space and power - the multiple and historically specific 
ways in which this relationship is organized in institutions such as the state, tied to the 
production of subjectivities, shaped by spatial imaginaries and produced through 
discursive representations - then I believe Schmitt’s work clearly finds its place in 
relation to some of the fundamental issues animating the discipline.   
 
I have argued throughout that at the very centre of Schmitt’s thought lies a conception of 
political order grounded upon the division of space, or more precisely an understanding 
of order as founded upon the production of inside-outside distinctions. Hence, my claim 
has been that the relationship between space and power is the most fundamental 
structural element in Schmitt’s entire oeuvre making him a thinker whose work is 
germane to the central concerns of political geography. Secondly, as I have shown, 
Schmitt’s thought focused for a large part on a variety of attempts to theorize institutional 
forms in which this foundational relationship between space and power could be 
managed. Although his early work focused on the modern state Schmitt’s focus later 
shifted to finding new institutional forms capable of managing the relationship between 
space and power in new geopolitical, technological and conceptual conditions to which 
the state was no longer adequate. Thus, the institutional organisation of the relationship 
between space and power, central to political geography, was one of the key 
preoccupations of Schmitt’s work.  
 
If another of political geography’s key concerns is the relationship between political 
subjectivity and space then Schmitt’s work again bears clear relation to the field. As 
argued in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 Schmitt understood the modern European state as a 
model of spatio-political subjectification whereby the inside-outside distinction between 
states ensured unified political communities and vice-versa, unified political communities 
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could maintain clear inside-outside distinctions with others. As argued in Chapters 6 and 
7 his late spatial theory was largely concerned with how to re-establish stable structures 
for new forms of spatio-political subjectification when the crucial distinctions between 
inside-outside that bound space to power were no longer located in the state but at wider 
geographic scales. Finally, if one of the crucial aspects of political geography is the 
analysis of the ways in which spatial imaginaries shape our understanding of politics and 
the role that discursive representations play in producing such imaginaries, then Schmitt’s 
work can again be located squarely in relation to the discipline’s core concerns. Schmitt 
at times reveals a deep appreciation of the way in which spatial relations rely on 
conceptions of space that are themselves subject to change. For example, in Land and Sea 
Schmitt’s comments on how “spatial revolutions” effect transformations in “spatial 
consciousness” bring his thought remarkably close to contemporary political geographers 
even as he insists on the political imperative to establish strict inside-outside 
distinctions.843 
 
Man has a clear awareness of his space, which historically is subject to 
deep-going perturbations. To the plurality of forms of existence 
corresponds an equal plurality of spaces. … The inhabitant of a big city 
has a different image of the world than does a farmer. A whale hunter 
has a vital space that differs from that of an opera singer. Life and the 
world are seen in a different light by an airplane pilot, and they have 
different dimensions, depths and horizons. The differences in the 
perception of space are even larger and deeper among various nations 
and among various periods in the history of mankind.”844  
 
Schmitt’s understanding of the relationship between space and power – one fixed to a 
strict distinction between inside and outside – is of course by no means unique. 
Conceptions of political order premised on the union of particular political communities 
and particular spaces might be recognised in the tradition of German geopolitics but are 
                                                
843 Schmitt, Land and Sea, 28. 
844 Schmitt, Land and Sea, 28. 
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also common to wider traditions of state theory and much of contemporary international 
relations thought. However, despite this rather over-familiar spatial imaginary running 
through his work I believe that an engagement with Schmitt’s thought is nonetheless 
valuable for political geography. As a key political thinker of the twentieth century, with 
a deep, broad and continuing influence on the Right and the Left in Europe, The United 
States and beyond, who theorised the relationship between space and politics, Schmitt is 
a figure that political geography not only can but, should engage.  
  
The fact that Schmitt was involved with the Nazi state and indeed attempted to formulate 
spatial theory to legitimate the regime’s murderous expansion in Eastern Europe does not 
rule him out as a worthy source of investigation. On the contrary, Schmitt’s Nazi 
association makes him an even more important case in attempting to understand the 
history of geographic thought in the twentieth century and its complicated entanglements 
with political power. Schmitt’s Großraum theory positions his thought at a unique 
intellectual crossroads between Nazi spatial thought and the wider field of modern 
European political thought, a relationship that political geographers are well placed to 
examine. Indeed, although it has recently begun to receive greater attention, Nazi spatial 
thought has been an area of study long under-examined in Anglophone political 
geography, perhaps reflecting an assumption that the German geopolitical tradition and 
its relationship to Nazism has been digested and is in no need of further critical attention. 
However, I think that it would be a mistake to assume that the nature and importance of 
the German geopolitical tradition or Nazi spatial thought have been adequately 
understood or have no afterlife today. Indeed, the fact that Schmitt’s theory of Großraum 
continues to have influence in mainstream International Relations discourse in Europe, on 
both the Right and the Left of the political spectrum, make it important for political 
geographers to engage with his work in order to offer a more nuanced critical perspective 
that builds on a deeper engagement with conceptions of spatio-political relations.  
 
Below I offer a very brief outline of some of the ways in which I believe Schmitt’s spatial 
thought may be productively engaged within political geography and related areas of 
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inquiry but also highlight some of the limits to his thought that act as stumbling blocks to 
its critical application today. I start first with these limitations.  
 
(2) Limits  
 
One doesn’t have to look deeply to identify some of the limitations of Schmitt’s spatial 
thought and its use in contemporary attempts to understand the relationship between 
space and politics. Several are immediately manifest. I will here only highlight four of the 
most immediately obvious and most pressing concerns.  
 
First, unsurprisingly, is the bearing Schmitt’s relationship to Nazism and anti-Semitism 
has on his spatial thinking. As discussed at length in Chapter 3, assessing the relation 
between Schmitt’s theoretical work and his political commitments is a complex matter of 
some controversy. Whilst I have argued that neither Schmitt’s complicity with Nazism or 
evident anti-Semitism can be ignored his conceptual work cannot be merely reduced to 
‘Nazi’ theory. Rather, an approach that remains aware of the antinomies of Schmitt’s 
polemical method is required. Nonetheless, Schmitt specifically developed his work on a 
European Großraum in order to legitimize the National Socialist’s aggressive 
expansionist policy in Eastern Europe. Further, this was the only case where Schmitt’s 
spatial thought had a chance of influencing policy, even if this remained ultimately 
remote. Schmitt took this chance to propose an image of a European spatial order based 
on the difference between ‘national groups’, dominated by an imperial Germany and in 
which the Jewish population clearly had no place. Although Schmitt’s Großraum theory 
in no way defines his spatial thought as a whole, it reflected some of its key structural 
concerns, i.e., the relationship between spatial division and political difference, 
understood as the relations of enmity between unified political groups. Schmitt’s vision 
of a European Großraum order perhaps reflects some of the dangers in a conceptual 
framework that fixes political to spatial differences. This is of particular concern in 
relation to Schmitt implicit claim that European Jews were the ‘spatial enemies’ of the 
German Reich. This cannot help but suggest a relationship between Schmitt’s concept of 
the friend-enemy relation, his spatial thought and the influence of anti-Semitism in his 
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work. The idea of a pluralist world order based upon a number of independent 
Großräume is not essentially tied to the specifics of Nazi foreign policy, but should give 
pause to those wishing to appropriate the concept in attempts to rethink imagining the 
nature of contemporary world order.  
 
A second concern, and one that inevitably flows into the others, is the relationship 
between spatiality and the concept of political. Although Schmitt’s definition of the 
political as the relationship between friends and enemy has an undeniable conceptual 
force and is something of an unmovable object within contemporary Continental political 
theory, it nevertheless expresses an extremely limited understanding of political 
possibilities. This is not the place to enter into the extensive and complex debate on the 
nature of the political, but suffice to say that by approaching politics solely through the 
lens of antagonistic difference, Schmitt excludes many other frameworks within which 
different forms of political relations can be imagined. For example, Schmitt develops his 
understanding of political difference as a polemical counterpoint to all forms of 
universalist thinking in politics. However, he understands political universalism to either 
assume, or aim towards, an undifferentiated totality. This excludes many relationships 
between universality and difference that could be conceived of in the realm of political 
co-existence. As a thinker avowedly committed to pluralism, Schmitt’s vision of plurality 
takes a severely limited form. Indeed, as argued in Chapters 4 and 5, his thought is 
principally focused on the means by which pluralism can be limited whilst nonetheless 
maintaining a minimum of difference.  
 
These limitations inherent to Schmitt’s concept of the political are significant in relation 
to his spatial thought because he understands political order to be founded upon a 
spatialisation of the political. The division of space is the means by which political 
difference is both given expression and managed, in Schmitt’s view. In other words, he 
understands order to operate precisely by fixing political differences to spatial 
differences. In this sense spatial difference is thus principally considered a means of 
ordering political difference. Although he makes many comments about the fluid and 
contingent nature of the relationship between space and the political, Schmitt is always 
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insistent that political differences should be mapped against clear spatial divisions 
between inside and outside. In this way, he believed conflict could be limited by 
channelling antagonism into relationships defined by clear spatial differences. Space is 
hence seen both as a medium for antagonism and the means of its containment. Whilst 
this certainly might go some way to explaining certain forms of relations between space, 
violence and political subjectivity, it fails to acknowledge the possibility of political 
spaces of gathering, co-operation and collective action unless as sites for the 
representation of political unities defined by enmity. Further, within Schmitt’s 
framework, spaces of mobility, exchange and transformation represent only the 
possibility of political disorder, the dissolution of political unities and escalating levels of 
antagonism freed of spatial restraint. This is not only a deeply reactionary conception of 
the relationship between politics and space, but provides no entry point for understanding 
the complexity of contemporary political subjectivities often defined by the intersection 
of multiple, dynamic and overlapping sets of spatio-political relations.  
 
A third limitation of Schmitt’s spatial thought is that it shaped by a largely 
representational understanding of space. Schmitt repeatedly stressed the importance of 
the visibility of order in a number of works, and spatial division is considered a medium 
through which order can be rendered visible. Hence, although Schmitt rails against the 
empty, neutral understanding of space typical of modern scientific thought, his own 
conception remains largely wedded to a concept of space as a flat representational plane 
that can be visibly partitioned. Indeed, Schmitt valorises the earth over land and sea 
precisely because it can, in his view, bear fixed lines of demarcation. Despite interesting 
discussions of the shifting patterns of ‘spatial consciousness’ and the changing 
dimensions of air war, Schmitt’s thought remains bound to a cartographic imaginary in 
which political distinctions can be represented in the division of a flat plane. Such a 
representational understanding of space has long been subject to critique in social and 
cultural geography, not only because of the other conceptions of space it excludes, but for 
the limitations it places on how the relationship between space and politics is understood. 
Hence, although Schmitt appeals to the importance of ‘spatial consciousness’ and the 
relationship between a political idea and a political group’s awareness of its concrete 
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spatial situatedness, his representational understanding of space leaves no room for 
conceiving of the multiple performative practices and emotional attachments that bind a 
political community to a sense of place and shape specific understandings of space that 
have powerful political resonances.    
 
Lastly, Schmitt’s spatial theory remains remarkably weak in relation to socio-economic 
factors. Although his work on the Monroe Doctrine and the development of U.S. 
interventionism includes perceptive remarks on the relationship between politics and 
economy, especially with regard to their different relation to space, such analyses are not 
typical of his spatial thought more broadly. His historical account of the rise and fall of 
the European state system pays little attention to the influence of socio-economic factors. 
He makes no significant analysis of the importance of the economic relationships 
between Europe and its New World colonies, nor of socio-economic developments within 
Europe including the industrial revolution. When he does address historical developments 
such as the French Revolution or the emergence of the industrial proletariat, he does so 
only in relationship to the changing nature of state power with scant attention to their 
relation to shifts in socio-economic relations. Schmitt’s discussion of the relative 
importance of appropriation, as opposed to distribution and production, in the foundation 
of spatial order can be understood as an active attempt to shift analysis away from socio-
economic processes to singular political acts. This is an understanding of spatial order 
that ultimately highlights the importance of political decisions over and above socio-
economic processes.  The bearing this lack of socio-economic engagement has on his 
spatial thought is perhaps most evident in Schmitt’s discussion of the key role of England 
in the jus publicum Europaeum. Rather than engage with the development of socio-
economic factors that shaped, and were conversely shaped by, the spread of Britain’s 
maritime empire, Schmitt claims it was based upon a ‘decision for the sea,’ a political 
choice by the English to tie themselves to the geo-elemental force of the sea. Hence, 
Schmitt displaces an analysis of socio-economic transformations into the realm of 
mythical events. The lack, or indeed the active avoidance, of socio-economic factors 
renders Schmitt’s spatial history of the jus publicum Europaeum historically questionable 
and politically reactionary.  
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(3) Engagements 
 
The obvious limitations of Schmitt’s spatial thought should not deter us from honestly 
identifying areas for productive engagement and potential use. This is a task that 
doubtless needs careful consideration, but one that I think it would be wrong to neglect. I 
will here briefly indicate four areas where I believe productive engagement can be made 
with Schmitt’s spatial thought.  
 
Firstly, there is much valuable work to be done in locating Schmitt’s spatial thought more 
squarely in the history of ideas and more specifically in the relationship between spatial 
and political thought in twentieth century Germany and Europe. As one of the key 
political and legal theorists of the twentieth century, Schmitt’s spatial thought alone 
deserves critical examination not only within Political Theory but also within Geography. 
This is especially true given Schmitt’s wide and deep reception across a number of 
historical and contexts and opposing ends of the political spectrum. More particularly 
however, Schmitt’s work occupied a fascinating position between different intellectual 
traditions and scholarly disciplines during a period of turbulent political transition on 
which he reflected directly. Hence, it represents a rich political and philosophical 
crossroads in which the significance of spatial thought has yet to be fully examined. The 
fact that Schmitt conceived of the political crises of the twentieth century to find its roots 
in a deep-seated crisis of spatial order should be of significant interest to those attempting 
to understand the relationship between political and geographic thought in the last 
century.  
 
Of particular note here are three areas of investigation. Firstly, examining the relationship 
between Schmitt’s thought and the tradition of German geopolitical thought is an area of 
that I believe deserves further investigation but which unfortunately lays beyond the 
scope of this project. As argued above, the fact that Schmitt explicitly engaged with 
German geopolitical thought during the period of his complicity with the Nazi regime 
might provide interesting avenues for an investigation of the impact of geopolitics on 
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other realms of German intellectual life during the first half of the twentieth century and a 
lens through which to map the relationship between Nazi spatial thought and modern 
political thinking more broadly. Secondly, it would be fruitful to trace the chains of 
influence running from Schmitt’s spatial thought to wider field of post-war intellectual 
thought in Europe and the United States. Of particularly interest would be an examination 
of his influence upon the nascent discipline of International Relations in the United States 
via German émigré intellectuals such as Hans Morgenthau and Leo Strauss. Tentative 
studies have already been made of the relationship between Schmitt’s thought and 
Morgenthau’s influential work but it seems a direction that can be developed further.845 A 
similar study might be possible of the influence of Schmitt’s spatial thinking on 
conceptions of world order in post war Europe developed by those such as Alexandre 
Kojève and Raymond Aron with whom Schmitt engaged in friendly intellectual dispute 
in the 1950s and 1960s.846 Thirdly, Schmitt’s work occupies a crucial position within the 
largely unexplored relationship between twentieth century spatial thought and the debates 
concerning secularization, the meaning of history and the ‘legitimacy of the modern age’ 
both within and beyond Germany.847 Investigating the relationship of Schmitt’s spatial 
thought to these debates could prove useful in excavating the unarticulated spatial 
imaginaries that underpin them and set his thought in conversation with still pertinent 
questions about the relationship between philosophies of history and global order 
 
Second, Schmitt’s analysis of the spatial foundations of order and the patterns of 
historical change through which they are transformed offers many suggestive insights 
into the nature of the modern European and world politics. The question of the nomos of 
the earth provides a framework for thinking about the spatial foundations of political 
order that moves beyond the limited state-based understandings typical of much 
International Relations scholarship whilst avoiding the geographic determinism of the 
German geopolitical tradition. The concept of nomos offers a provocative starting point 
                                                
845 See: Coleman, “Colonial War” (2011); Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt (1999), 225-252. 
846 See: Müller, A Dangerous Mind, 96-103; Howse, “Europe and the New World Order” (2006). 
847 See for example: Hans Blumenburg. The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1985);; Reinhart Koselleck. Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and The Pathogenesis of Modern Society 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987); Jacob Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul (Standford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2004). 
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for interdisciplinary investigations tracing the historical dynamics that have shaped the 
constitutive relationship between space and law, in ways that both build on and challenge 
Schmitt’s work. Despite its historical sweep and its global ambition, Schmitt’s own 
investigation of the spatial foundations of order in the concept nomos undoubtedly has a 
number of conceptual and empirical flaws, but it opens a potentially rich seam of 
historical and philosophical reflection on the spatial nature of order.  
 
Further, Schmitt’s gestures towards ‘planetary’ thought find much common ground with 
recent attempts within Geography, but also in Philosophy and Political Theory, to pose 
the question of how ‘worldliness’ or ‘the planetary’ might be thought after ‘globalisation’ 
(or rather after the discourse of ‘globalisation’ has been eclipsed).848 At a time when we 
are faced with the no-longer avoidable problems of climate change there seems a pressing 
need to have a framework to approach macro-scale problems beyond the terms of a 
liberal progressive ‘globalisation’.849 The ‘spatial histories’ that Schmitt sketches in Land 
and Sea and The Nomos of the Earth - sadly under-developed in this project due to 
restrictions on time and space - offer one avenue through which the question of 
‘planetary’ space may be approached and a productive engagement between Schmitt’s 
thought and this emerging literature might be possible in the future.  
 
Thirdly, Schmitt’s work can provide an important link between debates on the nature of 
political pluralism and spatial questions. Schmitt highlighted the central importance of 
the distinction between universalist and pluralist forms of world order. This remains a 
crucial question at a time when the balance of global power is changing with the 
emergence of new regional powers and an American hegemony weakened by military 
adventurism and economic crisis. Although his vision of a globe carved up between 
hermetically sealed regional hegemons is neither possible nor desirable, Schmitt’s work 
can nonetheless make an important contribution to understanding and imagining the 
                                                
848 See for example: Stuart Elden, “Lefebvre and Axelos: Mondialisation before Globalisation.” Space, 
Difference, Everyday Life: Reading Henri Lefebvre, edited by Goonewardena, Kaniska., Kipfer, Stefan., 
Milgrom, Richard., & Schmid, Christian., 80-93. New York: Routledge; 2008; Jean-Luc Nancy, The 
Creation of the World, Or, Globalization (SUNY University Press, 2007) 
849 See for example: Geoff Mann and Joel Wainwright, “Climate Leviathan” Antipode (forthcoming 2012): 
Accessed July 18 2012. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2012.01018.x 
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spatial foundations of a pluralist world order. Furthermore, although Schmitt’s work 
remains marginal to debates on the relationship between space, the political and 
democratic contestation, his work can provide important insights for these discussions. 
Not only was Schmitt the first to develop the concept of the political but also already 
directly related it to questions of space. This has been largely overlooked by geographers 
engaging with the question of spatial contestation on the one hand and by political 
theorists using Schmitt’s work as a resource in developing concepts of radical democratic 
pluralism on the other. Thus, the relationship between Schmitt’s spatial thought and his 
use within democratic theory has yet to be examined. Although, as noted above, 
Schmitt’s spatial thought is ill-equipped to deal with the complexities of contemporary 
spatio-political relations it might nonetheless provide useful tools for developing a 
concept of democratic spatial contestation if engaged with carefully and selectively.  
 
Lastly, although it has already received significant attention, further productive 
engagement can be made with Schmitt’s diagnosis of the collapse of the spatial order of 
the earth in the twentieth century. Schmitt’s critique of U.S. interventionism, 
humanitarian warfare and the antinomies of universalism in international law may appear 
to be routes of scholarly critique well worn during the last decade, but in my view remain 
bracingly relevant to contemporary global politics. Schmitt’s analysis continues to offer 
profound insights into the nature of the contemporary relations between space, law and 
violence that have in no way been exhausted. Although these concerns within Schmitt’s 
work came to prominence in Anglophone debates during the period of the ‘war on terror,’ 
they continue to bear light on the nature of global disorder. This phase of U.S 
interventionism cannot be considered of merely historical interest given that the U.S. led 
war in Afghanistan is ongoing, the use of drone attacks along the frontier with Pakistan 
has been expanded under President Obama’s administration, and detainees continue to be 
held without charge in Guantanamo Bay. Hence, the concerns to which Schmitt’s critique 
was considered relevant over the last number of years persist. This is despite a shift in 
media, and often scholarly, attention that appears to have followed a change in the 
discursive frame in which U.S. foreign policy is conducted. More importantly, however, 
the deeper concerns reflected in this engagement with Schmitt’s work, i.e., the nature of 
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humanitarian interventionism, the role of universalism in international law and the 
changing relationship between war and space, are areas that remain topical and require 
ongoing critical examination. That many prescient insights can be drawn from Schmitt’s 
spatial thought in the investigation of these areas is demonstrated by the existing 
literature. However, the appearance of new translations of Schmitt’s work from the late 
1930s and early 1940s provide a further resource for critical engagements with 
contemporary global politics.  
 
The Italian political theorist, Carlo Galli and the geographers Robert Meyer, Janosch 
Prinz and Conrad Schetter have all argued that Schmitt’s spatial thought is invaluable in 
understanding the “spatial-political nexus” of the modern era of nation states, but has 
little to offer attempts to understand contemporary spatio-political relations.850 Both claim 
that the categories of Schmitt’s spatial thought are no longer adequate to grasp the 
increasing complexity of the spatio-political relations today. To some extent this 
argument is understandable. It is clear, for instance, that the solutions Schmitt proposed 
for the crisis of twentieth century spatial order provide little positive orientation for a 
progressive engagement with contemporary spatial politics. However, such a view goes 
too far in positing a break between the era of the modern state and the contemporary 
moment. Indeed, many of the problems Schmitt diagnosed were not confined to his time 
alone and their legacy continues to shape the present. That Schmitt’s critiques of 
humanitarian warfare and U.S. interventionism have been considered germane by so 
many in recent years, despite originally being developed over seventy years ago, attests 
to this fact. Thus, even if the limitations of Schmitt’s spatial thought are acknowledged it 
cannot simply be consigned to the status of a reactionary curiosity from a dark chapter in 
European history that is out of joint with the times. Nonetheless, any engagement with 
Schmitt’s spatial thought must approach his work with a critical awareness of its 
conceptual limitations and a historical and political sensitivity to the compromised 
context of its emergence. I hope that this thesis has made a contribution to clarifying the 
nature of Schmitt’s spatial thought, and indeed establishing Schmitt as a spatial thinker, 
both within Geography but also within the wider field of Schmitt scholarship. I hope that 
                                                
850 Meyer, et al. “Spatial Contestation?” (2012), 696. See also: Sitze, Introduction, liv. 
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it goes some way to providing a contextual and conceptual framework within which 
future scholarly engagements with his spatial thought might be made. both within 
Geography but also within the wider field of Schmitt scholarship. 
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